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The era of manned flight is not yet over, and the likelihood of its demise is not imminent.  
Unmanned Aircraft Systems are, however, currently assuming roles in air power that, 
hitherto, have been undertaken by manned aircraft.  In future warfare, will it be possible for 
Unmanned Combat Air Systems, the next stage in Unmanned Aircraft System evolution, to 
undertake the tasks and accept most of the risks that until now have been the lot of military 
aviators?  The aim of this thesis is to determine where threats to a US led alliance in 2040 
are likely to come from, and whether Unmanned Combat Air Systems will be effective in 
undertaking all the counter-air missions that are required of a nation’s armed forces.  
Control of the air is the foundation for all conventional military operations against an 
adversary with an air defence capability.  If Unmanned Combat Air Systems cannot control 
the airspace in which they operate, and unless control can be gained by other than manned 
systems, then manned fighter aircraft will be required to achieve this task.  This would be 
perverse, largely negating the purpose of utilising Unmanned Combat Air Systems.  The 
effect that political, legal and ethical issues of using Unmanned Combat Air Systems might 
have upon decision makers cannot be underestimated, particularly in terms of their 
willingness to deploy such systems at little, if any, risk to their own military personnel.  
There is currently a lack of cohesion and clear thought on the future utility of Unmanned 
Combat Air Systems in the counter-air role, particularly within the UK, which requires 
cogent and informed input.  This research examines these issues and will allow value to be 
added to the procurement decision process, and help inform future policy over the manned 
versus unmanned aircraft debate.  Ultimately, this thesis advocates that Unmanned 
Combat Air Systems, capable of gaining control of the air, have the potential to offer a 
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
A2/AD   Anti-Access/Area-Denial 
AAG   Air-to-Air Gun 
AAM   Air-to-Air Missile 
AAR   Air-to-Air Refuelling 
AAS   Air-to-Air System 
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile 
ACM   Air Chief Marshal 
ACMI Air Combat Manoeuvring Instrumentation 
AD   Air Defence 
AESA   Active Electronically Scanned Array 
AFRL   Air Force Research Laboratory 
AGG   Air-to-Ground Gun 
AI   Artificial Intelligence 
AM   Air Marshal 
AMRAAM Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile 
ASAT Anti-Satellite 
ASBM   Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile 
ASCM   Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
ASRAAM Advanced Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile 
ASMS Advanced Surface Missile System 
ATD   Automatic Target Detection 
ATI   Automatic Target Initiation 
ATR   Automatic target Recognition 
AVM   Air Vice-Marshal 
AWACS  Airborne Warning and Control System 
BLOS   Beyond Line-of-Sight 
BM   Ballistic Missile 
BMC2   Battle Management Command and Control 
BVR   Beyond Visual Range 
C2   Command and Control 
C4ISTAR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, Targeting, Acquisition and Reconnaissance  
CAP Combat Air Patrol 
CAS   Chief of the Air Staff 
Capt   Captain 
CDE   Collateral Damage Estimation 
CEP   Circular Error Probable 
CFE Conventional Forces Europe 
CID   Combat Identification 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
CNP Comprehensive National Power 
COIN Counter Insurgency 
Col Colonel 
COMAO Composite Air Operations 
CONOPS  Concept of Operations 
COP   Common Operating Picture 
CSBA   Center for Strategy and Budgetary Assessment 
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CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation Europe 
CSG   Carrier Strike Group 
DARPA  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DCA   Defensive Counter Air 
DCDC   Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre 
DEW   Directed Energy Weapons 
DIRCM   Directed Infrared Countermeasures 
DMT   Distributed Mission Training 
DoD   Department of Defense 
DPOC   Deep and Persistent Offensive Capability 
Dr   Doctor 
DRFM   Digital Radio Frequency Memory  
DSTL   Defence, Science and Technology Laboratory 
EA   Electronic Attack 
ECM Electronic Countermeasures 
ELINT   Electronic Intelligence 
EMS Electromagnetic Spectrum 
EP Electronic Protection 
ES Electronic Support 
EW   Electronic Warfare 
F2T2EA  Find, Fix, Target, Track, Engage and Assess 
FJ   Fast-Jet 
Fl Lt   Flight Lieutenant 
FLIR Forward Looking Infrared 
FLOAAT  Function-specific Level of Autonomy and Automation Tool 
G Force of Gravity 
GCS   Ground Control Station 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
Gen General 
Gp Capt Group Captain 
HALE   High-Altitude Long-Endurance 
HEL   High Energy Laser 
HITL   Human-in-the-Loop 
HMCS Helmet Mounted Cueing System 
HOBS High-angle Off-Boresight 
HOTL   Human-on-the-Loop 
HPM   High-Powered Microwave 
HVAA   High Value Airborne Asset 
IADS   Integrated Air Defence System 
IFDL Intra-Flight Data link 
INF   Intermediate-range Nuclear Force 
IR Infrared 
IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile 
IRSTS Infrared Search and Track System 
ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting, Acquisition and 
Reconnaissance 
JSF   Joint Strike Fighter 
JTIDS   Joint Tactical Information Distribution System 
km   Kilometre 
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LADAR   Laser Detection and Ranging 
LFE   Large Force Employment 
Lt   Lieutenant 
Lt Col   Lieutenant Colonel 
LO   Low Observable 
LOAC   Law of Armed Conflict 
LOCASS  Low Cost Autonomous attack System 
LVC-IA   Live Virtual and Constructive Integrating-Architecture 
MALE   Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance 
Maj   Major 
MAWS   Missile Approach Warning System 
MEZ Missile Engagement Zone 
MOD   Ministry of Defence 
MRBM   Medium-Range Ballistic Missile 
MTCR   Missile Technology Control Regime 
NASA   National Air and Space Administration 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NCADE  Network Centric Airborne Defense Element 
NCW   Network Centric Warfare 
NEC   Network Enabled Capability 
NGLRS  Next Generation Long-Range Strike System 
nm   Nautical Mile 
OCA   Offensive Counter Air 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OG Objective Gateway 
OODA   Observe-Orient-Decide-Action 
OTH Over-the-Horizon 
PGS   Precision Global Strike 
Pk   Probability of a Kill  
PLA   People’s Liberation Army 
PLAAF   People’s Liberation Army Air Force 
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy 
PRC   People’s Republic of China 
QWI   Qualified Weapons Instructor 
RAF   Royal Air Force 
RAM Radar Absorbent Materials 
RCS   Radar Cross Section 
RF   Radio Frequency 
RMA   Revolution in Military Affairs 
RN   Royal Navy 
ROE   Rules of Engagement 
RPA   Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
RPAS   Remotely Piloted Air System 
SAM   Surface-to-Air Missile 
SAR   Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
SEAD   Suppression of Enemy Air Defence 
SIGINT Signals Intelligence 
SLOC Sea Lines of Communication 
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Sqn Ldr Squadron Leader 
SRBM Short-Range Ballistic Missile 
TDL Tactical Data-Links  
TIBS Tactical Information Broadcast System 
TLC Through-Life Costs  
TPT Third-Party Targeting 
TST Time-Sensitive Target 
TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
UA   Unmanned Aircraft 
UAS   Unmanned Aircraft System 
UAV   Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UCAS   Unmanned Combat Air System 
UCAS-D  Unmanned Combat Air System – Demonstrator 
UCAV   Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle 
UCLASS  Unmanned Carrier Launched Air Surveillance and Strike 
UK   United Kingdom 
US   United States 
USAF   United States Air Force 
USMC United States Marine Corp 
USN United States Navy 
VHF   Very High Frequency 
Wg Cdr  Wing Commander 
WSO   Weapon Systems Operator 
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Control of the air is the foundation for all conventional military operations against an 
adversary with an air defence capability.  The research of this thesis into the counter-air 
capabilities and requirements for future Unmanned Combat Air Systems (UCAS) is unique.  
While there are a number of academic opinions and government ‘roadmaps’ on the use of 
UCAS gaining control of the air, these do not scrutinise in detail their full potential.1  In his 
Master’s thesis, Major Robert Trsek USAF, an F-15C pilot, contends that, ‘In the context of 
future threat systems and anti-access strategies, the Air Force would be foolish not to 
pursue UCAV fighter technology’.2  The United States (US) acknowledges, through its 
Department of Defense’s (DoD) Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmaps and Flight Plans, 
that counter-air UCAS are intended to be in service by 2025-2030; however, these do not 
detail any development programmes.3  The United Kingdom’s (UK) Ministry of Defence 
(MOD), conversely, views that out to 2035, although UCAS, ‘…are likely to form part of the 
future control of the air force-mix…a wholly unmanned capability for the air-to-air role is 
unlikely to be achievable or desirable within the concept timeframe’.4  
 
A number of Western countries are developing UCAS; however, these programmes do not 
currently include any that will enable these systems to gain control of the air, in its entirety.  
As at 2013, UCAS development focused on detecting and destroying Time-Sensitive-
Targets (TST), utilising Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting, Acquisition and 
Reconnaissance (ISTAR), and Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) roles, the air-to-
surface portion of the counter-air task.5  The air-to-air component of counter-air warfare, a 
true TST issue, is as important.  It is envisaged that developmental UCAS, such as the X-
                                                          
1 While acknowledging that current US UCAS programmes do not meet requirements for an air superiority 
fighter, Lt Col Devin Cate, believes UCAS have potential as a future generation air superiority fighter, by 
2025 – see generally,  Lt Col Devin L. Cate USAF, The Air Superiority Fighter and Defense 
Transformation: Why DoD Requirements Demand the F/A-22 Raptor, Master's Degree: USAF Air 
University, 2003.  See also, generally, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Browning USAF, Cooperative 
Engagement: Concept for a near Term Air-to-Air Unmanned Combat Aircraft System, Master's Degree: 
USAF Air University, 2006.  
2 See Major Robert Trsek USAF, The Last Manned Fighter: Replacing Manned Fighters with UCAVs, 
Master's Degree: USAF Air University, 2007, p.30. 
3 See US Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY 2011 - 2036, Washington, 
DC, 2011, p.17.  Also see, Office of the US Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap: 
2005 - 2030, http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uav_roadmap2005.pdf, (accessed 4 April 2009), Table 
6.2-1, p. 74, and US Department of Defense, United States Air Force: Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight 
Plan 2009 - 2047, http://www.govexec.com/pdfs/072309kp1.pdf, (accessed 23 January 2010), p.39.  
4 Development, Doctrine and Concept Centre, Joint Concept Note 3/12: Future Air and Space Operating 
Concept, Shrivenham, Ministry of Defence, 2012, p.4.  As far as can be ascertained, this position is not 
based on any incisive analysis. 
5 Caitlin Harrington Lee, 'Armed and Dangerous', Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 August 2011, p.38.  TST, 
ISTAR and SEAD roles are examined in Chapter’s 3 and 4. 
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47B Unmanned Combat Air Demonstrator (UCAS-D) programme, part of the overarching 
US Unmanned Carrier Launched Air Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) programme, will 
conduct air-to-surface and surveillance missions, but not counter-air missions.6  The UK’s 
Taranis UCAS technology demonstrator programme has similar aims.7   
The role of UCAS should not be viewed in isolation, but rather as part of a system of 
systems, that aid, it can be argued, the most critical component of warfare, situational 
awareness.  The importance that situational awareness plays in warfare, particularly in 
control of the air, is crucial.  Network Enabled Capabilities (NEC) are required in order to 
establish consistent and reliable battlefield situational awareness, and will form the basis 
upon which UCAS are developed.  The threat environment in which any weapon systems 
are planned to operate in will also reinforce capability requirements.  Some countries 
adhere to different principles from those of developed democracies; it is relationships with 
these countries that are likely to dictate the frequency and severity of future military 
challenges.  An understanding of where threats come from is essential.  Ultimately, policy 
and procurement decisions are underpinned by all-source strategic and intelligence 
analysis.  This scrutiny is fundamental, as any specious assumptions may result in 
erroneous conclusions, leading to the wrong strategy and procurement decisions.   
Warfare in the 20th Century demonstrated the potential and performance of air power.  The 
21st Century promises to be a period of military revolution, sometimes referred to as a 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), with NEC and the utilisation of UCAS coming to 
fruition.8  In 1993, the director of the US Office of Net Assessment, Andrew Marshall, began 
to use the term RMA, in place of the then current term Military-Technical Revolution.  
Marshall did this to stress that, while technological advances were making a current 
technical revolution possible, the revolution itself would only be realised when new 
operational concepts had been developed, along with new military organisations.9  Marshall 
argued that such a revolution was only beginning, emphasising that the humans would be 
                                                          
6 Jeremiah Gertler, CRS Report for Congress: U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems, Washington, DC, 
Congressional Research Service, 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42136.pdf, (accessed 9 
October 2012), pp.47-48. A RAND report prepared for the US Navy, contends that UCAS will not be 
suitable in the air-to-air role, in the 2025 timeframe - see Brien Alkire and others, Applications for Navy 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010, p.44.   
7 QinetiQ, 'UK Taranis UAV Passes First Major Milestone', (2010), 
http://www.qinetiq.com/news/pressreleases/Pages/taranis-uav-passes-major-milestone.aspx, (accessed 
11 May 2011). 
8 For example, for a view on the effectiveness of current NEC used by the Israeli Defence Force, see Gp 
Capt Alistair Byford RAF, 'Network Enabled Capability, Air Power and Irregular Warfare: The Israeli Air 
Force Experience in the Lebanon and Gaza, 2006-2009', Air Power Review 13, no. 1, 2010, pp.1-12. The 
importance of NEC is explored in Chapter 4. 
9 Barry D. Watts, The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments, 2011, p.3. 
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fundamental in its development.10  In 1994, Andrew Krepinevich contended that an RMA is: 
‘….what occurs when the application of new technologies…combine[d] with innovative 
operational concepts and organizational adaptation…[produces] a dramatic increase…in 
the combat potential and military effectiveness of armed forces’.11  Marshall and 
Krepinevich were by no means the first to use the term RMA.  An RMA was described in a 
Soviet military manual in 1973, ‘…[as] the present stage in development of Soviet military 
theory and practice in relationship to scientific-technical progress…’.12  This Soviet vision of 
RMA was considered by some to be too narrow, concentrating on technology and 
weapons, rather than the importance of concepts and doctrine.13  Although Marshall 
understood the Soviet’s philosophy, he believed it was flawed.14  Not all are enamoured 
with the concept of RMA.  Professor Colin Gray, in Another Bloody Century, discusses the 
relevance of RMA, believing that too much emphasis is placed on technology, while 
humans will remain the critical factor.15  The concept of an RMA is also debated fiercely in 
China; drawing on Russian and US writings, Chinese military authors, for example, have 
emphasised the requirement to exploit information, stealth (and counter-stealth) and anti-
satellite (ASAT) technology.16 
The current utilisation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and future potential use of 
UCAS could be viewed as an RMA, with the potential to bring a transformation to the way 
future battlespace is controlled and victory is achieved.  However, there have been a 
number of false dawns preaching the virtues of unmanned aircraft.  For example, General 
Hap Arnold, Chief of the US Army Air Force, predicted future possibilities, when he 
observed on VJ Day in 1945: 
We have just won a war with a lot of heroes flying around in planes.  The next war may be 
fought by airplanes with no men in them at all…Take everything you’ve learned about aviation 
                                                          
10 Colin S. Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History, London: 
Frank Cass, 2002, p.viii. 
11 Andrew F. Krepinevich, 'Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions', The National Interest, 
Fall 1994, p.30. 
12 Colonel General N. A. Lomov, Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs, 
translated, and Pubilised under the Auspices of the United States Air Force, Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 1973, p.v. 
13 Elliot Cohen, 'A Revolution in Warfare', Foreign Affairs 75, 1996, p.39. 
14 Keth Shimko, The Iraq Wars and America's Military Revolution, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010, p.37. 
15 See Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005, pp.105-119.  Gray 
has been at the centre of the RMA discussion for many years; see also generally, Colin S. Gray, 
SCSIOccasional Paper No 28 - the American Revolution in Military Affairs: An Interim Assessment, 
Camberley: Joint Services Command and Staff College, 1997. 
16 See Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, Washington, DC: National 
Defense University Press, 2000, pp.285-291. 
 15 
 
in war, throw it out of the window, and let’s go to work on tomorrow’s aviation.  It will be 
different from anything the world has ever seen.17 
Although not quite prescient, Arnold’s words, almost 70 years later, are gaining relevancy.  
Whether the ascendancy of UAS is an RMA or not, it is worth remembering that the 
fundamentals of war will likely remain extant.  As Peter Singer states in Wired for War: The 
Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century: ‘….it [war] will still involve all the 
unexpected confusion, mistakes, and dilemmas that go hand in hand with both technology 
and war.  The fog of war ain’t going anywhere’.18   
It is emphasised that this thesis does not examine in detail the current or future use of UAS 
by either nation states, or non-state organisations.  While an overview of UAS is given, the 
focus is on unmanned air systems that are required to operate in highly contested airspace, 
capable of achieving control of the air, which require major investment and infrastructure for 
operation; only UCAS currently fit this description.  Within NATO, control of the air is 
classified into two subdivisions - air superiority and air supremacy.  Air superiority is defined 
as: ‘that degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the 
conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time 
and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force’.19  Air supremacy is 
defined as: ‘that degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of 
effective interference’.20  Although these terms are not consistently used by commentators, 
they do illustrate that air power may not allow absolute dominance of the airspace all of the 
time.  When describing control of the air, or the use of systems to obtain it, this thesis uses 
the terms control of the air, air supremacy, and air superiority, where each is relevant.   
Standard military acronyms are used throughout this thesis, where appropriate; these are 
based on NATO terminology and standard convention.21  This thesis uses the terms 
Unmanned Aircraft (UA), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), UAS, Unmanned Combat Aerial 
Vehicle (UCAV) and UCAS.  It is important to understand that UAS consist of a number of 
physical components and other strands: the UAV themselves, their sensors and weapons, 
communications links, the Ground Control Station (GCS), the personnel involved in 
                                                          
17 Jay Shafritz, Words on War: Military Quotes from Ancient Times to the Present, New York; Prentice Hall, 
1990, p.104. 
18 P. W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century, New York: The 
Penguin Press, 2009, pp.194-195.  
19 See UK Ministry of Defence, Joint Warfare Publication 3-63: Joint Air Defence, 2nd Edition, Shrivenham: 
Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, 2003, p.1.6.   
20 ibid. 
21 All acronyms are used for both the singular and plural sense. 
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operating the system, and the logistics support required.22  This may seem obvious, 
however, very few analysts refer to the system as a whole.  A similar situation exists with 
UCAS terminology.  At writing, there was no agreed standard definition of UCAS. The 
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research Manual on International Law Applicable to Air 
and Missile Warfare, defines a UCAV as: ‘…an unmanned military aircraft of any size which 
carries and launches a weapon, or which can use on-board technology to direct such a 
weapon to a target’.23  This is a useful description for the purposes of this manual.  
However, the UK and US, for example, do not normally term weaponised UAS as UCAS.  
Until there is conformity, and for the purposes of this thesis, the author defines UCAS as 
weaponised UAS, utilising a level of automation/autonomy, which may also be capable of 
ISTAR tasks, designed to survive in highly contested airspace.  This can be by utilisation of 
a combination of stealth features, NEC, Electronic Attack (EA), countermeasures, weapon 
systems capable of self-protection as a minimum, speed and manoeuvrability.    
Thesis Structure 
This thesis is structured to allow the reader to develop an understanding of the 
methodology used, and why, before giving an overview of UCAS potential.  Technical 
capabilities and tactical doctrine are explained, in order that the reader has a basic 
understanding of the requirements of air power, in particular, counter-air capabilities.  
These are referenced appropriately to allow further examination.  Ultimately, two potential 
future conflict points, centred on the US and its allies, and China and Iran, are examined; 
these allow the use of UCAS to be put into context. 
Chapter 1 examines the research methodology, including analysis of a questionnaire used.  
This questionnaire was designed to help remove any bias the author may have had, by 
eliciting opinion from military aviators and engineers, UK MOD aviation analysts and 
engineers, and pertinent civilians.  This helped establish trends on the efficacy of using 
UCAS, the weapon systems required, and concerns regarding recruitment, ethical, and 
legal issues.  
Before scrutinising in detail the hypothesis of this thesis, it is important to allow the reader 
to develop a basic understanding of the issues involved.  The purpose of Chapter 2, 
therefore, is to give an overview of the potential that UCAS may offer to military 
commanders and political leaders in the coming decades.  It also gives a brief synopsis of 
the questions that are currently being debated regarding UAS/UCAS utility, including: 
                                                          
22 Bill Yenne, Attack of the Drones: A History of Unmanned Aerial Combat, St Pauls, MN: Zenith Press, 
2004, p.67. 
23 Commentary on the HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare,  
Cambridge, MA: HPCR Harvard, 2010, p.55. 
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terminology; UAS/UCAS background; the future threat environment; technical issues; a 
short review of aerial warfare; current UAS/UCAS Roadmaps; and a discussion on the 
meaning of autonomy versus automation.  The debate over one-seat versus two-seat 
fighters has been ongoing over many years; its relevance to UAS is discussed.  The 
importance of precision navigation and weapon delivery systems, potential cost-savings, 
leadership challenges, and a view of UCAS operations and developments are also 
examined.  The discussion over UCAS Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and current 
developments, is also covered.  This chapter should give the reader an incentive to explore 
further.  Subsequent chapters examine some of these areas in greater detail. 
Chapter 3 scrutinises the evolution of UAS and the beginnings of UCAS developments.  
UCAS technological challenges, including the employment of UAS/UCAS within the Law of 
Armed Conflict (LOAC) are also examined; this is essential, as the LOAC is increasingly 
dominating the conduct of warfare, especially during wars of choice.  The current debate 
over the ethical issues of using UAS is also examined, discussing its pertinence with regard 
to the future use of UCAS.   
The aim of Chapter 4 is to develop a basic understanding of the role that air and space 
power play in modern warfare; this is vital in appreciating the criticality of control of the air 
and the counter-air campaign.  Control of the air doctrine and the components required are 
examined, including the relevance to UCAS operations that both Boyd’s Observe-Orient-
Decide-Action (OODA) Loop concept and situational awareness play in warfare.  The 
developmental path of air-to-air missiles (AAM) and other weapon systems is also 
scrutinised.   
Chapter 5 reviews the evolution of air warfare, with the aim of establishing the importance 
of weapon systems, in particular, the kill probability of air-to-air systems (AAS), and tactics 
for future counter-air roles.  Western and Chinese air-to-air doctrine is also reviewed, with a 
future air-to-air scenario used to illustrate the importance of weapon system kill probability.  
How would UCAS be utilised in 2040? Putting the future utilisation of UCAS into context is 
vital; the CONOPS that a military force would require, if UCAS were to be part of the force 
mix, is examined in more detail.   
Chapter 6 examines international relations and future threats, concentrating on China and 
Iran, in particular their Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) doctrine.  Other countries, such as 
Russia, Australia, North Korea, Japan and India, will play a significant part in international 
relations in the coming decades – many will affect the foreign policies of each other.  It is 
not the aim of this this thesis to analyse these countries, instead, analysis is confined to 
China and Iran, as both these countries potentially pose the greatest risk to stability in 
international relations.  This is considered by the author sufficient in order to illustrate 
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potential future scenarios, while allowing the thesis to concentrate on developing an 
understanding of the importance of air power, in particular, the attributes required for 
gaining control of the air, and the potential utility of UCAS.   
Finally, the conclusion consolidates and summarises the research process taken, and 




Chapter 1: Research Methodology 
The research methodology used in this thesis is based on conventional methods. The two 
main approaches to research are the scientific and ethnographic.24  These and other 
methods are examined, including the utility of a questionnaire survey, before outlining the 
main methodologies chosen.  The scientific approach is linked to a particular way of doing 
research in which objective measurements are taken in a controlled environment; these are 
repeatable, which means that alternative explanations for findings can be ruled out.  The 
logic of this approach is that of deduction from experiments, with the aim of providing 
statistical results that can be considered valid and reliable.  While not exclusive to the 
scientific approach the main type of data used is quantitative.25  The ethnographic 
approach is concerned with studying culture; it is more open ended and iterative in nature 
than that of the scientific approach.  It is concerned with meaning through investigating 
feelings, attitudes, values, perceptions and the interactions of people and groups.  Unlike 
the scientific approach, the ethnographic approach can be described as more of a journey, 
along which learning will occur.26  This leads to ethnographers starting their data gathering 
across a broad area not knowing exactly what they are going to find.  This approach often 
means more time is spent gathering and interpreting the results than in the scientific 
approach, and that the data gathering is likely to start earlier.  This approach has been 
utilised, as it has allowed the author to use appropriate colleagues and other experts as a 
source of material on an ad hoc basis.   
The method for data gathering and analysis is not defined within the case study 
approach.27  Critics of the case study method believe that the study of a small number of 
cases can offer no grounds for establishing reliability or generality of findings.  However, 
researchers continue to use the case study research method with success in carefully 
planned studies of real-life situations, issues, and problems.28  Perhaps one of the first 
questions to be asked when undertaking a case study is what the unit of analysis is - is it 
an individual, an organisation or situation?  Having decided what this is, a researcher then 
needs to define the case study, enabling a decision on what is relevant to the research.  
Although the research method is not defined in the case study approach, both the scientific 
                                                          
24 H. Maylor and K. Blackmon, Researching Business and Management, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005, pp.141-149. 
25 ibid., p.142. 
26 Web Center For Social Research Methods, 'Qualitative Measures', Research Methods Knowledge Base, 
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/qual.php, (accessed 4 May 2009).  See also, Maylor and 
Blackmon, op. cit., pp.144-145. 
27 ibid., p.243. 
28 Sue Soy, 'The Case Study as a Research Method', Uses and Users of Information - LIS 391D.1 - Spring 
1997, http://www.ischool.utexas.edu/~ssoy/usesusers/l391d1b.htm, (accessed 6 June 2009). 
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or ethnographic approaches can be used in isolation, or together.  Moreover, the use of 
indirect data in the case study method can also be used to supplement direct data, the 
former including things such as reports and archival documents.  
Maylor and Blackmon argue that scientific quantitative research methods, such as random 
sampling, which are applied to a research question with a view to providing a statistical 
analysis of the results, do not sit well with the single unit of analysis used in the case study 
approach.  Instead they suggest that the qualitative method is more suited, stating: ‘In a 
qualitative research design, you continually refine your data collection and analysis as you 
investigate your research problem, opening up new areas and closing off other ones’.29   As 
with the ethnographic approach, the case study approach, using the qualitative method, 
does not seek to prove a hypothesis and normally starts from a broad research objective.  
Nevertheless, quantitative methods can be used in the case study approach or a 
combination of methods can be used, this being called multi-method research or 
triangulation.30  Multi-method research has emerged because the multi-method nature of 
contemporary social science has convinced many researchers that solutions to their 
research problems require more and different kinds of information than any single method 
can provide.31  Multi-method research offers the opportunity to capture information on a 
subject in different ways that may in turn lead to different answers.  One reason for 
adopting a multi-method approach is to support a research project which is undertaken in 
stages where a variety of methods may be appropriate through the different stages of the 
research.  For example, a questionnaire, such as the one the author has used, may be 
used in the first stage to try to identify key areas that are then analysed using qualitative 
methods.  Triangulation as a research method uses several perspectives, multiple-
methods, sources of data, measures and viewpoints.  There are a number of advantages to 
adopting the triangulation method, but perhaps the most important is that it can strengthen 
conclusions; having used more than one source of data can remove that which is 
unreliable.   
In order to help remove bias, and to seek peer review, the questionnaire used was 
originated to enable opinion from appropriate experts and knowledgeable individuals to be 
assessed, with the ultimate objective of facilitating analysis on whether the overarching aim 
of this thesis had validity.  It is difficult to give a particular value to an interviewee, however, 
by allowing sight of their background and experience, it can be seen that there is a wide 
                                                          
29 Maylor and Blackmon, op. cit., p.344. 
30 ibid., pp.256-261. 
31 Brewer, 'The Multimethod Approach and Its Promise', http://www.sagepub.com/upm-
data/6050_Chapter_1_Brewer_I_Proof.pdf, (accessed 17 May 2009). 
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range, both in experience and professional roles.32  It would have been relatively easy, and 
produced a far larger pool of interviewees, if this survey had been conducted by allowing 
the questionnaire to be answered by civilians or military aircrew selected randomly.  
However, the value of their opinions would be difficult to quantify.  It was important that the 
interviewees had relevant experience of the questions being asked, whether that be 
military, scientific, or aspirational based.  The findings have validated those areas of 
research that are central to this thesis, allowing these to be focused on.  Valuable insight 
has also been gained, allowing comment and recommendations to be made on what 
systems UCAS will require, and also, the type of air vehicle necessary.  A number of 
graphs are used in this thesis to show trends and any clusters.  These offer a clear 
illustrative tendency on views gained from the questionnaire.  All graphs are contained in 
Appendices G and H.  The results from the questionnaire are examined later in this 
chapter, and also integrated into this thesis, where appropriate. 
The literature review was wide-ranging.  Strategic and military policy institutes, such as the 
RAND Corporation, the US Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment (CSBA), the 
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Chatham House, and the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS), provided a source of material on international relations and military 
capabilities and issues.  A number of websites and aviation journals proved essential in 
tracking advances in technology.  International affairs, law, and security journals, allowed 
for balanced opinions to be assessed for relevance.   Technical and reference works have 
also been beneficial in allowing the fundamentals of the systems UCAS will likely use to be 
better understood.  Relevant national newspapers also provided a rich seam of up-to-date 
analyses, which were be used to compare views.   
In deciding the research methodology to be used for this thesis, it was an absolute 
requirement to be meticulous in the removal of bias from any conclusions.  The author is an 
experienced RAF aviator and Qualified Weapons Instructor (QWI) Air Defence (AD), with 
some 30 years’ experience, and over 6000 hours in the counter-air role.  He has also been 
responsible for analysing potential adversary UAS/UCAS, and advising MOD projects on 
UAS/UCAS procurement.  All of which has helped the author’s research immensely.  The 
research undertaken involves personnel and organisations with which the author has had 
contact during his career; hence, establishing a neutral position was paramount.  In 
attempting to remove bias, a number of methods have been utilised.  A survey of military 
aircrew and officers, MOD engineers and aviation specialists, and civilians, collecting views 
on whether UCAS can gain control of the air in future warfare in 2040, and also, ethical and 
motivational issues, inter alia, was conducted.  The intention was to determine any 
                                                          
32 See Appendix G. 
 22 
 
emerging trends in thought, in particular, identifying divergence in interviewee’s views, 
dependent on their experience and qualifications, both academic and military.  Time was 
spent reviewing the literature surrounding the subject area in order to get an insight into the 
different perspectives and views held.  Reviewing the available research methods led to the 
conclusion that the use of triangulation and the ethnographic methodology, aligned within a 
case study approach was the most appropriate methods for this thesis.  There are a 
number of reasons behind this conclusion.  Perhaps the most fundamental being that 
although this thesis investigates ‘The utility of UCAS in gaining control of the air’, which is 
on the face of it a very technical subject, scientific experimentation or measurements have 
not been conducted; rather analysis of opinion and technological capabilities, aligned with a 
review of international relations have informed the conclusions.33  The questionnaire used 
enabled confirmation that the crux of the thesis warranted investigation.  More importantly, 
the responses to questions specifically designed to elicit expert views, yielded answers that 
allowed robust investigation questioning the efficacy of some current fundamental maxims 
of counter-air warfare.  The views of senior commanders were particularly revealing. 
Questionnaire  
Analysis of the responses to the Questionnaire have helped validate those areas of 
research that are central to this thesis, allowing these to be focused on, and thus helping to 
determine any bias towards full UCAS autonomy, semi-autonomy, or indeed, no autonomy 
at all.  Valuable insight has also been gained allowing comment to be made on the ethical, 
legal and motivational issues, and what systems UCAS will require, including the type of air 
vehicle necessary.  The following breakdown of responses allows later analysis to be put 
into context.  
Interviewee Background and Experience 
The background of interviewees has been collated, including: age groups, professions, 
flying experience, operational experience, academic and professional qualifications, military 
rank, and experience with NEC and AAM.  The number of interviewees totalled seventy-
five.  The sample size was a trade-off between the time available to conduct and collate the 
interviews, and the number of interviewees it was considered necessary to allow proper 
analysis.  For the type of research undertaken, a sample size of larger than 30 and less 
than 500 is considered appropriate.34  A large proportion of the interviewees were RAF 
                                                          
33 Although trials could be conducted using appropriate simulation, at this stage it is not possible to 
conduct these and produce unclassified results.  It is possible, however, to access a wide unclassified 
knowledge base, via interviews and questionnaires, which have been informed by such trials, and where 
appropriate, results are discussed in this thesis. 
34 Uma Sekaran, Research Methods for Business: A Skill Building Approach, Fourth Edition, Chichester: 
John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.47. 
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aircrew.  This was necessary because most of the questions were geared towards aircrew 
experience.  That said, where the questions were more technical, the views of scientists 
and aviation specialists are just as pertinent.  Finally, questions regarding the ethical and 
political aspects of using UCAS, and future recruitment motivations, are equally pertinent to 
civilians.  
 
A total of Fifty military aviators have been interviewed; most were either current or ex-fast 
jet (FJ) pilots or navigators; a few have experience on other aircraft, such as the maritime 
Nimrod, and the Nimrod R1 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Electronic Intelligence 
(ELINT) aircraft.  The majority of the FJ crews have a background in counter-air, with some 
dual qualified, having flown either multi/swing-role aircraft, or are experienced in both 
counter-air and ground attack roles on different aircraft.  The overall experience on different 
aircraft types is diverse, covering: Tornado F-3, F-4 Phantom, F-14 Tomcat, F-15A/C/E 
Eagle, F-16 Falcon, F-22 Raptor, Harrier FA-2, GR-7/9, Tornado GR1/1A/4/4A, Jaguar, 
Predator/Reaper UAS, Global Hawk UAS, U-2, BAE Systems HERTI UAS, MiG-17 Fresco, 
MiG-21 Fishbed, Nimrod R-1 and R-2, C-130 Hercules, C-17, and Puma helicopter.  Nine 
MOD aviation analysts have been interviewed - all have a background in UAS/NEC.  One 
ex-military interviewee is an academic instructor at the USAF Weapons School, at Nellis Air 
Force Base, with a background as an Aggressor pilot instructor at ‘Exercise Red Flag’, 
having flown various US and Russian fighters, including the MiG-17 and Mig-21; he also 
flew air-to-air combat missions in Vietnam and Laos.35  Exercise Red Flag is a multi-faceted 
military training exercise, centred on flying operations.  It is conducted in airspace situated 
in training ranges in the Nevada Desert, to the north of Las Vegas.  It is considered the 
premier training programme for US military aviators and its allies, Integrated Air Defence 
System (IADS) operators, including cyber-space, covering all aspects of modern air power.  
Its aim is to simulate, as closely as possible, the conditions that ‘warfighters’ are likely to 
meet on operations.  Red Flag was instigated as a direct result of the losses suffered by the 
US during the Vietnam War.  The RAF has been attending Red Flag exercises since the 
1970s.36  Eleven non-aviation specialist civilians were interviewed; their views on the future 
ethical and motivational issues are valid.  The remaining civilian interviewees are from 
diverse professional backgrounds, including engineering and management.  A number of 
senior RAF and USAF commanders were interviewed, and although small in number, their 
views give weight to future MOD/DoD policy towards the use of UCAS.  Five interviewees 
chose to express their views under ‘The Chatham House Rule’.   
                                                          
35 This interviewee was a founder member of Exercise Red Flag, which started in 1975.  Aggressor 
instructors use adversary tactics and doctrine, and sometimes equipment, to teach US and coalition forces 
how to counter these threats – see S Davies, Red Eagles, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008, pp.34-36. 




The youngest interviewee is 16, while the oldest is 75.  The majority, 80%, are aged from 
30 to 54.  The majority of interviewees, 62%, are either serving or ex-serving military 
aircrew.  The remaining interviewees are military ground personnel, MOD/aviation analysts 
and civilians.  When considering whom to interview, it was decided that the majority should 
be FJ aircrew, experienced in the air defence role.  This is important, as their views on the 
technical and tactical aspects of conducting counter-air missions are crucial, particularly 
concerning the type of air vehicle UCAS requires, and, also which systems/weapons would 
be effective.     
 
The majority of military personnel interviewed were squadron leaders and below.  This was 
to be expected, as these officers form the majority of serving FJ aircrew.  The survey is not 
intended to be senior officer centric.  It did, however, seek, the views of the current RAF 
Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), a former RAF CAS, the Chief of Defence Intelligence (2012), a 
former Air Member for Personnel and recently the Commander-in-Chief Air Command 
(2012), the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, DCDC (2011), and the Chief Executive of the 
Services Pensions and Veterans’ Agency.  The current commander of the USAF 9th Air 
Force, Air Combat Command, responsible for 480 aircraft, including the F-22, also 
completed the questionnaire.  A former air marshal responsible for Information Superiority 
within the UK MOD, and four other US military personnel were also interviewed.  
 
Although the interviewees have a diverse number of academic and professional 
qualifications, all military aircrew are qualified air pilots, air navigators, or Weapon Systems 
Operators (WSO), in addition to any other qualifications they possess.  A qualification of a 
QWI (AD) indicates these aircrew are trained to teach air defence tactics, including air 
combat manoeuvring, and weaponry to an advanced level.  This qualification is considered 
to be the pinnacle of a fighter pilot or navigator’s professional achievement, and is 
internationally recognised as being achieved only by those fighter aircrew who have 
reached the highest standards.  It is usually these QWI who inform the procurement and 
evaluation process for future combat air platforms.37  Eighteen of the aircrew are AD QWI.38   
 
Fifty-five percent of aircrew interviewed have between 2000-4000 hours FJ experience, 
either on air-to-air fighters, air-to-ground bombers, or swing-role fighter/bombers.  Two of 
the FJ aircrew interviewed both have less than 1000 hours FJ experience.  At the other end 
                                                          
37 See Wg Cdr Justin Reuter RAF, 'Qualiied Weapons Instructors Course', in 25 Years of Air Defence: 
Tornado F3, Wg Cdr Justin Reuter RAF (ed), Arbroath: Squadron Prints Ltd, 2011, pp.112-115. 




of the spectrum, a number of FJ aircrew have over 5000 hours FJ experience.  All aircrew 
interviewed have had some operational experience.  Most have flown on operations over 
Iraq, in either the 1991 or 2003 Gulf War.  Those who have not experienced operations in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, or Libya, have operated in the Falkland Islands, and 
carried out Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) duties in the UK and Europe, during and post the 
Cold War.  Non-aircrew military personnel have all seen operational duty on various 
operations, including in Combined Air Operation Centres.  There have been no air-to-air 
engagements involving British forces on operations since the 1982 Falkland’s War.  
However, having had experience of operating in large Composite Air Operation (COMAO) 
exercises, conducting counter-air missions, the majority of those interviewed have 
experience of the importance of NEC and Command and Control (C2).  Seventy-seven 
percent of military interviewees have experience with airborne Tactical Data Links (TDL).  
One-hundred percent of aircrew interviewed have some TDL experience.  Thirteen percent 
of military/MOD interviewees have experience with simulation/ground-based data-link.  This 
is important, as experience with TDL/data-links gives insight into the value NEC can bring 
to the conduct of warfare.  Overall, 90% of relevant interviewees have some form of 
experience with the concept of NEC.39   
 
Sixty-seven percent of FJ aircrew interviewed have experience with the Radio Frequency 
(RF) AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and the Infrared (IR) 
Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile (ASRAAM).  Twenty-one percent have experience 
with RF Skyflash/AIM-7 and early Sidewinder IR class AAM only.40  These types of AAM 
are significantly less effective than AMRAAM and ASRAAM, tending to lead to a 
requirement for visual combat with an adversary.41  A number of aircrew have experience 
with the AIM-54 Phoenix AAM, which was carried on the F-14 Tomcat, and the Meteor 
AAM, currently in development for the UK and four other European nations.42  It is those 
aircrew experienced with Meteor, AMRAAM and ASRAAM type AAM who are able to give 
the most pertinent comments on the employment of AAM in future air warfare.   
                                                          
39 See Appendix G for details of aircrew flying hours, operation and TDL/NEC experience. 
40 Skyflash and AIM-7 class AAM are semi-active RF missiles, which require guidance from a fighter’s own 
radar – see Robert Hewson (ed), Jane's Air-Launched Weapons, Coulsdon: IHS Jane's, 2011, pp.96-100.  
This severely limits engagement opportunities, and also, results in a within-visual-range situation 
developing.  AMRAAM are able to guide using their own radar seekers, in certain situations – see ibid., 
pp.102-108. 
41 For a description of the advantages of AMRAAM, see Sqn Ldr Steve Kilvington RAF, 'Fox 3: AMRAAM', 
in 25 Years of Air Defence: Tornado F3, Wg Cdr Justin Reuter RAF (ed), Arbroath: Squadron Prints Ltd, 
2011, pp.25-29.  For a comparison of ASRAAM and Sidewinder AAM, see Wg Cdr John Shields RAF,  
'Unprecedented Lethality: ASRAAM', in ibid., pp.22-24. 
42 The Meteor AAM will be a huge leap in capability, giving a far greater stand-off capability than any other 




Questions asked of interviewees were designed to elicit opinion on a number of issues 
concerning the utility of UCAS.  Some questions concentrated on the aerodynamic and 
stealth capabilities of the UCAV itself.  Others sought to establish any trend in views 
regarding the perceived capability of UCAS being able to effectively undertake counter-air 
missions, either semi-autonomously, or fully autonomously.  Three questions, in particular, 
sought to establish whether a future UCAV would require the capability to conduct highly 
agile air combat manoeuvring, in order to either achieve a kill, or defend itself against a 
highly agile adversary.  In attempting to define the weapon systems which a future UCAS 
will require, it is necessary to decide whether the UCAV will need the same attributes of 
current counter-air fighters, in airframe performance, sensors and weapons.  In order to 
achieve this, it is essential to establish which attributes are important, desirable or 
unnecessary.  For example, is the ability to conduct highly agile air combat essential, and is 
it still vital for a fighter to have a gun.  This may well be true currently, but will it remain so 
by 2040?43  Also, the question needs to be asked: how much emphasis should be placed 
on stealth, NEC, EA, aerodynamics, endurance, and payload? 
 
Third-Party Targeting (TPT) capabilities will be central to the effectiveness of UCAS.44  
NEC will play a pivotal role in achieving this.  Opinion was sought as to viability of TPT in all 
three phases of an air-to-air engagement: Beyond Visual Range (BVR), Within Visual 
Range (WVR), and close combat.  The purpose of this question is to seek judgment on 
when these methods will become possible.  An important consideration is whether there 
are any legal or political concerns which need to be considered when pursuing the 
procurement of autonomous systems.  Also, will future recruitment to the RAF and other air 
arms be affected by the predominance of air combat systems being unmanned and 
autonomous?  Three questions have been designed to elicit approximate statistics 
regarding the frequency aircrew have been required during training sorties to: (1) - enter 
the visual merge, in order to kill an adversary; (2) - been required to conduct air combat 
manoeuvring to either achieve a kill, or defend against being killed, and (3) - been required 
to use the gun to achieve a kill.45  The purpose of these questions is to establish what 
                                                          
43 For a background on the utility of the gun in air combat, see generally, Anthony Williams and Emmanuel 
Gustin, Flying Guns of the Modern Era: Development of Aircraft Guns, Ammunition and Installations since 
1945, Marlborough: Crowood Press, 2004. 
44 TPT is the ability of a system/platform to effectively use information from another system/platform, in 
order to conduct its mission – ultimately, instigating delivery of weapons from the system’s own vehicle, or 
from another system, and in certain scenarios, guidance of weapons.  For an example of TPT, see Byford,  
op. cit., p.5. 
45 These sorties are Large Formation Employments exercises, such as, Red Flag, Tactical Leadership 
Programme and other COMAO exercises - see Wg Cdr Justin Reuter RAF, ‘Red Flag’, in 25 Years of Air 
Defence: Tornado F3, Wg Cdr Justin Reuter RAF (ed), Arbroath: Squadron Prints Ltd, 2011, pp.30-34. 
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emphasis is likely to be needed in these three phases of an engagement, when considering 
any preference towards weapon systems development.  Where percentages are given as 
responses to questions, they are not intended to be totally accurate.  Many aircrew have 
flown in a large number of these types of training exercises, some covering decades of 
flying.  No aircrew keeps an exact tally of their kills achieved, or by what method.  Their 
answers, therefore, are a best estimate of what they consider to be kills achieved from 
relevant sorties.  The answers do, however, indicate a trend.  This trend has helped 
examine the types of weapons future UCAS will require.  The results of the interviews are 
largely qualitative, rather than statistical.  They have, however, allowed with a high level of 
confidence, further research and analysis to be conducted, in the knowledge that the 
process has been peer reviewed, and found to be fundamentally sound.  Where 
interviewees are quoted, their details are footnoted once; any further quotes from the same 
interviewees in this chapter were taken from the same questionnaire.  The following are the 
results of the questionnaire.46     
NEC and Requirement to Enter the Close-Combat Fight 
Ninety-five percent of interviewees believe NEC is vital in effecting control of the air in 
2040, while 5% believe it is highly desirable.  Essentially, all believe NEC will provide a very 
important function in future warfare.  These figures added integrity to the author’s 
hypothesis that NEC is crucial to situational awareness and success in future warfare. 
 
There have been a limited number of air-to-air engagements in the modern era, which, for 
the purpose of this study, is defined as post 1990.  Pre-1990, BVR air-to-air engagements 
were conducted using semi-active RF and IR AAM, whereas post-1990 saw the 1991 Gulf 
War, which, while still a semi-active AAM air-to-air war, can be used as a benchmark for 
future BVR air-to-air engagements.  The 1999 air campaign in Kosovo saw AMRAAM used 
for the first time against an adversary.  The Vietnam War and the Israel/Arab conflicts of the 
1960/70s were the last known occasions when the gun was used in air-to-air engagements, 
to any great extent.47  Three questions were asked in order to elicit opinion on the number 
of times aircrew have been required, during large training sorties, to enter the visual merge, 
in order to kill an adversary; been required to conduct air combat manoeuvring to either 
achieve a kill, or defend against being killed, and been required to use the gun to achieve a 
kill.  These were asked to determine what emphasis is likely to be needed on these three 
phases of an engagement.  Appendix H details the responses to the requirement to enter 
                                                          
46 Details of all interviewees are in the bibliography. 
47 Two AAG kills were achieved by Sea Harriers during the 1982 Falklands War - see Jeffrey Ethell and 
Alfred Price, Air War South Atlantic, London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984, pp.233-245.  Analysis of air-to-air 
engagements from the Vietnam War to the present is included in Chapter 5 of this thesis.   
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the visual merge, to conduct air combat manoeuvring, and the use of the air-to-air gun 
(AAG).  Defined as a percentage, the majority, 78%, of FJ air defence aircrew have been 
required to enter the visual merge, in order to kill an adversary, on less than 10% of 
COMAO sorties.  Thirteen percent have been required to do so between 10 – 15% of 
occasions, with 9% between 16 – 20% of sorties.  Thirty percent of aircrew have conducted 
visual air combat manoeuvring, post-merge, in order to achieve a kill, on less than 3% of 
their COMAO sorties, with 39% less than 5%.  Seventeen percent have been required to do 
so on less than 10% of missions, with 14% on greater than 10%.  Nineteen percent of 
aircrew have never used the AAG in a COMAO training sortie, while 28% have used the 
gun on less than 1% of sorties.  Twenty percent have used the gun less than 2%, with 31% 
less than 5%.  Two percent have used the AAG on 5% or greater.  The majority of those 
aircrew that have never used the AAG, have 2000 - 3000 hours front-line flying experience. 
 
All those who stated that they were required to enter the visual merge between 16 – 20% of 
occasions, have had no experience of AMRAAM or ASRAAM, or their equivalents, or have 
stated that Rules of Engagement (ROE) constraints have caused this to occur.48  Although 
those experienced with the most modern AAM were required to enter the visual merge less 
often, the analysis indicates that BVR AAM and tactics do not always allow fighters to 
remain outside of the visual combat environment.  Significantly, AAM probability of a kill 
(Pk) was not considered with this question.  The BVR and WVR analysis leads to the 
conclusion that it is likely there will be a need for a UCAV to enter the classic visual merge 
on occasion, in order to achieve a kill – if weapon systems, combined with NEC, do not 
obviate this requirement by 2040.  The usefulness of an air-to-air gun is more debatable, in 
particular, when employed in high-intensity air warfare.  The question is - does a gun need 
to be procured, and if so, at what cost?  Also, even if a gun should be included as part of a 
UCAV’s weaponry, could a UCAV use it successfully?  However, while difficult to quantify, 
the gun does not play a significant factor in air-to-air engagements, during training sorties.  
Further analysis of actual air-to-air engagements seeks to establish the usefulness of 
including a gun into a UCAV.49 
Third Party-Targeting 
Having the capability to conduct TPT when utilising UCAS will be fundamental to the 
system’s effectiveness.  It will also dictate the type of air vehicle and range of weapon 
systems UCAS will require in order to optimise such effectiveness.  Three phases of an 
                                                          
48 For the principles of ROE, see RAF Air Warfare Centre, AP 3002 - Air Warfare, 1st Edition, High 
Wycombe: Media Services HQSTC, 2009, Chap 1, pp.10-11. 
49 See Chapter 5. 
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engagement were considered – BVR, WVR, and close-visual combat.50  For each phase it 
was asked whether TPT was possible now; if not, when it might be, or if it would never be 
thought possible.  Military personnel and MOD/aviation analysts answered these questions.  
Eighty-two percent of interviewees believed BVR TPT is possible now, with 15% believing it 
will be by 2020.  Three percent believed it will be possible by 2040.  One-hundred percent 
of those interviewed believed it is either possible now, or by 2040.  Sixty-one percent 
believed WVR TPT is viable now, with 21% by 2020.  A further 11% believe it will be 
possible by 2040.  Four percent stated it may be possible, but do not know when, with 3% 
stating they don’t know.  Overall, 97% believe WVR TPT is possible now, or within the next 
30 years.  Unsurprisingly, only 5% thought close-combat TPT is viable now.  More 
surprisingly, 54% believe it will be viable by 2040.  Eighteen percent thought it will be 
possible, but cannot say when, with 12% stating they do not know.  Eleven percent 
believed it will never be possible.  The majority of MOD/aviation analysts believed it will be 
possible. 
 
Open sources confirm that BVR TPT is currently conducted.51  WVR TPT is more difficult to 
quantify however; if an adversary is manoeuvring aggressively, it is likely to become more 
difficult to achieve success the closer to an adversary the fighter or the weapon gets.  
Although TPT is currently used on some systems, its classification makes it somewhat 
difficult to quantify.  That said, as a basic principle of operation, its viability is unclassified.  
Current TPT is achieved via TDL, such as those used in Airborne Warning and Control 
System (AWACS) E-3, F-3, F-15, F-16, F-18, and ground- and sea-based units.  This 
capability has been available for over ten years, and its utility is continually being 
expanded.  It is not known if close-combat TPT is currently achievable; however, it is the 
most dynamic of any air-to-air engagement, requiring a high level of skill by aircrew to 
manoeuvre their aircraft, and coordinate weapon systems, and other aircraft.  Close-
combat TPT will be the most difficult technological hurdle.  It may be possible in the future, 
but to what degree is difficult to predict.  All of these processes will be underpinned by 
NEC.   
 
                                                          
50 For the purposes of this thesis, BVR is defined as being greater than 10 nm from an adversary.  WVR is 
defined as being between 10 and 2 nm of an adversary.  Close-visual combat is defined as being within 2 
nm of an adversary - see S. Schallhorn and others, Visual Search in Air Combat, Pensacola, FL: Naval 
Aerospace Research Laboratory, 1991, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA241347,, 
(accessed 12 August 2009), p.8. 
51 For example, see a brief from Brent Nave and Robert McWhorter, 'Third Party Targeting of SLAM-ER 
Weapon in Flight via Link-16 Surveillance Messages', (2011), 
http://www.idlsoc.com/Documents/Symposiums/IDLS2005/IDLS2005_Thurs_1115_Main_Stream_Brent_N
ave.pdf, (accessed 10 October 2011), slides.7-10. 
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Questions remain, however.  Will TPT continue to develop to the extent that it allows 
UCAS, and other systems, to conduct all phases of the counter-air mission?  If only certain 
phases of this mission are possible, what constraints does that put on UCAS?  Ultimately, if 
reach-back to C2 is lost, will NEC allow the ‘system’ to operate autonomously?  If TPT is 
effective for all phases of an air-to-air engagement, the requirement for highly agile 
dynamic manoeuvring will be negated, for what is currently termed ‘the visual fight’, at 
least.  This axiom could be said for all future air combat systems, manned or unmanned.  
Issues such as ROE will continue to form part of the decision matrix when conducting 
counter-air operations.  Situational awareness, allowing discrimination and the mitigation of 
fratricide, will also form an essential part.   
UCAS Airframe Characteristics and Manoeuvrability Requirements 
Will it be necessary to conduct highly agile manoeuvring, either for general survival, or for 
manoeuvre in the ‘visual’ phase of a combat engagement?  What aerodynamic capabilities 
would counter-air UCAS require?  Will stealth be of crucial importance?  The capability of 
current modern air-to-air fighters is based on a number of fundamental principles, excluding 
fifth-generation stealth technology: the ability to fly at high altitude – 50, 000 feet+, to fly at 
high speed – Mach 1.5+, and to be highly manoeuvrable.52  The attributes of height and 
speed allow for an increase in the ability to launch an AAM at further range from an 
adversary, than that of a slower and lower fighter.  The ability for a fighter aircraft to fly high 
and fast gives an AAM, once launched, increased energy above its own launch speed.  
This extra energy can achieve a greater advantage by increasing the RMaximum and Rno-escape 
of an AAM.53  In addition to the Rmaximum and Rno-escape of an AAM, the distance between 
opposing fighters at AAM impact, referred to as F-pole, is of great significance; this 
distance can mean the difference between winning and losing an engagement where both 
fighters are exchanging AAM.  F-pole can be greatly increased by the higher and faster an 
aircraft can fly.54   
 
                                                          
52 For an excellent overview of the capability requirements for modern air superiority fighters, see Anthony 
Thornborough, Modern Fighter Aircraft: Technology and Tactics, Sparkford: Patrick Stephens Ltd, 1995, 
pp.53-100. 
53 RMaximum is the maximum range an AAM will travel, once launched from an aircraft, before intercepting a 
target - see Brian T. Schreiber, William A. Stock, and Jr. Winston Bennett, Distributed Mission Operations 
within-Simulator Training Effectiveness Baseline Study, Mesa, AZ: Lumir Research Institute: Air Force 
Research Laboratory, 2006,  Appendix G, pp.27-32.  Rno-escape is the no-escape range of an AAM, which is 
the range, inside which an adversary cannot escape a threat’s AAM, by manoeuvring, normally at 9 G 
(force of gravity), sustaining the same speed, although this can vary - see ibid. 
54 For, arguably, the definitive discourse on the importance of AAM dynamics, including the significance of 




How much emphasis needs to be placed on agility in the design of either manned or 
unmanned systems?  Manoeuvrability may allow for survivability, when conducting close 
visual combat, or a last-ditch missile defence manoeuvre against an adversary’s AAM or 
SAM.  However, in the coming epochs, will it be the agility of the airborne vehicle, or the 
agility of its weapon systems, that are the mitigating factor in this phase of an engagement?  
If agility is vital, then a UCAV has the potential to fulfil this requirement to a very high 
degree, whereas a manned fighter is constrained by human physiology.  A human can 
sustain a maximum of approximately 9 G, and then only with the aid of anti-g systems, 
such as anti-g suits, and even then only for limited periods.55  UCAV airframe strength 
would still need to be considered.  It may be possible that the weapon systems are robust 
enough to conduct all the manoeuvring necessary in the close-in visual arena.  Helmet-
Mounted-Cueing-Systems (HMCS), aligned with High-Angle Off-Boresight (HOBS) AAM, 
such as ASRAAM and AIM-9X, which are currently in use, could militate against the need 
for this type of combat.56   
 
Fifty percent of interviewees believe a UCAV will not need to be highly agile in 2040, with 
25% stating that it would, with no caveats.  Fifteen percent believe it will be desirable, with 
20% for survivability reasons, with the ability to conduct defensive manoeuvres against 
SAM or AAM systems.  Thirty percent believe a manned fighter would not need to be highly 
agile in 2040, with 24% stating it would be, with no caveats.  Thirty-two percent believe it 
will be desirable, with 14% for survivability reasons, with the ability to conduct defensive 
manoeuvres against situational SAM or AAM.  Forty-seven percent of interviewees believe 
it would not be necessary for a UCAV to be able to conduct highly agile close combat in 
2040, with 27% stating it would, with no caveats.  Twenty-four percent believe it will be 
desirable, with 2% for survivability reasons, with the ability to conduct defensive 
manoeuvres against SAM or AAM.57   
 
Twenty-five percent believed that both a manned fighter and a UCAV would need to be 
highly agile.  While this view is consistent, the differential for not requiring being highly 
agile, 50% and 31% respectively, is interesting.  The difference being that most 
interviewees believe that weapon systems should be able to prevent the UCAV from 
needing to engage in this type of fight.  The views on the requirement for a UCAV not to be 
highly agile are more consistent, although only one interviewee believes it is important for 
                                                          
55 See Dr Kent Gillingham and John Fosdick, High-G Training for Fighter Aircrew, Brooks Air Force Base 
Medicine: USAF School of Aerospace, 1988, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA196171, 
(accessed 9 May 2011), pp.12, 16-18. 
56 For description of HMCS and HOBS AAM, such as the ASRAAM and AIM-9X, see Hewson, op. cit., 
pp.38-41, and 44-50. 
57 See Appendix H for breakdown of views and experience of interviewees. 
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self-defence.  The overall result is that approximately 70% believed a manned fighter will 
need to be highly agile, while only 50% believed a UCAV would need to be.  This begs the 
question: why is this not the case for a manned fighter?  Would the same weapon systems 
not be available?   
 
The overarching attributes that the interviewees believe a UACV would require vary.  The 
most prominent of these is reach/endurance/persistence, followed by speed, the ability to 
use the full height envelope, stealth and agility.  Endurance and reach will be fundamental 
strengths of UCAS; the ability to fly at high altitude and speed is also an important 
consideration.  Although stealth was not at the top of requirements, it is interesting to note 
that, in the responses to a different question, 63% of interviewees view stealth in 2040 as 
crucial, 30% as desirable, with 7% stating that it would not be crucial.  Most believe that 
stealth will play an important part, but it will need to be in all domains, not just the RF, but 
also in the IR and visual spectrums.  In an interview in 2010 with the RAF’s CAS, ACM Sir 
Stephen Dalton, stated that he believed that stealth will continue to be crucial.58  His 
predecessor, ACM Sir Glen Torpy, is of the same opinion, although he caveats that stealth 
needs to be balanced against the requirements for agility and speed.59  Air Marshal (AM) 
Christopher Nickols, the 2011 Chief of Defence Intelligence, and a former Commandant of 
the RAF’s Air Warfare Centre, views future stealth as important, but not in its present 
form.60  A former RAF Commander-in-Chief Air Command, ACM Sir Simon Bryant, believes 
stealth, persistence, height and weapon systems to be the critical capabilities for future 
UCAS.61   
 
A common belief is that an adversary’s situational awareness will need to be destroyed, by 
whatever means necessary, whether by stealth, cyber, EA, or a combination.  Overall, 63% 
of interviewees believe it would be a crucial requirement for a UCAV to have stealth 
attributes, with 30% viewing it as highly desirable.  Seven percent believe that it will not be 
crucial.  The F-22 has been designed with stealth in mind.62  The forthcoming F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighter (JSF) also has stealth as a significant part of its design.  However, is stealth 
the panacea?  Will future adversaries develop counter-stealth technology that render the 
present advantage void?  Is there a cost benefit trade-off with other systems or airframe 
                                                          
58 ACM Sir Stephen Dalton RAF - Chief of the Air Staff - 2010, (Interviewed 12 January 2010). 
59 ACM Sir Glen Torpy RAF - former Chief of the Air Staff, (Interviewed 11 October 2011). 
60 AM Christopher Nickols RAF -  Chief of Defence Intelligence - 2011,  (Interviewed 12 September 2011). 
61 ACM Sir Simon Bryant RAF -  Commander-in-Chief RAF Air Command - 2010,  (Interviewed 30 March 
2010). 
62 For F-22 development background and capabilities, see Paul Jackson (ed), Jane's All the World's 
Aircraft 2011-2012, Coulsdon: IHS Jane's, 2011, pp.788-792. 
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characteristics?  Fundamentally, it appears that some interviewees may be viewing stealth 
as the solution to all the problems with which an advanced IADS can confront combat 
aircraft.  Stealth technology will remain important, but how much is debateable.63   
Ethical and Political Implications 
Issues concerning the ethics of using autonomous systems to enforce government policy, 
including interstate warfare, and the political implications surrounding any decisions to do 
so, will need to be addressed, particularly before any decisions on procurement are made.  
These issues are currently causing debate within academia and governments worldwide.  It 
is worth remembering, however, that these types of systems have been used for centuries.  
Bombs, artillery, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, AAM, are all unmanned, of course, but 
should these be regarded as being in the same family of systems as UAS/UCAS?64  
Nonetheless, there is certainly some deliberation whether it is ethical to use UAS/UCAS in 
warfare.  It gives an unfair advantage, is one common view.  Another is that it shows that a 
country is not prepared to risk its own people in warfare, therefore, taking the moral ‘low-
ground’.  These are questions worth debating.  A just and moral cause has been part of 
societies’ principles for many hundreds of years; but would any nation consider not using 
technology because of moral concerns, if an adversary did not have these concerns, 
thereby offering them an operational and strategic advantage – particularly if national 
survival was at stake?     
It is emphasised that this thesis is, in the main, researching the role of UCAS gaining 
control of the air in its purist sense - specifically, in air-to-air engagements.  The counter-air 
roles of SEAD and strike will, by their nature, incur more debate concerning collateral 
damage and civilian casualties.  If the perceived thinking is that there is a huge ethical 
ambiguity in using these systems, will this skew development and procurement of UCAS?  
In the first instance, it needs to be established whether there are really any major issues, or 
if this is just a perception of a few.  The views of senior RAF and USAF commanders are 
particularly pertinent.  ACM Dalton stated he ‘…has no moral concerns, however, society 
has a way to go before accepting an autonomous war-fighting/killing system’.  AM Nickols 
is neutral, opining that, ‘[we] are already using UAS and [are] tackling moral and political 
issues’.  ACM Torpy believes that it is, ‘a moral component that hasn’t been fully 
investigated, and needs to be thought through by policy makers…[it] depends on 
willingness to accept political risks’.  ACM Bryant believes, ‘Checks on C2 will need to be 
rigid.  [It will be] driven by levels of confidence in the system.  [I am] concerned if it doesn’t 
work, [which] would inhibit utility.  If all of this is satisfied, then it is morally OK…if politicians 
                                                          
63 This is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
64 Whether the LOAC allows the use of UAS/UCAS is examined in Chapter 3.   
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can be satisfied, then it is OK’.  At the other end of the spectrum, perhaps, are the views of 
younger officers and aircrew.  Flight Lieutenant Jonathan Skinner, a 26 year old RAF pilot, 
with  approximately 350 hours on the Tornado F-3 and 200 hours on the Typhoon, believes 
that, ‘It [UCAS] would just need extensive testing…A decision matrix can be inputted into 
UCAS as easily as trained into a pilot.  The necessary human input is just at the 
programming stage’.65  Colonel Gaillard Peck USAF (Retd), a vastly experienced US fighter 
pilot, having flown in the Vietnam War, and is one of the founding members of Exercise 
Red Flag, simply states, ‘Go for it!  There is no substitute for victory’.66  Major General 
Lawrence Wells, Commander 9th Air Force, has ‘…no issues, as long as the ROE 
considers collateral damage’.67 
The emphatic response to this question is that there seems to be little concern on ethical or 
political issues, overall, in the future utility of UCAS.  Eighty-six percent of interviewees 
have no issues, with 14% having some reservations.  It could be argued that those 
interviewees that have no issues have not thought though the implications of this 
technology.  However, most have direct experience with combat operations, with some 
having been Air Component Commanders during conflicts, responsible for the conduct of 
all air operations; others have operated UAS in Iraq and Afghanistan, while most aircrew 
are immersed with the doctrinal and collateral damage issues of large wartime missions.  
That is to say, their views, including those of senior officers, need to be considered.  Most 
civilian interviewees have no concerns, with 17% having some issues – broadly in line with 
military interviewees.  A British Army lawyer familiar with the LOAC, stated the ethical and 
legal implications for the use of UCAS are no different from those applicable to any weapon 
system.  The LOAC will still need to be applied, and it is there to protect the person 
authorising the mission, as well as the civilian population and infrastructure.68 
 
From a political viewpoint, obtaining the views of someone with a direct link to current 
political thought was important.  An interview with the then UK Secretary of State for 
Defence’s (Liam Fox) Special Adviser, Oliver Waghorn, was conducted in June 2011.  
Waghorn’s response to the moral and political question offers an interesting perspective on 
the debate.  Summarising his response:  
[it] could weigh heavily on a politician’s mind.  [There is a] need to understand all the risks.  
[There] may be concerns whether an autonomous system can make the right decisions 
                                                          
65 Flight Lieutenant Jonathan Skinner RAF, (Postal Questionnaire, dated 24 March 2010). 
66 Colonel Gaillard Peck USAF (Retd), (Questionnarie completed electronically and sent by email, 3 
August 2010). 
67 Major General Lawrence Wells USAF, (Postal Questionnaire, dated 11 January 2013). 
68 The author interviewed this army lawyer under the Chatham House Rule, on 17 November 2011. 
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without a human in the loop.  The safety of aircrew may be an incentive, however, it depends 
on the scenario – what is the Grand Strategic context?  [Politicians] would probably be loath to 
allow it, unless it was proven to be one-hundred per cent effective.  The unknown context of 
UCAS would make it very difficult for politicians to sign up to the idea.  [Would be] more 
content in an air-to-air scenario, due to collateral issues.  [Ultimately] success may invite a 
reassessment.  [The] default would be risk adverse.69 
Waghorn’s views are fairly comprehensive, which he emphasised are likely to be 
consistent with many politicians.  It was made quite clear to the author that Waghorn was 
speaking on behalf of his boss, the Secretary of State.  It may be coincidental, but 
subsequent to the Waghorn interview, on a visit to the RAF detachment at the Italian Air 
Force base at Gioia del Colle in Italy, Liam Fox spoke to a group of Typhoon pilots, who 
were conducting missions in Libya, as part of Operation Ellamy.  Fox asked them how 
many thought they would be flying a fast-jet after the Typhoon had finished service in the 
RAF.  He stated that the Typhoon would likely be the RAF’s last manned fighter.70  
Whether he was bantering or not, it illustrates that politicians are at least contemplating 
the idea of unmanned aircraft fulfilling the counter-air role.  It may be that politicians will 
be risk adverse to the use of UCAS.  It remains to be seen, however, if the momentum of 
development, and the likelihood that technology makes these systems viable, whether 
any residual ethical or political concerns are dealt with.  It is apparent that military 
aviators and RAF commanders have a practical view of the future utility of UCAS.  If 
operated within the LOAC, then the overwhelming majority do not have concerns.   
 
Waghorn’s comments are perceptive; it is the political will to use UCAS that will probably 
incur barriers.  The author believes that if managed correctly, the general public would 
be mostly accepting of these systems, and it seems that the majority of military 
personnel would have few concerns.  While not wanting to prevent reasonable 
discussion vis-à-vis the ethical and political issues, it is the author’s opinion that debate 
should not hinder UCAS development unduly, if in fact, there are no real barriers to 
overcome.  Politicians will generally be adverse to new technologies, until their 
effectiveness is proven.  However, it should not prevent UCAS development and future 
use – the effectiveness of the system, within the LOAC, should be the overarching 
concern.  
Motivation for Personnel Joining an Air Force 
Will a UAS/UCAS centric air force engender the same motivations for joining as currently?  
What motivates someone to want to join an air force to fly?  Is it the act of being able to fly 
a complex, fast and very potent aircraft?  Is it the prospect of flying helicopters in extremely 
                                                          
69 Oliver Waghorn, 'Special Adviser to the UK Secretary of State for Defence,' (Interviewed 24 June 2011). 
70 Interview with an RAF Typhoon pilot, under the Chatham House Rule - 24 August 2012. 
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challenging scenarios?  Alternatively, is it merely the act of flying, in fact, flying anything?  
Is this an important issue at all?  Some do not actually join to fly; a significant number of 
personnel know that they can never fly, but decide do join because they wish to be involved 
in aviation per se.  Historically, the desire to join one’s own air force has been predicated 
on events that have brought flying to the attention of the general public.  The Battle of 
Britain has been used as an exemplar of the spirit of the British people during a time of 
extreme adversity.  RAF fighter pilots, in particular, were, and still are, heralded as the true 
heroes of the Battle.  While there is no doubt that these pilots were vital in gaining control of 
the air over the UK and the English Channel, they were but one small part of a very large 
team.71 
The motivation to join the RAF may well initially have been the desire to fly for some 
applicants.  However, it is very likely that the majority joined because of the ethos that the 
RAF projected.72  This ethos, nonetheless, was essentially based around ‘fighter pilots’.  
Despite the fact that most pilots and aircrew flew aircraft other than fighters, the impression 
was, and, to a certain extent, remains today, that the RAF is made up of fighter pilots.  In 
reality, this has never been the case.  As of 2011, the RAF’s total fulltime strength was 
approximately 36,500 personnel.73  As an example of the number of front-line fighter pilots 
from this total, in 2011 the RAF’s operational Typhoon strength numbered 36 frontline 
aircraft.  Traditionally, the RAF has 1.5 times the number of pilots for each frontline aircraft.  
This gives approximate operational total fighter pilot strength of 54.74  This example is not 
intended as definitive, but it is not many out of 36,500.  It does, however, illustrate that it is 
only a small portion of current RAF personnel that actually fly.  The vast majority are 
support personnel, which include aircraft engineers, avionics technicians, administrators, 
logistics personnel, medical professionals, caterers and physical education staff.  This list is 
not exhaustive, but it is likely to be similar to that of most other air forces around the world. 
If the RAF, or the UK military establishment, does become autonomous unmanned systems 
centric, or even semi-autonomous, the recruitment of personnel to conduct the roles 
required to operate and manage these systems will need to be tailored to ensure that the 
                                                          
71 For an example of the importance that groundcrew played during World War II, see Richard J. Overy, 
The Air War: 1939-1945, Washington, DC: Potomac Books Inc., 2005, pp.140-141. 
72 For a view on the background to the emergence of aircrew ethos in the RAF, see Dr Peter Lee, 
'Remoteness, Risk and Aircrew Ethos', Air Power Review 15, no. 1, 2012, pp.2-8. 
73 Approximate figure as of 2011-2012, see 'The Management of Defence: Defence Personnel Totals', 
armedforces.co.uk, http://www.armedforces.co.uk/mod/listings/l0013.html, (accessed 5 January 2012). 
74 No 29 Squadron, the RAF’s Typhoon Operational Conversion Unit, has approximately 15 aircraft and 
instructor pilots.  Although these pilots could be utilised, they are considered to be Limited Combat Ready - 
see Amyas Morse - Comptroller and Auditor General, National Audit Office, Management of the Typhoon 
Project, London: The Stationery Office, 2011, http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/hc1011/hc07/0755/0755.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2012).    
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most suitable personnel were motivated to join the Services.75  What will be the character 
of these personnel?  What intellectual qualities will be required?  Will the whole ethos of the 
RAF change, and if so, will it matter?  The questionnaire asked: ‘Would a predominance of 
UCAS being an air force’s combat strength in 2040 affect the motivation for personnel 
wanting to join?’  The majority, 82%, do not believe recruitment will be affected, there will 
just be a different motivation; indeed, there is an underlying opinion that recruitment, while 
attracting a different type of person, could be enhanced.  Future personnel would be 
attracted by the technology driven role of an air force.  Some interviewees opined that, 
while recruiting could be affected initially, overtime, perceptions would change, to the extent 
that it would not be a significant factor.  Nine percent had minor issues, which included 
some concern over the ‘fighter ethos’ being eroded.  A small number, 9%, expressed major 
issues.  One of the three students interviewed expressed concern with motivation.  ACM 
Dalton considers that recruitment would be affected initially, but perceptions would change.  
‘[The] experience of Reaper [UAS] is that there is no shortage of volunteers.’  AM Nickols 
believes that motivation would change, but not necessarily negatively, ‘…they [the recruits] 
would just be different’.  ACM Torpy simply states there would be no issues.  ACM Bryant 
considers that, ‘Personnel would be motivated by different things.  [They] would not be the 
same type of personnel joining today, although not exclusively.  If people can be motivated 
to join to ‘serve’, [for example] engineers, then there are probably enough people 
interested’.  A retired air marshal, previously responsible for Information Superiority policy 
for the MOD, believes it will be a different type of person joining.  He also asked, ‘Why an 
RAF?’76  Major General Wells believes it would increase recruiting, ‘…as it “opens up” the 
rather restricted criteria for employing fighter aircraft in combat’.  Flight Lieutenant Skinner, 
the Typhoon pilot, believes recruitment would be improved –‘If we were at the forefront of 
this technology it would be very appealing’.  
 
Those with major apprehensions on future motivation to join offer a cogent argument for 
concern.  These opinions are in the minority however, with 91% having no or only minor 
issues.  Nonetheless, the concerns are warranted, particularly that of the skill of tactical 
leadership being lost.  How this will be addressed will test the development of UCAS, and 
those skills required to put into operation doctrine that is currently gained over years of 
experience by commanders, all of whom are aircrew, who have many years operational 
and flying experience.  Overall, there seemed to be very few issues regarding the future 
motivation of personnel wanting to join an air force.  The general view is that future 
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generations will be more inclined to find the computer orientated tasks more fulfilling.  
Professor Phillip Sabin makes an interesting observation: ‘The challenge for airmen and 
airwomen is to move away from the flight experience itself as the defining qualification for 
air leaders, and to build a more enduring identity around expert employment of the 
distinctive strategic characteristics of air, space and cyber capabilities’.77  This view will 
certainly have traction if air forces become unmanned centric.  Dr Peter Lee probably best 
captures the reality of UAS operators’ and ethos: ‘It is the moral courage, combined with a 
determination to protect allied troops and kill enemy combatants while going to great 
lengths to avoid the unnecessary deaths of noncombatants that already provides, and will 
increasingly provide, the basis for RPAS aircrew ethos’.78  Lee’s opinion captures the 
holistic belief that the ethos of the RAF includes all personnel, not just the ‘flyers’.79  The 
USAF has recognised the importance of motivation and ethos, and is developing 
recruitment structures and incentives for UAS personnel, with plans to operate UAS units in 
a similar way to manned aircraft units.  New professional fields have been established, 
aiming to integrate senior operators into the command structure, as they progress through 
their careers.80 
Is the Manned Fighter Necessary and Could UCAS Gain Control of the Air in 2040?  
The main purpose of the questionnaire was to garner views on whether a manned fighter 
was necessary, or if a UCAS could perform the full gamut of combat air tasks by 2040.  
Two questions were asked – both similar.  ‘Will it be crucial to have a pilot in the cockpit, or 
will a semi-autonomous UCAS, or fully autonomous UCAS, be able to gain control of the 
air, in 2040?’  Also, ‘Would a UCAS be able to effectively conduct counter-air missions in 
2040?’  These two slightly different questions were asked to establish whether there was 
consistency in opinion, if the term pilot was introduced into a question. 
 
In response to the first question, 67% believe there is no requirement to have a pilot in the 
cockpit, with 22% believing there is no requirement, but with caveats.  The caveats include 
views that situational awareness must be such that it allows for these types of systems to 
operate autonomously, within the LOAC.  AM Nickols believes it will be preferable to have 
UCAS.  ACM Torpy believes, ‘…a swarm of UCAS should be controlled by a piloted 
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aircraft, and we will be reliant on the degree we can progress AI’.81  ACM Dalton does not 
believe piloted counter-air will be required, ‘But it depends on the scenario…[and the] 
limitations of commanders and politicians to use [these] systems’.  ACM Bryant considers 
that it will not be crucial, but manned aircraft will be part of the matrix.  Overall, 10% believe 
a pilot will be required, with 1% not sure.  The response to the second question resulted in 
65% stating a UCAS could conduct counter-air missions effectively, with 33% believing the 
system could, but with caveats.  Overall, 98% believe a UCAS could conduct counter-air 
missions, with 1% stating no, and 1% not sure.  Senior commanders’ views are worth 
highlighting:  ACM Torpy believes UCAS could, as do ACM Bryant and AM Nickols.  ACM 
Dalton sees no reason, in principle, why UCAS could not effectively conduct counter-air 
missions; it will rely on sensors, both off- and on-board, and NEC.  Major General Wells, 
states, ‘Yes, but with caveat.  We need a man-in-the-loop.  This is the future’.  Flight 
Lieutenant Skinner, our archetype junior fighter pilot, simply states: ‘…UCAS will be 




This is a relatively short summary of interviewee responses, as in general, the answers 
were either yes or no.  A large proportion of the interviewees are knowledgeable about air 
power, both in theory and practice; others are experts in the technological aspects of 
counter-air warfare.  While not providing proof that a UCAS could conduct all counter-air 
roles by 2040, the responses support the hypothesis that it is at least worth investigating 
the potential for UCAS that are capable of gaining control of the air.  Ethical and legal 
issues also require some thought, however, it is evident from the responses to the 
questionnaire, that there is little compunction against their use, if the LOAC is adhered to.  
Likewise, recruitment concerns do not appear to be thought a major issue, for the moment, 
at least.  
 
Ultimately, examination of expert opinion and technological capabilities, aligned with a 
review of international relations, and analysis of the questionnaire, have informed the 
findings of this thesis.  The following chapters examine these issues in depth.
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Chapter 2: Overview 
This chapter gives an outline of the potential that UCAS may offer to military commanders 
and political leaders in the coming decades.  It also gives a brief history of UAS and a 
synopsis of the issues that are currently being debated regarding UAS/UCAS utility and the 
environment in which they might operate.  Subsequent chapters examine some of these 
issues in greater depth. 
Terminology 
The term UAS itself is often misunderstood.  Many ‘experts’ refer to the air vehicle 
component of a UAS as a ‘drone’.  This is a legacy term, more fitting to the German World 
War II V-I Doodlebug, or target drones used for gunnery practice.  V-1s were designed to 
impact a target, and not to be recoverable; they were effectively cruise missiles.  Herein 
lays the problem when defining what in fact, a UAV is.  A UAV is not a cruise missile.  A 
UAV is a UA designed to be reusable.  A cruise missile has a one-way mission.  The Office 
of the US Secretary of Defense’s Unmanned Aircraft System Roadmap: 2005 – 2030 
describes UAV as:     
A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to 
provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or 
recoverable, and can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload.  Ballistic or semi ballistic vehicles, 
cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles.82 
 
While there is no internationally agreed policy regarding UAS terminology, there are a 
number of working agreements that attempt to align common lexicon, as far as is possible.  
The UK’s MOD Joint Doctrine Note 2/11 Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Terminology, 
Definitions and Classification aims to be consistent with NATO doctrine.83  This document 
offers guidance on the use of common terminology.  Nevertheless, it needs to be 
understood that the terms used in this Joint Doctrine Note are guidance only.  The terms 
Remotely Piloted Air System (RPAS) and Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) have been 
adopted by the RAF and USAF.84  It is not the aim of this thesis to argue what terminology 
should be used.  However, there is no consistency at all within the wider military and 
academic community; even the term UAV seems to evade a consistent definition, with a 
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recent RAF CAS referring to a UAV as an Uninhabited Air Vehicle, while another senior 
RAF officer using the term Unmanned Air Vehicle.85  None of these terms are incorrect, 
however, consistency is important.   
UAS Historical Background and Developments 
The history of the development of UAV is as old as manned flight itself.  The subject is 
thoroughly examined, inter alia, in Air Power – UAVs: The Wider Context.86  A brief 
background is given here, as it is important to understand the progress of early UAV 
developments, which have informed the evolution of UAS and UCAS programmes.87   It 
can be argued that the first UAV utilised were balloons.  Indeed, there are examples of 
unmanned balloons being used to deliver weapons recorded as far back as 1849, when the 
Austrians besieged Venice launching the first recorded air raids in history.88  This was a 
precursor to the horror that massed bombing raids would bring to the civilian population in 
World War II.  The First World War witnessed the development of the first UA for the 
purpose of attack, with the US, Britain and Germany developing UA, with varying degrees 
of success.  An example is the US Kettering Aerial Torpedo; the Kettering Bug was a small 
biplane made of wood, equipped to carry a bomb load equal to its own weight, 
approximately 300 pounds.89  
The years between the two World Wars saw a decline in UA developments, until 1935, 
when the British Queen Bee, the first returnable and reusable UAV, was designed for use 
as an aerial target for training missions.  The Queen Bee was radio-controlled and able to 
fly up to 17,000 ft., with a range of 300 miles, at over 100 mph.90  World War II witnessed 
the massive use of air power to deliver effect.  Many tens of thousands of airmen from all 
sides were killed, particularly on bombing missions against heavily defended targets.  The 
desire to protect aircrew led to a US bomber aircraft flown by a crew for part of a mission, 
when the crew bailed out, and the unmanned aircraft continued to its target.91  These UA 
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were not particularly successful, and are not considered UAV, within the context of this 
thesis. 
Reconnaissance missions have always been dangerous.  The Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Roadmap: 2005 – 2030, observes that during World War II, 25% of the 3rd 
Reconnaissance Group's pilots were lost in the North African campaign, compared to 5% of 
bomber crews flying over Germany.92  When the Soviet Union shot down a U-2 
reconnaissance aircraft and captured its pilot on 1 May 1960, manned flights over the 
Soviet Union ceased.  This U-2 and its pilot, Frances Gary Powers, was only one of 23 
manned aircraft and 179 airmen lost on Cold War reconnaissance missions; their loss 
spurred the USAF to develop UA for these missions.93  The US developed a number of 
highly classified, at the time, UAS capable of conducting long-range reconnaissance 
missions into hostile territory; the AQM-34 Firebee and Lockheed D-21 being the prime 
examples.94   
In 1960, the USAF began its first stealth aircraft programme and began to modify combat 
UAV for reconnaissance missions, and the resultant AQM-34 Ryan Firebee, still in US 
service as late as 2003, was air-launched and controlled from a DC-130 director aircraft.  
After a mission, the Firebee UAV was directed to a safe recovery area, where it deployed 
its parachute and was then recovered.  The Firebee proved extremely successful.  From 
October 1964 to April 1975, more than 1,000 AQM-34s flew in excess of 34,000 operational 
surveillance missions over Southeast Asia.  They were deployed from Japan, South 
Vietnam, and Thailand, flying day and night surveillance, leaflet-dropping, and surface-to-
air missile radar detection missions over North Vietnam and other areas of interest.95  
Following the shoot down of an EC-121 SIGINT aircraft by the North Koreans in 1968, with 
the loss of all 31 aircrew, a SIGINT variant of the Firebee, the 147TE, was developed.  
These were used to collect SIGINT from North Korea, China and the Soviet Union.96  The 
Israeli military were particularly impressed with the Firebee, procuring 12 systems, which 
they subsequently weaponised.  Designated the Firebee 1241, these performed a 
significant role in the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel, Egypt, and Syria, both as 
reconnaissance UAV and as decoys.  On the second day of the war, the Israeli Air Force 
deployed their Firebees to lead attacks against Egyptian air defences along the Suez 
Canal.  The Egyptians fired their entire stock of SAM at the Firebees, which successfully 
                                                          
92 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap: 2005 - 2030, p.2. 
93 ibid. 
94 ibid., p.2.  See also, Yenne, op. cit., pp.25-33. 
95 Ehrhard, op. cit., p.6. 
96 ibid. p.12. 
 43 
 
evaded most of these missiles, while aiding destruction of a significant number of SAM 
systems.97  This marked a new dawn for the utility of UAS, and similar systems, where, 
perhaps, the utility of which had not been previously investigated, by some nations at least.  
China may be the exception to this.  Swarming of UAV in order to swamp an adversary’s air 
defence systems, to destroy it, reduce its stock of weapons, or mask other raids, is a tactic 
well worth developing.  China certainly has this as a doctrine.98  During the 1982 Bekaa 
Valley conflict between Israel and Syria, Israeli UAS were used to great effect, detecting 
and acting as decoy, helping the IAF to destroy or use EA against the majority of Syrian 
SAM systems.99 
The first US UAV shot down over China on 15 November 1964 was revealed as a 
deliberate attempt by the US to exercise Chinese air defences to collect intelligence on 
aircraft intercept methods.  The US was very keen to gather information on the 
development of a Chinese nuclear reactor at Lop Nor, requiring a round trip of 4000 nm 
from Taiwan, for any asset undertaking a recce task.100  At that time the U-2 was the only 
aircraft capable of the task.  However, with the introduction of Soviet SA-2 SAM systems, 
these missions became very dangerous, with five U-2 shot down within a relatively short 
period; these shoot downs led to the development of the D-21 unmanned system.  The D-
21 was designed to cruise at Mach 4 and at 100,000 ft.101  Once its mission was complete, 
the D-21 would drop its wet film in a container into the sea, before self-destructing.  
Although at the cutting edge of technology at the time, the D-21 was not a success.  A 
disaster during a test flight, leading to the loss of an A-12 (a CIA version of the SR-71) – 
the D-21’s mother launching aircraft – and one of its crew, set the programme back 
considerably.  However, the requirement to be able to fly an unmanned system over 
China’s nuclear weapon testing facilities was deemed so vital that the programme 
continued.  Eventually, it was deployed on missions to overfly targets in China on four 
occasions, none of which were successful.102  Ultimately, aircraft such as the manned SR-
71 and the unmanned D-21 were retired, with satellite systems filling the requirement.  
Satellites are not omnipresent, however, and do not obviate the requirement for loitering 
surveillance. 
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There seemed to be a hiatus with US UAS development from the Vietnam era, until the 
beginning of the 1990s.103  While this is not quite the case, it was not until the early 1990s 
that a coherent programme became successful – the RQ-1A Predator.  Predator was the 
first UAS to use Global Positioning System (GPS) for navigation, as well the first to 
effectively operate beyond line-of-sight (BLOS).104  Although there were teething problems, 
early use of the Predator in Bosnia in 1995 proved its utility.  Further successful 
deployments in Kosovo and Iraq caused the USAF to take the issue of UAS seriously.105  
The MQ-9 Reaper has been developed from the RQ-1A, and is the mainstay ISTAR asset 
of US and UK UAS operations in current expeditionary warfare.  Designed from the outset 
as a weaponised UAS, Reaper has set the bar for all systems of this type.106  The 
requirement for a High-Altitude Long-Endurance (HALE) UAS led to the development of the 
RQ-4A Global Hawk, designed to fly up to 65,000 ft., with a payload of 2000 lbs., at a range 
in excess of 3000 nm, and loiter for more than 20 hours.107  It was far from a 
straightforward process, however.  As part of the Advanced Airborne Reconnaissance 
System (AARS) programme, Global Hawk was developed at the same time as the 
Lockheed Martin DarkStar.  Meant to be complementary to each other, the two projects 
ended up competing for funding.  The prototype DarkStar crashed in 1996, effectively 
ending its development, leaving the Global Hawk as the remaining part of the AARS 
programme.108  Ultimately, however, the Global Hawk will only remain sustainable if it can 
conduct the tasks of the venerable U2.  
The US has been at the forefront of current advanced UAS development, with Israel 
another.  Israel began to develop its own UAS during the 1960s and 1970s.  The Heron 
HALE UAS, for example, has been exported to Canada, Australia and India, amongst 
others.  Israel will likely continue to be at the forefront of UAS development.109  Many other 
countries have developed UAS.  South Africa, China, Russia, Britain, France, Germany, 
and Italy, all have advanced UAS programmes.110  Even Iran produces UAS, some copied 
from other countries’ inventories.  Most of these countries also strive to market their own 
systems.  For example, the Thales UK Watchkeeper ISTAR UAS, a derivative of the Israeli 
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Hermes 450 UAS, originally due in service in 2012, but now delayed, will be an important 
system, working as a short- to medium-range support, within a mix of manned and 
unmanned ISTAR systems.111  Current focus is on a replacement for the MQ-9 Reaper 
UAS.  Project Scavenger was a study conducted by the UK MOD with the aim of selecting 
a UAS design in 2012.  Scavenger is a sub-element of a wider ISTAR project, now known 
as Project Solomon, but previously entitled Project Dabinett, which is intended to improve 
the analysis and dissemination of intelligence.112  No design was selected from Project 
Scavenger.  BAE Systems submitted their Mantis UAS as a solution, with other companies 
offering their systems, with France’s EADS actively canvassing for UK collaboration with its 
Talarion UAS.  In late 2011, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between France 
and the UK, with the intent that the two countries should collaborate on a UAS project.  This 
is currently referred to as Telemos; the programme is a joint venture between Dassault and 
BAES.113 
In the last decade, China has closed the gap in UAS development.  China now has UAS 
that are comparable, although not equal to, the US Predator and Global Hawk.114  The 
Chinese government has encouraged UAS development, with several companies currently 
offering over 25 different UAS.115  China vigorously markets most of its UAS at its own and 
international air shows.  The potential for China to influence the balance of the global arms 
market is becoming significant - China’s Defence industry is booming.116  During the 1980s 
and early 1990s, China was among the world’s leading weapon suppliers to developing 
countries; it stumbled during the mid-1990s, unable to compete in the international market 
place.  However, as its defence industry seeks to reduce the PLA’s dependence on 
Russian weapon systems, it is also looking to become a major exporter again.117  An 
example of China’s continuing push into the international arms market is its showing at the 
8th China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition in 2010.  A number of UAS were 
displayed, including the Pterodactyl, similar to the US Predator-B, and the BZK-005 and the 
Yilong Medium-Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) UAS.118  These are thought to be close to 
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reaching an operational capability.  These systems will have the range and endurance to 
patrol the South China Sea, and further afield.119  These, and other UAS, are clearly being 
marketed to foreign militaries.  A report to the US Congress by the US-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission noted that, ‘Beijing is developing a “variety of medium- and 
high-altitude long-endurance” UAVs that include “options for long-range reconnaissance 
and strike” mission’.120  China is intent on capturing some of the huge potential emerging 
markets for weapons and supporting systems. 
Following the 2008 Georgian conflict, the Russian military stressed the need to provide its 
Armed Forces with advanced means of battlefield reconnaissance, when the effectiveness 
of Russian military operations was severely hampered by the lack of reliable intelligence.121  
Witnessing the success of Georgia’s own UAS, predominantly of Israeli origin, led Russia 
to approach Israel directly for assistance.  In October 2010, Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd 
signed a $400 million contract to sell UAS to Russia.122  The primary reason for 
procurement of UAS from Israel is because Russia does not have a particularly coherent 
UAS programme.  Although Russia’s aviation industry is capable of producing very 
sophisticated and capable military and civilian aircraft, it has not, until recently, focused on 
the development of UAS.123   
UCAS Background 
UCAS may eventually be capable of the full gamut of air missions, including: ISTAR, Air-to-
Air Refuelling (AAR), perhaps even autonomous AAR from one UCAV to another UCAV, 
Strike Control and Reconnaissance, Close Air Support, SEAD, interdiction, EA and 
conceivably, control of the air in its entirety, including Defensive Counter Air (DCA) and 
Offensive Counter Air (OCA) missions.124  One of the greatest advantages UCAS can have 
is a small radar-cross-section (RCS), if low observable (LO) technology is used.125  UCAS 
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could have long endurance, enabling persistence and availability, and with no aircrew, 
allowing operations in a toxic environment.  Mitigating the effects on aircrew may be a 
partial driver, but it is the potential reduction in procurement and life-cycle costs, and the 
capability to persist on task for periods currently not capable by manned fighter aircraft, that 
will be the main reasons for their usage.  Human endurance has historically limited fighter 
sortie duration to approximately 10 hours.126  A report from the US Department of 
Defense’s (DoD) Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) states: ‘a UCAV 
weapon system has the potential to fully exploit the emerging information revolution and 
provide advanced airpower with increased tactical deterrence at a fraction of the total life 
cycle costs of current manned systems’.127  Ultimately, if UCAS can do the required tasks 
more cost effectively, and/or superior to that of a manned system, then their development 
will have justification.  
The relatively recent advent of UAS, such as the Predator is now considered an essential 
part of the utility of air power.  However, recent UAS counter-insurgency operations (COIN) 
in Iraq and Afghanistan have concentrated on ISTAR and Close Air Support capabilities, 
with ISR missions in the Arabian Gulf.  More strategic missions will require attributes that 
current UAS do not possess.  For example, in November 2012, Iranian Su-25 Frogfoot 
aircraft unsuccessfully attempted to shoot down a US Predator UAS.  Subsequent Predator 
missions have been escorted by US fighters; an Iranian F-4 attempted to engage a 
Predator in March 2013, but was warned off by a US escorting fighter.128  This is a classic 
example of how vulnerable UAS, that are unable to protect themselves, will be in contested 
airspace.  The current perceived view is that strategic UCAS will need to have LO 
characteristics – this capability is an obvious advantage, and will perhaps be their greatest 
asset, but it significantly increases the cost of a UCAS, and, while enabling greater 
penetration of an adversary IADS, also imposes design limitations.129  Importantly, this very 
asset will drive counter-LO techniques, potentially mitigating any benefit gained.  For 
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example, the development of multi-static and bi-static radars may offer a potential counter 
to LO technology.130  
UCAS Developments 
Although UAS are capable of conducting ISTAR and strike missions, they are not 
survivable in highly contested airspace.  UCAS, capable of conducting these combat air 
tasks, while operating with a high degree of survivability, are being developed by the US, 
UK, France, Russia, China, and other nations.  The US Navy’s Unmanned Combat Air 
System – Northrop Grumman’s X-47B UCAS-D programme, which has replaced the 
USAF’s Joint-UCAS effort, aims to demonstrate the technical feasibility, military utility and 
operational value for a networked system UCAS.131  As part of the overarching UCLASS 
programme, the X-47B first flew in 2011, with trials from carriers beginning in 2013, and an 
anticipated in-service date of 2020.132  The UCLASS programme was instigated by the 
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance.  The US navy has identified 
a requirement, ‘…for an aircraft carrier based aircraft system providing persistent 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and strike capabilities that will 
enhance the versatility provided by an aircraft carrier…’.133   
Already mentioned, the UK is developing the Taranis, a UCAS demonstrator, while a 
European consortium is developing the Neuron system.134  Russia unveiled the Skat UCAV 
at the 2007 MAKS Air Show, and although not much was heard of it again until 2011, 
Russian aircraft manufacturers, MiG and Suhkoi announced in 2011 that they will be 
working jointly on the Skat.135  China is also known to have its own UCAS programme, the 
An Jian (Dark Sword), which has been shown as a mock-up at the 2006 Zukhai Air 
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Show.136  These systems will likely begin to enter the service of these nations in the 2020 – 
2025 epoch.137   
The fundamental understanding of the components that comprise a UCAS, and the types of 
roles that these systems may be able to undertake, is essential when attempting to analyse 
any utility that these weapon systems may have in future warfare.  Current UAS are not 
survivable in contested airspace, against an adversary with a sophisticated IADS.  Potential 
future conflicts and the development of UCAS are changing this emphasis.  Currently, 
strategic UCAS are being developed that have stealth characteristics, in both the IR and 
RF spectrums, and while enabling greater penetration of enemy defences, also imposes 
design limitations.  Significantly, a UCAS will not be stealthy in all RF spectrums.  Older 
Very High frequency (VHF) search radars, updated with the latest computing hardware and 
software, are able to detect current platforms, such as the US F-22 Raptor.  Although the 
range at which these are detected is still somewhat less than that of third or fourth 
generation, non-stealthy aircraft, it may be enough to direct counter-air assets to intercept 
and destroy any hostile aircraft.138  Open source material is available which highlights the 
significant advances that the Russians and Chinese have made, particularly in the areas of 
IADS and counter-stealth technology.139  The requirement to analyse these capabilities is 
central to understanding the requirements that UCAS will need in order to dominate the 
airspace in future warfare.  China’s naval expansion is also causing concern.  These types 
of ‘arms races’ mean that there may be a need for changes to tactical concepts, if 
technology cannot keep pace.140  
Future Threat Environment 
Historically, for every new military capability established by nation-states, their potential 
enemies will inevitably attempt to counter any such advantage.  Predicting future wars is 
impossible, and as Clausewitz observed, ‘No other human activity is so continuously or 
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universally bound up with chance’.141  It is axiomatic, however, that there will always be 
potential threats; identification of such threats and their resources is continually analysed 
by government agencies and policy institutions.  At some point, it becomes necessary to 
make certain assumptions; these will then drive governments’ defence procurement and 
scientific development policies.  Some developing nations are on the brink of economically 
entering the developed world; all seek access to the raw resources that stimulate 
development.  The West’s current focus is on irregular warfare; while this type of conflict is 
likely to be on-going for some time, possibly indefinitely, circumstances may drive nations 
to believe that the only way to survive, let alone prosper, is to instigate conflict, in order to 
establish dominance over natural resources.  A lack of natural resources, whether for 
manufacture or sustenance may prove crucial.  A resurgent Russia, or an economically 
powerful and resource-hungry China, aiming to establish hegemony within their spheres of 
influence, may dictate future governments’ defence policies.142  Not least, containing Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions will continue to test international relations.  How will these threats be 
countered?  Will the character and nature of warfare, forcing operations over long distances 
be such that UCAS are the only viable solution?    
Technologies 
This thesis is not UK centric, and the likelihood of a direct military air threat to the UK 
mainland re-emerging from Russia, for example, is minimal.143  However, threat systems 
continue to evolve, and potentially hostile regimes are able to obtain sophisticated military 
hardware relatively easily.  Identification of these potential adversaries can be readily 
determined.  It should also be possible to estimate the extent of their capabilities.  How they 
are deterred, and if required, defeated, is not so easily achieved.  While not a direct danger 
to the UK, these threats may pose a risk to UK interests.  If the UK continues its 
interventionist foreign and defence policies – and that is a big if – it is most likely within an 
alliance in which it will fight future wars, invariably US led, or at least greatly subsidised by 
US expertise and hardware.   
The types of systems required to carry out nations’ aspirations will depend on a range of 
scenarios.  If range and endurance are required, systems will need to be procured 
accordingly.  In the years before World War II, the US faced choices between procuring 
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more short-range assets, or opting for sea and air systems, with greater range; the latter 
helped win the war.  The US’s current and likely future security responsibilities in the 
Western Pacific offer a similar scenario.  An editorial in DefenseNews emphasised that: 
‘The U.S. is shifting its strategic focus to Asia, where allies worry about rapid military rise 
and increasing assertiveness.  Boosting U.S. regional presence is key, but the Pacific is a 
vast theater and distance is a tyrant’.144  The types of weapon systems required to meet his 
challenge will test current doctrine.   
The paradigm has shifted.  A fundamental rethink is taking place in the way C2 is 
conducted, and the ways in which military objectives are achieved.  Significant advances in 
capabilities, together with flexibility in force employment and improved efficiency, will result 
in a vastly increased ability to achieve the desired outcome.  It can be argued that 
technology offers military forces a solution to solving the difficult tactical and operational 
conundrums posed by future wars.  Whether this is correct or not, the dramatic results of 
recent military operations indicate a major expansion in military capabilities.  Advances in a 
broad range of technologies have begun to enable the integration of joint-forces not 
previously possible. 
Future US air doctrine will be NEC-centric, probably utilising stealth technology as a key 
enabler.145  TDL are a fundamental part of NEC; these are utilised by air, sea and land 
forces, enabling Joint Fires (the delivery of an effect using a combination of platforms and 
systems, whether ground, sea, air or space borne), particularly by US and UK armed 
forces.  The US F-22 Raptor air supremacy fighter is, currently, the only Western fifth-
generation stealth aircraft of its type; indeed, despite rhetoric, no other nation is close to 
achieving this capability.146  The F-22 may be very manoeuvrable, indeed superior to any 
other comparable aircraft; however, the question remains - is this of any significance?  If it 
is not, then what are the prerequisites of a future counter-air aircraft?  Is it speed, 
manoeuvrability and endurance, or is it stealth and NEC, or a combination of these?  The 
importance that EA capabilities and defensive countermeasures have in future air power 
scenarios will also be of enormous significance.  Advances in technology will continue to 
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allow weapon systems to develop, and a ’system of systems’ may be capable of achieving 
the desired effect.  An understanding of what might be achievable, and an ability to 
appreciate the ‘art of the possible’, is required of a state’s military and political 
commanders.  There continues to be a dramatic expansion in computing technology.  
‘Moore’s Law’ states that computing processing power doubles approximately every 24 
months.147  This principle has been proven correct, thus far; indeed, the video gaming 
industry is taking the lead in developing processing capabilities.  Understanding the 
significance of this is vital, with future improvements in processing power potentially 
increasing in excess of the rate stated by ‘Moore’s Law’.148  This expansion in processing 
power will be crucial for almost all future technological advances.   
Aerial Warfare 
Most major conflicts since World War II have involved some form of aerial warfare.  The 
Korean War, the Israeli/Arab conflicts of 1967 and 1973, the Vietnam War, the 1982 
Israeli/Syrian Bekaa Valley conflict, and the 1982 Falkland’s War, involved air-to-air 
engagements, some of which required aggressive visual manoeuvring in order to engage 
and kill an adversary, employing either short-range IR AAM or AAG.149  However, since the 
1980s, conflicts such as the 1991 Gulf War, Bosnia and Kosovo, most successful airborne 
engagements have been conducted BVR with RF AAM, or WVR, with RF and IR AAM.150  
Similar to other munitions, launched at range, BVR AAM are permitted under the LOAC: 
‘Missiles and other projectiles fired from beyond visual range are lawful when their 
employment permits distinguishing military objectives and combatants from civilians and 
civilian objects. Such may be accomplished through sensors on the weapon itself, or 
through external guidance, for instance from the aircraft’.151   
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The US F-35 JSF is being procured as a replacement for the F-16 Fighting Falcon.  While it 
is relatively manoeuvrable, it is not in the same league as the US F-22 Raptor, UK 
Typhoon, French Rafale or the Russian Su-27 Flanker and MiG-29 OVT Fulcrum fighters.  
Some military aviation analysts argue that the F-35 will not be able to gain control of the 
air.152  A project such as the JSF is highly classified, with much of the information on its 
capability not available in the public domain.  For the moment, let us assume that the JSF 
is capable of at least defending itself in a high threat environment, against an air superiority 
platform.  It is also entirely possible that JSF itself may be developed or modified to operate 
unmanned in the future.  John Pike, executive director of GlobalSecurity.org, believes, ‘[It] 
would be crazy not to be looking at this.  It's a foregone conclusion that at some point in the 
F-35 production program that [the Air Force is] going to decide we're going to replace the 
rest with unmanned systems’.153  This raises the question: how much research, 
development and expense should there be towards an air vehicle, whether manned or 
unmanned, that is capable of pure ‘dog fighting’ - that is, highly manoeuvrable, visual air 
combat?  It is arguable whether this ability to out manoeuvre fighters is relevant in an era 
when long-range BVR AAM capability is of such importance.  It is perhaps surprising, 
therefore, that current Western, Chinese and Russian fighters strive for an ability to obtain 
a maximum sustained and instantaneous turn performance, the most important attributes 
for fighters in the visual air combat environment.154  Why is this?  In some low- or mid-
intensity conflicts, for example Bosnia in the early 1990s, the ROE required air defence 
crews to visually identify (VID) any potential target before engagement, thereby potentially 
forcing that fighter into a visual merge.155  Moreover, in a high-intensity conflict, when faced 
with an adversary with capable aircraft and weapons, and training, in which a VID is not 
required, AAM technology has not always guaranteed that the BVR ‘Shoot Out’ will 
succeed.156  This area is the core question of whether a UCAS could successfully conduct 
counter-air operations in future warfare. 
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When discussing warfare, it is useful to have an understanding of conflict intensity.  Low-
intensity conflict (LIC) is defined by the US as:  
…a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, military, or 
psychological objectives…LIC is generally confined to a geographic area and is often 
characterized by constraints on weaponry, tactics, and level of violence…[Mid-intensity conflict 
is]…war between two or more nations and their respective allies, if any, in which the belligerents 
employ the most modern technology and all resources in intelligence; mobility; firepower 
(excluding nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons)…for limited objectives as to the extent of 
destructive power that can be employed or the extent of geographic area that might be 
involved.157   
High-intensity conflict is as per mid-intensity, except nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons may be used, and there are no limitations on objectives, or the geographic area 
involved.158  
The more advanced an adversary’s counter-air capability, the more important gaining and 
maintaining control of the air, and the more sophisticated a force’s own counter-air 
capabilities requires to be.  Having freedom from attack and freedom to attack are the 
fundamental principles of control of the air.  The ability to conduct the full range of air 
operations, unhindered, against enemy forces is vital; it enables the safe deployment, 
resupply, and protection of those forces once deployed.159  This concept of aerial warfare 
has been validated since World War I.  In future warfare, will it be possible for UCAS to 
conduct these combat roles and accept most of the risks that thus far have been the lot of 
military aviators, in particular, the counter-air role?  Control of the air was quickly gained in 
Iraq, and in Afghanistan it was essentially a given from the beginning of operations.  
However, there is a risk of forgetting the lessons of previous conflicts: if control of the air is 
not gained, a campaign is likely to fail.  The Libya campaign of 2011 reinforced the 
importance of air power, and was an exemplar of how air power, on its own, virtually 
attained the required outcome.160  Control of the air was quickly gained by a coalition led by 
the UK and France, and with a great deal of aid from the US in terms of initial strikes from 
combat aircraft cruise missiles, and support assets, including intelligence, planning and 
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material support, enabling coalition air forces to conduct operations essentially 
unhindered.161  It was the destruction of the Libyan IADS and attacks on centres of gravity 
that enabled the Free Libyan Forces eventually to defeat Gaddafi’s forces.  Libya’s IADS 
was not an example of a highly-integrated system, however.  It was essentially 
‘…obliterated…within 72 hours’. 162  Other potential adversarial states, for example, Syria, 
Iran, and China, with access to more modern and lethal sensors and weapons, will offer 
stiffer resistance.163 
US UAS Roadmaps 
Already mentioned, the US has published a number of UAS developmental paths, setting 
out its vision for the employment of unmanned systems, including ground, sea and air.164  
Two of these official publications are particularly pertinent to UCAS development: the 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap: 2005 -2030, published by The Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, and the USAF Unmanned Aircraft System Flight Plan 2009 – 2047.  
The Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap states:  ‘…The overarching goal of this 
Roadmap is to guide the Department towards a logical, systematic migration of UAS 
mission capabilities focused on the most urgent warfighter needs’.165  In 2009, the then 
Secretary of the USAF, Michael B. Donley, and the USAF Chief of Staff, General Norton 
Schwartz, signed the USAF Unmanned Aircraft System Flight Plan 2009 – 2047.  This 
Flight Plan is the USAF’s own vision for the development of UAS.  It details an ‘actionable 
plan’ for UAS/UCAS.166  It sets out the USAF vision for the implementation of UAS/UCAS 
into USAF service, out to 2047.  It states: 
[UAS] and the effects they provide have emerged as one of the most “in demand” capabilities 
the USAF provides the Joint Force.  The attributes of persistence, endurance, efficiency, and 
connectivity are proven force multipliers across a spectrum of global Joint military 
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operations….The vision is the USAF postured to harness increasingly automated, modular, 
globally connected, and sustainable multi-mission unmanned systems resulting in a leaner, 
more, adaptable and efficient air force that maximises our contribution to the Joint Force.167 
The USAF intends, ‘…to achieve the USAF vision for the future of UAS.  The USAF will 
implement the actions described within to evolve UAS capabilities’.168  There are a number 
of assumptions which drive the focus for the USAF’s vision, emphasising the attributes of 
persistence, speed of reaction, potential reduced costs and automation: 
….Integration of manned and unmanned systems increases capability across the full range of 
military operations for the Joint fight…UAS are compelling where human physiology limits 
mission execution (e.g. persistence, speed of reaction, contaminated 
environment)…Automation with a clear and effective user interface are the keys to increasing 
effects while potentially reducing cost, forward footprint, and risk…Agile, redundant, 
interoperable and robust command and control (C2) creates the capability of supervisory 
control (“man on the loop”) of UAS…The range, reach, and lethality of 2047 combat operations 
will necessitate an unmanned system-of-systems to mitigate risk to mission and force, and 
provide perceive-act line execution...169 
The Flight Plan’s emphasis of the man-on-the-loop, and the range, reach and lethality of 
combat operations requirements, captures a number of fundamental premises of this 
thesis.  Comments in December 2012 by General Mike Hostage, commander of the USAF 
Air Combat Command, offer an insight into current US thinking on the utility of UAS/UCAS; 
he gave his view on the applicability of current UAS developments, and what would be 
required for future high-intensity operations.  Speaking to reporters, Hostage stated: 
We are now shifting to a theatre [the Western Pacific] where there is an adversary out there 
who is going to have a vote on whether I have that staring eye over the battlefield…and [I am] 
pretty certain they are not going to allow that to happen…The fleet I've built up, and I'm still 
being prodded to build up too, is not relevant in that new theatre.170   
Hostage believes that the USAF will have to adjust its force structure to meet the demands 
of the Pacific theatre.  He also said that, ‘…the USAF has no intention of backing away 
from the capability unmanned aircraft bring and the "new style of warfare" that they 
enable’.171  A prescient point of view, perhaps, or is Hostage merely stating the obvious, 
that is, the present crop of UAS designs will not survive in the type of scenarios envisaged 
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in the Western Pacific.  General Norton Schwartz, USAF CSAF in 2012, also reiterated that 
today’s UAS cannot survive in contested airspace.172 
Bringing all of the UAS ‘roadmaps and plans’ together, is the US DoD’s 2011 Unmanned 
Systems Integrated Roadmap FY 2011-2036.  Now on its 3rd edition, it was first published 
in 2007, and has evolved into a document which is focused on the issues facing all US 
Armed Services, as well as setting out a vision and acting as a single, unified source.173  
This Roadmap seeks to establish a unified vision:   
US aircraft procurement plans, out to 2041, detail plans for manned and unmanned 
acquisitions.  The Department of Defense’s vision for unmanned systems is the seamless 
integration of diverse unmanned capabilities that provide flexible options for Joint Warfighters 
while exploiting the inherent advantages of unmanned technologies, including persistence, 
size, speed, maneuverability, and reduced risk to human life. DOD envisions unmanned 
systems seamlessly operating with manned systems while gradually reducing the degree of 
human control and decision making required for the unmanned portion of the force 
structure.174 
The UK MOD seems to be somewhat behind the US in its UAS/UCAS developmental 
philosophy.175  Without any substantial UK ‘Roadmap’, the author has used US ‘Roadmaps’ 
and programmes as a reference baseline in this thesis.  Although not definitive, all three US 
Roadmaps/Flight Plans (2005, 2009, and 2011) are used, where appropriate.  While there 
are no equivalent UK UAS Roadmaps in the public domain, one strand of the RAF’s recent 
Deep and Persistent Offensive Capability (DPOC) study, examined the feasibility of UCAS 
as a replacement for the GR-4 Tornado bomber.176  When interviewed by the author, ACM 
Sir Glen Torpy, the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) Chief of Air Staff until 2009, now BAE Systems 
Senior Military Adviser, stated he believed that, due to their potential capabilities and cost 
benefits, UCAS will become a prominent part of the RAF’s inventory.177  Funded by the UK 
MOD and BAE Systems, The Taranis UCAS programme is a technology risk reduction 
demonstrator, initially instigated to inform the DPOC process, but now informing the UK’s 
wider UCAS development route.178  The UK’s MOD is also looking at a range of options for 
its future combat air power; part of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) programme is a 
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France/UK study, which is looking at the potential use of UCAS as a replacement for 
current manned platforms.179   
Autonomy or Automation? 
The term autonomous is often used when referring to the operation of UAS/UCAS; this has 
caused some concern among certain sectors of the military and media, with the belief that 
the use of autonomous UAS would not be acceptable in some scenarios.  The debate over 
the meaning of autonomy is ongoing.  The UK’s MOD’s DCDC, defines an automatic 
system as: ‘A system, in response to one or more sensors, is programmed to logically 
follow a predefined set of rules in order to provide an outcome.  Knowing the set of rules 
under which it is operating means that its output is predictable’.180  The Oxford English 
Dictionary (OED) defines automation as: ‘Like the action of an automaton; unintelligent, 
merely mechanical; done without thought, unconscious; occurring as a matter of course 
without debate. Working by itself, without direct human involvement’.181  Autonomy is 
described by DCDC as: ‘A system that is capable of understanding higher intent; will be 
effective, self-aware and their response to inputs indistinguishable from or superior to, that 
of a manned aircraft.  As such, they must be capable of achieving the same level of 
situational understanding as a human’.  The OED defines autonomy as: ‘Freedom of the 
will.  Independence, freedom from external control or influence.  Personal liberty.  Self-
governing.   Free to act independently’.182  Gillespie and West, in The International C2 
Journal, describe autonomous and automatic systems:  
[autonomous systems]…[as] act[ing] on results from their own processing of instructions from 
external sources; without necessarily involving human operators after initiation.  Automatic 
systems are directly controlled by either a human or quantified input parameters with no 
interpretation by the automaton.183   
A report for the US Office of Naval Research, defines autonomy as: ‘….the capacity to 
operate in the real-world environment without any form of external control, once the 
machine is activated and at least in some areas of operation, for extended periods of 
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time’.184  The Commentary on the HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and 
Missile Warfare defines autonomous UCAV as: ‘Autonomous action means that the 
unmanned aircraft has sensors and an onboard data processing capability to make 
decisions to attack according to a computer program. The sensors and computer programs 
must be able to distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects, as well as 
between civilians and combatants’.185   
Air Commodore Anthony Nicholson, a former Commandant of the RAF Institute of Aviation 
Medicine, and in 2012 the Visiting Professor at the Centre for Human and Aerospace 
Physiological Sciences of Biomedical Sciences, King’s College, London, believes that a 
system that could think like a human, an autonomous system, as described by DCDC, 
‘…would have responsiveness indistinguishable from, if not superior to, that of manned 
aircraft, levels of situational awareness far beyond those of humans, [and] be able to 
exercise judgement and possess a sense of responsibility’.186  Nicholson argues that 
significant advances would be required for such autonomous air systems, but that 
‘automated’ systems may reach levels of human situational awareness, and my even 
exceed these.  These automated systems, however, will lack the ability to judge and have a 
sense of responsibility, that is, ‘….there is no ‘awareness of awareness’’.187  This 
component, Nicholson believes, would be the key to an autonomous system.188  However, 
Nicholson believes a truly autonomous system is not currently viable, nor likely to be for 
some time, stating that: ‘The mystery of consciousness will not be solved in this century…It 
is the increased sophistication of on-board artificial intelligence in unmanned systems, 
subservient to human decision making, that will be the means by which air capability will be 
enhanced for the foreseeable future’.189  All of these views warrant consideration. 
It is apparent that within the UK MOD there is no consistent view of what autonomy means 
in relation to UCAS.  Gillespie and West’s, and the ONR report’s view of autonomy comes 
closest to the author’s vision of UCAS employment, but this is still really only a high level of 
automation.  With automation, DCDC describes ‘…its output is predictable’.190  It should be 
expected that any weapon system’s output is predictable, when working correctly.  
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Similarly, a pilot’s output should be predictable, as would be UCAS’s.  Even an adversary’s 
actions should be predictable, within defined boundaries.  This is not in the sense that 
adversaries’ actions can be predicted; but it does mean that ‘systems’ will follow a set of 
rules, defined within pre-programmed matrices, while manned systems will use tactics and 
procedures that are constrained by the laws of physics and convention.   Unpredictable 
actions should not be confused with a pilot, for example, who carries out a manoeuvre that 
allows him to defeat an adversary in air-to-air combat, one that his adversary was not 
expecting.  This manoeuvre would not be invented on the spot; it would be one that was 
within the pilot’s skill-set; one that had been practised - one that would be the best 
manoeuvre for that situation.  It may seem unpredictable to the adversary, but in reality, it is 
in the bounds of what the pilot and the aircraft could actually do - within the bounds of 
tactical doctrine and the laws of physics.  Strict convention would have been followed to 
achieve the best result.  Manoeuvres made up on the spur of the moment, invariably lead 
to a suboptimal situation.  Major Robert Trsek USAF, (his Master’s thesis already 
mentioned), himself a fighter pilot on F-15Cs, believes automation is the way forward: 
‘…automated BFM can provide far superior maneuvering against the majority of pilots the 
world over’.191  It seems that even some UAS autonomy industry experts now acknowledge 
that what they really mean by an autonomous UAS, is not a truly autonomous system. It 
was acknowledged at the ‘2012 Autonomous Systems Technology Related Airborne 
Evaluation & Assessment Conference’, that the UAS industry, ‘…had not done itself any 
favours with its choice of [autonomy] terminology’.192 
In summary, the author defines ‘Automatic Systems’, as systems which use pre-
programmed instructions, however complex – these may be aided by  Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) software.  ‘Autonomous Systems’ are defined as systems that make decisions which 
are not based on specific directions from pre-programmed instructions, but more random 
decisions, based on their own interpretation of influences.  This thesis uses the term 
‘autonomous’, acknowledging that ‘a high level of automation’ is more accurate.  The 
author argues that a high level of automation is actually how UCAS would be utilised.  It is 
probable that UCAS will only act ‘autonomously’, when communications links are lost, and 
then, only in the sense that there is no human input into its decision-making, but as the 
decision making is based on pre-programmed instructions, the UCAS will still be in 
automation mode.  This is an important distinction, as it should help both military and 
political decision makers understand the legal boundaries within which new weapon 
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systems are required to operate, according to the LOAC.193  Whatever interpretation is 
used, automatic/autonomous systems are already in the inventory of most militaries.  
Cruise missiles, anti-radiation missiles, and AAM, are just some examples of weapons 
systems that once launched, use on- or off-board systems to continue to seek their target, 
independent of the launching platform.  The US AEGIS Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) sea-
based system, and the Patriot SAM land-based system have been in service since the 
1970/80s.194  Both of these systems are intended to be operated automatically, in an 
environment that requires engagement decisions to be made more quickly than those by a 
human.195 
The One-Seat versus Two-Seat Debate 
A USAF Advanced Staff College paper views that, ‘Airmen provide the flexibility and 
adaptability that is synonymous with airpower. UAVs will play a large role in our future but 
airmen will be required to ensure that UAVs are employed correctly and manned aircraft 
will be vital for dealing with the uncertainties of war’.196  Previous arguments have 
questioned the requirement for one-seat versus two-seat.  This question has divided air 
forces, on both sides of the Atlantic.197  This section examines some of the issues that have 
challenged the development of single- and two-seat fighters, and whether we are now on 
the cusp of any aircrew being required at all.    
Since the beginning of manned flight, pilots have been regarded as pivotal in the flying and 
operating of powered aircraft.  The Wright brothers, initially bike makers, were the pioneers 
of powered flight.  Other innovators added to the surge in aviation progress, with 
subsequent developments leading to aircraft capable of the full gamut of civil and military 
tasks, including transport, AAR, reconnaissance, bombing and air-to-air combat.  Over 
time, other aircrew skills were required to help facilitate the ever-increasing complex 
requirements that flying, per se, required, particularly in military scenarios.  These have 
included navigators, bomb aimers, observers, air engineers, air signallers, air electronic 
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operators, radio operators, air gunners, and latterly, WSO.  Some of these airborne 
professions are now redundant, at least in those air forces equipped with modern aircraft 
and systems.  The closure of the RAF’s Air Navigation School in 2011 heralded a new era, 
where no new ab Initio WSO will be trained.198  This was unthinkable even five years 
previously.  Indeed, when the RAF’s Tornado GR-4 goes out of service, the RAF will have 
no role for fast-jet qualified WSO.  There are reasons for this – the main one being that, 
with the advent of the single-seat Typhoon, and the probable introduction of F-35 JSF, 
there is no perceived requirement for fast-jet WSO.  
As technology has developed, the role of the navigator, and other associated airborne 
professions, has become less crucial.  The change of professional status from navigator to 
WSO was an attempt to capture the many functions for which a navigator was responsible, 
with navigation being just one part.199  Now defunct, the role of an AD navigator, for 
example, was always more of a battle manager, manipulating the air-to-air radar, the Link-
16 based Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) – a TDL system, and other 
avionic systems, while directing the pilot of his aircraft, and other aircraft and crews in his 
formation, to a position where engagement of adversary aircraft could take place, hopefully 
with some advantage.200  This was, more often than not, much harder to achieve than one 
would suppose.  First, the adversary had to be detected, which could be challenging, 
especially when airborne sensors, such as radar, were not capable of detecting aircraft in a 
heavy clutter environment, created by ground returns and electronic warfare (EW) 
techniques.  If an adversary was attempting to achieve the same aim, while utilising EA 
techniques, such as Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) jammers, against detection 
systems to confuse the air picture, engagements could be prolonged affairs, not always 
resulting in mission success.201  In training scenarios, this produced battered egos at best; 
in real-world operations, it could have catastrophic consequences at worst.   
Some advocates of the single-seat fighter use cockpit confusion as a reason against two-
seat operations; it is also advocated that it does not take two men to handle the workload.  
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The cockpit confusion objection to a two-seat fighter rests on concern that the need to take 
votes between cockpits delays the decision-making process.  Craig Penrice, a former RAF 
test pilot for the Eurofighter Typhoon, with experience on the Lightning and F-15, certainly 
believes so, opining that, ‘A modern, reliable defensive aids suite can easily do the job of 
the rear seat occupant during a dogfight’.202  This can be true, if two weak, or two dominant, 
aircrew are crewed together.  However, good crew-cooperation training, latterly referred to 
as crew resource management (CRM) by the RAF, has allowed the full benefits of two-crew 
operations to be realised.203  Penrice does not mention CRM, perhaps because he has no 
operational experience in two-seat aircraft; he absolutely advocates, however, the virtues of 
the single-seat fighter, stating: ‘….I believe wholeheartedly that the single seat fighter is the 
only really viable way ahead for the future on the grounds of cost and operational 
effectiveness.  Technical advances in the fields of sensor fusion allow a single pilot to have 
better situational awareness’.204  Another pro-single-seat argument is that, although there 
are many tasks, they do not all come at once; therefore, a fighter pilot should be able to do 
them.  However, while it is possible for one man to perform most tasks in a benign counter-
air environment, it is an entirely different matter in poor weather, at night, when one’s own 
systems are being jammed by EA.205    
Improvements in radar and other sensor technology, aligned with increases in computer 
processing power, have meant more automation can be incorporated into weapon systems, 
particularly radars.  This has allowed the better-designed fighters to dispense with the 
navigator/WSO.  There have been concerns and problems along this developmental path, 
however.  Nonetheless, fighters such as the F-22 Raptor, F-15 Eagle, F-16 Falcon, F-18 
Hornet, Typhoon and Rafale, and the Russian Su-27 Flanker and MiG-29 Fulcrum, are all 
predominantly single-seat.  Where there are two-seat versions of these aircraft, they are 
designed for use in mainly in the air-to-surface role, concentrating on the EA and SEAD 
tasks, against sophisticated IADS.206  These missions have traditionally necessitated a 
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heavier workload on aircrew, which, until quite recently, has meant two-seat fast-jets have 
been required to achieve the task.  On the other hand, the single-seat F-15C has proven to 
be an immensely capable air superiority fighter.  Flown by, amongst others, the US and 
Israel, it has achieved a kill ratio of 105.5:0 in conflicts in the Middle East.207  The F-22 
Raptor is acknowledged as the preeminent fighter flying today and the only fifth-generation 
fighter operational.208  The F-35 JSF is publicised as being capable of achieving all combat 
air power tasks; both of these aircraft are flown and operated by a single pilot.209  Whether 
operated by a single pilot, or more aircrew, recent conflicts have seen the strategic 
decision-making during sorties having to be made by the aircrew, due to lack of 
communications with their C2.210  The US Navy acknowledges the potential lack of C2, 
emphasising that future warfare:   
…could lead to a highly contested or even denied C2 environment where forces face a near 
total loss of their commercial and military-specific networking capabilities due to adversary 
action. Forces will be challenged to provide even one communication path for most 
information requirements. Threats to the Navy’s capabilities in this environment potentially 
involve a total loss of existing SATCOM and RF links, as well as a loss of GPS position 
navigation signals.211 
This is an important consideration; if unmanned air systems are to be utilised, mission 
critical decisions will need to be made autonomously, at times.  If unable to do so, whether 
for technical reasons, or a lack of willingness to by commanders, the roles of UCAS will be 
severely curtailed. 
Along with the trend towards single-seat aircraft operations, doctrine and tactics have 
evolved to take advantage of the transformation evolution that technological advances have 
allowed manned flight to utilise.  What advances in flight does the future hold?  With the 
demise of non-pilot aircrew, will advances in aviation systems mean there will be fewer 
requirements for pilots?  The evolution of flying continues.  Other than the actual act of 
flying an aircraft, historically, navigation has been deemed critical to mission success.  For 
much of the history of flight accurate navigation has proven somewhat problematic, 
especially until the advent of inertial navigation systems, and, significantly, satellite-based 
navigation systems.  Is technology just following a natural trend that means computers and 
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associated avionic systems will do the required task more efficiently?  Are we now coming 
full circle, where navigation accuracy and the precision of weapon delivery is by far the 
predominant requirement for combat air power?  Historically, the science, and some would 
say art, of navigation has taken precedence over many other aspects of warfare.  Mastery 
of the sea required accurate navigation.  The establishment of the Royal Observatory at 
Greenwich, and the fevered race to produce a timepiece allowing longitude to be calculated 
accurately enough to withstand the rigours of sea voyage, were fundamental to the success 
that Britain enjoyed as the primary sea power through the 18th and 19th centuries.212  John 
Harrison’s H1 timepiece, developed in the 1730s, allowing for accurate calculation of 
longitude, can be described as revolutionary.213   
The Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, and COIN operations in Afghanistan and post-war Iraq, 
have demonstrated the vital role that precision weapon delivery plays in modern warfare.  
Russia and China have taken note of these advances in weaponry, and have been making 
steady advances in their development of comparable systems.214  The primacy of 
navigation, and all that the mastery of it brings, is now, arguably, firmly established as the 
priority of any nation that wishes to have, and use effectively, a military force.  The fact that 
pilots have historically been required to fly aircraft that facilitate achieving the requisite 
military task should not be a driver for future doctrine, tactics, or procurement.  Technology 
now allows greater time, effort, and resources to be focused on systems that will not 
require a human interface in an aircraft.  With the demise of the two-seat fighter and the 
development of UCAS, capable of undertaking ISTAR and SEAD roles, considering their 
use in counter-air tasks seems a reasonable step.  
Potential Cost Benefits 
Aircrew in high performance aircraft, capable of sustained high ‘Gravity’ (G) manoeuvring, 
can suffer marked physical effects.  A UK study concluded that: ‘Good evidence is available 
to show that aircrew of high performance aircraft will experience degeneration of the 
cervical spine during their career which is greater than that observed in the normal 
population’.215  In 2010, the F-22 Raptor Force was grounded for a number of months, 
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following the loss of an F-22, suspected to be caused by the aircraft’s oxygen system 
malfunctioning and incapacitating the pilot.  The F-22, like the F/A-18C/D, uses an on-
board oxygen-generation system.  These types of systems are required on aircraft to allow 
persistence.216  While rectifiable, it illustrates the problems of having a human in the 
cockpit.  Although the preservation of aircrew is undoubtedly important, it is questionable 
whether this will be paramount in any decision on UCAS development.  The capability to 
operate longer than manned aircraft, and maintain persistence, are attributes that make 
UCAS every attractive.  It is these attributes, and the economics and effectiveness of a 
system, including the cost of training aircrew and associated through-life costs (TLC), which 
are likely to affect decisions on procurement and capability.  UCAS may well offer a 
significant TLC advantage over a manned system.  Notwithstanding that manpower will still 
be required to operate an autonomous system, taking aircrew out of the equation could 
mean substantial savings.  The cost of training a RAF Typhoon pilot to a point where 
he/she can start training on an operational squadron, for example, is £4 million, as of 
2008.217  Further training to actually become, and remain, capable of conducting 
operational tasks would be considerably more, perhaps as much as £9 million.  This is 
based on the capitation cost (the calculation used for overall cost) of the RAF Typhoon 
being £92,000 per hour, with it taking approximately 60 hours further training on a squadron 
before a Typhoon pilot becomes fully operational.218  Once operational, a Typhoon pilot 
currently requires 180 flying hours a year in order to conduct training to remain 
operational.219  The operating costs of a UCAS would be significantly less, essentially 
because the UCAV remains on the ground, containerised, unless or until it is actually 
required for operations, or maintenance procedures.220   
The cost of personnel normally forms the largest part of a country’s military budget.  For 
example, the actual cost of employing a relatively junior RAF officer, a flight lieutenant, is 
calculated using their annual salary, plus other associated costs.  In 2011, an RAF flight 
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lieutenant pilot was paid on average £50,000, including flying pay.221  The actual capitation 
cost includes annual salary, plus pension contributions (Superannuation Contribution 
Adjusted for Past Experience (SCAPE)) – for officers this is 42.8% for FY 2011/12, plus 
Earnings Related National Insurance Contributions (ERNIC) at 7.7%, plus housing, 
uniforms, training and other associated costs at 25%.222  This brings the average annual 
capitation cost for a junior officer pilot to £87,800.  The range of personnel costs will vary, 
according to rank; however, it can be broadly seen that by reducing manpower, costs can 
be significantly reduced. 
A substantial cost saving in training and personnel can be gained by the use of simulation.  
Advances in this area are creating opportunities for improvement in training that were not 
previously thought possible.  Most of the training and currency requirements could be 
achieved through distributed mission training (DMT) systems.  Although the UK uses a 
number of these types of training systems, it is the USAF that has been at the forefront of 
the development of DMT, with its Live, Virtual and Constructive (LVC) Integrating 
Architecture (IA) (LVC-IA) Plan.  USAF training specialists believe that the increased use of 
simulators and the ability to connect simulators and/or aircraft at dispersed locations, and 
new applications of LVC are essential allowing fifth-generation pilots are able to acquire the 
required skills, enabling training risks to be minimised.223  LVC simulations allow aircrew 
and other personnel to conduct training to an extremely high- level of fidelity, and at 
significant cost savings.  These systems may actually allow for better training - by offering 
the scenario that everything always works – aircraft and weapon systems, and C2 all work, 
and the weather is suitable - but, if required, effectiveness of individual systems and 
weapons could be degraded, to simulate austere operating conditions.  This is preferable to 
the haphazard way in which most live flying training is currently conducted, where the 
vagaries of system serviceability and the whims of the weather, significantly impact on the 
value of training – at great wasted cost, and, ultimately, operational effectiveness.224  There 
is a balance to be maintained, of course; however, technology advances should allow for 
the utilisation of these systems to greatly enhance the effectiveness of all air operations, 
including the use of UCAS, with associated cost savings. 
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Leadership Challenges  
Will future leaders of the military flying cadre have the necessary qualities to lead if they 
have never flown a military aircraft, let alone flown in combat?  Indeed, would it be 
necessary for any of the operators of a UCAS to be combat experienced aircrew?  The 
once pilot centric command hierarchy in the RAF is changing.  The 2011 RAF Commander-
in-Chief of Air Command, the second most senior officer in the RAF, was a navigator.  The 
commander of the new UK Joint Forces Command, announced in 2011, was also a 
navigator.  The 2nd edition of UK MOD’s AP3000: Air Power Doctrine emphasises the 
importance of leadership, stating, ‘Leadership can take many forms and styles both in the 
air and on the ground, but invariably includes professional mastery and moral courage’.225  
Although not emphasised in current publications, this is still pertinent.  ACM Sir Stephen 
Dalton, believes that air power’s significance is being diluted by a lack of understanding.  
Addressing a conference at the IISS in 2010, ACM Dalton stated:  
I would contend that air power is, and must be, our comparative advantage over potential 
opponents in future conflict.  So success depends on our ability to exploit this critical 
advantage, through mastery of its capabilities by people who have the knowledge, professional 
expertise and competence to apply that advantage.  Such mastery requires years of training, 
and our advantage must not be squandered by non-experts who do not really understand the 
third dimension – or relative and space advantage – that mastery of the air can deliver.226 
 
ACM Dalton’s views are relevant and hard-hitting; they get to the crux of the general 
malaise in the understanding of the attributes of air power, and should be a reminder to 
military leaders in all the disciplines and academics alike, that it is imperative to understand 
the dynamics of air power.  The relevant skills are not easily gained, or maintained.  This is 
axiomatic for sea and land power.  ACM Dalton has also stated that those who fly UAS 
‘….will be cut from the same cloth as their comrades in the air’.227  Notwithstanding the 
prescience of Dalton’s comments, would it be possible to have a Chief of the General Staff, 
who has not led soldiers in the field, or a Chief of the Naval Staff who has not captained a 
ship, or a Chief of the Air Staff who has no military flying experience?228  Not least, a lack of 
emotional connectivity with the battlespace will require particular attention by military 
leaders.  These are valid issues.  However, they should not detract from frank analysis 
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regarding the utility of UCAS in future warfare.229  The US, at least, has acknowledged 
there is a lack of ‘UAS-expert leaders’, and aims to identify future UAS-expert senior 
leaders, integrating them into their Air and Joint Staffs.230   
The UCAS Debate 
The debate over the future utility of UCAS is fierce, particularly within the US military 
hierarchy.  General Norton Schwartz, the USAF Chief of Staff in 2011, apparently rejected 
the development of a completely unmanned long-range bomber.  Schwartz, speaking to 
reporters, outlined the current state of US technology stating in his view, “‘… at least for the 
next 25 years, maybe 50 years, there's going to be a mix of manned and unmanned 
[aircraft].  Beyond 50 years, anything's possible’”.231  He also stated, ‘’…that he isn’t ready 
to contemplate a nuclear sortie on a remotely piloted aircraft’”.232  His reasoning for this is 
not clear, after all, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, armed with nuclear warheads have 
been part of the US arsenal for decades.  These cannot be recalled.    
In contrast, also speaking to reporters, US Marine General James Cartwright, the vice 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2011, stated he believes unmanned bomber 
technology is ready for deployment.  General Cartwright, who was the Pentagon's top-level 
review panel with authority to determine all of the military's major hardware requirements , 
said the US should buy an affordable bomber to replace its ageing fleet of conventional-
only B-1s and nuclear-capable B-52s and B-2s. 
What I'm trying to understand is: What is it we're going to build it for?  Is it the most exquisite, 
high-end, penetrating, go-anyplace anytime weapon system…or is it a truck that has today's 
state-of-the-art survivability attributes, can incorporate the next-generation attributes in a way 
that makes sense…[including] sensors and whatnot…and carry reasonable payloads?233 
Cartwright further stated that he would, ‘"throw down the gauntlet by asking whether the 
bomber truly requires a human pilot, or if instead all of them could be remotely 
controlled….Nobody's shown me anything that requires a person in that airplane.  
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Nobody"’.234  Whoever is correct, some military aviation analysts believe it is probable that 
the US has had UCAS projects in development for a number of years, including a probable 
project run by Northrop Grumman; this programme is likely to be a demonstrator for the US 
requirement for the original Next Generation Long-Range Strike System (NGLRSS) 
programme, now referred to as the Long-Range Strike Platform (LRSP).235   
Concept of Operations 
 
While a CONOPS is required for a UCAS, regardless of whether the platforms are manned 
or not, the doctrine with which forces are employed should remain constant.  Future military 
actions, and specifically air power, will still likely be based on the extant principles of war 
and, specifically, manoeuvrability.  Describing the Manoeuvrist Approach, UK MOD 
Defence Doctrine states: ‘Emphasis is placed on the defeat, disruption or neutralisation of 
an opponent through ingenuity, even guile, rather than necessarily, or exclusively, through 
the destruction of his capability or gaining territory for its own sake’.236  This is essentially 
the employment of forces on the battlefield through movement combined with firepower to 
gain advantage over an opponent.  The air power characteristics of reach, speed, and 
flexibility are particularly relevant to manoeuvre warfare.  Frans Osinga believes that the 
Manoeuvrist Approach is ‘…pure Boyd…’, referring to Boyd’s OODA Loop concept (this is 
examined in Chapter 4).237   
The US has a formidable and deserved reputation for carrier operations.  Beginning in 
earnest in the build-up to war in the Pacific in World War II, the US navy was pivotal in the 
joint campaign against Japan.  So important was the carrier, the US Army acknowledged 
that, ‘The decisive combat element in the Central Pacific was the large aircraft carrier…’.238  
The US Army Air Force, on the other hand, although acknowledging the crucial role of 
aircraft carriers during WW II, sought to emphasise the role of land-based air power, 
viewing the Leyte Gulf operation as an exemplar: 
….air operations had been successfully coordinated with the advance of ground and naval 
forces in the southwest Pacific…It had been repeatedly recognised…that carrier-based 
airpower could extend the reach of amphibious operations,…provided land-based airpower 
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was in a position to take over promptly the primary responsibility…the capacity to stay there 
and fight it out for whatever term might be necessary to maintain air superiority…239 
Permanence is one of the weaknesses of air power.  Nonetheless, US carrier operations 
were so effective in projecting power that they rendered battleships obsolete.240  This ability 
to conduct long-range strike and counter-air missions since World War II, including from 
carriers, has given the US a decisive military capability.241  Is this now the case?  Dr 
Thomas Ehrhard and Robert Work in, Range, Persistence, Stealth and Networking: The 
Case for a Carrier Based Unmanned Combat Air System, view current US capabilities to 
operate at long range as deficient.  They believe that both land- and sea-based US fighter 
assets lack the necessary range and persistence for air campaigns in non-permissive 
scenarios.242  These aircraft are best suited for striking targets at a maximum of 450 nm 
from their operating bases/carriers.  Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM) and cruise missile 
threats are likely to force US Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) to operate at least 1000 nm from 
adversary borders.243  Why is this relevant?  Mark Gunzinger from the US Centre for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) believes that a number of states, including 
those of China and Iran, are investing in A2/AD doctrine that, ‘…poses a direct and 
formidable challenge to the traditional forms of US conventional power-projection in all 
operating domains’.244  Andrew Krepinevich, and others, define ‘[A2] strategies [as actions] 
to prevent US forces entry into a theater of operations…[AD] operations aim to prevent 
their freedom of action in the more narrow confines of the area under an enemy’s direct 
control’.245  The US DoD defines A2 as: ‘Action intended to slow deployment of friendly 
forces into a theater or cause forces to operate from distances farther from the locus of 
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conﬂict than they would otherwise prefer A2 affects movement to a theater’.246  AD is 
defined as: ‘Action intended to impede friendly operations within areas where an adversary 
cannot or will not prevent access. AD affects maneuver within a theater’.247 
 
While the US military currently enjoys a huge advantage over the PRC, the geography of 
the Western Pacific nullifies some of this superiority.248  According to Gunzinger, scenarios 
involving such A2/AD systems would require US short-range land- and sea-based combat 
aircraft to operate from much longer ranges, curtailing their ability to attack land targets 
deep in adversary territory, greatly reducing sortie generation rates.  The development of 
advanced IADS would probably make most areas impassable to non-stealthy aircraft and 
cruise missiles.249    
Concentration of force is a fundamental principle of war that is particularly well suited to air 
power.  Experience has shown that air power concentrated in both time and space is more 
effective in achieving an objective than if it were dispersed over a wider area and longer 
time.250  Moreover, a concentrated force will use support forces more efficiently, increasing 
overall capability and survivability.  Whether operating from carriers or land-based, UCAS 
would conduct missions as part of a COMAO concept.  A COMAO formation normally 
consists of counter-air, strike, AAR, ISTAR and other supporting assets.  Benefits of 
operating in large formations include minimising attrition by optimising mutual support and 
saturating adversary IADS, generally by concentrating force.251  However, due to UCAS 
extended range and persistence, other assets may be stretched to support.  Fundamental 
to the future employment of UCAS, will be their utility within COMAO packages.  Ultimately, 
it may be possible for a large COMAO formation of combat and support aircraft, combining 
manned aircraft and UCAS, or made up entirely of UCAS, to operate together or 
autonomously.  This autonomy may permit a quicker and more accurate response, allowing 
not only a high probability of survival, but ultimately the desired strategic effect being 
achieved.    
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Current US led operations in Afghanistan utilise the advantages that UAS bring over 
manned aircraft, such as persistence and operating costs.  Other nations, including China 
and Iran, have seen the force multiplier attributes of these systems.  The momentum of 
UAS development is increasing worldwide.  The next stage is the development and use of 
them in highly contested airspace; this will require a fundamental change in approach in a 
number of disciplines, including procurement, planning, doctrine, and the tactics used.  This 
will not be easy – a thorough and robust understanding of the international environment 
over the coming decades is necessary to inform the debate.  The types of situations in 
which any military system needs to operate, dictates that system’s requirement.  The 
relationships between nations will dictate the resources allocated to nations’ military 
infrastructures.  Predicting future conflicts poses problems; however, tensions and conflicts 
will continue to be a part of international relations.252  According to a report from the US 
National Intelligence Council, there is an economic shift in emphasis away from the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries, to Asia.  When 
observing on China’s economic advancements, the report states, ‘….This high economic 
growth has resulted in an unprecedented demand for natural resources…it is evident that 
change is inevitable and that many stress points are likely to emerge in the future global 
environment’.253  Economic constraints and competition over natural resources will likely 
create focal points that result in nations making claims and counter-claims, flexing their 
economic and military apparatus in attempts to achieve objectives.   
 
A2/AD networks being developed by China, Iran and other states will pose unacceptably 
high risks to land- and sea-based forces, compelling them to operate initially as far as 1000 
nm or more from an adversary’s coastline.  Aircraft with a range that is at least two to three 
times that of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet or F-35 JSF are required, if combat air is to 
contribute to future operations.254  According to Gunzinger, ‘…[these] land- and sea-based 
aircraft penetrating dense, sophisticated IADS will require all-aspect, broadband low-
observable characteristics’.255  If NEC assets are compromised, combat air will be required 
to operate effectively independent of these networks.  Ultimately, the combination of range, 
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persistence, stealth, EA and autonomy will likely be the prerequisite for effective strike 
operations over the coming decades.  These strike missions will necessitate operating in 
highly contested airspace, where control of the air will be required.  UCAS capable of 
conducting all parts of this task may offer a solution to the range and persistence challenge.  
However, the cost of advanced military system development and implementation, and the 
returns to any civilian manufacturer, may have a significant impact on the ability of the 
military/industrial complex to pursue the development of UCAS.  A balance between the 
requirements of the state and industry will always be difficult, but must be taken into 
account.   
Persistence is a key force multiplier of UCAS.  However, for missions requiring 
engagement of an adversary, weapons expenditure may become a limiting factor.  
Development of Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) may alleviate this problem by permitting 
a range of targets to be engaged, either lethally, or non-lethally, allowing an engagement 
capability to persist for as long as a UCAV can remain airborne.256  The question of 
whether UCAS will ever be allowed to operate totally autonomously is an emotive one.  The 
LOAC, which is based on Customary International Humanitarian Law, as defined by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, may mean that the authorities are not willing to 
take the risk of allowing decisions to be made by a ‘machine’, without reach-back to a 
command centre.257  UCAS, or any other system, manned or unmanned, that cannot 
operate autonomously when required, will only be of use in certain scenarios.  Large state 
conflicts, that could mean the survivability of one state over another, may require a 
response that is currently not part of most nations’ doctrine.  A radical approach to this 
issue is required, particularly, if potential adversaries are prepared to use similar systems 
fully autonomously.  
UCAS have the potential to offer a revolutionary new set of options with enormous long-
term payoffs to air power in terms of expanded mission tasks, tactical deterrence and, 
importantly, affordability.  Although ROE constraints and moral and political necessities 
may initially militate against full autonomy, the development of AI and Human-Machine-
Interface (HMI) technology may offer a level of integration which enables a greater degree 
of certainty when conducting Combat Identification (CID) and Collateral Damage Estimation 
(CDE), than that of a Human-in-the-Loop system (HITL).  This would allow missions to be 
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planned and then executed using on-board decision making – with a Human-on-the-Loop 
(HOTL) monitoring the system and taking action only when necessary, and perhaps, totally 
autonomously.  Precision has been the driving characteristic of air power in recent conflicts.  
Although this will remain extant, with the advent of improved IADS and modern SAM, low 
probability of detection may become crucial, with EA, persistence, payload and 
discrimination also vital to the utilisation of air power.  Persistence is enabled by a number 
of technologies, such as significant advances in propulsion and aerodynamics.  
Autonomous in-flight refuelling, potentially with unmanned tankers, and advanced power 
sources would allow for increased endurance.  UCAS would stay on task for as long as fuel 
permits, and then leave the hostile airspace to refuel and return.  Separating aircrews from 
their platforms is also a factor in increasing range and endurance.  However, although 
UCAV can deploy over great distances and with a reduced logistic chains, their operating 
tempo may stretch any manned airborne supporting systems.  If the TLC of a UCAS means 
that these systems are High Value Airborne Assets (HVAA), it may mean manned HVAA 
are required to protect them, thereby mitigating any advantage that these systems offer.  In 
order to operate effectively, UCAS will need to be able to control the air space they fly.  It is 
important, therefore, that UCAS are capable of operating independently of other HVAA, 
with a high chance of survival.  This premise is at the crux of this thesis. 
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Chapter 3: Unmanned Combat Air Systems: Technical, Legal and Ethical 
Challenges 
UCAS Developments 
The development of UCAS worldwide is consistent with the evolution of UAS as a whole.  
Countries, such as Iran, see UAS as offering a significant problem to US maritime forces in 
the Gulf, for example.  Stuart Yeh, in Comparative Strategy, argues: ‘A small force of UAVs 
could decimate entire divisions of soldiers…destroy all aircraft in a given threater, and put 
Nimitz-class carriers out of action’.258  Already discussed, the US DOD’s Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems Roadmap: 2005 – 2030, outlines a programme for the development of 
UAS/UCAS.  This roadmap is not policy, but it does give guidance on what is possible, if 
procurement leans towards unmanned systems.  The US Joint-UCAS programme is quoted 
in the roadmap, but was cancelled in 2007.  The US Navy has now taken over the 
development of the US UCAS, with its UCLASS programme (detailed in Chapter 2).  A 
number of other US companies are mirroring Northrop Grumman’s UCAS programmes, 
although, not necessarily aligned with seaborne operations in mind.  Boeing has been 
developing the X-45 Phantom Ray UCAS.  General Dynamics are developing the Predator-
C Avenger.  This system is a jet powered, semi-stealthy UAS, which has the potential to be 
more survivable than current UAS.259  Whether Avenger type UAS have a place in warfare 
is debateable, as it appears that it is not a UCAS, as defined in this thesis.  It would seem 
that this program is on hold in any case.260  Other systems have been trialled, such as the 
Lockheed Polecat, which crashed during trials in 2006, and has since been cancelled.261  
Pictures published by bloggers on the web in 2009 of a strange looking UAS, led the USAF 
to acknowledge that it was fielding a stealthy UAS, the RQ-170.262  It is believed that the 
RQ-170 is being utilised in and from Afghanistan in the ISR role.263  Whatever its role, it 
seems to be a precursor to the shape of future UCAS.  In December 2011, an RQ-170 
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flying over Iranian territory was obtained by Iran, with open sources indicate that it is 
virtually unscathed.264  The US has acknowledged the loss of an RQ-170 while on a 
mission over Iranian territory.  Speculative reports suggest that the RQ-170 may have 
suffered a cyber-attack against its command-and-control system, allowing Iranian forces to 
take control of it.265  Iranian officials have claimed they jammed the GPS and guided it to a 
landing area.  Although Western experts indicate this is plausible, US officials blamed the 
loss on a malfunction.266  There is little doubt that Iran will attempt to reverse engineer the 
RQ-170.  How damaging this may be to any technological advantage the US has in 
UAS/UCAS development is difficult to make comment on.  However, in May 2013, photos 
of what appears like an RQ-170 taxiing at an airfield in China, appeared on a Chinese 
website.267 
The US UAS Roadmap 2005 – 2030 and USAF UAS Flight Plan 2009 – 2047, detailed 
earlier, give details of the possible timelines for the different systems and missions for 
which UAS/UCAS could be utilised.  The USAF is analysing the requirement for a follow on 
to the MQ-9 Reaper UAS.  Its vision is for a medium sized UAS, referred to as the MQ-M, 
to be operational by 2020; it will be required to have:  
.…an enhanced autonomy, modular, open architecture and networked system built around a 
common core airframe…[while] incorporat[ing] modular structural elements as well as 
payloads for optimal mission performance.  The sensors will be interchangeable...[with an] 
open architecture interface for weapons allows air-to-ground and air-to-air weapons 
employment from current and future weapon inventories.  As the MQ-M evolves over time an 
air refuelling configuration in the 2030 timeframe will allow the aircraft to serve as a small 
tanker, extending the missions of other aircraft.268  
From approximately 2030 onwards, the USAF UAS Fight Plan foresees the MQ-Mc version 
capable of performing a number of roles including: autonomous swarm, aero-medical 
evacuation, personnel recovery, EW, SEAD, ISTAR, CAS, air interdiction, AAR as a tanker, 
missile defence, strategic attack, and counter-air missions.269  These counter-air missions 
are defined within the USAF UAS Flight Plan as DCA missions.  Larger UAS, nominated as 
MQ-L, will be capable of all of these roles, additionally, Battle Management Command and 
Control (BMC2), Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, AWACS, air mobility and 
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humanitarian assistance operations, but excluding counter-air.270  In the Special System 
category, the roles of LO persistent and penetrating ISR and SEAD, hypersonic ISR, C2, 
lift, and strike are emphasised as specialised roles.  These missions will demand high 
levels of autonomy, and the capability for ultra-long endurance or hypersonic flight.  
Significantly, due to the sensitive nature of these types of UAS/UCAS programmes, they 
will be developed in the classified domain.271   
In 2006, the US DoD’s Quadrennial Defense Review concluded that the USAF should 
accelerate the fielding of its NGLRSS from 2037 to 2018.272  It is envisaged that 80 to 100 
of the aircraft are to be built.273  Looking forward to 2025, for a replacement for the F/A-
18E/F and F-22, Boeing are working on design concepts for a sixth-generation fighter; 
conceptually, its design will be stealthy, tailless, with the ability to super-cruise, and, 
significantly, will be optionally manned.274  This has traction with some aviation experts, as 
it is far easier to make a stealthy air vehicle if it is unmanned, as there is no requirement to 
have a cockpit with very reflective surfaces – so attractive to radars.275 
The UK has collaborated with the US on a UCAS programme (referred to as ‘Project 
Churchill’), forming a partnership in establishing a CONOPS.276  This project ceased in 
2009, but has, nonetheless, proved extremely valuable in allowing fundamental research to 
be undertaken.  As already mentioned, as part of the overarching DPOC study, BAE 
Systems has been awarded a contract by the UK MOD to build a UCAS, as a technology 
risk reduction demonstrator.  A European consortium of six counties, led by Dassault 
Aviation, aims to have its own UCAS Project, NEURON.277  All of these programmes are 
demonstrators; they are not necessarily intended to become operational systems.  Their 
successes, or otherwise, will help inform future procurement decisions.  Unlike the US, 
there are no UK, or European equivalents, of the US UAS Roadmap 2005 – 2030 and 
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USAF UAS Flight Plan 2009 – 2047.  Making informed comment on these countries’ UCAS 
ambitions is, therefore, difficult. 
It is likely that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is developing concepts for 
UCAS along the same lines as Western doctrine, with UCAV that can conduct AAR, and 
able to conduct long-range missions, including ISTAR, strike and SEAD.278  Since first 
appearing at the 2006 Zhuhai air show as an advanced UCAS concept, An Jian (Dark 
Sword) has posed questions for Western analysts about its proposed role.  Initially 
portrayed as being intended for air-to-air superiority roles, the design reflects the potential 
for a combination of concepts.  Due to its size, and corresponding fuel capacity, a UCAV of 
this type could theoretically support air-to-air operations after reaching its target.  According 
to Peter La-Franchi, a defence analyst from Flightglobal:  ‘…Dark Sword hints at an 
operational concept that is part of developing ideas for the conduct of extremely long-range 
deployments, followed by highly dynamic operations’.279  Although this objective is 
technologically challenging, it is consistent with the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) 
desired approach to be able to engage a future adversary at great distances.  At the Zhuhai 
Air Show, a representative called the aircraft the, ‘…future of Chinese unmanned combat 
aviation…’, emphasising its projected ability to evade enemy radar and to engage in air-to-
air combat.280   
The Dark Sword concept may well represent an attempt to field a counter-air UCAS.281  
However, it appears very conceptual.  A counter-air UCAS would require far more than just 
a very fast, high-altitude capable and manoeuvrable airframe.  It is the avionics, sensors 
and networking capabilities that are fundamental to this type of system.  That said, China’s 
showing of its J-20 and J-31 5th Generation stealth fighters in 2011 and 2012 respectively, 
demonstrates how quickly it can develop concepts.282  It is likely that future UCAS 
developments are aligned with China’s A2/AD doctrine, and that these systems will form 
                                                          
278 See Ian M. Easton and L.C. Russell Hsiao, The Chinese People's Liberation Army's Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle Project: Organizational Capacities and Operational Capabilities', Arlington, VA: Project 2049 
Institute, 2013), http://project2049.net/documents/uav_easton_hsiao.pdf, (accessed 13 March 2013), p.12. 
279 Peter La-Franchi, China's Dark Sword Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Programme Raises Questions', 
Flightglobal, (17 October 2007). http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/10/17/218683/chinas-dark-
sword-unmanned-combat-air-vehicle-programme-raises.html, (accessed 25 November 2010). 
280 Kospoth, op. cit. See also, Bradley Pitt and Maxim Pyadushkin, 'Unmanned in the East', Aviation Week 
& Space Technology, 9 July 2012, p.102. 
281 Douglas Barrie and Alexey Komarov, 'Fighter Order Rekindles Russian Air Force', Aviation Week, 26 
August 2009, 
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/RUSSAF082609.x
ml, (accessed 2 March 2010). 
282 Abdullah, The Military Balance: 2013, p.254. 
80 
 
part of the matrix of sensors and weapon systems China aspires to in building a viable 
deterrent force, and one also capable of enforcing its aims, if required.283 
The unveiling of a full-scale mock-up of a Russian UCAV at the 2007 MAKS Air Show, 
highlighted Russia’s desire to venture into UCAS development.  The Skat UCAV was seen 
again at the 2009 MAKS Air Show.  As recently as June 2013, RAC MiG have announced 
that a research and development contract has been signed with the Russian Defence 
Ministry to build a prototype.284  Mayor General Oleg Barmin, chief of procurement for the 
Russian air force in 2011, has suggested that the UCAV could carry the same weapons as 
the PAK-FA 5th Generation fighter.285  MiG and Sukhoi are also working together on UCAS 
developments.  Sukhoi General Designer, Mikhail Pogosyan, has commented that the 
development of a UCAV could be the first common effort between the two fighter 
manufacturers.286 How these would fit in with manned systems is difficult to judge; 
however, UCAS would probably need to be used in the same way as Western systems.  
Russian support of UAS/UCAS, however, is not universal.  Nikolay Chistyakov, chief UAS 
designer at Novik 21st Century Science and Production Design Centre, has stated: ‘In my 
view, the role of the UAV in contemporary conflicts has been considerably overrated…the 
current vogue for strike-capable UAVs is altogether a total absurdity…Far simpler to bring 
up a D-30 howitzer battalion and raze to the ground the area being targeted for strike…’.287  
Whether this is indicative of policy within Russia’s military hierarchy, or if Chistyakov is just 
displaying a level of naivety and lack of understanding of the basics of air power that 
borders on ludicrous, is difficult to judge.  Perhaps Russia does not intend to enter into 
strategic UAS/UCAS development to any great extent.  It is possible that Russia’s desire to 
enhance its own UAS industrial base is as much an attempt to enter the World UAS/UCAS 
market, than gaining military capabilities.288  See Appendix I for examples of current 
International UCAS programmes. 
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UCAS Technological Challenges 
The necessary components of a counter-air campaign are examined in Chapter 4.  Most, if 
not all, of these components will be necessary for the successful utility of future UCAS.  
The future challenges that these systems will face requires reviewing.  The weapon 
systems, sensors, overall airframe, and engine design that UCAS require, are fundamental 
to their successful development, and ultimately, the doctrine by which they will be 
employed.  Whether the air vehicle itself requires being as manoeuvrable as the F-22 
Raptor, for example, in the close-combat arena, is an important consideration.  To this end, 
part of the author’s research asks the question: ‘How often, since the Vietnam War, has it 
been necessary to use a fighter’s AAG as a means to achieve a kill?289  As previously 
discussed, from interviews conducted with a number of counter-air aircrew, the available 
evidence suggests that an AAG is not required, although it may be another matter for low-
intensity operations in an air-to-surface role.290  This does not mean that a visual 
manoeuvring capability for visual combat will not be necessary.  To what extent, however, 
will depend on how well NEC is integrated, aligned with the employment of HOBS AAM.   
Jason Bowman, from the US Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), believes that the 
distinction between ‘manned’ and ‘unmanned’ systems will erode; the person is no longer 
limited by the aircraft, and it is not pilots, but mission managers that will be required.  
Significantly, Bowman considers that UAS will need to become more survivable to allow 
operating in contested and denied airspace.  In his view, UAS will require speed, 
manoeuvrability, EW capability and visual, acoustic and IR stealth in contested airspace; in 
addition, in denied airspace.  UAS will also require airframe shaping, materials and 
aperture technology.291  The importance of TDL and communications, particularly the 
vulnerability of satellites was emphasised.  Ultimately, Bowman believes, there is a 
significant potential in the utility of UAS to increase cost effectiveness, without going to the 
extremes of stealth and speed.  Perhaps, most importantly, he believes the issue of 
autonomy is not new, sighting the example of the US Navy AEGIS SAM system and cruise 
missile, which the US has been comfortable with since the 1970s.292  Philippe Koff, head of 
the European NEURON UCAS project, believes that there is a balance between LO and 
stealth, and that air-to-air missions need some thought, particularly for the 2030-40 epoch, 
and if used correctly, autonomy will make TDL and communication links less susceptible.293  
Both Bowman’s and Koff’s views are important; they indicate where European and US 
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UCAS doctrine may be heading.  The views of the majority of responders to the 
questionnaire also align with this. 
Advances in a broad range of technologies have begun to enable the integration of joint-
forces, not previously possible.  Perhaps the most significant is the expansion in computing 
technology.  The principle of ‘Moore’s Law’ has been proven correct, thus far.  The 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap: 2005 – 2030 emphasises this, stating: ‘[that if the 
ultimate goal is to replace aircrew with a system of]…superior capacity, and responses 
gained from training and experience, then processors of human-like speed, memory, and 
situational adaptability are necessary’.294  According to the Roadmap, human capabilities 
are generally agreed to equate to 100 million million-instructions-per-second in speed, and 
100 million megabytes in memory; the cost of developing a system that could conduct most 
human thought processes is currently uncompetitive with that of a trained human.  It is 
likely, though, that by 2030 the cost of a 100 million MIPS processor should approach 
$(US) 10,000.295  Raymond Kurzweil, a prominent computer technologist, believes that the 
inevitable rate of continuing growth in processing power means there will be a point in the 
future where the rules of ordinary physics do not apply, sometimes referred to as 
singularity.  Kurzweil’s analysis of the exponential growth of processing power agrees with 
Moore’s Law.  He believes that the human brain will be successfully reversed engineered 
by the mid-2020s, and by 2030 computers will be capable of human-level intelligence.  
Kurzweil estimates, that by 2045, due to the vast increases in computing power and the 
reductions in cost, ‘…the quantity of artificial intelligence created will be about a billion 
times the sum of all human intelligence that exists today’.296  Kurzweil’s views are not 
universally accepted, but they are worth considering.   
The limit of computer processing power has been predicted many times; however, Justin 
Rattner, Chief Technology Officer of Intel Corporation, believes this is not the case: 
In some sense - silicon gate CMOS [Complementary Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor] - Moore’s 
law ended last year…One of the founding laws of accelerating returns ends.  But there are a 
lot of smart people at Intel and they able to reinvent the cruise CMOS transistor using new 
materials.  Intel is now looking beyond 2020 at photonics and quantum effects such as 
spin…The arc of Moore’s Law brings singularity ever closer.297 
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This is not an isolated view.  Peter Cochrane, the former head of BT’s research labs, 
believes that for machines to outsmart humans: 
.…depends on almost one factor alone - the number of networked sensors.  Intelligence is 
more to do with sensory ability than memory and computing power….The internet overtook the 
capacity of a single human brain in 2006….I reckon we’re looking at the 2020 timeframe for a 
significant machine intelligence to emerge….By 2030 it really should be game over.298 
What does this mean for future UCAS development?  It is assumed that UCAS will use AI 
technology such as ‘Agent' software.  There is no universal definition of AI; Andrew 
Ilachinski, from the Center for Naval Analyses, describes Artificial Life, as, ‘…using artificial 
components (such as computer programs) to capture the behavioural essence of living 
systems’.299  Agent programs have evolved from other legacy AI software, such as Fuzzy 
Logic and Neural Networks; these are now maturing into a feasible technology, aligned with 
a viable HMI.  Agents are normally defined as self-governing (autonomous), problem-
solving computational units capable of effective operation in dynamic and open 
environments.  They are often deployed in environments in which they interact, and 
sometimes cooperate with other agents (including both people and software) that have 
possibly conflicting aims.  These situations are known as multi-agent systems.  Essentially, 
Agent programs are autonomous entities capable of exercising choice over their actions 
and interactions, acting in order to achieve individual objectives.300 
Current UCAS programmes indicate that their UCAV are not high performing airframes in 
the classic fighter sense.  That is to say, they do not have a supersonic, very high level, 
capability.  The X-47C UAS-D as an example, is capable of heights and speeds of 40,000 
ft. and M0.85.301  These are well below current counter-air aircraft traits, such as the F-
22.302  These aspects of air-to-air combat are normally fundamental to the success of BVR 
engagements, unless other aspects of the vehicle’s design mitigate this advantage, for 
example, stealth technology, which may allow a platform to get close enough to an 
adversary, unseen, allowing first use of AAM, before the adversary’s detection systems 
have allowed them to launch their own AAM.  Already established, in its simplest form, the 
higher and faster a fighter aircraft can fly the further and faster its AAM will go, the larger 
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the distance between fighters at AAM impact.303  This may enable the fighter to stay 
outside an adversary’s AAM Missile Engagement Zone (MEZ), while allowing the aircrew 
time to plan and coordinate the appropriate tactics, and escape, if necessary.304  
Future Weapon Systems and Autonomy Capabilities 
Barry Watts, in Six Decades of Guided Munitions and Battle Networks, argues that a long-
term problem for the US is, how long can it have superiority in guided munitions and 
Networked Centric Warfare (NCW) capabilities?  China is currently focused on exploiting 
guided munitions and battle networks, primarily as an A2/AD.  However, in the long-term, 
China may be the most likely state to field combat systems capable of opposing those of 
the US.  US supremacy does not mean that rivalry in this area has ended.305  This does not 
mean that weapon delivery technology will stagnate at the endpoint; other, more effective 
means of delivering objectives are likely to have their own revolution. 
Unless AAM and SAM systems are developed that achieve an acceptable level of kill 
probability, then alternative means will be required.  DEW could radically transform the 
conduct of future warfare.  From the perspective of the current guided-munitions regime, 
DEW appears, on balance, to be a technology that could eventually produce radical and 
far-reaching changes in the conduct of war.  DEW not only offers the possibility of 
achieving an extremely fast kill through vastly improve weapon systems, but, in an 
application such as the intercept of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, AAM, and SAM, 
extend the maximum feasible range of aimed, line-of-sight weapons to several hundred 
nm.306   
The USAF appears to be leading the field in AI and autonomy programmes.  The USAF 
UAS Flight Plan envisages, ‘… a fully autonomous capability, swarming, and Hypersonic 
technology to put the enemy off balance by being able to almost instantaneously create 
effects throughout the battlespace’.307  The aim is, to get inside an adversary’s OODA 
Loop.308  The leadership of the RAF also understands the implications of the revolution that 
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weapons technology can bring to the effectiveness of future combat air structures.  In 2011, 
the RAF’s CAS, ACM Sir Stephen Dalton, remarked to reporters: ‘”…There’s a lot more 
capability out there in terms of using microwaves, heat waves and lasers, and we need to 
further our understanding of them…,we might be able to use a [DEW] of some form or 
other from a non-combat platform…”’.309   
Autonomy 
Although responses to the author’s questionnaire established that the vast majority (89%) 
of military professionals do not believe that UCAS should always need a human interface, it 
is not an unreasonable aspiration, although it may not always be possible, or indeed 
practical.310  Communication bandwidth constraints may not allow for full-time two-way 
communications with C2, the UCAS GCS and the UCAV.  Operating deep into adversary 
territory may militate against robust communications.  Not least, decisions made by a HITL, 
or indeed, a HOTL, may not be quick enough to attain the desired aim.  It is, therefore, 
crucial to at least investigate the effectiveness that autonomous UCAS operations may 
have in achieving the commander’s intent.  The USAF, in its UAS Flight Plan 2009 – 2047, 
believes that advances in computing speeds and capacity will change how technology 
affects the OODA Loop, ostensibly supporting the concept of a HOTL: 
Today the role of technology is changing from supporting to fully participating with humans in 
each step of the process.  In 2047 [the USAF predicts] technology will be able to reduce the 
time to complete the OODA loop to micro or nanoseconds….Increasingly humans will no 
longer be “in the loop” but rather “on the loop” – monitoring the execution of certain decisions. 
Simultaneously, advances in AI will enable systems to make combat decisions and act within 
legal and policy constraints without necessarily requiring human input.311 
If some degree of autonomy is authorised, the ability to retain and refine the level of 
autonomy the systems use will be fundamental to their effectiveness.  This should be 
established by mission role and in some cases within the phase of the mission, just as is 
the current doctrine for manned systems.  The USAF requires that: ‘To achieve a “perceive 
and act” decision vector capability, UAS [UCAS] must achieve a level of trust approaching 
that of humans charged with executing missions’.312  Although it is acknowledged that 
UCAS AI/autonomy should be based on human intent, the USAF envisages that humans 
will still be required to monitor the execution of operations and retain the ability to override 
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the system or change the level of autonomy during the mission, with a HOTL at all times.  
Whether this is possible in a communications link denied environment is crucial to whether 
UCAS could, or would be authorised to, operate totally autonomously, if this was the only 
mechanism by which the ‘system’ could achieve the commander’s intent. 
A metric by which autonomy levels are measured is required in order to understand what is 
necessary for successful operation.  However, before any metric can be designed, an 
appreciation of the complexities which an unmanned system may encounter, and the tasks 
required of that system, is necessary.  As technology advances, the autonomy on board 
these systems also advances.  As autonomy cannot be evaluated quantitatively without 
sound and thorough technical basis, the development of autonomy levels for unmanned 
systems must take into account many factors such as task complexity, human interaction, 
and environmental challenges.313   
A paper from the UK’s Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA), in 2000, 
describes a real-time adaptive automation and real-time task, interface and timeline 
management tool, designed to support pilot operations, while using computerised 
assistance.  Referred to as Pilot Authorisation of Control of Tasks (PACT) Levels, ‘The 
PACT system uses military terminology to distinguish realistic operational relationships for 
five aiding levels, with progressive pilot authority and computer autonomy supporting 
situation assessment, decision making and action’.314  Six levels of control are offered: 
Level 0, has no computer autonomy, with the pilot having full authority and control; Level 1 
introduces computer assistance to the pilot when requested; Level 2 uses the computer to 
offer advice, but the pilot needs to accept it; Level 3 uses computing to conduct tasks, with 
the pilot accepting or rejecting the recommendations; Level 4 – the computer conducts all 
tasks, unless revoked, and Level 5 is fully automatic, with monitoring only.315   
Another example of giving metrics to different levels of autonomy is used by the US 
National Air and Space Administration (NASA).  NASA uses the Function-specific Level of 
Autonomy and Automation Tool (FLOAAT).  NASA has constructed this tool to aid its future 
Crew Exploration Vehicle, as this will be designed at higher levels of autonomy and 
automation than previous NASA vehicles.  This is due to a number of reasons, including, 
significantly, communication delays, as well as computer enhancements, and the 
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emergence of highly reliable decision-making algorithms.316  At the centre of this evolution 
in design are the questions, ‘“What is the right balance of ground versus on-board authority 
(autonomy)?” [and] “What is the right balance of human vs. computer authority 
(automation)?”’ 317  The strength of FLOAAT is that it is a practical concept of separate 
levels of automation and autonomy, based on Boyd’s OODA Loop of ‘observe, orient, 
decide and act’.318  These studies have not gone unnoticed in China; an article in a journal 
from Beihang University, proposes 9 levels of autonomous control for UAS, with level 9 
being for fully autonomous control.319  From the DERA PACT and NASA examples, it is 
relatively easy to transpose appropriate levels for use when referring to how a UCAS could 
be utilised.  Keeping their five levels of autonomy, the following is the author’s interpretation 
of autonomy levels for UCAS.  Table 1 describes these definitions and levels of autonomy. 
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Level Observe Orient Decide Act 
5 On-board sensors 
operate 
autonomously.  Data 
assessed by UCAS.  
No HOTL. 
Data used by 
UCAS.  No HOTL. 
Decision made by 
UCAS.  No HOTL 
Task executed by 
UCAS.  No HOTL. 
4 On-board sensors 
operate 
autonomously.  Data 
assessed by UCAS.  
HOTL monitoring. 
Data used by 
UCAS.  HOTL 
monitoring. 
Decision made by 
UCAS.  HOTL 
monitoring. 
Task executed by 
UCAS.  HOTL can 
stop the task, if 
required. 
3 On-board sensors 
operate 
autonomously.  HITL 
can allocate sensor 
types. 
Data used by 
UCAS.  HITL 
monitoring. 
Decision made by 
UCAS.  HITL can 
alter decision 
HITL required to 
authorise execution 
of task, by 
accepting or 
rejecting. 
2 On-board sensors 
operate 
autonomously.  HITL 
can allocate sensor 
types. 
Data used by 
HITL. 
Decision made by 
HITL. 
HITL authorises 
execution of task. 
1 Air Vehicle flown with 
a combination of 
manual and 
automatic inputs.  
On-board sensors 
operated by HITL. 
Data used by 
HITL. 
Decision made by 
HITL. 
HITL authorises 
execution of task. 
Table 1: Author’s proposed Levels of autonomy that could be used by UCAS 
The author considers the minimum autonomy level a UCAS should operate is Level 3.  
Levels 1 and 2 are for information only; these levels would best describe current UAS 
operations, such as Reaper UAS in Afghanistan. 
Concern over the ability of autonomous systems to conduct the Find, Fix, Target, Track, 
Engage, and Assess (F2T2EA) cycle will be assuaged by systems that use Automatic 
Target Detection (ATD), Automatic Target Initiation (ATI) and Automatic Target Recognition 
89 
 
(ATR) technology.320  Faster and more-capable computers, communications, and weapon 
systems contribute to a faster pace in the battlespace and to the requirements for more-
rapid decision-making.  The proliferation of integrated, accurate sensors provides the 
opportunity to create a detailed, cohesive picture of the battlespace that could enhance and 
accelerate combat decisions.  Throughout the history of warfare, human senses and 
reasoning have been the predominant tools used to discriminate friendly forces from 
targets, and to prioritise and direct strikes against the targets.  However, with the volume of 
data threatening to overwhelm, some assistance is necessary to reduce the requirement for 
humans to analyse data and make decisions.  ATR can exploit sensor data gathering by 
using algorithms to analyse data.  Ideally, ATR algorithms, integrated with high-resolution 
data and communications fusion, would provide a list of recognised targets, along with 
sufficient data to assess the associated fratricide and CDE issues.321  This technology is 
particularly pertinent to UCAS conducting SEAD and air-to-surface operations, but also has 
efficacy in air-to-air roles.  In the long term, it seems inevitable that autonomous robotic 
combat systems will be fielded.  The USAF certainly plans to do so, with the aim of, 
‘…leverage[ing] a fully autonomous capability, swarming, and Hypersonic technology to put 
the enemy off balance by being able to almost instantaneously create effects throughout 
the battlespace’.322   
 
The main obstacle to the fielding of truly autonomous strike systems does not seem to be 
technological maturity.  It may not even be unit cost - instead it appears to lie in a cultural 
disinclination to turn attack decisions over to software algorithms (this is examined later in 
this chapter).  Whether potential adversaries such as China will have similar inhibitions is 
doubtful.323  The gap between the US and Russian/Chinese technological capabilities is 
rapidly closing.  Much of the computing processing technology required for advanced 
weapons and upgrades can be obtained through commercial sources.  China has access to 
                                                          
320 ATD, ATI and ATR, are the three phases of automatic entity detect, decide if important, then identify.  
See Jim Schroeder, 'Automatic Target Detection and Recognition Using Synthetic Aperture Radar 
Imagery', Cooperative Research Center fo Sensor Signal and Information Processing, 2011, 
http://www.ips.gov.au/IPSHosted/NCRS/wars/wars2002/proceedings/invited/print/schroeder.pdf, 
(accessed 23 August 2010), pp.1-3.  For the background to F2T2EA development, see Lt Col John M. 
Fyfe USAF, The Evolution of Time Sensitive Targeting: Operation Iraqi Freedom Results and Lessons, 
Research Paper 2005-02, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education: Air University, 2005, 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA476994, (accessed 4 November 2012), pp.9-12. The 
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combat engagements – Acquisition, Identification, Challenge, Attack, Position to Fire, Fire, Damage 
Assessment, Separation - see Attinello, Air-to-Air Encounters in Southeast Asia: Volume IV: Analyses, 
pp.22-23. 
321 Alan J. Vick and others, Aerospace Operations against Elusive Ground Targets, Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation, CA, 2001, pp.104-105. 
322 United States Air Force: Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009 - 2047, p.50. 
323 Watts, Six Decades of Guided Munitions and Battle Networks: Progress and Prospects, pp.283-284. 
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these weapons, and significantly, is very adept at reverse engineering, copying these 
systems and subsequently improving on their design.324  
Is the confidence placed in the US and its allies’ ability to counter emerging threats 
warranted?  There is a school of thought that the F-35 JSF, for example, may be unable to 
successfully neutralise the new generation of Russian/Chinese fighters that are envisaged 
in the coming decades.  Chris Mills, from Air Power Australia, believes, ‘The F-22 Raptor is 
the only US fighter design with the stealth, speed and agility to defeat the new Russian 
PAK-FA design...’.325  Dr Carlo Kopp, also from Air Power Australia, goes further, opining: 
....advanced Russian technology exports present a major strategic risk for the US, whether 
operated by China, or smaller players like Iran or Venezuela.  These systems will deny 
access to most US ISR and combat aircraft, with only the B-2A, the “2018 bomber” and the 
F-22A designed to penetrate such defences.  With its compromised X-band optimised 
stealth, the F-35 JSF will simply not be survivable in this environment.326 
These opinions are not aligned with current US military thinking.  The JSF published 
airframe and engine performance is still fundamentally better than any currently proposed 
UCAS platforms, giving it a higher maximum speed and better manoeuvrability.327  
However, it does not have the performance of the F-22 Raptor.  According to Mills, ‘…the 
most dangerous situation the US could face, is where the upwardly spiralling…costs of the 
JSF drain the available resources which are needed to develop the advanced capabilities 
necessary to counter the new Russian PAK-FA fifth-generation stealth fighter’.328  He 
further believes that the West needs to consider, ‘…long and hard about the PAK-FA, as 
the current and retrograde F-35 centric future fighter fleet model guarantees certain defeat 
in future combat’.329  Whether this view is true or not, it is evident that consideration needs 
to be given to the type of airframe a UCAV would require, in order to gain control of the air, 
against an adversary that has reached parity in advanced fighter design and capabilities.  It 
would seem possible that China is likely to achieve this.  The recent flight-testing of China’s 
J-20 and J-31 fifth-generation stealth fighters has given some cause for concern in the 
                                                          
324 For a view on how China is shrinking the technology gap between itself and the West, particularly the 
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West over China’s intentions.330  Although at a very early stage of testing, the mere display 
of such aircraft adds to the question of why China is developing these, and other 
sophisticated weapon systems. 
Tactical Data-Links 
Integrated TDL, which are a fundamental part of NEC, are being utilised by air, sea and 
land forces - particularly by US forces.    UCAS GCS personnel would utilise all aspects of 
integrated TDL displays and systems, if UCAS were not operating totally autonomously.  
Most modern western combat aircraft and support assets, such as AWACS, ELINT and 
AAR aircraft, are fitted with TDL.  Ground- and sea-based units, such as ships and radar 
sites are also fitted.  The aim is to allow an integrated Common Operating Picture (COP) to 
be used by all friendly forces.331  In warfare, situational awareness is king; TDL harness 
information from all sources, increasing situational awareness, if integrated correctly, to a 
level that gives an advantage over an adversary without the same capability.  This is, in 
part, why on day one of any campaign C2 nodes are targeted as a priority. 
The picture below is an example of the significant increase in situational awareness gained 
by the use of TDL.  The aircrew of this aircraft, a Tornado F-3, are able to establish where 
all friendly forces that have TDL are, and are also given the information that these units 
have; other entities detected by E-3 AWACS are also shown, establishing a COP, which is 
as accurate and complete as possible.  If any known hostile aircraft are detected, these 
would also be displayed to all users.  Ground and sea entities can also be part of the 
system.332   
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Figure 1: Tornado F-3 JTIDS display.333 
Advanced TDL displays are in colour, allowing for greater ease of use and discrimination.  
A level of integration with mapping displays and vastly superior HMI has been achieved 
because of the evolution of computer processing power.  When used autonomously, UCAS 
and other systems would not need displays – the information produced would be fused 
through ‘objective gateways’, such as Battlefield Airborne Communication Node (BACN), 
allowing decisions to be made much more quickly than if humans were involved.334  If a 
HITL was not possible because of loss of communications, then a fused COP could still 
allow UCAS, and other systems, to operate effectively, until, and if required, 
communications were re-established.  TDL, as part of an NEC, will aid third-party-targeting.  
The Japanese military refer to this as ‘Cloud Shooting’ – fighters would fire their AAM using 
off-board targeting data.335   
Air-to-Air Refuelling 
AAR has enabled air forces to project air power over great distances, sustaining these 
forces for extended periods, offering huge savings in both manpower and hardware.  AAR 
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capability is seen as a force multiplier.336  Unless a platform has the ability to stay airborne 
long enough to achieve its task unrefuelled, AAR assets will normally be required to extend 
their time airborne.  If AAR is unavailable, or limited, aircraft require the capability to have 
the range and endurance for the required mission; this will require not only significantly 
more aircraft, but also radically altered designed characteristics.  AAR assets, by virtue of 
their importance, are normally considered HVAA. 
 
It is anticipated that UCAS will be able to conduct AAR from the normal array of manned 
AAR assets.  Automated tanking from receiving UCAV will be critical to the persistent 
surveillance and deep-strike capabilities envisioned for UCAS.  It is intended that the 
Northrop Grumman X-47B UCAS-D will conduct trials proving that autonomous aircraft can 
refuel in flight from the same AAR assets, using the same methods as manned aircraft.337  
The UCAS and manned tanker aircraft exchange position information from on-board global-
positioning/inertial-navigation systems via a high-integrity data link.  The UCAS calculates 
its location relative to the tanker and flies itself into formation, from where it is directed, by 
its GCS or the tanker itself, to the standard refuelling positions used by manned aircraft.338 
As of 2011, more than 10,000 simulations had been conducted before the first X-47B flight, 
totalling approximately 100,000 hours, including AAR.  A surrogate F/A-18D Hornet has 
been used to conduct trials using the X-47B precision navigation software and hardware.  
The F/A-18 pilot was hands off, monitoring the procedure.  The surrogate F/A-18 performed 
36 approaches to a carrier, 16 touch-and-go landings, and six arrested landings.  The 
challenges associated with landing a UCAS aboard a carrier are similar to those in 
autonomous AAR, such as being able to determine a precise position relative to another 
moving object, the capability to hold that position, and the proper levels of command and 
control.  A team from Northrop Grumman plans to retrofit and demonstrate this capability by 
conducting flights with a surrogate, a modified Learjet, in 2014.339   
While the USAF and USN are developing a common approach to automated refuelling, the 
Navy version requires an additional step.  In the USAF system, the unmanned aircraft 
navigates itself to the centre of the boom envelope, where the refuelling operator on the 
tanker takes over and steers the boom into contact with the receiver.  In the USN probe-
and-drogue system version, the UCAS will navigate itself to where the drogue is expected 
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to be, where an on-board sensor will guide the probe into contact with the refuelling 
basket.340  If these systems work, there is no reason why unmanned AAR assets could not 
be used, allowing UCAS to refuel UCAS.  This capability would further extend the range 
and persistence of UCAS, particularly if these AAR assets were also survivable in high-
threat environments.  Extending endurance of aircraft, whether manned or unmanned 
presents problems not only with fuel requirements and human endurance, but also the oil 
required for engine systems.  The Tornado F-3, for example, could consume one litre of oil 
per engine per flight hour.  Each engine had an oil reservoir capable of holding 10 litres.341  
This gave a maximum sortie length of approximately 10 hours, before an engine would get 
into the dangerous oil low zone.  Engine oil capacity will be a critical node for UCAS 
operations required to operate over extended periods. 
Weapon Systems and Sensors  
The types of weapon systems and sensors UCAS will require in the coming decades will be 
the key to the successful utility of these systems.  This may be by kinetic effects, or, 
ultimately by cyber means.  Mostly on-board at present, the trend towards off-board 
networked systems aiding the establishment of a COP is becoming increasingly important, 
if not vital.342  Current UCAS programmes have an array of sensors being considered for 
employment.  These range from Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars, 
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), Ground Moving Target Indicator and IR/optical 
systems.343  AESA radar technology has revolutionised the capabilities of aircraft and other 
platforms with which it is fitted.  It is not the purpose of this thesis to detail all the 
technological benefits AESA systems bring, however, it is important to establish an 
understanding. 
The ability of AESA radars to use rapid electronic inertia-less scanning allows for the 
extremely fast processing of information.  The rapid scanning within the search ambit of the 
system, results in a much quicker target track detection than that of mechanically scanned 
radar.  This permits high accuracy tracking of multiple targets, enabling multiple target 
engagement while maintaining other functionality.  It is not only the superior capability of 
AESA radars to find and track airborne targets that is revolutionary, but also their capacity 
                                                          
340 Warwick, 'Plug to Play: Automated Aerial Refueling Is Next on X-47B Test Agenda', p.12. 
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to be used in the full EW spectrum.  The emergence of AESA radars, and the ability to 
provide high average power for significant periods, makes them extremely effective.344   
AESA systems offer the opportunity to employ non-kinetic effects.  Current AESA radars 
are focused on detecting and negating cruise missiles, anti-radiation missiles and AAM.   
AESA radars are particularly effective against AAM because the energy focused on the 
approaching AAM increases as an inverse square as distance decreases.345  Fighter 
aircraft AESA radars use thousands of small transmitters/receivers, each a couple of 
inches square, which allow the antenna to conduct multiple tasks simultaneously.  These 
include detection of small, even stealthy targets, tracking and communications.346  Along 
with the AESA radar’s high average power, there are also bandwidth benefits and the 
ability to utilise flexible waveforms.  This means AESA can also be used for EA.  Possible 
AESA techniques for attacking radar systems include burning through the target radar's 
antenna side-lobes, filter side-lobes, or other known features of the system.  AESA 
transmitters can also be focused on other targets to deliver bursts of RF energy into the 
electronics of adversary aircraft or computer systems.347      
AESA radars can also utilise high-power microwave (HPM), which is beginning to emerge 
as a missile defence system.  A handful of F-15C modified with the APG-63(V)2 radars for 
cruise missile defence and the latest production F/A-18E/F are HPM capable.348  It is 
planned to be included in the F/A-22 and B-2 as part of a radar upgrade programme.  It is 
believed that HPM is eventually to be part of a US Navy UCAS payload.349   
The US defense company Raytheon, plan to build conformal AESA radar that weigh 2 to 5 
pounds per square foot and are less than an inch thick.  This will allow installation in places 
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inaccessible by current radars.  Additionally, Raytheon believes it can expand the 
capabilities of AESA radar so they can be used by 2015 to feed ISR and other data to other 
sources at high-speed, and, significantly, installed on UAS.350  UCAS may become flying 
antennas, with data imaging and weapons arrays making up the aircraft’s skin.  Conformal 
multi-aperture sensors, referred to as smart skins, will be central to UCAS development.351  
AESA radars, or any active radar for that matter, can act as large reflectors, which could 
compromise RCS.  However, frequency selective radomes could be designed to allow only 
signals to pass through that are in the frequency band of the radar itself; adversary EA 
would require to be in the same frequency band, which would be hard to achieve.  Tunable 
radomes that can change their filtering characteristics as the AESA changes frequency will 
further enhance capability.352  Raytheon’s single-curve AESA is the first step in creating 
antennas that wrap around aircraft, missiles, ships and ground vehicles.  These are 
eventually expected to serve as combination sensors, TDL and EA weapons.353  
High-energy lasers (HEL) as part of the UCAS weapon system would offer an ideal 
effector, which would not necessarily be reliant on reloads when depleted.  Currently in 
development, these types of lasers are too large to be incorporated into fighter-sized 
airframes.  However, if these were able to be part of a future UCAV, lasers would offer a 
potential solution to the kill probability conundrum of AAM (See Chapter 5).  Richard Dunn, 
in Operational Implications for Laser Weapons, gives the view that, ‘…laser weapons offer 
warfighters opportunities for quick and precise target engagement, flexibility and a light 
logistics burden’.354  Dunn believes that, ‘…warfare could enter the age of laser weapons 
[by 2016]…’.355  If utilised, HEL could potentially achieve soft kills, without the need to 
achieve hard kills, for the majority of scenarios.  The mere fact that an adversary can and 
will use HEL may well cause the recipient to spend great efforts to counter these systems.  
Major Aaron Angell USMC, describes how HEL equipped aircraft might be employed:  
 
The ability of aircraft to conduct counter-air warfare will be greatly enhanced by a HEL 
weapon.  It could provide a counter-air capability that operates distinctly from the primary 
mission of the aircraft and pilot… while a pilot is conducting his assigned aviation mission…a 
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HEL weapon could automatically identify, acquire, target, and engage an enemy missile or 
aircraft. 356 
AAM are being considered for use on UCAS.  The USAF and the US Missile Defense 
Agency, allied with Raytheon, are developing AESA radar systems in conjunction with an 
extended range AAM, as part of their Network-Centric Airborne Defense Element 
(NCADE), aiming to engage ballistic missiles.  Initially to be carried by F-22, Philip Pagliara, 
Raytheon Missile Systems’ programme manager for NCADE, believes UCAS could be 
used as effectively.  According to Pagliara, ‘”…a longer-term solution would be to put 
radars and missiles on larger unmanned aircraft…The operational concept for both manned 
and unmanned is similar”’.357  If UCAS were fielded today, their killing payload would 
consist of AAM.  If AAM kill probability was not to an acceptable level, and not enough 
could be carried, then other negating mechanisms would be required.  It is the author’s 
view, that in any case, appropriate effecters that do not suffer a limit on expenditure will be 
required. 
Countermeasures 
Countermeasures to defeat or confuse the components comprising a sophisticated IADS 
will be a critical element of any future UCAS.  These will range from EA systems, either 
utilised through AESA radars, and/or other systems.  The full panoply of countermeasures 
includes DRFM jammers, towed radar decoys, expendable radar decoys, stand-in jammers 
to defeat RF missile systems, and Directed Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM) and flares 
to defeat IR missile systems.  The aim of a DIRCM missile jammer is to radiate more 
modulated IR than the seeker receives from the aircraft’s heat sources.358  DRFM 
technology has transformed the ability to counter adversary radar defence systems.  A 
DRFM countermeasures system can duplicate an incoming signal from enemy radars by 
converting it from analogue to digital and back again.  DRFM jammers then modify the 
digital duplicate so that the manipulated signal will be coherent with the threat radar.  This 
signal manipulation can deceive threat radars by altering the target’s apparent RCS, range, 
velocity, and angle.359  Added, would be a requirement to counter laser and HPM systems.  
Active and passive countermeasures are inherently costly and difficult to implement into 
manned aircraft and stealthy aircraft in particular.  The process of defeating any missile 
system involves two necessary tasks, detecting missile launch, and deploying 
                                                          
356 Major Aaron Angell, 'The High-Energy Laser: Tomorrow's Weapon to Improve Force Protection', 
National Defense University Press, no. 64, 2012, p.120. 
357 David A. Fulghum, 'Boost-Phase Battles', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 28 June 2010, p.54.  
358 RAF Air Warfare Centre, Infrared Countermeasures Handbook, p.25. 
359 See Schleher, op. cit., pp.293-294. 
98 
 
countermeasures to defeat the missile guidance system.  Currently, classic detection 
techniques rely either on visual acquisition or aircraft sensors mounted on the aircraft.  
Reliable missile launch detection, via a Missile Approach Warner System (MAWS), is a 
technological challenge, but offers a viable solution.  MAWS forms part of a DIRCM 
system.360 
 
If a UCAS is to be stealthy, and required to operate in highly sophisticated IADS, the 
essential requirement of the surface of the UCAV airframe to be smooth, with very few, if 
any protrusions, will take priority.  A UCAV would also likely carry the same EA system 
fitted to manned fighters.  For example, the US Navy is developing the Next Generation 
Jammer (NGJ), which could be utilised by UCAS.361  A balance may be required between 
the necessity for absolute stealth and countermeasure capability.  The need to have fitted 
internally, or as a conformal part of the UCAV airframe, Closed-Loop DIRCM jammers, 
lasers, AAM, HPM and the like, will be difficult to align with other requirements.  It can 
never be assumed that an aircraft is invulnerable to missile, laser or HPM attack, therefore, 
negating systems and countermeasures are essential, as is defence against cyber-attack; 
this is examined in Chapter 4. 
 
The Law of Armed Conflict, Ethics, and Employment of UCAS 
 
The development of UCAS in future warfare requires scrutiny to ensure compliance with 
international laws, both in practice and ethically.  The current employment of UAS has 
raised issues over the legality of their use.  The future utility of UCAS will need to be 
examined to ensure that the LOAC is adhered to, not least, if these systems are employed 
autonomously.  Authorising an unmanned system to make combat decisions autonomously 
will be dependent upon the political and military cadre resolving legal and ethical issues.  
These include the appropriateness of unmanned systems having this capability, under what 
circumstances these should be utilised, where responsibility lies for mishaps, and what 
limitations should be placed upon the autonomy of such systems.  International laws and 
treaties in modern warfare govern the use of weapons.  Individual nations interpret their 
political, legal and operational constraints, which dictate the ROE for their forces, specific to 
each operation.  Different ROE may be set for different phases and locations during a 
campaign.  The ROE set clear criteria for the decisions made by humans in the command 
chain.  Could these decisions be made autonomously by ‘systems’ used by UCAS?  For 
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armed autonomous systems, the critical issue is the ability for the weapon to discriminate a 
legal target.  There is considerable discussion within the military, media and academic 
institutions on the ethical and legal implications of the current use of UAS, and the future 
utility of UCAS.362  The two issues are essentially separate disciplines, but ethical, 
sometimes referred to as moral, issues do enter into the realm of the laws of war, at 
times.363  Reviewing existing opinions on the legal and ethical issues will allow an 
understanding of the current concerns, and whether these will impact the development of 
UCAS.   
In a report published in 2011, the UK MOD offers the view that policy makers need to be 
aware of the potential legal issues involved in UAS procurement and use.364  This is a legal 
requirement.365  Whether UCAS will operate with a HITL, HOTL, or autonomously, seems 
to be causing the most concern.  Currently, UAS operate with a HITL.  Future UAS/UCAS 
may not follow this modus operandi.  P. W. Singer in, Wired for War: The Robotics 
Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century, discusses the issue of autonomy and keeping a 
HITL.  Singer gives a number of examples of both military and civilian professionals, who 
view that keeping a HITL will always be required.366  The author’s own survey, however, 
indicates this is not necessarily the majority view among military professionals, and 
civilians.  Detailed in Chapter 1, analysis of the responses to the questionnaire sought 
views on whether ethical or political constraints should affect future UCAS doctrine; these 
views confirmed that there is little ethical compunction against using UCAS, autonomously 
if required, with 86% of interviewees having no concerns.367  The thoughts from a political 
perspective, however, indicate that it is highly likely that politicians would be reticent in 
authorising the use of autonomous unmanned systems, unless used legally.  A somewhat 
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obvious view, some would say.  Nonetheless, these issues are relevant, and it does not 
take much sagacity to see the actual benefits from conducting in-depth analysis.368 
The Law of Armed Conflict 
The LOAC, also known as Customary International Humanitarian Law (CIHL), is part of that 
body of international law that governs the relations between states; it is derived from two 
main sources of international law - treaty law and customary law (rules developed from the 
practice of states which are binding on all states).369  Although debate continues over 
whether CIHL, the Law of War and the LOAC, are the same discipline, Professor Gary 
Solis best sums up the opinions: ‘Whether called the law of war, IHL, or LOAC, the goal is 
to confine fighting as closely as possible to combatants and to spare noncombatants; to 
target those things having a military need for destruction and sparing property not 
necessary to achieve the military ends of the conflict’.370  The LOAC regulates the rights 
and duties of the belligerents in time of armed conflict.  It seeks to protect combatants and 
non-combatants from unnecessary suffering, and to provide safeguards for civilians and 
persons who fall into the hands of an adversary.371  The Laws of War are divided into three 
basic categories, the first two being of established acceptance, with the third forming a 
relatively new emphasis; these are: jus ad bellum: the law concerning acceptable 
justifications to use armed force and declare war, and jus in bello: the law concerning 
acceptable conduct in war, once it has begun.372  Jus post bellum, is the law concerning 
acceptable conduct following the official or declared end of a war.373  Jus in bello tradition 
asserts that there are two external rules: ‘Proportionality’, and ‘Discrimination and Non-
Combatant Immunity’.374  Non-Combatant Immunity means that non-combatants must not 
be intentionally killed or harmed.  There are other principles; Joint Services Publication 
(JSP) 383 describes the four customary principles of the LOAC as:  
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Military Necessity: Military necessity permits a state engaged in an armed conflict to use only 
that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, that is 
required in order to achieve the legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely the complete or 
partial submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the minimum expenditure 
of life and resources.375  Humanity: The principle of humanity forbids the infliction of suffering, 
injury or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military 
purpose.376  Distinction: Since military operations are to be conducted only against the enemy’s 
armed forces and military objectives, there must be a clear distinction between the armed 
forces and civilians, or between combatants and noncombatants, and between objects that 
might legitimately be attacked and those that are protected from attack.377  Proportionality: The 
principle of proportionality requires that the losses resulting from a military action should not be 
excessive in relation to the expected military advantage.378 
 
Proportionality and Distinction are fundamentals of the LOAC, and will likely remain so.  
The current law on targeting (Distinction) is contained within the 1977 Additional Protocol 1 
(AP1) to the Geneva Convention of 1949.  The basic rule, encapsulating the principle of 
distinction, is contained in Article 48 of AP1: 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the 
Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objects and accordingly shall direct their 
operations only against military objectives.379 
AP1 to the Geneva Convention represented an unprecedented change to the protection of 
civilians in the law of armed conflict.380  Unlike other binding documents of the LOAC in the 
past, AP1 explicitly stipulates the protection of civilians.381  It is argued by some theorists 
that in contemporary armed conflicts, especially in internal wars, the principle of civilian 
protection in its most elementary form continues to be violated.382  The Doctrine of Double 
Effect (DDE), originating from natural ethical law, does, nonetheless, allow for collateral 
damage, that is, the killing of civilians, in certain circumstances.  DDE may be permissible, 
even if it is foreseen that it will cause a bad effect.383  The Philosopher Joseph Mangan is 
credited with formulating the DDE, with his seminal 1949 essay, An Historical Analysis of 
the Principle of Double Effect, Mangan offered the following thoughts: 
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It is lawful to actuate a morally good or indifferent cause from which will follow two effects, one 
good and the other evil, if there is a proportionately serious reason, and the ultimate end of the 
agent is good, and the evil effect is not the means to the good effect. The reason for this 
principle is that such an action could be unlawful only from the intention of the evil effect, or 
from the very actuating of the cause itself, or from the foreseeing of the evil effect. But the 
action is not unlawful under any one of these headings.384  
DDE is particularly pertinent when considering UAS use against terrorist and insurgent 
groups, whom may be using civilians as human shields.  This does not mean, however, 
that states will always fall back on this principle, particularly, in low-intensity operations.  It 
is dependent on the importance of the mission, ultimately. 
  
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has published 161 rules that apply to 
the LOAC.385  When a weapon system is being procured for use, countries must ensure 
that these principles are taken into account.  Perhaps the most pertinent rules when 
considering the developmental path of UCAS are Rules 15, 16, 17 and 151.  Rule 15 - 
Precautions in Attack, states: ‘In the conduct of military operations, constant care must be 
taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.  All feasible 
precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects’.386  Rule 16 pertains to 
Target Verification: ‘Each party to the conflict must do everything feasible to verify that 
targets are military objectives’.387  Rule 17, Choice of Means and Methods of Warfare, 
confers responsibility by the following: ‘Each party to the conflict must take all feasible 
precautions in the choice of means and methods of warfare with a view to avoiding, and 
in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to 
civilian objects’.388  Binding these rules together is Rule 151, Individual Responsibility: 
‘Individuals are criminally responsible for war crimes they commit’.389  These rules are 
particularly relevant, with the potential for UCAS operating autonomously to deliver 
weapons. 
 
Within the LOAC, the term combatant applies to those persons who have the right under 
international law to participate in armed conflict.  These persons include members of the 
regular armed forces (except medical personnel, chaplains, civil defence personnel, and 
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members of the armed forces who have acquired civil defence status) and irregular forces, 
which carry their arms openly and distinguish themselves from the civilian population.390  In 
general, civilians are considered non-combatants.  Since only combatants may lawfully 
participate directly in armed conflict, non-combatants who do so are acting unlawfully and 
are considered illegal combatants.  More importantly, Rule 106 – Combatants and 
Prisoner-of-War Status, covers civilian personnel who are illegal combatants; these 
constitute a legitimate military target, which can be legally prosecuted for their wartime 
actions, and do not have the same prisoner of war protections as lawful combatants.391  
This may apply, for example, to the software engineers of UCAS. 
 
Effect on Middle East and Arab Public Opinion 
 
The current debate over the legal and ethical issues of the use of UAS is worth 
examining, particularly with regard to its relevance to UCAS.  Not least, current US UAS 
operations against targeted ‘terrorists’ has amplified the arguments over the lawful use of 
UAS.  In 2009, President Obama authorised the use of UAS to conduct targeted-
assassination missions against suspect terrorists, not only in Afghanistan and Iraq, but 
also Pakistan and Yemen.392  The continued use of US UAS on these types of missions 
has caused some disquiet.  In a letter to The Times, fourteen distinguished historians 
detailed their belief that the use of, ‘…UAS ‘drones’ in Afghanistan and Pakistan, is in 
violation of international law, as there is no state of war with the communities involved 
and insufficient care has been taken to ensure that there is no negligent harm to 
civilians…’.393  They believe their use is, ‘…likely to engender hostility and alienation, and 
will do nothing to improve the population’s perception of the American and British forces 
responsible’.394  While their first concern is arguable (examined later in this section), 
affected civilian public opinion is certainly of concern.  In Arab culture, remote means of 
conducting warfare are seen as cowardly.  It is also argued that the civilian deaths caused 
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by the use of UAS creates more militants than those eradicated.395  Terrorists, and 
frequently some of the civilian population, perceive the use of new technologies, such as 
UAS, as evil.396  The Taliban claimed that their 2009 attack on the Lahore Police Academy 
in Pakistan was in direct retaliation for Predator UAS strikes.  While it is somewhat 
understandable that civilians in countries such as Pakistan may see the use of UAS as 
‘unfair’, it is completely perverse that terrorist groups, such as the Taliban, do.  The failure 
of the Taliban to meet their reciprocal responsibilities under the LOAC, by intentionally 
using voluntary human shields, allows these civilians to be targeted.397  This type of 
targeting would only be used in extremis, but would be consistent within the DDE.    
 
Opinions differ; there is an argument that the use of UAS, and the associated weapons 
and sensors technology, will allow for greater discrimination and the prevention of 
collateral damage.398  There is also a view that to rule out the legality of the targeting of 
terrorists on foreign territories is at odds with the obligations of nation-states to protect 
their citizens from terrorist attacks.399  Andrew Orr, in Unmanned, Unprecedented, and 
Unresolved: The Status of American Drone Strikes under International Law, argues 
persuasively that the use of UAS by the US in Pakistan adheres to the LOAC, although he 
acknowledges that the facts of the engagements remain classified.400   
 
In May 2013, in a speech at the National Defense University, President Obama spoke 
about the use of ‘Drones’:  
 
Where foreign governments cannot or will not effectively stop terrorism in their territory, the 
primary alternative to targeted lethal action would be the use of conventional military 
options.  As I’ve already said, even small special operations carry enormous 
risks.  Conventional airpower or missiles are far less precise than drones, and are likely to 
cause more civilian casualties and more local outrage.  And invasions of these territories lead 
us to be viewed as occupying armies, unleash a torrent of unintended consequences, are 
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difficult to contain, result in large numbers of civilian casualties and ultimately empower those 
who thrive on violent conflict.401  
 
Understanding the feelings that the use of UAS can engender in the civilian population of 
countries affected, Obama emphasises the legality of their use, and also the proportionality 
and accuracy they offer.  This speech is a clear indication that the US will continue with the 
use of UAS.  
 
International Committee of the Red Cross in Relation to UAS/UCAS 
 
At the 2011 ICRC forum, ‘New Weapon Technologies and IHL’,  Dr Jakob Kellenberg, 
President of the ICRC, commented on robotic weapon systems, highlighting a number of 
issues, the foremost being the challenge of ensuring automated systems are capable of the 
level of discrimination required by IHL.  Kellenberg believes the deployment of such 
systems would reflect a paradigm shift and a major change in the conduct of hostilities, but 
would also raise a series of fundamental legal and ethical issues.  Kellenberg’s opinion, 
however, is that automated weapon systems may actually be more ethical and operate far 
more cautiously on the battlefield than a human being.  In certain cases, he believes, the 
deployment of remote-controlled or autonomous weapon systems might cause fewer 
civilian casualties and less damage compared to the use of conventional weapons.  
Because these types of weapon systems are deployed from a safe distance, with time to 
choose targets carefully, it may be easier to avoid civilian collateral damage.  It could even 
be argued that the LOAC would require that a commander consider whether the use of 
autonomous systems may be best practice in achieving the military objective.402  At the 
same forum, Dr Philip Spoerri, Director for International Law and Cooperation, ICRC, 
emphasised the difficulties facing the use of autonomous weapon systems, particularly, 
individual responsibility: 
….Whether new technologies will reduce our capacity to allocate responsibility and 
accountability for violations remains to be seen…it is worth recalling that international 
humanitarian law parties to conflicts (states and organised armed groups) and international 
criminal law binds individuals...I am not convinced that we have reached the end of 
accountability with autonomous weapons. Even if artificial intelligence were to be achieved and 
autonomous systems deployed in armed conflicts, would it not always be the case that any 
robot is at some point switched on by a human being?  If that is the case, then that individual – 
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and the party to the conflict - is responsible for the decision, however remote in time or space 
the weapon might have been deployed from the moment of the attack.403 
Both Kellenbeg and Spoerri raise germane points.  Developing autonomous (highly 
automated) weapon systems, requires a rigorous audit of likely legal issues.  Research is 
on-going, for example, Tony Gillespie and Robin West, in The International C2 Journal: 
Requirements for Autonomous Unmanned Air Systems set by Legal Issues, propose an 
approach for developing these systems within current legal constraints.  They consider that 
there are two approaches to aligning technology and the law: fitting emerging technologies 
into the law, and articulating the legal and ethical constraints as requirements, which would 
then determine design protocols.  The first approach is traditional, with the legal 
considerations placing limitations on the operational exploitation of any military capability.  
The second approach uses systems and capability engineering techniques, which provide 
a procedure to turn constraints into design requirements for unmanned air systems.404   
An autonomous system will use machine-based logic to make command decisions that are 
currently made by humans.  Gillespie and West believe it should be possible to develop 
systems using technologies which are based on an approach that turns qualitative criteria 
into autonomous quantitative ones; they describe how a three-part model, developed by 
Joanne Thoms, could be used to derive a method to convert the human role to one 
provided by an autonomous decision making system.405  The three cognitive capabilities 
are: Awareness: perceiving the current operational position and context.  This is the 
assimilation of all available sensors and other information relevant to the UAS and its 
mission.  Understanding: recognising the relationships in the information, and their 
significance.  Deliberation: choosing between the various options available, based on an 
understanding of them and their consequences.406  It includes making the decision within 
the known constraints and acting on it; that is, a decision point in the command chain.407  
Gillespie and West suggest using this three-component model of the decision-making 
process to establish the technical requirements for autonomous decision-making systems 
and the implications for technology development.408  This method could provide a robust 
means of conducting evaluation of UCAS. 
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William Boothby, in Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict, details the LOAC issues 
that are pertinent to the use of Unmanned Combat Vehicles (UCV).  Air Commodore 
Boothby RAF (Retd), was Deputy Director of Legal Services for the RAF until 2011.  
Boothby describes UCV, ‘…as unmanned air, land, or maritime vehicles of any size which 
either carry and deliver force, which may have been deployed from another platform, to a 
target’.409 Boothby emphasises that the important question is the ability of the vehicle to 
direct a weapon to a target, whether it took the weapon there or not.410 
The mere fact an unmanned vehicle is used to fire a weapon does not raise relevant issues if, 
for example, the technology permits a person to review available information and requires that 
person to review available information and requires that person to make a decision in advance 
as to whether the particular attack goes ahead.411 
If the system has an autonomous attack capability, Boothby states that the legal 
reviewer, that is, the person responsible for advising the authoriser on the legal aspects 
of the mission:  
…is therefore concerned to establish whether the particular technology governing the vehicle 
and its prosecution of autonomous attacks is such that those attacks will properly discriminate 
in the manner provided for in article 51 or, for states not party to AP1, as required by 
customary law principles….His task…is to assess whether the system is capable, in the 
circumstances of intended use, of being used in a discriminating way…412 
Article 57 of AP1 details the considerations required for sparing civilians and civilian 
objects.  Article 57(2)(a) details the precautions that must be taken in respect of attacks, 
addressing the requirements for, ‘those who plan or decide upon an attack’.413  A problem 
arises for the reviewer when autonomous technology is employed.  The reviewer is 
required to determine whether Article 57(2)(a) can be adhered to.  A HITL, Boothby 
believes, able to monitor systems, and countermand an attack decision, if required, would 
satisfy the LOAC.414  JDN 2/11 states that, ‘Legal responsibility for any military activity 
remains with the last person to issue the command authorising a specific activity’.415  
However, Boothby gives the legal opinion that if a human was not in the loop, the use of 
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autonomous weapons would still be within the principle of distinction, if appropriate 
technology was used.  Boothby argues that by using software algorithms and artificial 
intelligence, attacks may be restricted to legitimate objects.416  Wg Cdr Mardell, an RAF 
lawyer, is also of the opinion that, ‘…providing the relevant decisions are made, it does not 
seem to matter whether this process is undertaken by humans or machines’.417 
UAS are now accepted as part of the military inventory, with their current C2 structures 
ensuring that ROE are met with HITL at the critical points in the decision cycle.  Research 
programmes around the world are developing ways of introducing autonomy into the 
decision processes of UAS; the next step is UCAS.  UCAS may include several UCAV 
operating together making cooperative decisions.418  Authorisation of weapon release is a 
clear example where the current position of human intervention may be expected to 
continue for some time.419   However, technology will become available, for example, to 
task a UCAS to survey a given area, looking for particular target types, and destroying 
them when found, without reference to a human commander - a system with the capability 
of delivering effects autonomously.420  
Articles 13 and 16 of The Hague Rules of Air Warfare, detail that only military aircraft can 
exercise belligerent rights.421  UCAV are defined as military aircraft.422  They can be used 
autonomously, with caveats: 
UCAVs…whether remotely piloted or acting autonomously, may engage in attacks as long as 
they qualify as military aircraft. Autonomous action means that the unmanned aircraft has 
sensors and an onboard data processing capability to make decisions to attack according to a 
computer program. The sensors and computer programs must be able to distinguish between 
military objectives and civilian objects, as well as between civilians and combatants.423 
Boothby believes that the system is capable of being used within the principle of distinction, 
although there may remain a legal requirement for a person to remain in the decision loop, 
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unless, ‘…it is possible at the sortie planning stage to take precautions in attack, which will 
remain valid throughout the period of UCV search to an acceptable level of confidence…for 
example, in areas remote from civilians…’.424  This is particularly pertinent to counter-air 
operations.425  Opinion will continue to remain divided. However, in the area of gaining 
control of the air, certainly in air-to-air engagements, the issue of collateral damage is 
treated differently from some other types of attacks.  In law, current counter-air air-to-air 
practice is not required to take into account collateral damage from shot down armed 
military aircraft.  The HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile 
Warfare states:  
Some members of the Group of Experts believed that consideration must also be given to the 
possibility that aircraft that are shot down in the air may cause collateral damage on the 
ground…The majority of the Group of Experts rejected this assertion, based upon the general 
impracticality of factoring in such eventual collateral damage during an air-to-air engagement. 
However, the majority of the Group of Experts conceded that there may be exceptional 
circumstances in some rare instances of air supremacy. In these circumstances, when a 
military aircraft intends to shoot down an aircraft — other than an armed military aircraft — 
over densely populated areas, the attack ought to be delayed in order to avoid — or, in any 
event, to minimize — collateral damage.426 
Certain counter-air operations will be conducted entirely over the sea, minimising the 
chances of any collateral damage to virtually to nil.  Nonetheless, even for counter-air 
operations conducted over, or near, populated areas, collateral damage is not a legal issue.  
This removes any legal arguments against using UCAS in an air-to-air role, as far as 
collateral damage is concerned.  That said, the normal laws of war will still apply, whether 
manned, unmanned, or autonomous unmanned systems are used.427   
The LOAC already allows for the use of autonomous UCAS, within the constraints 
adumbrated.  Ultimately, individual states are responsible for ensuring that weapon 
developments adhere to Article 36 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949.  Article 36 requires each State Party to ensure that the use of any 
new weapons, means or methods of warfare that it studies, develops, acquires or adopts 
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comply with the LOAC.428  In general, once a system has been released into service, legal 
responsibility will always remain with the person who issued the command to the UAS.  If 
autonomous systems could not be employed for long-endurance and complex scenarios, 
without a HITL or HOTL, many of the advantages of UCAS would be lost.   
Ethics 
 
There is an increasingly large source of literature on the ethics of using UAS.429  There 
are arguments both for and against the use of UAS being ethical.  Arguments against 
their use include the view that these systems fail a jus ad bellum test, because political 
leaders might be more inclined to wage war; robotic soldiers could lower barriers to 
entering a war, since they would reduce casualties among human soldiers.430  Some 
object to their use because they would potentially make war relatively risk-free.  They 
view that autonomous military systems, with the potential for fewer human casualties, will 
make war less horrific, and therefore more likely.431  P. W. Singer certainly believes so, 
opining that, ‘…robots may entail a dark irony.  By appearing to lower the human cost of 
war, they may seduce us into more wars’.432  Sarah Kreps and John Kaag, in The Use of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Contemporary Conflict: A Legal and Ethical Analysis, 
believe that there is complacency within many of the arguments for the use of UAS; in 
particular, they consider the capability of technology to ensure ‘distinction’, is overstated.  
Kreps and Kaag also discuss the hypothesis that military personnel need to be put at risk 
in order to satisfy moral legitimacy.433  Ryan Tonkens, in The Journal of Military Ethics, 
argues, ‘…even if autonomous lethal robotic systems could be more ethical than some 
human soldiers in certain ways and certain situations, this is insufficient reason for 
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developing and using these machines’.434  Although these arguments are certainly worth 
considering, Professor Patrick Lin and colleagues, believe such arguments have multiple 
flaws, arguing that, ‘…using robots or not makes no difference as to whether the war is in 
self-defence, is proportional, or is a last resort’.435  Offering a contrary view, they believe 
it is likely that the development of autonomous systems will make war more ethically 
waged.436  This view is gaining credence; Ronald Arkin, from the Georgia Institute of 
Technology, also believes that autonomous unmanned systems may eventually have the 
potential of performing more ethically than humans.437   
 
In the same vein, Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun argue that the use of UAS can 
serve as a measure short of full-scale war, providing a more proportional response to 
certain security threats.  They view that their use could, ‘…raise the threshold of last 
resort of large-scale military deployment by providing a way to avoid deploying troops or 
conducting an intensive bombing campaign while still counteracting perceived threats’.438  
Bradley Strawser, from the University of Connecticut, argues that using UAS, as long as 
the military action is justified in the first place, should be mandatory, if they allow for the 
protection of own personnel.439  The principal of ‘Military Necessity’ requires ‘…the 
minimum expenditure of life and resources’.440  This should apply equally to both sides of 
a conflict.  Jai Galliot, from Macquarie University, strongly disagrees with Stawser; he 
argues that the, ‘use of remote weaponry by one force, against another force without 
such technology, crosses some symmetry threshold making the fight intrinsically unfair 
and thus unjust’.441  Galliot seems to be concerned, ’…that there is indeed something 
powerfully disturbing and morally troubling about being killed by remote control’.442  Is this 
argument logical?  It may be to some, but it is a fact, that many weapons are delivered by 
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‘remote control’ – the nature of warfare necessitates their use.443  Why, therefore, should 
the use of UAS to deliver weapons be viewed differently?  Also, militaries throughout 
history have strived to gain an advantage over an adversary, both in weaponry and 
tactics; the F-22 is an example. 
 
While acknowledging there is an on-going academic debate, it is worth considering the 
argument from a military perspective.  When asked his thoughts on the ethics of using 
‘drones’ to kill suspected terrorists, USAF CSAF, General Norton Schwartz, rejected the 
whole question: ‘”Is it more ethical to engage an asset from an F-15 or an F-16 or an 
[unmanned] MQ-9?  We have rules of engagements, so if it is a legitimate target, the 
manner in which we engage that target in close combat is irrelevant”’.444  A more pertinent 
argument, perhaps, is put forward by Professor Markus Wagner, from the University of 
Miami School of Law.  Wagner opines that, while autonomous systems should be able to 
distinguish between civilian and military targets (Distinction), because of the quantitive 
nature of assessment, proportionality assessment is more difficult, as it is qualitive.  This, 
Wagner believes, makes the use of autonomous weapon systems both illegal, and 
‘…highly problematic both ethically and politically’.445  
 
Some arguments against the use of UAS centre on concerns about the effect they have 
on how states are viewed as aggressors, particularly, against religions.  Michael Boyle, in 
International Affairs, believes: ‘Over time, an excessive reliance on drones will deepen 
the reservoirs of anti-US sentiment, [and] embolden America’s enemies…’.446  Dr George 
Friedman, does not view the use of UAS as being unethical, or against the LOAC, but he 
does believe that their use may lead to, ‘…geographical unlimitlessness’.447  Friedman 
believes: 
The enemy strategy is to draw the United States into an extended conflict that validates its 
narrative that the United States is permanently at war with Islam…From the U.S. point of 
view, unmanned aerial vehicles are the perfect weapon because they can attack the jihadist 
command structure without risk to ground forces.  From the jihadist point of view as well, 
unmanned aerial vehicles are the perfect weapon because their efficacy allows the jihadists 
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to lure the United States into other countries and, with sufficient manipulation, can increase 
the number of innocents who are killed.448   
It is perhaps these views that are the most pertinent when arguing the ethical nature of 
UAS.  P. W. Singer, in Wired for War, uses films such as Terminator and 2001 a Space 
Odyssey as examples of the future use of ‘robots’, and potential ethical dilemmas.449  Using 
fictional stories to illustrate the ethics of robotics may be questionable, but Singer also 
states that: ‘The fear amongst soldiers…[is that they]…worry war is disappearing…Lives 
may be saved in unmanned warfare, but war itself is becoming almost unrecognisable, 
something they are not all that comfortable with’.450  Singer’s findings are interesting; as 
already highlighted, they are in direct contrast to those of the author’s.  Who is correct?  
The jury is still out.  Singer is also of the opinion that unless people are actually put in 
harm’s way, that is, a nation is not prepared to sacrifice its own people, then the morality 
of wars could be undermined.451  Although the author does not agree with this sentiment, 
he acknowledges that some do have this view.  However, as part of a structure that can 
actually help prevent conflict, the use of ‘robotics may actually be more ethical.   
 
It can be argued that UAS allow greater emphasis to be placed on the distinction and 
proportionality process, due to their persistence, and the fact that decisions to attack can 
be made at relative leisure, without the stresses of actual combat.452  Although, in theory, 
the technological advantages mean UAS should be better able to satisfy the principles of 
proportionality and discrimination, Brunstetter and Braun observe that these same 
advantages, aligned with the fact that the operators can be situated thousands of miles 
away at a computer console rather than in the line of fire, have the potential to make 
discriminating between combatants and non-combatants more difficult.453  But is this, in 
reality, correct?  Expert opinion from the ICRC gives the view that the use of UAS may 
improve discrimination.  Fifty experts on international law, under the auspices of the 
Harvard Program for Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, have drawn up 
recommended rules on the use of air launched weapons in warfare; on the use of UAS, 
they offer the following:  
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Their modest size and the noise signature relative to manned aircraft may make them useful 
in tracking individual combatants and military vehicles without alerting them to the fact that 
they are being observed. Further, the ability of UAVs to loiter often allows them to monitor 
the target area to assess the presence of civilians at the time of attack.454  
Perhaps it is this statement that best sums up the virtues of current UAS operations. 
Summary 
 
Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman, from the Hoover Institution Task Force on 
National Security and Law, believe that HITL will initially be included as a fail-safe, but as 
improvements in technology and the pace of operations increases, the requirement will 
diminish.455  They view that autonomous military systems developments will not pose a 
crisis for the LOAC, provided ethical and legal norms are incorporated into the design at the 
initial stages.456  Armin Krishnan’s extensive research concludes that there are less 
concerns with regards to accountability, ‘…than some critics of military robots believe’.457  
Anderson and Waxman sum up the future of autonomous weapon systems, such as UCAS: 
‘Some view these automated technology developments as a crisis for the laws of war.  To 
the contrary, provided we start now to incorporate ethical and legal norms into weapon 
design, the incremental movement from automation to genuine machine autonomy can be 
made to serve the ends of the law on the battlefield’.458  ‘International law has never 
approved the defensive plea of superior order as a mandatory bar to the prosecution of war 
criminals’.459  The Nuremberg Principle requires that individuals are responsible for their 
actions, with the LOAC requiring participants to limit collateral damage, through accurate 
target recognition and identification prior to engagement.460  The question is: who is 
responsible for an autonomous system?  Arkin and others, in  Responsibility and Lethality 
for Unmanned Systems: Ethical Pre-mission Responsibility Advisement, argue, ‘….that by 
making the assignment of responsibility transparent and explicit, through the use of a 
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responsibility adviser at all steps in the deployment of these systems, that this problem is 
solvable’.461   
 
The current employment of UAS is generally consistent with the LOAC.  Whether these 
systems are weaponised, or not, does not alter their legal use, it is whether the weapons 
are used legally.462  The principles of the LOAC will apply equally to the use of UCAS.  If 
these principles are adhered to, then there are no legal reasons why these autonomous 
systems cannot be utilised in warfare.  The ethics of whether to use UCAS should be based 
less on current discussions regarding UAS, but more on whether nation-states can afford 
not to use systems that offer, not only a viable deterrent, but also an exceptional capability.  
Some nations may be less inclined to adhere to the LOAC, when faced with stark decisions 
on survival, or an action is initiated to achieve an aim, at all costs.  As Noel Starky 
observes, although the future use of autonomous UAS, ‘…could be at the cost of sacrificing 
or stretching International Humanitarian Law…with other countries closing the military gap 
and able to use similar systems, why be disadvantaged by having a [HITL]?’463  Ultimately, 
if the normal path that Western weapon systems development has taken, certainly since 
the end of the Cold War, is continued, with all the rigorous debate concerning ethics and 
the LOAC that this has entailed, the future utility of UCAS will be ensured.  
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Chapter 4: The Role of Air and Space Power, and Control of the Air  
 ‘….the only security upon which sound military principles will rely is that you should be 
master of your own air’  
Winston Churchill 464 
This chapter gives an overview of the role of air and space power, before concentrating on 
the principle enabling requirements and uncertainties in developing systems that can gain 
control of the air, in the air-to-air environment.  In order to understand the possible future 
roles of UCAS, it is necessary to recognise the role that both air and space power plays in 
modern warfare.  Air power was seen as NATO’s most valuable asset by many during the 
Cold War.465  The British definition of air power, which is reflected in UK military Joint 
Doctrine publications, was, until recently: ‘The ability to project military force in air or space 
by or from a platform or missile operating above the surface of the earth.  Air platforms are 
defined as any aircraft, helicopter or unmanned air vehicle’.466  This definition did not 
include space assets.  Space, along with cyber-warfare, are now both significant 
components of air power.  The description in the 4th edition of AP 3000: British Air and 
Space Power Doctrine defines air and space power as: ‘The ability to project power from 
the air and space to influence the behaviour of people or the course of events’.467  Rightly, 
space is now regarded as a crucial domain, in addition to land, sea and air.  AP 3000 
emphasises its importance: 
…[After] the spectacular success of the American-led coalition in the 1991 Gulf War… China 
identified the West’s space capability as both its battle-winning advantage and potential point 
of failure, and began to invest strategically in space as a result…Over ninety percent of current 
United Kingdom military procurement projects rely to a greater or lesser extent on space; the 
Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) function provided by [GPS], for example, supports key 
elements of all military operations and an increasing number of commercial activities.468 
Space power should not be viewed as a standalone tenet of military doctrine; rather, it is an 
intricate part of air, land, and sea power.  When viewed in this light, the components of 
space power that enable control of the air can be summed up as the assets that help 
facilitate those parts of warfare that allow for the critical enablers of Command, Control, 
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Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting, Acquisition and 
Reconnaissance (C4ISTAR), and spaced-based navigation systems, which are 
fundamental to the accurate delivery of information and many weapon systems, as well as 
cyber-warfare.469   
Three types of air campaigns have traditionally been utilised within air power doctrine: 
counter-air, anti-surface force, and strategic air offensive.470  Although all three of these 
campaigns may have to be prosecuted simultaneously, experience has shown that, when 
facing an adversary with potent air power, priority has to be given to achieving the required 
level of control of the air, that is, the counter-air campaign.  The RAF now advocates that 
there are four fundamental air power roles (including space): control of the air, air mobility, 
attack, and intelligence and situational awareness.471  Within air power roles, control of the 
air has primacy.  The RAF’s current British Air and Space Power Doctrine emphasises the 
importance of counter-air, stating: ‘Control of the air is the primus inter pares of the four air 
power roles.  It has doctrinal primacy because it enables freedom of manoeuvre in all of the 
military domains: air, land and sea’.472  The following succinctly captures the essence of its 
significance: 
.…control of the air is the RAF's paramount duty: not only in defence of the United Kingdom 
itself, but also on expeditionary operations, where control of the air guarantees the freedom 
of manoeuvre and action of friendly air, land and naval forces, while curtailing the activities 
and options open to our adversaries.473 
Significantly, the importance of situational awareness has been acknowledged, and is now 
understood to be a major factor in air warfare. 
For the purposes of this thesis, when the term air power is used, it encompasses the 
domain of space, but will not examine its strengths and weaknesses in depth.  It will, 
however, scrutinise those aspects of space power pertinent to the employment of future 
UCAS.474  RAF air power doctrine identifies the strengths of air power as height, speed, 
reach, ubiquity, agility and concentration.475  However, there are inherent limitations as well 
as strengths - weaknesses are given as impermanence, limited payload, fragility, cost, 
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dependency on bases, and sensitivity to weather.476  For a simpler view of the attributes of 
air power, Professor Phillip Sabin believes that air and space power platforms have three 
basic strengths, and one weakness.  Strengths are: Perspective – because of the height 
that aircraft and satellites operate at, they have the ability to see over large distances; 
Speed, and Overflight – the freedom to operate in three dimensions, makes it difficult to 
negate their effect.  The one weakness is Energy Needs.477  One does not have to agree 
with Sabin, however, these terms do capture the fundamentals.  Persistence and the ability 
to deliver an effect will be important traits of any future air system.  Although AAR is of 
primary importance as a force multiplier par excellence, and is used to enhance the 
capabilities of many aircraft types in almost all air power roles, no means have yet been 
found to re-arm, re-crew or service an aircraft in flight.478  These limitations may be 
overcome, to some extent, in future systems, such as UCAS equipped with DEW.   
The enduring lesson of the last 90 years is that air power does not win large-scale high-
intensity conflicts on its own, although the two recent Gulf Wars have given the impression 
that air power achieved this.479  While this is not true, air power has a vital role in any 
campaign.480  Although these wars were indeed large-scale and of high-intensity, they were 
of relatively short duration.  Following the 1991 Gulf War, air power was used to enforce a 
no-fly zone over two separate areas of Iraq, north and south.  The experience of living 
under the threat of any Iraqi combat fixed-wing aircraft or helicopter being shot down during 
the period 1991 – 2003, aligned with periodic targeting of selective C2 facilities, led the 
Iraqi Air Force to essentially give up when faced with overwhelming force during the 2003 
Gulf War.  No Iraqi combat aircraft got airborne during this conflict; the Iraqi military started 
to bury most of its combat aircraft – a classic example of deterrence at work.481  Although 
the Iraqi IADS presented a threat, at least initially, control of the air was achieved relatively 
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quickly.  This reinforced the utility of air power, allowing coalition air forces to operate with 
confidence; it forcefully demonstrated the utility of contemporary air power.  Most recently, 
the 2011 Libya campaign conducted by a UK/France/US led coalition demonstrated that air 
and space power alone can, in certain scenarios, achieve all the required objectives.482  
The Free Libya Forces were all ground-based, and were a disparate group of 
peoples/tribes, who would have been very unlikely to succeed against Libyan Government 
forces, without coalition air power effectively targeting and negating the air defence system, 
C2 nodes, and pertinent military and government infrastructures.  Air power has other 
attributes of course; it can be utlilised not only to effect the destruction of an adversary’s 
centre of gravity, for example, but also to help prevent conflict in the first place.483  Perhaps 
air power’s capability to concentrate force in time and space is its greatest asset, although 
this is only for limited periods, unless massive assets are available.484   
Historical examples help give a perception of the relative strengths and weaknesses of air 
power.  Alexander Seversky argued that the rescue of the British Army from Dunkirk was 
only possible because the RAF had control of the air.  This control permitted the Royal 
Navy (RN) to evacuate over 300,000 troops.485  Had the Luftwaffe owned the skies, the 
British evacuation operation would not have been anywhere near as successful as it 
was.486  During the 1982 Falklands War the Argentineans started from a position of 
considerable strength relative to the British Task Force, yet their apparent lack of any 
coherent air strategy meant that they quickly lost air superiority over the Falkland Islands.  
This was despite the British Forces having no dedicated all-weather air defence aircraft.  
The RN’s Sea Harrier and the RAF’s Harrier were very definitely limited to short range, 
visual and clear weather intercepts, owing to a limited capability of the airborne radar in the 
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Sea Harrier, and in the case of the RAF’s Harrier, no radar at all.487  If the British Task 
Force had possessed dedicated AEW, and if any of the RN’s aircraft carriers had been 
capable of operating the F-4 Phantom - at that time the RAF’s primary air defence fighter - 
equipped with a radar and weapons with the ability to find, track and engage aircraft at all 
heights and in all weather, at significant ranges from the Task Fleet, British naval losses 
would probably have been far fewer.488  Major James Thigepen, USMC, emphasises the 
lack of AEW assets, which the F-4 Phantom was capable of providing, viewing that, ‘…the 
British were lucky that their static defence in-depth worked given their inability to see, 
shape, and manoeuvre in the skies over the Falklands’.489 
Although air power does have limitations, thanks to its speed and reach, it can counter 
threats across a far wider geographical area than is generally possible with surface 
systems.  These two tenets make air power unique and are perhaps air power’s greatest 
strengths; it can be deployed rapidly to provide visible and timely support or to act as a 
deterrent, particularly over great distances.  Growing effectiveness has tended 
progressively to widen air power applications.  For example, for closer threats, it can also 
be used rapidly, direct from its peacetime bases.  The Kosovo conflict in 1999 is an 
example of this, when RAF Tornado GR-1 strike aircraft flew night sorties from their bases 
in Germany.490  Nonetheless, the full utility of air power can, at times, be limited by political 
constraints.  Both Gulf Wars were examples of how politicians and commanders were 
intensely aware that a large loss of life of Iraqi civilians and coalition troops would be 
publicly unacceptable; great effort was made to avoid collateral damage to structures, 
wherever possible.  Where poor targeting has resulted in civilian deaths, as in Kosovo 
during Operation Allied Force in 1999, public perception is that air power was used 
indiscriminately.  In fact, the targeting error rate was 1%, and although it led to 
approximately 500 civilian deaths, it was considerably better than any previous 
operation.491  However, there is a trend amongst the democratic international community to 
not countenance casualties amongst civilians in conflicts not directly affecting their own 
country, or national interests.  Large inter-state conflicts, risking global escalation, may alter 
this antipathy to accepting casualties and collateral damage.  
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While air power has been employed for strategic effect since its inception, the differences 
now, as opposed to operations as recently as the Falkland’s War, are the accuracy of 
delivery systems, aligned with the capabilities of ISTAR assets, enabling these systems to 
be used to maximum effectiveness, while using fewer assets.  All forms of modern military 
power depend on base support if they are to operate at their maximum sortie rate.  Armies 
in the field need depots to support them and navies need harbour facilities.  However, air 
power is often more dependent on its bases than are either land or sea power.  If this base 
support is vulnerable to attack, then base-dependency can be a source of potential 
weakness.492  This axiom can also apply to a carrier task force, if it cannot adequately 
protect itself, or it does not have the option to remain outside the range of adversary threat 
systems.  
An air force’s mission is to deliver air power in the most effective manner possible to meet a 
nation’s security and defence requirements.  In order to achieve this, a balanced force must 
be maintained, one capable of all air power roles and able to meet the requirements for 
high and low-intensity conflict, if mandated to do so.  Although there has been an 
increasing requirement to deploy and sustain forces for expeditionary warfare, it is 
necessary for the UK and other members of NATO to retain the capability to meet the 
requirements of NATO Article 5, which means that an attack on any NATO country is 
considered an attack against all members and will be met by joint responsive action.493  
The UK has provided a level of air power support in the Iraq - (having left) - and 
Afghanistan theatres of operations, second only to the US.  Although Man-Portable Air 
Defence Systems pose a threat, importantly, no air threat exists in either country; the RAF’s 
role has currently been biased towards the COIN threat, concentrating on Close Air 
Support and gathering intelligence through its ISTAR assets.  This threat is very much 
‘today’s’ threat.  The threat faced by the UN alliance during the Libyan conflict in 2011 was 
towards the lower end of a competent IADS.  The lack of competent C2 and the actual poor 
density of SAM, meant that, although still a threat, the Libyan defences were made 
redundant relatively quickly, for no coalition losses.  This IADS was made completely 
ineffective relatively quickly, from bases that were largely land centric, within 200 – 500 nm 
of the threat targets.494  In certain future conflict scenarios it is extremely likely that a 
UK/US, NATO or other alliance, will have to contend with significantly more capable IADS, 
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with states intent on denying access to safe bases and sea operating areas.  The USAF 
acknowledges that since the fall of the Soviet Union, while it has had overwhelming 
dominance in air power capabilities, it faces new challenges, not least from China, which 
will test its current force structures.495 
The US’s approach to its air power capabilities is closely aligned to the UK’s, but does 
emphasis other areas.  A recent strategy study by the Air Force Research Institute, Air 
Force Strategy Study 2020 – 2030, sought to analyse US interests, including economic, 
demographic, and technological trends, defence scenarios, and the USAF’s capabilities to 
meet future strategic challenges.  Its findings recommend that the USAF focus on five 
critical capabilities out to 2030: power protection; freedom of action in air, space, and 
cyberspace; global situational awareness; air diplomacy, and military support to civil 
authorities.  The study emphasises the importance of integrating the three domains of air, 
space, and cyber.496  In recognising that the two mediums of cyberspace and the 
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) are converging, the US is attempting to combine cyber, 
EW and computer network operations (CNO) into what is termed ‘the third dimension’.497   
Air power, although crucial, is just one role making up the matrix required to target an 
adversary’s ‘centre of gravity’ – that point where the enemy is most vulnerable and the 
point where an attack will have the best chance of being decisive.498  Colonel John Warden 
USAF (Retd), in The Air Campaign, articulates very effectively on the centre of gravity: 
‘Every level of warfare has a center, or centers, of gravity.  If several centers of gravity are 
involved, force must be applied to all if the object is to be moved’.499  Clausewitz was 
perhaps one of the originators of the ‘Centre of Gravity’ doctrine; however, Colonel John 
Boyd, in Patterns of Conflict argues that:  
Clausewitz incorrectly stated: “a center of gravity is always found where the mass is 
concentrated most densely”…then argued that this is the place where the blows must be 
aimed and where the decision should be reached.  He failed to develop [the] idea of 
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generating many non-cooperative centers of gravity by striking at those vulnerable, yet critical, 
tendons, connection, and activities that permit a larger system…to exist.500 
Although air power may be capable of achieving the strategic aim, the capability to 
undertake such missions is not easily gained, or maintained.  Ultimately, however, the 
author believes that the capabilities demanded of high-intensity conflict remain paramount; 
the preservation of such capabilities will underpin the ability to field forces structured 
adequately for low-intensity conflict and Peace Support Operations.  Air power can provide 
coercive or retaliatory actions to discourage regimes from unacceptable actions, adding to 
nations’ deterrence capabilities.  Once gone, this ability could take considerable efforts to 
regain.  In the meantime, a valuable strategic influencing tool is also lost.  In particular, the 
demands of control of the air require special consideration. 
Control of the Air 
 
‘The struggle for air superiority is part and parcel of all air operations against a first-class 
enemy’ 501 
Already established, combat air power requires to be generated from close, secure bases, 
both land- and sea-based.  Within combat air structures there are a number of key enablers 
to achieving airspace dominance.  Before any attempt to hypothesise on future counter-air 
requirements, it is important that these critical enablers be understood.  These enablers are 
BVR air-to-air combat, gaining situational awareness of the battlespace, stealth technology, 
NEC, AAR, and EW; all are of prime importance.502  Other components consist of the 
sensors required, sea-, land- and space-based assets and, if defending one’s own 
homeland or sea-based forces, an IADS.  A system that gives the first detect, first 
engagement, first kill capability is vital.  Gaining this capability requires an understanding of 
AAM and AAS Pk principles, and how these affect the air battle. 
During the initial stages of World War I, military aviation was mainly concerned with the role 
of reconnaissance; however, the potential for bombing and air-to-air combat soon became 
apparent.  1915 saw the development of fighter aviation, including mechanical interrupter 
gears, which enabled guns to fire through the arc of spinning propellers.  By 1916, control 
of the air emerged as the crucial issue in the Germans’ Verdun offensive and the British 
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Somme counteroffensive.  A revolution was beginning; control of the air was increasingly 
viewed by air and ground commanders as a means of allowing the observation and the 
attack of enemy ground forces.  The development of fighter aviation to counter these 
missions was a direct result of their increasing importance. 503  By 1917 it was becoming 
evident that poor reconnaissance of an enemy’s disposition could cost all the gains of a 
successful previous attack.504  The disparate requirements of the British Army and the 
Royal Navy, both with independent air services, led to the Smuts Report, which 
recommended the formation of a single air service, combining the Royal Flying Corp (RFC) 
and the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS).505  The RFC was formed at the start of World War 
I, with Lieutenant General Sir David Henderson as its first commander.506  The 1st April 
1918 saw the establishment of the RAF by amalgamating the RFC and the RNAS.507  Hugh 
Trenchard was appointed General Officer commanding the RAF on 13 May 1918.508  Air 
power had come of age and was now seen as an integral part of military operations, with 
control of the air acknowledged as being an essential element of any campaign.   
Some air power strategists have stated that gaining control of the air is so important it might 
bring victory in itself.  General Guilio Douhet, the Italian air power theorist, stated in his 
seminal work The Command of the Air: ‘…to have command of the air is to have victory’.509  
General Erwin Rommel, speaking after the failed North African campaign, stated: ‘Anyone 
who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against an enemy in complete 
control of the air, fights like a savage against a modern European army’.510  Whatever the 
desired degree of control of the air required, against an adversary with a capable IADS, or 
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the ability to project air power, air superiority, let alone air supremacy may be very difficult 
to achieve.  However, unless control of the air is achieved, the full utility of a nation’s own 
military force may not be achievable.   
Richard Hallion, in Control of the Air: The Enduring Requirement, articulates very effectively 
the importance of control of the air.  Going further than most academics and military 
theorists, he delineates control of the air into three spectrums, within the field of warfare as 
a whole: the freedom of initiative, the freedom to operate, and the freedom to manoeuvre, 
which he describes as: 
Freedom of initiative refers to the ability of the air-dominant adversary to control the…nature of 
the conflict: to hold an adversary…behind-the-decision-making-curve.  Freedom to operate is 
characterized by the ability of military forces to conduct all of their functions…without fear of 
that foe attacking them in any meaningful or significant way…Freedom to maneuver embraces 
the ability for joint military forces to operate unhindered on land, [air] and sea within an area of 
operations...511 
Hallion emphasises that when fighting a near-peer or peer adversary, the battle for control 
of the air takes on even more critical importance, and at the same time, will become 
increasingly difficult to achieve.  Fighting under these circumstances, a force’s own survival 
is of crucial importance, before any other mission objectives are achieved.  Counter-air 
assets are required to defend as well as attack, limiting their ability to gain advantage over 
an adversary.512  Warden also emphasises this aspect and the importance of maintaining 
reserve forces. 513  Indeed, an air-to-air battle can arise that consumes all air assets just in 
order not to lose the battle before anything else is achieved.  Having the capability to 
achieve air supremacy, and even localised air superiority is crucial in this scenario; if not, 
all other forces are severely constrained, if not made impotent.  Having mere parity, or 
even superiority, may not be enough, when confronted with an adversary that utilises its 
military forces across all fronts.  Air supremacy would seem to be the only option – is this 
possible to achieve against a peer or near-peer adversary?  A peer competitor is defined 
by the US DoD, as, ‘…in the national sense, is any nation whose capabilities are such that 
in a supreme test of wills with the [US], the outcome is uncertain.’514  Near-peer 
adversaries are less able, but would have the capabilities to attack satellites with DEW, 
and also conduct CNO, for example.515  Examined in Chapter Six, are the capabilities of 
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China to conduct counter-air operations in future warfare.  If the threat from China were 
such that it was a peer adversary, the required systems to counter or deter it would be 
need to be revolutionary. 
The Counter-Air Campaign 
Knowledge of the components of a counter-air campaign is fundamental to an 
understanding of the requirements for future UCAS.  Although definitions of counter-air 
have varied, the principles that encompass the full range of counter-air tasks have remain 
constant.  The combat air component of the counter-air campaign consists of OCA and 
DCA operations.  OCA is a combination of SEAD, EW, air-to-surface and, not least air-to-
air missions.  Equally important, but at times completely independent of OCA operations, 
are DCA operations, which comprise all measures designed to neutralise or reduce the 
effectiveness of hostile air action, normally over own territory, or when particularly high 
value asset requires protection, such as a navy task group, or military command 
structures.516  These counter-air operations can be prosecuted in a number of ways; firstly, 
by defensive actions to minimise the risk of air attack and the damage which may be 
sustained by friendly forces and facilities; secondly, by seeking out the critical nodes of an 
IADS, and enemy aircraft, before or after they have attacked their targets, to inflict 
maximum attrition - although it is always preferable to destroy these aircraft before they 
reach their target; finally, as part of an OCA campaign, by mounting air operations in depth, 
and if necessary, over potentially hostile territory, to seize and retain control of airspace.  
Ultimately, OCA operations are mounted to destroy, disrupt or limit enemy air power as 
close to its source as possible.  Deciding where the priority lies between the various types 
of counter-air operations will depend partly on friendly vulnerabilities and partly on the 
nature of the threat.  The RAF’s AP 3002 – Air Warfare describes counter-air as:  
Counter-air involves those operations conducted to achieve a desired degree of control of the 
air, through the destruction, degradation or disruption of enemy aircraft and missiles, in order 
to allow all friendly forces greater freedom of action whilst minimizing their vulnerability to 
detection and attack…Counter-air operations include all actions, taken by any component, to 
gain and maintain the required degree of control of the air. Effective counter-air requires timely 
collection, processing, analysis, production and dissemination of reliable and accurate 
intelligence. Real-and/or near-real-time information from air, surface and space based sensors 
is used to provide warning, SA, targeting and combat assessment...517 
Most air campaigns will invariably contain some offensive operations.  The success of OCA 
operations against an enemy with a credible air threat requires dedicated SEAD, fighter 
sweeps, and air-to-surface capabilities.  SEAD operations are an integral part of achieving 
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control of the air – they neutralise, destroy, or temporarily degrade enemy air defence 
systems in a specific area by physical attack and/or EW.  The US DoD describes SEAD 
missions as, ‘…[involving] the electromagnetic spectrum to neutralize, degrade, disrupt, 
delay, or destroy elements of an enemy's IADS…SEAD targets include radars for early 
warning/ground-controlled intercept, acquisition radars, SAM, and anti-aircraft artillery’.518  
SEAD capabilities have become increasingly important, as countries with a capable IADS 
pose a significant threat to all combat and support aircraft.   
 
Within an OCA formation of aircraft, fighter sweeps, also referred to as fighter screens by 
US forces, are used to seek out and destroy enemy aircraft in an allocated area of 
operations.  Fighter sweep is generally broken down into two groups, area and route 
sweep.  An area sweep is used to establish control of the air in a given area.  It may be 
used in isolation from other air assets, or it may be used indirectly to support an attack 
force by decoying or destroying enemy aircraft that pose a direct threat to the attack force.  
This form of sweep may be some hours ahead of the main attacking package.519  A route 
sweep is used in direct support of an attack force, clearing the planned route of enemy 
aircraft that may pose a threat to the attack force.  It is usually used in conjunction with 
escort, which involves the mission of aircraft to protect other aircraft.  Escort fighters 
present a direct last line of defence to an adversary’s fighter aircraft.520   
The counter-air response is likely to be shaped by the nature of the overall military 
campaign.  Fundamentally, the counter-air campaign has three elements:  first, the means 
to detect, identify and track potential targets and to direct weapons systems; second, a 
command, control, communications and information infrastructure to link the weapons and 
detection systems; finally, weapons systems to destroy adversary air systems, and more 
frequently, the requirement to counter cyber and space assets.521  The axiom of ‘know your 
enemy’ still holds.  Without knowledge of an adversary’s capabilities and disposition, it is 
likely that a nation’s combat assets will not be used to best effect.  This knowledge is not 
easily gained.  A comprehensive mechanism of information gathering is required.  This will 
include national intelligence agencies and academic institutions that are able to give a 
holistic view of nations’ capabilities and intent.  An adversary’s intent is just as important as 
its capabilities.  Although the two may go hand-in-hand, it is important to have an 
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understanding of what is behind an arms build-up; for example, is it as part of an overall 
deterrence strategy, or is it part of a plan to launch an offensive to gain control of shipping 
access points, or to force another country to capitulate to demands.522  Information, which 
is part of the situational awareness chain, is critical to the counter-air campaign.  Many of 
the necessary assets described are part of this chain; without this information, all the 
impressive military hardware available could be made almost useless.   
The ability to conduct the full gamut of counter-air operations requires a wide range of skill-
sets, from all personnel involved.  Fighter aircrews need to be able to digest information 
quickly, react accordingly, assess, and then start the process again.  Much of this is done 
BVR, however, the classic air-to-air combat arena is usually perceived as being a Battle of 
Britain type scenario, or from the 1986 film ‘Top Gun’, where kills where achieved by 
getting in close to the enemy - that is seeing him, and manoeuvring hard to achieve a kill, 
or prevent being killed.523  Whether there will be a call for this type of combat in 2040 
demands examination.  Leaving this argument aside for the moment, air-to-air combat is 
one of the most cognitively and physically demanding tasks fighter crews engage in, 
particularly in the visual, close in, arena.524  It demands that a pilot skillfully manipulates the 
control column and throttles - referred to in modern fighters as Hands on Throttle and Stick 
(HOTAS) - to control radar and weapon systems, while keeping track of, and responding to, 
opponents and friendly aircraft manoeuvres in a rapidly changing three-dimensional 
environment.525  The pilot must do this while often flying the aircraft at the very limits of its 
turning performance, and straining to prevent loss of consciousness resulting from extreme 
g-forces.  It is difficult to quantify all the skill sets required.  John Stillion’s PhD thesis 
discusses the issues facing the training of fighter crews, viewing: ‘…air-to-air combat skills 
are among the most perishable fighter crew combat skills…’.526  The US experience during 
the Vietnam War, for example, viewed counter-air (MIGCAP) missions as the most 
demanding, requiring, ‘…an intimate knowledge of the weapon system, a thorough 
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Crew Combat Skills, PhD Thesis, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Graduate School, 1999, p.80. 
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knowledge of high performance characteristics and capabilities of the aircraft, and 
extremely close coordination between cockpits and flight members’.527 
Summary 
In 1918 it was appreciated by the British military that ‘air supremacy’, would become as 
important as ‘sea supremacy’.528  Since then, control of the air has become a fundamental 
prerequisite for any planned military endeavour in the 21st Century.  Unless control of the 
air is achieved, all other types of air, surface, and sub-surface operations become 
increasingly difficult, and often impossible, to sustain.  Ground and naval surface forces can 
and have made major contributions to the counter-air campaign.  Their contribution can be 
even greater if they are thoroughly integrated into the mission.529  Once control of the air is 
obtained, the potential of air power can be fully exploited, allowing effective combined 
attacks to be conducted.  The more formidable the opposing air power, the more important 
this task becomes.  Achieving the desired degree of control of the air will continue to be an 
essential element of any military campaign.   
Implementing UAS to conduct ISTAR and air-to-surface strike missions has been achieved, 
at least in non-contested airspace, while the utility of air-to-air UCAS has barely entered 
into the academic sphere of interest, let alone military procurement requirements.530  
Whatever systems are used, there are some maxims that will drive the key enablers 
required to gain control of the air.  What happens if some of the key enablers fail?  Will 
there be access to secure air bases or aircraft carriers close enough to the threat?  Will 
stealth technology work as publicised?  Will BVR AAM work?  Perhaps most importantly, 
can the required advantage be gained if outnumbered and outmanoeuvred?531  Analysis 
from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment questions, ‘…whether the USAF 
can depend on any of these key enablers of air power in the future primarily due to growing 
                                                          
527 USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Project Red Baron III: Air-to-Air Encounter in Southeast Asia, 
Volume III: Analysis – Part 1: Tactics, Command & Control and Training, Nellis Air Force Base, NV: 1974, 
p.38.  This report was obtained by the author from the USAF Historical Research Agency. 
528 Smuts, op. cit., para 11. 
529 David E. Johnson, Learning Large Lessons: The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the 
Post-Cold War Era, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007, p.107. 
530 Recent and current operations in Iraqi and Afghanistan are examples. 
531 See generally, John Stillion and Scott Perdue, 'RAND: Project Air Force - Air Combat Past, Present and 
Future', 2008, http://www.docstoc.com/docs/42891479/Air-Combat-Past-Present-and-Future#, (accessed 
28 October 2011), 
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challenges associated with anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) strategies and enabling 
capabilities’.532 
Minimal vulnerability to attack, again, sometimes aided by stealth and superior BVR-
systems, are the current requirements to engage and destroy adversary fighters, and 
maintain an advantage.  Putting all of this into context enables a clear understanding of the 
foundation that underpins the future counter-air systems that will be essential to 
successfully dominating the battlespace.  The PRC is an example of a nation approaching 
peer adversary status.  Although it is highly unlikely that Iran will even be a near-peer 
adversary in 2040, Iran will certainly seek to develop a highly sophisticated IADS.533  Both 
China and Iran will likely utilise A2/AD doctrine, presenting a challenging situation for the 
US and its allies – this is examined in Chapter Six. 
Components of the Counter-Air Campaign 
An air campaign will begin with intricate planning, normally as part of joint operations.  The 
many components required to mount an air campaign will depend on the complexity of the 
task, but will normally consist of a number of essential branches.  Gaining control of the air 
comprises many of these branches.  Operating bases, stealth technology, weapon 
systems, C2, NEC, the sensors on counter-air aircraft, AAR, EW, and ground-based 
assets, such as IADS, are some of the component parts.534  All of these capabilities aid, 
both directly and indirectly, situational awareness.  When planning any OCA mission, a 
thorough understanding of the assets available, and their capabilities, is essential.  It is 
inconceivable that any offensive force will not have all the assets required.  All major 
Western powers place great emphasis on OCA training; it is in this sort of scenario in which 
counter-air assets are tested to their limits.535  While this type of training is essential for 
high-intensity conflicts, it builds on capabilities that are suitable in low-intensity conflicts as 
well.  While OCA training has largely been a Western preserve since the end of the Cold 
                                                          
532 Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran's Anti-Access 
and Area-Denial Threats, Center of Strategic Budgetary Assessment, 2012, http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/CSBA_SWA_FNL-WEB.pdf, (accessed 6 March 2012), p.17. 
533 Iran has augmented its largely obsolescent modern short-range air defence systems, acquiring Russian 
SA-15 Gauntlet, and SA-22 Greyhound SAM.  Russia rejected the idea of deliveries of modern S-
300PMU1 (SA-20 Gargoyle) long-range SAM in 2010, although a future shift in Russian policy represents 
a potential risk - see Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner, U.S. and Iranian Strategic 
Competition: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & 
International Studies, 2012, pp.40-41. 
534 For an explanation on how Joint Air Operations are planned, and for the specialist branches required, 
including, intelligence, EW, cyber-space ops, weapon systems, air and missile defence planning, 
information ops, command, control and communications - see US Department of Defense, Joint 
Publication 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations, 2010, Chap III-4, Figure: 111-3, p.55.  
535 Exercise Red Flag, held in the US, is an exemplar of OCA training, conducted using the full range of 
counter-air systems, both friendly and adversary - see Reuter, 'Red Flag’, pp.130-134. 
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War, significantly, China has begun to conduct Large Force Employment training exercises, 
venturing as far as Turkey to conduct joint exercises.  China wishes to be able to project 
power at distances it is not currently capable of achieving, and is keen to learn Western 
doctrine and tactics.536    
When planning for and conducting a counter-air campaign, planners are required to 
consider a number of aspects, not least, the capabilities of any potential adversary.  There 
are, however, some axioms that do not change, or at least have not to date.  Control of the 
air itself is rarely achievable by air assets alone.  The forces required for adequate control 
of the air will vary, depending on the threat.  The level of control required will depend on the 
level of risk/attrition the planners are willing to accept.537  Component elements of a 
counter-air package will include the full range of combat air and support assets, and 
infrastructure; included are all the ground- and space-based effects that make up a 
campaign.  These assets will consist of:538 
- Air-to-air, SEAD and strike-attack aircraft.  Unless capable of achieving air 
dominance, SEAD and strike assets will be behind the fighters. 
- C4ISTAR, ELINT assets.  Used in friendly airspace, until control of the air is gained, 
unless capable of self-protection. 
- AWACS – Used to provide battlespace management; sometimes combined with an 
AEW role.  Positioned well behind the combat air, although, sometimes pushed 
forward, if protection is offered by combat air.   
- AAR – Positioned well behind the combat air, although, sometimes pushed forward, if 
protection is offered by combat air.   
- Ground- and sea-based radar units; own IADS, for land- and sea-based defence; 
EW, communications, space assets, and all support personnel. 
All air assets can ‘retrograde’ (fly in the opposite direction to enemy fighters) if required – 
however, this would normally render them incapable of providing a viable service. 
Basing  
Close and secure land bases and sometimes carriers, close enough to an adversary’s 
centre of gravity, are necessary to generate sufficient sorties.  If these do not exist, against 
                                                          
536 See Jim Wolf, 'China Mounts Air Exercise with Turkey', Reuters, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/08/us-china-turkey-usa-idUSTRE6975HC20101008, (accessed 14 
March 2011).  
537 For guidance on the considerations for military risk, see DCDC, Campaign Planning: Joint Doctrine 
Publication 5-00, 2nd Edition, Shrivenham: UK Ministry of Defence, 2008, Annex 2H – Military Risk.  
538 AP 3002– Air and Space Warfare, Chap 7, pp.3-12. 
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an adversary capable of projecting force at great distances, fighters must attempt to 
dominate the air battle from bases situated at suboptimal distances.  This presents 
significant difficulties, particularly if an opponent has a quantitative advantage.  Due to a 
normal fighter aircraft’s size, fuel constraints limit most fighter operations to within 500 nm 
of the battle area, from both AAR orbits, and operating bases, land and sea.539  Previously 
mentioned, AAR can greatly extend a fighter’s on-task time; however, AAR assets may 
themselves be forced to operate in contested airspace.  According to John Stillion and 
Scott Perdue in Air Combat, Past, Present and Future, a RAND brief of a potential conflict 
between the US and China, an example of the distances combat aircraft travel was 
demonstrated in the 2003 Gulf War, where the fighter distance to Baghdad was 
approximately 550 nm, while during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, the fighter distance to 
Belgrade was approximately 350 nm.540  All of these operations were backed with the full 
gamut of support required, including large numbers of AAR, ELINT and C2 assets.  
Importantly, neither conflict offered a significant counter-air threat to coalition forces. 
This RAND brief uses a possible China versus Taiwan conflict as an example.  The 
analysis describes the PLAAF as having 27 bases within 500 nm of the Taiwan Strait, while 
the USAF has just one – Kadena, in Japan.541  This analysis goes on to state that current 
and planned US combat aircraft fleet range/payloads are optimised for a Cold War 
scenario, centred on a Soviet invasion into Central Europe.  The scale of Western Pacific 
theatre is significantly larger.542  If US CSG are forced to remain at distance from a Taiwan 
conflict, then it is axiomatic that operating current and planned US combat aircraft in the 
Western Pacific will result in low sortie rates, thus reducing effective combat power, while 
still demanding a huge AAR refuelling task.  China would also have the capability to target 
bases like Kadena, and others further afield, potentially rendering them ineffective.543 
                                                          
539 The Tornado F-3, for example, could operate at 500 nm from base for approximately 1 hour, if fitted 
with large external fuel tanks - see Squadron Leader RAF Brian Handy (ed), Royal Air Force Aircraft & 
Weapons, London: DCC(RAF) Publications, 2003, pp. 4-5.  See also, Work and Ehrhard, op. cit., Part III, 
p.25. 
540 See Stillion and Perdue, op. cit., PPF.14.  This RAND brief (Power Point presentation) is available from 
internet sources.  Although it is caveated ‘Unclassified/FOUO/Sensitive’, it has been cited in a number of 
academic works, including, Barry Watts, The F-22 Program in Retrospect, Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2009, http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2009/08/the-f-22-
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the author to cite this presentation, (Email – Lauren Skrabala, Permissions Officer, RAND Corporation, 14 
November 2012).   
541 Stillion and Perdue, op. cit., PPF.14. 
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Stealth has its roots in long-standing efforts to reduce the detection of military aircraft 
through camouflage paint schemes.  However, as electronic sensors have replaced the 
eyes of pilots as the primary means of tracking other aircraft, more intricate means of 
defence were needed.  Stealth has evolved as a complex design philosophy to reduce the 
ability of an opponent's sensors to detect, track and attack an aircraft.544  The design of 
stealth systems does, however, require careful trade-offs, some of which can impact on 
other areas of aircraft performance.  A range of technologies are combined in order to 
make an aircraft difficult to detect by radar.  These include a smooth surface design, radar 
absorbent materials (RAM), and electronic support and protection.545  The aircraft’s RCS 
reduces the range at which ground- and air-based radars can detect the aircraft.  RAM 
absorbs most of an adversary’s radar’s energy, with the aircraft's suitably designed shape 
redirecting much of the remaining power away from the radar source – in theory.  Where 
possible, engines are incorporated into the fuselage with air intake and exhaust ducts 
placed on the top of the aircraft in order to reduce the heat signature, and hide the jet 
engine's compressor blades from radar detection, impeding Non-Cooperative Target 
Recognition techniques.546   
The experience of both Vietnam and the 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars was the single strongest 
factor in encouraging the development of stealth aircraft.547   Soviet supplied SAM systems 
accounted for a large number of US and Israeli aircraft.  A Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) report from1968, declassified in 2007, details the lengths the Soviet Union went to in 
order to supply SAM systems to the North Vietnamese regime.548  The Egyptians, for 
                                                          
544 For a background to development of stealth applications, see Belcher, op. cit., pp.292 -294.  An 
example of the significance of a stealth advantage is where a fighter with an RCS of less than 0.1-m2 could 
target a conventional fighter, who’s RCS is 5-m2 for more than 60 seconds before the conventional fighter 
can fire an AAM.  The F-22’s RCS is considered to be in the 0.001- to 0.1-m2 range - see ibid., pp.501-
502. 
545 There are four basic techniques for reducing RCS: Shaping; Radar absorbing materials; Passive 
cancellation, and Active cancellation – see Eugene Knott, John Shaeffer, and Michael Tuley, Radar Cross 
Section, Second Edition, Raleigh, NC: SciTech Publishing Inc, 2004, p.270. 
546 For analysis of the fundamentals of stealth, see Schleher, op. cit., pp.508-514,  
547 The Israeli Air Force lost 50 aircraft in the first three days of the 1973 war – see Grant, ‘The Bekaa 
Valley War’, p.58.  Although the majority of US surface-to-air losses during the Vietnam War were from 
Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA), the huge number of SAM launched at US aircraft hindered their operations – 
see, Spencer Tucker (ed), The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History, 
Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2011, pp.27-29. 
548 See Directorate of Intelligence, 'Intelligence Report: The Sino-Soviet Dispute on Aid to North Vietnam 
(1965-1968)', Central Intelligence Agency, 1968, http://www.foia.cia.gov/CPE/ESAU/esau-37.pdf, 
(accessed 6 September 2012), pp.i-iv. 
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example, possessed a range of Soviet supplied SAM, including 40 SA-2, 85 SA-3 and 40 
SA-6 batteries, with over 400 early warning, acquisition and fire control radars.549   
Knowledge of the capabilities of Soviet SAM systems led directly to the development of the 
first truly stealth aircraft, the US F-117 Nighthawk.550  A product of the Lockheed 
Corporation’s Skunk Works, the F-117 was also the first combat aircraft to use an 
automatic flight control system capable of controlling every aspect of a mission, from take-
off, execution and delivery of weapons.551  The stunning success of the F-117 during the 
1991 Gulf War led Donald Rice, the US Secretary of the Air Force from 1989 – 1992, to 
predict: ‘…that by the first couple of decades of the [21st century] every military aircraft 
flying would be stealth…’.552  Rice was perhaps overstating things, and probably meant 
combat aircraft, that is, those that require taking the fight to the enemy.  Most current 21st 
century fighters lack real stealth; only the F-22 Raptor can be classified as truly stealthy.  
However, China and Russia are making great strides in development of their own fifth-
generation fighters, with the J-20, J-31 and PAK-FA.553   
Although RCS reduction is important, there are limits to the utility of stealth techniques.  
Since the RCS of an aircraft depends on the angle from which it is viewed, an aircraft will 
typically have a much smaller RCS when viewed from the front or rear than when viewed 
from the side or above.  In general, stealth aircraft are designed to minimise their frontal 
RCS.  Current technology struggles to allow the contouring of the surface of an aircraft to 
reduce the RCS equally in all directions, and reductions in the frontal RCS may lead to a 
larger RCS from above.554  While a stealth aircraft may be difficult to track when it is flying 
toward ground-based radar or another aircraft at the same altitude, high-altitude airborne 
radar or space-based radar may be more successful.555  These and other detection 
systems, when their data is fused as part of a NEC system, may offer the counter to stealth 
technology. 
 
                                                          
549 Edgar O'Ballance, No Victor, No Vanquished: The Yom Kippur War, London: Presidio Press, 1978, 
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550 Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos, Skunk Works, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1994, p.95. 
551 ibid., p.95. 
552 ibid., p.99. 
553 Abdullah, The Military Balance: 2013, p.254. 
554 Knott, Shaeffer, and Tuley, op. cit., p.271. 
555 See Schleher, op. cit., p.506, Table 8.6. 
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Counters to Stealth 
While stealth techniques are considered very important to achieving control of the air, 
whether they are crucial is open to debate.556  The basics of RF stealth, in particular, are 
well understood by scientists.  Many publications describe the fundamentals of sensor and 
platform physics.557  There is a general perception that stealthy aircraft are undetectable.  
This is not the case, as they are just difficult to detect at certain radar frequencies.558  Their 
stealth qualities are optimized against X-Band (fighter radars generally work in this 
frequency band, 8 – 12 GHz) engagement radars.559  According to the designers of the F-
117, for example, it could be detected by the Iraqi IADS, but it could not be tracked 
accurately enough to allow weapon engagement.560   
Although knowledge of the principles of stealth may be relatively easy gained, 
implementation of stealth technology is another matter entirely.  Some of the materials 
used require special and costly maintenance.  The manoeuvrability of an aircraft can be 
compromised by the introduction of stealth design features, which may also impact on 
operational efficacy.  Sensors pose a particular problem for stealth aircraft, in particular, 
large radars used by conventional aircraft.561  As a result, future air-to-air missions may 
largely rely on passive detection of transmissions by hostile aircraft, as well as IR tracking.  
The use of on-board EA and radar systems emits RF energy that can be detected by 
adversary systems.  Other means of establishing situational awareness are therefore 
preferred.  Aircraft for attacking targets on the ground face a similar problem.  Any aircraft, 
including stealth, will be vulnerable to detection by Infrared Search and Track (IRST) 
systems.  The natural heating of an aircraft's surface makes it visible to this type of system.  
The faster an aircraft flies, the hotter it gets, making it easier to detect through IR means.562  
                                                          
556 Although stealth was not at the top airframe requirement of responses to the author’s questionnaire, it 
is interesting to note that, in the responses to a different question, 63% of interviewees view stealth in 
2040 as crucial, 30% as desirable, with 7% stating that it would not be crucial.  Most believe that stealth 
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spectrums.   
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37. 
558 See Schleher, op. cit., p.507. 
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Although Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) can be used for detecting targets of known 
general location, they are ill suited for searching for targets over a wide area.  In order to 
locate targets, stealth aircraft may rely on airborne Laser Detection and Ranging (LADAR), 
although such a sensor may prove of limited utility in poor weather.563  
A number of countries produce radar systems that have been specifically developed to 
detect LO/stealth aircraft.  The Belorussian Nebo SVU VHF Digital AESA radar is an 
example, and is in service and available for export.  The Nebo SVU is being integrated into 
a mobile VHF acquisition radar.  A Belorussian military export company, Rosoboroexport, 
describes the Nebo SVU radar as: 
The Nebo-SVU radar is designed to automatically detect…and track a wide range of modern 
airborne platforms, including strategic and tactical aircraft…ballistic targets such as small-size 
hypersonic cruise missiles warheads, low-observable targets, in particular those embodying 
stealth technology…[and]to detect active EA threats…564 
Its digital AESA design allows accurate bearing measurement of altitude and range; this 
accuracy may be enough to allow mid-course updates for long-range SAM or AAM, acting 
as part of a third-party-targeting system.  Another novel approach to counter-LO has been 
the development of passive systems such as the Czech VERA-E, which uses radar, 
television, cellular phone and other available signals of opportunity reflected from stealthy 
aircraft, to find and track them.565   
Although stealth may not be the panacea, its importance is generally acknowledged; there 
are dissenters, however.  According to Dr Carlo Kopp, Air Power Australia, the US needs, 
‘…to start thinking about which strategic niche they wish to occupy in 2020.  The stealth 
monopoly cannot last forever, and the US must now confront the prospect of a future in 
which the asymmetric advantage of US stealth is no longer absolute, but rather 
incremental’.566  There are contrary views.  Barry Watts, in The Maturing Revolution in 
Military Affairs, notes there is a view that, ‘…the balance between information acquisition 
and information denial will swing dramatically in favor of the former…there will come a time 
in the not-too-distant future when the SAM will almost always win against air-breathing 
penetrating platforms…’.567  Watts argues, however, that this scenario is unlikely.  He 
contends that a definite answer would require access to data on current and projected 
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capabilities for reducing radar signatures and countering advanced SAM that are highly 
classified, which means that comment not totally informed should be treated with 
scepticism.568  Watts further suggests the shift to digital AESA radars and continuing 
growth in computer processing capabilities which aid the attacker can also be exploited by 
stealthy adversaries.569  The F-35 JSF’s planned fusion of sensors, aligned with NEC, for 
example, gives the F-35 an ability to react automatically to threats.  The F-35’s AESA radar 
can be used for EA of adversary IADS, as well as DRFM jamming capabilities that offer the 
potential to increase survivability.570  Although the use of active AESA radars and DRFM 
jammers could alert adversary systems, there will be occasions when their use is 
warranted.  For example, DRFM techniques can be utilised against both aircraft and AAM 
radars.571   
Watts writes that the F-35, like the F-22, has been developed for survivability in daytime 
operations and will probably operate in networked groups of four or eight aircraft, greatly 
multiplying their capacity to overcome adversary IADS, such as Russian S-300/400/500 
class SAM.572  Chinese SAM systems, such as the HQ-9, which is based on the S-300, 
have similar capabilities.573  It is this class of SAM that presents a counter-air planner with 
the greatest test.  Although stealth will undoubtedly aid the counter-air mission, it is but one 
part of the matrix to their mission success.  Essentially, Watts believes that the US decision 
makers are committed to the JSF programme, and are able to evaluate the capabilities of 
all-aspect LO into the 2040s.574   
Stealth’s primacy may well be tested, with the result that other techniques, systems and 
tactical doctrine are required.  As with any game-changing technology, such as the tank 
during World War I, and the development of radar in the 1930s, other industrial based 
societies will eventually develop the same types of systems, and counter-systems.  Science 
is not the preserve of certain countries; however, having the economic and industrial base 
required to develop this advanced technology may limit the number of countries capable of 
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doing so.  Whether stealth is the panacea to obtaining control of the air is debateable, 
nonetheless.  Against a peer or near-peer adversary however, there is no doubt that it will 
cause that adversary to seek ways to counter any advantage that stealth brings.  It is 
perhaps telling that the US will now only have 187 F-22, maximum, in its inventory.575  
Systems will be developed, with the aim of allowing the US to maintain its counter-air 
supremacy in the coming decades.  In 2009, writing in The Washington Post, the Secretary 
of the US Air Force, Michael Donley, and the USAF Chief of Staff, General Norton 
Schwartz, in a joint statement, stated that, ‘Within the next few years, we will begin work on 
the sixth generation [fighter] capabilities necessary for future air dominance’.576  Since this 
statement, Donley speaking to a USAF journalist, has indicated that, although there is no 
sixth- generation programme, ‘…the early pieces of what would constitute a program are 
already out there’.577  Although there is no universal definition of what ‘sixth generation’ 
entails, a definition used by some aviation journals, for example, the US Air Force 
Magazine is – ‘…extreme stealth; efficient in all flight regimes…possible “morphing” 
capability; smart skins; highly networked; extremely sensitive sensors, optionally manned, 
[and utilising] directed energy weapons’.578  Optionally manned and DEW are particularly 
interesting aspects. 
Weapon Systems, Sensors and Enablers 
It may seem a fairly basic principle, but in order to engage and destroy adversary aircraft, 
these need first to be detected, tracked and identified.  Detection and tracking information 
on hostile aircraft may be obtained from a variety of sources: for example, visual sightings, 
IR or acoustic monitoring, conventional radar, including airborne radar, over-the-horizon 
radar, ELINT and Electronic Support (ES) systems, and spaced-based detection 
systems.579  Fighter aircraft have relied on airborne radars, positioned at the front of the 
aircraft, since WW II.  Referred to as air-intercept radars, these have evolved from very 
basic pulse systems, into the sophisticated AESA systems used today.580  Already in use, 
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AESA are set to become critical in target detection, with other systems being incorporated, 
as part of an NEC.  The information from these systems needs to be merged into a 
recognised air picture (RAP), which can then be disseminated to all agencies and forces 
involved in counter-air operations. 
A counter-air system is not entirely air-to-air centric.  It will normally consist of two 
complementary components: surface-to-air defences, if protecting land- or sea-based 
assets, and air-to-air systems.581  Surface-to-air defences consist of SAM systems and 
AAA, and the associated detection systems; they allow high readiness states to be 
maintained over long periods, giving quick response and, in certain cases, they can be 
used to counter ballistic missiles, for example, the American Patriot SAM system, which 
was used to some effect during the 1991 Gulf War against Iraqi Scud missiles, although its 
efficacy has been questioned.582  However, in comparison to fighter aircraft, SAM have 
limited range and low mobility, and therefore relatively large numbers of surface-to-air 
defence systems may be required. These air defences can be fully effective only if they are 
integrated into the wider air defence organisation.  They not only help to protect air 
installations from air attack, but also form an integral part of the counter-air campaign by 
inflicting attrition on the enemy air forces.583  Fighter aircraft are the ‘front-line’ of counter-
air.  They are flexible and reusable and can be switched to tasks other than counter-air, 
should the operational situation demand it.  If required, fighter aircraft can be used to 
protect very large areas or be concentrated rapidly to counter enemy saturation raids.  
They may also be used to identify targets positively before engaging them, if no other 
means is available.584   
The primary current means of destroying adversary aircraft in air-to-air engagements is by 
the use of AAM, both RF and IR; their importance in achieving the endgame – that is 
destroying attacking aircraft, has been crucial since the Vietnam War.585  Most fighters are 
also equipped with an air-to-ground gun, normally the same gun used for air-to-air.  Having 
the ability to engage an adversary at long-range, classically known as BVR, can enable an 
attacker to stay outside an enemy’s weapon systems engagement zone.  This advantage is 
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negated, however, if an adversary also has a BVR capability; in this case, one’s own 
kinematic advantage and AAM stand-off supremacy is paramount.586  If a fighter’s BVR 
AAM are negated, or a fighter is outnumbered, it is probable that an air-to-air engagement 
will be forced to enter into the visual arena.  The first part of WVR combat will include the 
exchange of AAM, when fighter crews have visual of each other.  If this happens, although 
RF AAM can be used, more manoeuvrable IR AAM become the primary means of 
engaging adversary aircraft, with the last resort being the AAG.587  The AAG is generally 
seen as a tertiary weapon, used if both RF and IR AAM fail.588   
Electronic Warfare  
Since the advent of radar in World War II, EW has played a prominent role in air power, 
particularly, in counter-air tasks.  The Vietnam War saw the use of EW increase 
dramatically, when it became clear that normal ‘kinetic’ methods would not achieve the 
desired result, that is the nullification of the North Vietnamese IADS.589  Although this was 
never achieved, once EW techniques were harnessed, US airborne losses decreased 
dramatically.590  The aim of EW is to disrupt an adversary’s use of the EMS at critical 
points, while ensuring continued friendly use of the EMS.591  EW is defined as any military 
action involving the use of the EMS, including DEW, to control the EMS or to attack an 
enemy.  This is not limited to radio or radar frequencies, but includes IR, visible, ultraviolet, 
and other less used portions of the EMS.592  The three major components of EW are EA, 
Electronic Protection (EP), and Electronic Support (ES).593  EA is the component of EW 
involving the use of the EMS, DEW, or anti-radiation weapons with the intent of degrading, 
neutralising, or destroying an adversary’s combat capability.  EA also prevents or reduces 
an enemy’s use of the EMS.  EA includes direct attack with high-speed anti-radiation 
missiles; active applications such as decoys, noise jamming, deceptive jamming, 
expendable miniature jamming decoys, HPM and DEW are also employed.  Electronic 
emission control and LO technologies are passive applications of EA.594  EP includes the 
actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from EW.  Examples of EP 
                                                          
586 See Schreiber, Stock, and Winston Bennett, op. cit., p.9.  See also, Shaw, op. cit., pp.51-52. 
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see ibid., p.xi. 
594 US Air Force Doctrine Center, Electronic Warfare, pp.7-8. 
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include radar frequency agility, and changing pulse repetition frequency.595  ES is that part 
of EW that intercepts, identifies, and locates sources of radiated electromagnetic energy for 
the purpose of threat recognition.  ES information can be correlated with other ISR 
information to provide a more accurate picture of the battlespace, which may then be 
developed into an electronic order of battle for gaining situational awareness; it may also be 
used to develop new countermeasures.596   
The importance of EW is generally understood by military planners; however, the 
significance that modern, easily obtained, EA systems have in denying the F2T2EA cycle is 
perhaps not so readily understood.  The effectiveness of relatively simple DRFM jammers, 
for example, can have devastating consequences on the ability of a force to gain control of 
the air.597  The effects of various EW techniques can significantly disrupt an IADS, sensors, 
communication links, weapon systems, and C2.  Jamming, chaff, and decoys degrade an 
adversary’s ability to conduct the F2T2EA cycle.  Even if targets are detected through this 
wall of confusion caused by EA techniques, and AAM weapon systems get through to their 
intended targets, they lose some effectiveness; their likelihood of actually destroying the 
target can be greatly reduced.598  
 
EA techniques have changed the way in which warfare is fought.  Every sensor, RF and IR 
weapon can be affected by EA; mitigating the effect of EA on these systems requires 
significant effort.  The future use and countering of EA systems forms a crucial part of 
military doctrine.  Aligned with weapon systems and sensors, stealth and NEC, EA has 
become a key element in gaining supremacy in the battlespace. 
Cyber-Warfare 
Cyber-warfare is another area of importance.  The air power environment is extremely 
dependent upon good data links and communications, in general.  With the recent 
formation of US Cyber Command, the US has emphasised that cyber issues are now part 
of the spectrum of warfare.  The US military was the first to merge its EW areas of interest 
with those of cyber – described as the ‘cyber-electromagnetic contest’.599  For the purposes 
of this thesis, however, EW and Cyber will be referred to separately as two different 
                                                          
595 ibid., p.9. 
596 ibid., pp.9-10. 
597 Schleher, op. cit., pp.293-294.  The Russian ‘Sorbtsya’ and the Chinese ‘KG300G’ systems, are 
examples of widely proliferated jammers – see, Streetly, op. cit.,  pp.529 and 565. 
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Shaw, op. cit., pp.56-57. 
599 US Army Capabilities Integration Center, op. cit., p.i. 
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strands.  Both disciplines use the EMS, and computer hardware and software.  An example 
of how cyber-attacks can have an effect, is an alleged 2011 attack on Iran’s nuclear 
programme.  In 2011, Iran accused the German engineering firm Siemens of helping Israel 
and the US launch a computer virus to sabotage its nuclear facilities.  Both the US and 
Israel have not denied computer experts' claims that they were behind the development of 
the Stuxnet Worm.600   
 
China is considered by many Western governments to be one of the most frequent 
practitioners of cyber-warfare.  According to The Washington Post, ‘China is waging a 
quiet, mostly invisible but massive cyberwar against the United States, aimed at stealing its 
most sensitive military and economic secrets and obtaining the ability to sabotage vital 
infrastructure’.601  A report from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission to the US Congress states, ‘Chinese capabilities in computer network 
operations have advanced sufficiently to pose genuine risk to U.S. military operations in the 
event of a conflict….A few weeks before a potential conflict over Taiwan, the [PLA] may 
mount a computer network attack on systems operated by the U.S’.602  It is likely that many 
countries, such as China, will seek to utilise computer network attack as a military tool, from 
ground-, air- and space-based assets.603 
Command and Control 
 
Any fighting force must have a cohesive and effective C2 system.  Its purpose is to 
integrate all of the various elements of weapon and detection systems into a coordinated 
entity, ensuring the optimum use of available resources against threats.604  When working 
with surface forces within a theatre, in particular, a good C2 system is essential to ensure 
that joint counter-air assets are employed in a fully coordinated approach.  If not, assets 
can be under-utilised, increasing the possibility of fratricide, which is always of major 
concern to any air defence unit.  C2 can be land-, sea- or air-based, or a combination of 
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these.  For identification of friend or foe, C2 is critical, unless forces can operate to some 
level of autonomy.  It can be seen, therefore, that taking out an adversary’s C2 is an 
important task, starting in the first stages of a campaign.  Conversely, however, having 
forces with the capability to operate autonomously can mitigate the criticality of C2.605  It 
may be prudent, therefore, in certain scenarios, to allow for the C2 to remain functioning. 
Network Enabled Capability 
Much is made today of the possibilities of NEC/NCW.  The aim of NEC is to have superior 
understanding of the battlefield by virtue of the ability to gather and assess information from 
many sources – especially in relation to that of an opponent – and act on it.  General 
Rupert Smith believes that NEC has effectively been used since World War II; he states: 
‘To my mind, from their reconnaissance and analysis to their ability to engage the enemy, 
RAF Fighter Command fought the first ‘network enabled’ battle’.606  Current UK doctrine 
considers NEC as the underpinning requirement for an IADS, with its Joint Warfare 
Publication: 3-63 Joint Air Defence, stating a Joint AD System as using:  
.…all available sources for surveillance and identification, whether theatre assets or those 
active or passive sensors provided by maritime, land, air or space based platforms acting as 
an integrated and interoperable system which provides the highest level of air situational 
awareness throughout the relevant area of operations.607 
An example of the force multiplier attributes of NEC is the introduction of the JTIDS.  In 
the mid-1990s, the USAF conducted the JTIDS Operational Special Project.  This trial 
tested the capabilities of the F-15C equipped with voice-only communications, compared 
with F-15C equipped with voice and JTIDS Link-16 TDL communications in tactical air-
to-air combat; more than 12,000 sorties were undertaken.  Blue offensive counter-air 
packages varied in size from two to eight F-15Cs.  In all cases, the packages were 
controlled by AWACS aircraft.  Engagements ranged from two Blue fighters on two Red 
fighters, to eight Blue fighters on 16 Red fighters.  On average, Blue offensive counter-air 
packages equipped with JTIDS achieved a two-and-a-half time’s improvement in kill 
ratio, over those that used traditional voice communications only.608  This is a significant 
dichotomy.  Essentially, aircrew’s situational awareness is significantly enhanced by the 
use of JTIDS, enabling all participants to share the information they possess, and 
                                                          
605 See ibid., Chap 2, p.44. 
606 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern War, London: Penguin Books, 2006, 
pp.133-134. 
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allowing a fuller air picture to be established.609  Once JTIDS was installed in all the 
Tornado F-3s, it became one of the best counter-air aircraft in the West’s inventory, 
despite its inherent deficiencies, such as its lack of agility in the visual environment.610  
NEC is more than one system; it encompasses all information nodes, enabling 
situational awareness to be gained, actions to be taken, and reassessment to be made – 
a classic example of Boyd’s OODA Loop.611   
 
Integrated Air Defence System  
An IADS fuses all anti-aircraft sensors, including radar, visual observers, anti-aircraft 
weapons, such as AAA, SAM, air superiority fighters and interceptors, under a common 
system of C2.  Today's battlefield, in many respects, starts as a duel between the IADS and 
the SEAD campaign against it.  During World War II, the RAF’s Fighter Command 
benefited from an early version of an IADS.  This was developed into a genuinely NEC, as 
radar and radio became available in the interwar period.  Data from radar stations and 
Observer Corps posts was collected, filtered, fused, analysed and disseminated, using a 
network of land-lines and ground-to-air radio.  This early example of NEC resulted in the 
RAF being able to make decisions quickly, getting inside the Luftwaffe’s OODA Loop.612  It 
would be fair to say that during World War II, the UK’s home-defence radar network was 
one of the key factors why the Luftwaffe failed to dominate the RAF, resulting in the 
cancellation of Operation Sea Lion, the German plan to invade Britain, once control of the 
air was achieved.613  The term IADS had not yet been invented, but more importantly, the 
Germans did not see the British system as a system.  They saw airfields and radars, but 
did not grasp that the most critical and vulnerable parts were the control centres.614  
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A modern IADS has multiple layers of sensors and defensive systems.  An example is in 
the protection of US naval CSG, in which the outermost ring consists of fighters and well-
escorted airborne radar aircraft, with the next ring made up of long-range SAM.615  A further 
example is the protection of key C2 centres, or nuclear facilities.  The critical nodes that 
comprise an IADS, such as its C2 links, can be considered the centre of gravity.  Attacking 
these nodes may well render an IADS toothless, without having to negate the radar and 
missile sites, or indeed, the fighters themselves.616  As already established, a functioning 
IADS is only as good as its C2/NEC. 
Boyd’s OODA Loop and its Relevance to NEC 
At this point it is worth examining the concept of Colonel John Boyd’s OODA Loop and its 
relationship with NEC/NCW, and the importance it plays in modern warfare and situational 
awareness.  Also known as the ‘Boyd Cycle’, often quoted by many military commanders 
and academics, Boyd’s OODA Loop aims, ‘…to create menace and uncertainty and 
mistrust, then…to exploit and magnify the presence of these disconcerting elements… ’.617  
The OODA Loop is a concept that is sometimes misunderstood.  Fran Osinga, in Science, 
Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd, offers the view that: ‘Controversy 
and misperception nevertheless surround Boyd’s work.  Like Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, his 
work is more heard than read or understood.  Very few people have actually worked their 
way through the presentations’.618  Commenting on the general lack of appreciation of 
Boyd’s wider works, Mark Safranski, in The John Boyd Roundtable: Debating Science, 
Strategy, and War, views that other than the OODA Loop, ‘…the corpus of Boyd’s work is 
well known to a relatively small number of his collaborators, reformers, theorists and 
military officers who were personally influenced by Colonel Boyd’.619   
Lt Gen David Fadok, Commander and President, the USAF Air University in 2012, in his 
Master’s thesis, John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis, 
compares the theories of Boyd and Warden.  Fadok views Boyd’s OODA Loop theory: 
…[as] process-oriented and aim[s] at psychological incapacitation.  He speaks of folding an 
opponent back inside himself by operating inside his observation-orientation-decision-action 
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(OODA) loop.  This severs the adversary’s external bonds with his environment and thereby 
forces an inward orientation upon him.  This inward focus necessarily creates mismatches 
between the real world and his perceptions of that world. Under the menacing environment of 
war, the initial confusion and disorder degenerate into a state of internal dissolution which 
collapses his will to resist.620 
Fadok’s summation captures the crux of Boyd’s OODA Loop; however, Boyd’s work has 
and continues to divide opinion.  According to Robert Coram, in his biography of Boyd, 
Boyd is regarded by some as the most important strategist of the 20th century, if not since 
Sun Tzu.621  Others, such as the military theorist Colin Gray, are more circumspect.  Gray 
views Boyd’s OODA Loop to be either a, ‘….banal statement of the obvious, or panacea – 
take your choice…’.622  Gray acknowledges, however, that, ‘It is a sound idea, but as the 
philosopher’s stone for victory at all levels of warfare it is distinctly sub-Clausewitzian’.623 
Boyd developed the OODA Loop concept over many years.  It began with the writing of a 
sixteen-page essay, Destruction and Creation, in 1976.  Grant Hammond, in Patterns of 
Conflict: John Boyd and American Security, writes that, ‘Destruction and Creation is the 
culmination of a quest to find scientific, mathematical, and logical verification for principles 
that Boyd intuitively knew to be true.  Thus tested and refined, it became the basis for most 
of his thought thereafter’.624   Chuck Spinney, a close friend and colleague of Boyd’s, 
believes that, ‘”Destruction and Creation” became the intellectual foundation of his 
monumental study of competition and conflict – although at the time, he had no idea where 
his philosophical musings might take him’.625  Boyd spent the next 20 years exploring and 
expanding on the ideas expressed in Destruction and Creation; the result was A Discourse 
on Winning and Losing.  Originally referred to by Boyd as Patterns of Conflict, this work 
evolved from a slide presentation of 90-minutes, to one eventually of over 13-hours.  
Containing 193 slides, it covers a wide range of ideas, including historical data of social 
forces, political motivations and technologies, with Boyd’s own interpretations and 
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questions, illustrating how these affect the process of winning and losing.626  Although 
available via websites, these slides have not been officially published, but can be freely 
studied.  However, as Coram, quite axiomatically, observes: ‘….they are not easily 
interpreted, and require some explanation’.627  Colonel James Burton USAF (Retd), 
believes, ‘A Discourse on Winning and Losing will be regarded as the 20th century’s most 
original thinking in the military arts.  No one, not even…Clausewitz… Sun Tzu, or any of the 
past masters of military theory, shed as much light on the mental aspects of conflict as 
Boyd’.628   
Hammond writes that, ‘[Boyd’s] intent was to unveil the character of conflict, survival and 
conquest’.629  Boyd, at heart a fighter pilot, used the analogy of air-to-air combat to describe 
the requirement of being able to lose energy and gain energy more quickly than the enemy, 
when in visual combat.630  Boyd believed these fast transients of changing direction, speed, 
and altitude equated to operating at a faster tempo than an adversary.  Boyd described this 
as getting inside an adversary’s OODA Loop.631  Osinga’s analysis of Patterns of Conflict 
concludes that, ‘…Boyd offered his audience a new look at military history…Applying the 
process of destruction and creation to his investigation, [Boyd] uncovers underlying 
dynamics of each category of warfare and expresses these in an increasingly abstract and 
conceptual way’.632  Boyd’s massive brief introduces the concept of the OODA Loop almost 
at the beginning.  In slide 5, Idea Expansion, he states: ‘[The] Idea of fast transients 
suggest that, in order to win, we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our 
adversaries--, or, better yet, get inside [an] adversary’s Observation-Orientation-Decision-
Action time cycle or loop’.633  In his conclusion in slide 185, Central Theme, Boyd sums up 
his concept: 
Evolve and exploit insight/initiative/adaptability/harmony together with a unifying vision, via a 
grand ideal or an overarching theme or a noble philosophy, as basis to: Shape or influence 
events so that we not only amplify our spirit and strength but also influence the uncommitted 
or potential adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are emphatic 
toward our success, yet be able to..[o]perate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-
decision-action loops or get inside his mind-time-space as basis to: Penetrate adversary’s 
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moral-mental-physical being in order to isolate him from his allies, pull him apart, and collapse 
his will to resist.634 
Military tacticians generally believe speed is the crucial part of the cycle.  While speed is 
important, it is also argued that it is the orientation phase of the cycle which is critical.  Chet 
Richards, a mathematician and colleague of Boyd, believes that, ‘….his reading in Zen, 
particularly The Japanese Art of War, confirmed his [Boyd’s] emphasis on such concepts 
as implicit guidance and control, which appears in both Patterns and Strategic Game, and 
the overriding importance of Orientation…’.635  Boyd emphasised that the cycle needed to 
be executed in such a way as to get inside the mind and decision cycle of an adversary, 
who is then required to deal with obsolete or irrelevant information, becoming confused and 
disorientated.636  Boyd used historical examples to illustrate that his OODA Loop concept 
was not new, for example, in his Historical Patterns: Chingis Khan and the Mongols slide, 
he states: 
By exploiting superior leadership, intelligence, communications, and mobility as well as by 
playing upon adversary’s fears and doubts via propaganda and terror, Mongols operated 
inside adversary OODA loops.  [The result]…Outnumbered Mongols created impressions of 
terrifying strength – by seaming to come out of nowhere yet be everywhere.  [H]ence, 
[s]ubversive propaganda, clever stratagems, fast breaking maneuvers, and calculated terror 
not only created vulnerabilities and weaknesses but also played upon moral factors that drain-
away resolve, produce panic, and bring about collapse.637 
Why is the OODA Loop relevant to NEC/NCW and the development of UCAS?  Osinga 
views that Boyd is the conceptual father of NCW.638  However, Osinga emphasises, ‘….that 
[although] Boyd’s influence on contemporary strategic thought has been and continues to 
be significant…for a full appreciation of that influence, one needs to go well beyond the 
narrow ‘rapid-OODA loop’ concept and fully engage with him in his Discourse on Winning 
and Losing’.639  Although he believes that Boyd himself would not be too keen on the 
technological aspects of NEC, Osinga emphasises that at the heart of NEC is Boyd’s 
OODA Loop.640  It is the importance of NEC in driving future doctrine that will be integral to 
the effectiveness of any UCAS.  NEC aims to compress the OODA Loop, enabling cross-
cueing and the sharing of information, allowing sustained high tempo F2T2EA operations.  
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149 
 
With data-fusion, from sources such as TDL, ISR assets, and Blue Force Tracker, it offers 
an RMA, providing greater situational awareness, helping to mitigate ROE and CID 
constraints.641  This is vital.  During the Vietnam War, for example, US aircrews were forced 
into visually confirming targets were hostile on most occasions; this, ‘…required a close 
approach which in some cases forced the U.S. fighter to pass entirely through the missile 
launch envelope in order to make the identification.  Thus the element of surprise was 
lost…’.642  Anderson and Waxman, in Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers, believe that, ‘The 
fastest OODA Loop of the future combat plane is likely to be an automated one…in both 
flight and weapon functions, and unmanned as well’.643  This view aligns with the author’s.  
Essentially, effective NEC enables a commander to operate within the ‘Boyd Cycle’ faster 
than an adversary without effective situational awareness.    
Situational Awareness  
Understanding the implications of what is happening in any given scenario is crucial in 
warfare - that is, having situational awareness.  There are a number of interpretations of the 
meaning of situational awareness.  In warfare, situational awareness generally means the 
view of the whole air, and ground picture, including not only location but also likely future 
activity, of both friendly and enemy forces.  Mica Endsley, in Theoretical Underpinnings of 
Situation Awareness: A Critical Review, defines situational awareness as ‘…knowing what 
is going on around you’.644  This explanation is succinct, and applies to both military and 
civilian situations; it has huge significance when applied to counter-air operations.  
Endsley’s three-level model of situational awareness: Perception (what is happening), 
Comprehension (what does it mean), Projection (what should I do about it)—are all 
applicable to air warfare.645  According to John Stillion from RAND, situational awareness, 
‘…is a most important aspect of air combat.  The pilot, or group of pilots, who maintains the 
best understanding of where friends and foes are relative to their own position during the 
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confusing, time compressed, air combat engagement will most likely emerge the victor’.646  
A NATO report views that pilots are required to answer many questions during air-to-air 
combat, including. ‘Where am I?  Where am I going?  Where are the enemies?  Where are 
the enemies going?...Where are friendly aircraft going?  What is the aircraft's energy 
status?  What is the status of on-board systems?  What is my weapon delivery 
envelope?’647  Lynn Carroll, from the AFRL/RHA Warfighter Readiness Research Division, 
describes situational awareness as: 
.…a pilot's, (or aircrew's), continuous perception of self and aircraft in relation to the dynamic 
environment of flight, threats, and mission, and the ability to forecast, then execute tasks 
based on that perception. It is problem solving in a three dimensional spatial relationship 
complicated by the fourth dimension of time compression where there are too few givens and 
too many variables. It encompasses the individual's experience and capabilities which affect 
the ability to forecast, decide and then execute. SA represents the cumulative effects of 
everything an individual is and does as applied to mission accomplishment. It's what allows 
you to successfully complete the mission, or to recognize the need to abort. It keeps you out 
of the dirt and out of someone else's space.648   
Gaining situational awareness is vital, perhaps the key enabler in air combat.  Its 
importance is understood today; however, it was not until the Vietnam War that the 
dominant role of situational awareness in war was fully comprehended.  Situational 
awareness is enabled by a number of technologies and skills, NEC and sensors, and, not 
least, by the acquired skills of those aircrew and battlespace managers involved in forming 
an accurate picture of the battlespace.  If UCAS were to be extensively used, NEC would 
form a crucial part of the enabling capability.  NEC, with all its facets included, allows 
commanders and operators to gain situational awareness, which the author contends, is 
the most important part of the kill-chain, enabling all other parts of the F2T2EA cycle to be 
conducted.  While aircraft and sensor performance are crucial to the effectiveness of any 
counter-air system, situational awareness facilitates their use; its importance cannot be 
overstated.  
An example of the stresses of air combat, and the factor that this can have on situational 
awareness, is the number of times during the Vietnam War US fighters were lost due to 
running out of fuel.  For example, on one engagement between four F-4Cs and four MiGs, 
one F-4 crew was forced to eject when they ran out of fuel, due, it seems, to a total lack of 
awareness of the type of AAR available.  During the same mission, the F-4s failed to shoot 
down any MiGs, despite being in a position of advantage.  The F-4s had a total of 24 AAM 
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between them; none were used; instead 1200 bullets were expended, with no hits.649  
Ultimately, SA is basically a function of the aircrew flying and operating their aircraft and 
systems, with the ability to combine strands of information into a coherent air picture of 
what is taking place around them, often in a highly dynamic situation.  It is a skill that is 
hard to gain, and maintain. 
Barry Watts, in Six Decades of Guided Munitions and Battle Networks: Progress and 
Prospects, believes future fighter against fighter encounters are likely to rely on superior 
weaponry.650  What about the aircrew?  Aircrew and other personnel are, currently, part of 
the situational awareness chain in air warfare.  This may presently be necessary, 
particularly in situations that require speed of decision making that is not always based on 
linear events, that is, the ‘fog of war’, which may be best used to describe resistance, or 
friction, to plans.  Ultimately, can gaining total situational awareness reduce this resistance 
to such a level that it does not affect campaigns?  Watts considers that, ‘driving one’s own 
friction to zero while, simultaneously, rendering the enemy’s effectively infinite is not, at its 
core, a technical problem’.651  Watts believes that the greater the stress, the more data will 
be ignored, and the greater will be the confusion.652  This rationale has merit - there is only 
so much that any human being can absorb, digest, and act upon in a given period of time; 
however, technology should allow friction to be less of a factor by not relying on human 
capabilities, which are generally not consistent, and are certainly vulnerable to the stresses 
that high intensity air combat scenarios generate.653 
Historical Analysis of Situational Awareness 
Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, for all the apparent progress in RF AAM technology, only the IR 
AAM had much success in combat.654  Why was this?  Was technology not the panacea 
that technologists and military tacticians envisaged?  What role does modern technology 
play in gaining situational awareness, and therefore an advantage in gaining control of the 
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air?  Reviewing evidence from historical and test data on air-to-air engagements can aid 
analysis of what the vital elements of gaining control of the air are.  It can be argued that 
the absence of situational awareness has been the cause of the majority of losses in actual 
air-to-air combat.  Neither the introduction of advanced fighters, equipped with air intercept 
radars, nor the development of AAM have changed the fact that many air-to-air kills have 
been achieved without the targeted aircrew knowing the enemy was targeting them.  Watts’ 
analysis of historical combat data and anecdotal evidence from World War II to the Vietnam 
War, suggests that lack of situational awareness has been fundamental in approximately 
80% of kills.655  Watts’ analysis is extraordinary.  His main findings are that situational 
awareness has played a far more important role in air combat than having a technological 
advantage.656  Is this correct?  Watts’ analysis is examined, with the aim of confirming its 
relevance.   
Watts’ analysis starts with the experience of a number of World War II pilots.  For example, 
Lieutenant Colonel Mark Hubbard USAAF, a P-38 Lightening pilot, stated that in his 
experience during World War II, ‘A wing man should always stay with his leader.  Under no 
circumstances should there be less than two airplanes working together…and 90% of all 
fighters shot down never saw the guy who hit them’.657  This was emphasised by another 
USAAF pilot, Colonel Hubert Zemke, who stated: ‘Remember few pilots are shot down by 
enemies they see’.658  Similarly, the German Me-109 pilot Erich Hartmann, one of 
Germany’s most successful fighter pilots during World War II, said that: ‘Today I am sure 
that eighty per cent of my kills never knew I was there before I opened fire…one factor 
always worked for me more than any other.  I found I could spot enemy planes long before 
my comrades-sometimes minutes before them’.659  ‘The pilot who sees the other first 
already has half the victory’.660 
Were the successes of Hubbard, Zemke and Hartman, down to superior flying skills, or was 
it having superior situational awareness?  During World War II, training and experience 
played a significant part in the success of US and allied air forces.  The superior 
performance of US fighters against German adversaries with similar equipment is believed 
to be due to the great advantage in basic and operational training which US fighter pilots 
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enjoyed.  Less skilled German pilots led to higher combat losses, which further increased 
the pressure to produce large numbers of progressively less skilled pilots, resulting in a 
devastating downward spiral in pilot quality.661  By early 1944, US fighter pilots had, on 
average, twice as much flight training as their German counterparts and over three times as 
much training in air-to-air combat and other operational skills.662  There is little doubt that 
training was certainly a factor during World War II.  Warden emphasises this in The Air 
Campaign, when referring to the huge losses the Luftwaffe suffered on the Eastern 
Front.663  He also believes that: ‘If it has not been practiced in peace, losses are likely to be 
high and the plan is unlikely to go as expected’.664   
Watts’ examples of air-to-air engagements between US and opposing Vietnamese forces 
using Russian built fighters, in Southeast Asia from 1971 through 1973, offers further 
evidence that situational awareness plays a major part in air combat.  His views are based 
on a 1974 report from the USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Project Red Baron III: 
Air-to-Air Encounter in Southeast Asia, Volume III: Analysis – Part 1: Tactics, Command & 
Control and Training.665  This report was a follow on from the initial USAF evaluation of air-
to-air encounters during the period of 1965 through to 1968 of the Vietnam War.666  These 
reports collated and analysed data from all air-to-air engagements in Southeast Asia from 1 
April 1965 to January 1968.  Volume I identified and reconstructed 78 air-to-air 
encounters.667  Volume II covered 151 engagements.668  Volume III completed the study 
with 346 engagements.669  Volume IV analysed these engagements, offering 
recommendations, with the aim of enhancing US air-to-air combat effectiveness.670 
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The Project Red Baron III: Air-to-Air Encounter in Southeast Asia, Volume III: Analysis 
emphasises the vulnerability of fighters lacking situational awareness, concluding that: ‘The 
most important factor affecting the loss of both MiGs and US aircraft as the element of 
surprise.  The absence of attack warning was a serious handicap to both sides’.671  The 
report states that: ‘Of the [US] 37 total losses, 30 (81 percent) were judged to have 
received inadequate real-time warning.  The remaining 19 percent (seven losses) were 
induced by fuel starvation when US aircraft continued to engage below safe separation fuel 
levels’.672  Significantly, the report states that 35% of all US losses received no attack 
warning at all, and while the remaining 65% received some warning: ‘…the absence of real-
time threat positioning did not enable US aircrews to acquire the threat in time to perform 
effective defensive actions’.673  From this analysis, it is apparent that the lack of situational 
awareness played a part in 100% of US losses, to some extent.  North Vietnamese MiG 
losses were also analysed, with 42% (31 of 75) not manoeuvring before being shot down; 
in addition, 14 other MiGs were shot down in undetected attacks as they positioned to 
engage other US aircraft, giving a total of 60% (45) which were destroyed in surprise 
attacks.674 
The US experience prior to 1971 offers additional statistics on the importance of SA.  
Burton, in his brief Letting Combat Results Shape the Next Air-to-Air Missile, observes that 
from 1965 to 1968, of the 117 air-to-air kills achieved by US forces, 44 – 80% of the enemy 
were unaware of being targeted, while between 1971 and 1973, of the 73 kills claimed, 
between 60-80% were unaware.675  Burton’s brief comes with no references; however, the 
author’s own reading of, Air-to-Air Encounters in Southeast Asia: Volume IV: Analyses, 
offers more granularity for engagements from 1965 to 1968.  The absence of situational 
awareness was a factor on virtually all occasions when US aircraft were shot down.  One of 
the main conclusions of the analysis observes: 
The analysis of the attack phase demonstrated that enemy success in achieving a position to 
fire was almost entirely dependent upon the ability to maneuver into a rear quadrant attacking 
position before detection.  Conversely, whenever U.S. aircrews acquired the enemy aircraft 
before the attack maneuver was completed, U.S. aircraft negated the maneuver 95 percent of 
the time.  The requirement for real time information on the position of enemy aircraft is 
apparent from these two results.676 
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The fact that crews were able to negate the MiGs 95% of the time (that is, on only 5% of 
engagements did the MiGs achieve a shoot down, if seen by US crews first), means that if 
they had not had situational awareness of their presence, they would have suffered far 
more losses.  In approximately 50% of cases, crews were not aware of enemy MiGs until 
less than 2 nm.677  The report emphasises the significance of firing first: ‘The importance of 
firing first can be seen in that for 209 encounters studied, in only four cases did an aircraft 
attacked first by another aircraft manage to destroy the attacking aircraft’.678  This meant 
that most MiG attacks from the stern were successful: ‘When the enemy attained a rear 
quadrant position before detection, the enemy fired first approximately 90 percent of the 
time’.679  Although US crews had a kill ratio of 9:1 in scenarios where they possessed 
situational awareness, ultimately, if they had possessed better situational awareness, they 
would have suffered far fewer losses, and shot down more MiGs.  Conversely, it was noted 
that if North Vietnam had been able to use their Ground Control Intercept radar control 
more effectively, and had weapons parity, far more US losses would have occurred.680  In 
addition to the lack of SA leading to US losses, during the period April 1965 to August 
1967, US crews were forced to terminate engagements on 160 occasions.  On 51 of these, 
32%, this was due to losing contact with the MiGs, either radar or visual.681  This is an 
extraordinary number, clearly illustrating that the lack of SA can not only lead to being shot 
down, but also affect a mission’s success, by allowing an adversary freedom of manoeuvre. 
 
While not quite correlating with Red Baron’s deductions, Burton’s figures do support the 
conclusion that SA, or the lack of it, played a significant part in losses.  This lack of 
situational awareness, which resulted in the relatively poor, and unexpected, kill ratio during 
the Vietnam War of approximately 2.5 to 1, was indicative of a number of causes, including 
poor training, restrictive ROE, and an expected technological advantage that did not in fact 
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exist.682  Even before the end of the Vietnam War, US analyses had identified enemy 
position and direction information, and long-range positive identification, as two of the main 
causal factors in poor US performance in air-to-air combat operations; the others were, 
‘Weapon versatility and reliability.  Target discrimination against ground return.  Aircraft 
rearward visibility.  Man/machine compatibility’.683  The overarching lesson from this period 
was that situational awareness is not easily gained; training, technology and experience is 
essential to the development of this vital skill.684  Watts concludes that this relationship with 
World War II and Southeast Asia regarding situational awareness is significant.685   
Post-Vietnam statistics also offer evidence of the criticality of SA.  Some analysis comes 
from US simulations of air combat, conducted on instrumented ranges and in flight 
simulators.  Although not actual combat flying, these tests, such as the Air Combat 
Evaluation (ACEVAL) and the AMRAAM AIM-120 Operational Utility Evaluation (OUE) 
were designed to gather statistics on engagement results.686  ACEVAL was conducted 
using an Air Combat Manoeuvring Instrumentation (ACMI) range, which relayed information 
from all the aircraft involved to a ground monitoring system.687  Since then ACMI systems 
have been extensively used by the US and European air forces for decades, greatly 
enhancing training opportunities.688  The friendly force consisted of F-15 or F-14 fighters 
armed with AAG, AIM-9L IR AAM, and AIM-7F Sparrow semi-active AAM; the opposing 
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force flew F-5Es, simulating, to a degree, the Soviet MiG-21 in performance, with AIM-9L 
Sidewinder and an AAG.689  Watts observes that from the results of this trial, it was 
demonstrated that ‘…human factors dominated results 83-84 percent of the time’.690    
The author’s own survey of counter-air aircrew asked the question, ‘How often were you 
required to enter the visual merge to kill an adversary, during Large Force Employment 
(LFE)/COMAO training sorties?’  Seventy-eight percent were required to on less than10% 
of the time, with the remaining required to on 20% or less occasions.  Why is this relevant?  
The responders to the question have on average 2000-3000 hours counter-air experience; 
many have flown hundreds of these types of training sorties.  Almost 80% were able to kill 
their adversaries on >90% of occasions, without having to conduct visual air combat, with 
100% having to on 20%, or less.691  These statistics are similar to World War II, Vietnam, 
and the ACEVAL trials.  The lack of adequate situational awareness appears to be a fairly 
constant metric in losses in counter-air warfare, approximately in 80% of engagements. 
In 2005, the F-22 Raptor completed its initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E).  
Similar to the AMRAAM OUE and ACEVAL, this trial included scenarios conducted in 
simulators and on an ACMI range.  Open source official reporting indicates that the Raptor 
was able to dominate opposing fighters for the vast majority of the time, even when 
outnumbered.  Major General Mark Welsh, the USAF’s director of global power 
programmes, speaking to reporters in 2005, stated that the, ‘Pilots in [the] IOT&E—most 
drawn from the F-15C community—raved about it being a huge leap over the time-tested 
Eagle’.692  An official F-22 Programme Office brief to the media in 2007 stated that:  
Successful IOT&E results released in Feb 2005 = “Overwhelmingly Effective” 
performance…F-22s demonstrated exceptional performance during joint training exercise 
“Northern Edge 2006” in Alaska during June. Air dominance was ensured, improved 
situational awareness of all aircraft greatly enhanced the success of combat commanders.693   
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These views seem to indicate that the F-22 (and these types of aircraft) will achieve control 
of the air without entering the visual arena.694  However, these results need to be examined 
in context – should everything said by the US military be believed?  On the basis that we 
cannot know for sure, a judgement needs to be made on the likelihood that the Raptor is as 
good as it is ‘officially’ stated to be.  For the purposes of this thesis, the author is sufficiently 
satisfied that the Raptor is likely to be an extremely capable air superiority fighter, not least, 
because the US has proven to be adept at producing world-beating air combat systems. 
The Raptor’s stealth and speed, when aligned with appropriate tactics, and advanced 
avionics, sensors and sensor fusion, apparently allowed the Raptor pilots to kill adversaries 
without being detected.  The required situational awareness would have been garnered 
through NEC, combining data fusion - using gateways, such as BACN and the US Tactical 
Information Broadcast System (TIBS), a Ultra High Frequency line-of-sight or satellite-
interactive network.   The TIBS network provides secure near-real-time, multi-sensor, multi-
source situational awareness and threat warnings.  BACN is an airborne communications 
relay and gateway that is part of the US DoD’s Objective Gateway programme, which is 
developing advanced gateway capabilities allowing real-time information interactions 
between different TDL systems.695  The F-22’s apparent dominance in the IOT&E reiterates 
that situational awareness most often determines the outcome of the counter-air battle, 
especially when technology is harnessed to augment situational awareness.696  These 
results were achieved by the F-22s operating as a single fighting force, unable to transmit 
their own situational awareness via NEC means.  Currently, stealth aircraft are not 
equipped with conventional TDL, such as Link-16, and cannot communicate with other 
aircraft types, as this can be detected by electronic sensors – instead they use an Intra-
Flight Data Link (IFDL), designed to relay data and synchronised air picture only amongst 
the Raptors.  A new programme to provide secure TDL for the F-22 and other stealth 
aircraft is being developed.  Objective Gateways, such as BACN, should help solve this 
problem.697 
                                                          
694 For example, according to Maj. Gen. Richard B.H. Lewis, US Air Force executive officer for the F-22 
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695 For a description of TIBS and BACN, see US Department of Defense, 'RDT&E Budget Item 
Justification: Link 16 Support and Sustainment', 2007, 
http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2008/AirForce/0207434F.pdf, (accessed 14 May 2009), p.12.  See 
also, United States Air Force: Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009 - 2047, p.27. 
696 Watt, Six Decades of Guided Munitions and Battle Networks: Progress and Prospects, p.54. 
697 See, for example, T.E. Bell, 'WB-57: NASA's Eyes on High', Combat Aircraft, May 2010, p.37. 
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Can the human factor input to situational awareness be considered crucial, or can 
technology allow the required level of situational awareness to be used by an 
autonomous/highly-automated system?  Computer programs exist which are capable of 
interpreting the information available, that is, the situational awareness, making decisions 
for the operator and the mission commander; there are few apparent reasons why aircraft 
systems could not react as required using these programs.  An example is SOAR software, 
which is a cognitive architecture program, giving both a view of what cognition is and an 
implementation of that view through a program for AI.  Since its beginnings in 1983, it has 
been widely used by AI researchers to model different aspects of human behavior.698  Glen 
Taylor and others, describe the benefits of SOAR in a paper, The Future of C2 Enabling 
Battlefield Visualization: An Agent-based Information Management Approach.  This paper 
identifies the requirements of a system for enabling battlefield visualisation through 
automating the information management process.699  SOAR based simulations have been 
trialed; for example, all aircraft flown in a USAF synthetic operational training exercise, 
conducted over 48-hours, were controlled by SOAR based SI software.700  
Trials with UCAS have been conducted under simulation by the US, UK and others, to 
determine the levels of autonomy to which these systems can operate.701  These systems 
require a high level of situational awareness.  The more autonomous a system is required 
to be, the higher the level of situational awareness necessary.   It is planned that software 
programs will allow for automatic responses by UCAS to real-world (simulated at the 
moment) conditions, for example, reacting to being targeted by SAM, or AAM.702   
                                                          
698 University of Michigan, ‘What is Soar’, 2010, http://sitemaker.umich.edu/soar/home, (accessed 19 
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Portsdown West: Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, 2010, 
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Lack of situational awareness in the battlespace has historically been a major factor in 
which side wins.  Watts, in Doctrine, Technology and War, states that some US strategists 
and scientists: 
.…have begun to grapple with the prospective changes in war fighting that lie ahead, [and] 
begun to argue that future advances in surveillance and information technologies will 
sufficiently lift ‘the fog of war’ to enable future commanders to ‘see and understand everything 
on a battlefield.’  Advances in sensor technologies and information systems should enable the 
side exploiting them more effectively to eliminate its ‘fog of war’ while turning the opponent’s 
into a ‘wall of ignorance.703  
The removal of this ‘fog of war’ has been an ambition of military strategists for centuries.   
In 1995, US Admiral William Owens advocated the doctrine ‘Dominant Battlefield 
Awareness’.  This doctrine proposes connecting existing sensors and personnel together 
via information and command-and-control systems, making it possible to detect, track, and 
classify most, if not all, of the relevant entities on land, sea, and air or in space.704  Current 
programmes, particularly in the US, are pushing the boundaries of this principle.  BACN, a 
data-fusion engine already mentioned, is an exemplar of the vision that the US military has 
with regard to merging all entities and sensors into one fused system.705  Simply put, Watts 
and Owens are stating that situational awareness is, and will be, the critical factor in 
warfare.  Unless targets can be found and tracked, then all the precision weapon 
technology available will be of little use.   
Air-to-Air Missile Development 
The weapons effectors required for future counter-air systems are open to discussion.  
Current means of destroying adversary aircraft invariably use AAM and AAG.  Evaluating 
the effectiveness of current AAM systems requires an understanding of AAM development 
and current doctrine; this allows the potential incorporation of air-to-air weapons onto 
UCAS to be evaluated, and to establish what killing or negating systems will be required in 
the 2040 battlespace.  Prior to the advent of AAM, fighters were generally armed with guns 
or cannons that fired forward along the aircraft’s longitudinal axis.  From 1914 to the early 
1950s, air-to-air combat was led by the use of the AAG.  Military forces continually sought 
to improve aircraft manoeuvrability and engine performance to give pilots manoeuvre 
advantages which they could exploit to achieve effective firing positions.  Without AAM that 
could reliably target aircraft from significantly greater ranges than those at which AAG were 
                                                          
703 Watts, 'Doctrine, Technology and War: Air and Space Power Journal Doctrinal Symposium', p.101 
704 Admiral William A. Owens, 'The Emerging U.S. System-of-Systems', in Strategic Forum, National 
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705 See RDT&E Budget Item Justification: Link 16 Support and Sustainment, op. cit., p.12. 
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effective, there was little alternative, whenever the target could not be taken unawares, but 
to fall back on air combat manoeuvring skills and aircraft performance to reach the close-in 
firing positions required.706 This also applied to early versions of IR AAM, which were only 
effective in the stern sector of enemy aircraft.707 
There were limitations and frustrations with the development of early AAM.  The Germans 
had developed prototype AAM towards the end of World War II.  The Ruhrstahl X-4 was 
designed to provide German fighters with a standoff weapon that could be used to attack 
allied bombers from outside the reach of the bombers’ defensive armament.  The X-4 was 
an air-to-air rocket-powered, wire-controlled missile, which was guided with a joystick; it 
had a maximum range of over three miles.708  Although the X-4 was not used in combat, its 
acquisition by the US after the war offered an indication of future AAM possibilities.  Since 
the Soviets had also gained access to German technology and scientists in 1945, with the 
onset of the Cold War there was an obvious incentive for the US to develop effective AAM 
before the Russians did.709  The UK, Israel and France were also involved in developing 
AAM during this period, and developed a number of effective AAM types.  However, it is the 
US and Russia that are the world leaders in AAM development and doctrine, with Israel, 
France and the UK close behind.  China is playing catch-up, with a combination of Russian 
AAM in its inventory, a number of its own programmes, the capacity to reverse engineer 
almost anything, and a seemingly easy route to gaining technology from the US and others; 
it is possible that there will come a point in the future when China reaches parity with the 
West.710  
Western AAM Development 
The first US AAM appeared in the mid-1950s, when the US Air Force declared its air-
intercept missile (AIM), the AIM-4 Falcon, operational in 1955.711  That same year, the first 
                                                          
706 For an excellent history of the development of the AAG, see Shaw, op. cit., pp.1-5. 
707 Ibid., pp.36-37. 
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The University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 2011, p.19. 
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production model of the IR AIM-9 Sidewinder AAM became operational, and the RF AIM-7 
Sparrow I, which was a beam-riding RF AAM, slaved to an optical sight, entered service.712 
Despite the AIM-9 Sidewinder’s simplicity and maintainability, the missile has limited range.  
While a substantial advance over the AAG for air-to-air combat, early versions of 
Sidewinder were still a close-in weapon, its effectiveness limited to within-visual-range 
engagements and in clear air outside of clouds.  Although the Sidewinder has some utility 
at night, if target acquisition can be achieved by the fighter’s radar, for most night or all-
weather engagements, particularly at distances BVR, early variants of the Sidewinder 
offered little capability.  Early AIM-9 IR AAM, which relied on detecting the exhaust heat 
plume from a jet engine, were designed for use against non-manoeuvring targets, attacking 
from the rear aspect of the defending aircraft.  During the Vietnam War, North Vietnamese 
MiG fighters countered the AIM-9 by turning in towards the attacking fighter, negating the 
heat source at the rear of the aircraft.713  Post-Vietnam, the US developed the all-aspect, 
highly manoeuvrable AIM-9L IR AAM.  The AIM-9L entered service in the US in 1978 and 
in Europe in 1982, when UK Harriers were equipped with AIM-9L AAM for the Falkland’s 
conflict.  Twenty-six AIM-9L were fired, achieving 19 kills, giving a Pk of 0.73.714  This 
appears a vast improvement, but does need to be kept in context; Argentinean aircraft were 
not equipped with flares to counter these IR AAM.  Also, many AIM-9L shots were taken 
from the stern, unseen by the Argentinean aircrews, again emphasising the importance of 
situational awareness.715 
By the mid-1980s many nations had developed and deployed IR decoy flares in response 
to emerging IR AAM lethality.  To mitigate this, the USAF developed an improved AIM-9, 
the AIM-9M.  This was an AIM-9L with improved flare rejection technology designed to 
counter decoy flares.716  The USAF, USN and USMC fired 48 AIM-9M during the Gulf War 
of 1991, achieving only 11 kills.  The AIM-9 Pk was reduced to just 0.23 - much closer to 
Vietnam era performance than the 1982 Falkland’s War.717  The US AIM-9X, UK ASRAAM, 
the French MICA and Israeli Python 4 and 5 AAM, are all examples of IR AAM developed 
with the main emphasis being counter-measures and manoeuvrability, including a HOBS 
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function.718  The high design lethality of late generation IR WVR AAM is in a large part due 
to the their ability to sustain very high load factors during the endgame manoeuvre (the 
phase at which an AAM may have to manoeuvre to hit an aircraft which is manoeuvring 
itself, in self-defence), precisely the scenario in which most AAM fail to kill their targets.719  
Although mainly employed in the visual arena, modern IR AAM can be employed BVR, 
particularly in the head-sector, at ranges outside the visual acuity of most aircrew, and at 
night, when even with the use of Night Vision Systems, aircrew cannot acquire targets 
easily.720  When utilised with TDL, IR AAM can be launched without an acquisition, flying 
through cloud, achieving target positioning from on- and off-board systems (third-party 
targeting).721  However, the true BVR realm belongs to the RF AAM, which are usually 
much larger, with a corresponding greater range, and possessing their own radar seeker-
head. 
During the Cold War the USAF had a requirement to engage high and fast bombers 
necessitating a high AAM Pk.  This resulted in the fielding of a nuclear-tipped version of the 
Falcon, the AIM-26A/GAR-11, which had radar-proximity fusing and utilised semi-active 
radar homing, giving it an all-weather capability.722  No AIM-26A were used in anger, and 
while offering a significant capability, presented problems with collateral damage, 
particularly against low-level overland targets.  Conventional radar-guided AAM for air-to-air 
combat with sufficient range to be launched BVR, entered the inventory in the early 1960s 
when the initial US Navy variants of the F-4 Phantom II, equipped with the AIM-7 Sparrow 
AAM and the AN/APQ-72 radar, became operational.  By the Yom Kippur War in October 
1973, the Israeli Air Force also had F-4s equipped with AIM-7 AAM.723  
The requirement to engage targets at ranges from a CSG that mitigated any weapon 
delivery systems that an adversary might have, emphasised the need for the US Navy to 
acquire an AAM with the ability to engage aircraft at very long-range.  The AIM-54 Phoenix 
was the first operational radar-guided AAM that could be launched in multiple numbers 
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against different targets from an aircraft, making the Phoenix the US Navy's main air 
defence long-range weapon.  The Phoenix was carried by the US Navy’s F-14 Tomcat, 
which had the capability to launch as many as six AIM-54 missiles simultaneously in all 
weathers and heavy jamming environments.724  
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the development of a new generation of RF AAM.  
The AIM-120A AMRAAM was introduced at the end of the Cold War to provide a ‘fire and 
forget’ active radar guided weapon with data-link support provided by the radar on the 
launch aircraft, allowing multiple simultaneous shots.  Until the advent of the AIM-120, the 
use of semi-active AAM still required the launching fighter to continue towards the target, 
using its on-board radar to guide the AAM until impact.  This would mean both aircraft 
getting within a few miles of each other at missile impact.725  If the adversary aircraft was 
also equipped with AAM, a race against each other ensued, with each fighter crew vying to 
increase any advantage they may have; each crew would be attempting to achieve the best 
standoff range - (Rseperation).726  Although an important part of counter-air engagements, 
Rseperation is matched by the importance of AAS to counter EA techniques.727   
The introduction of the AIM-120 AMRAAM sought to give the advantage back to US fighter 
crews.  AMRAAM employs active radar target tracking and active RF target detection to 
provide an autonomous launch, rendering a capability against single and multiple targets in 
all environments.  However, early AMRAAM variants suffered from a lack of robust 
capability in an EW environment.  The AIM-120A was followed by the improved B-model, 
and then by the AIM-120C.  Versions of the AIM-120C are currently the backbone of the 
US and its allies.  Open sources indicate improvements in AIM-120 capabilities.728  The 
latest version, the AIM-120D introduces a redesigned seeker, which is a conformal 
antenna, probably of AESA design, a two way data-link, GPS to supplement inertial 
guidance, improved kinematics, and better seeker performance against HOBS targets.729  
Combat statistics for the Aim-120 variants to date are not robust, amounting to ten kills 
(including a friendly fire incident against a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter) of which six were 
genuine BVR shots, for the expenditure of 17 AIM-120 AAM – giving a Pk of 0.59.730  
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Significantly, no target was equipped with a modern defensive EW capability, and, 
therefore was not representative of the type of air-to-air system likely to be used against US 
and other Western forces in a modern peer-on-peer BVR engagement.  In addition, 
AMRAAM class missiles lack the extended range that may be required when pitted against 
Su-35 Flanker type aircraft, equipped with ramjet propelled AAM, now being developed in 
Russia and Europe.731  A European consortium is developing the Meteor AAM which will 
use advanced air breathing motor technology.  Conventional rocket motor powered AAM 
rely upon an initial boost phase to achieve the high speed required, followed by a 'coast' 
phase to intercept the target.  Latest generation, highly manoeuvrable aircraft, are able to 
out run and out-manoeuvre conventional missiles at the extremes of their range.  The air 
breathing Ramjet motor used by Meteor provides sustained power, following the initial 
boost that offers extended maximum ranges, and no-escape zones, over AIM-120.732  The 
advantage of ramjet BVR AAM lays in their ability to sustain thrust and turning performance 
in the endgame phase of an engagement, where conventional solid rocket AAM fly on 
inertia alone for much of their flight, and rapidly lose speed when turning.733 
Russian and Chinese AAM Development 
Until the 1980s, Soviet AAM technology lagged the West in rocket propellants, airframe and 
guidance designs.  That changed with the deployment of the RF Vympel R-27 (NATO 
reporting name AA-10 Alamo) and IR Vympel R-73 (NATO reporting name AA-11 Archer) 
AAM during the 1980s.734  In kinematic terms, the IR R-73 series, and the BVR R-27 and 
R-77 (RVV-AE) (NATO reporting name AA-12 Adder) are highly competitive against their 
Western equivalents, and the long-burn variants of the R-27 outperform all Western solid 
propellant competitors.735  The next step for Vympel is the production of the air breathing 
ramjet RVV-AE-PD design, displayed since the 1990s at numerous trade shows.736   
Russian seeker technology has made great advances since the early 1990s, largely as a 
result of the availability of digital signal processing chips available on the world market.  
The Russian weapons company Agat, which manufactures semi-active and active radar 
seekers for the AA-10 and AA-12 AAM, has openly acknowledged its use of Western digital 
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signal processing chips in a variant of its seeker-head.737  The move away from analogue 
and early digital seekers to software programmable digital seekers is significant, since it 
opens up many choices in signal processing and counter-countermeasure techniques 
hitherto only used by US, EU and Israeli manufacturers.  In practical terms, there is no 
reason why a later model digital variant of the AA-10 and AA-12 would be no less difficult to 
defeat by jamming than Western equivalent active seekers.  With modern seeker 
technology, AAM can be updated with new software fixes relatively quickly.  Replacement 
modes can be kept secure until combat operations commence.  According to Kopp, ‘…no 
side would have an advantage; in effect the advantage in the rapid adaptation of ECM held 
by the West during the Cold War period is largely nullified’.738  This is a significant 
observation. 
The Russian philosophy has been to make fighters that can carry an exceptional payload of 
AAM.  Up to 14 AA-12s can be carried on the Su-35 Flanker.  It is envisaged that the Su-35 
will also be able to carry up to five long-range missiles. Labelled 'very-long-range' air-to-air 
missile, the K-100-1 (Izdeliye 172S and 172S-1) has been developed from the earlier K-172 
AAM. The Izdeliye has a range of 160-215 nm, and is capable of reaching speeds up to 
2,160 knots (approximately Mach 3.0-4.0) to engage targets flying at altitudes ranging from 
10 ft. to 100,000 ft.739  This type of AAM is a significant threat to HVAA such as AWACS 
and AAR aircraft.  The AA-11 IR AAM continues to evolve.  Russian industry is working on 
a Focal Plane Array seeker for their future WVR missiles, to compete against the ASRAAM, 
AIM-9X, and Python-5 seekers, adding further IR counter-countermeasures capabilities.  
Details of a Russian passive X-band RF anti-radiation seeker are classified, but is a unique 
capability in the AA-10 and AA-12 AAM.740  It seems Russia may be reaching parity with 
the West in AAM technology, and may well be exceeding this capability.  
China is making significant progress in the development of AAM technology.  The PLAAF 
operates a diverse mix of indigenously manufactured and imported Russian AAM.  
Imported Russian AA-10, AA-11 and AA-12 AAM are primarily used with the imported 
Russian built Su-27SK and Su-30MKK Flankers, and the home-grown copy of the Flanker, 
the J-11.  Indigenous Chinese built AAM are dominant across the Chinese built fleets of J-
10A/S Sinocanard, J-11B Sino-Flanker, J-8 Finback, J-7 Fishbed, J-6 Farmer, A-5/Q-5 
Fantan, and JH-7 Flying Leopard.741  Currently, China manufactures only two BVR guided 
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AAM, the active radar guided PL-12/SD-10 ‘Sino-AMRAAM’ and the reverse engineered 
semi-active radar guided Selenia Aspide Mk.1, designated the PL-11.742  China also has a 
much more diverse inventory of IR AAM in its inventory.  These include the PL-5 to 9 
series, which are derivatives of a range of Western AAM, such as the AIM-9 and Rafael 
Python AAM.743  
 
What is the significance of Western, Russian and Chinese AAM development?  The sheer 
diversity of AAM types in service or being introduced into US, Russian, EU, Israeli and 
Chinese inventories, and the prospect of evolving regional clone variants and derivatives, 
presents a genuine long-term problem in intelligence gathering, analysis and 
countermeasures.  If all major nations have similarly effective AAM in the coming decades, 
unless there is a radical change in advantage for one nation against another, the 
employment of AAM may be deemed the least effective means of destroying or deterring 
an adversary.  Should this be the case, then a radical reappraisal of Western BVR doctrine 
and tactics is required.  Most US and European fighter aircraft just do not currently have the 
capability to carry a payload of more than six BVR AAM, without compromising range and 
endurance, unlike Russian and Chinese fighters, with the Flanker, and its variants, capable 
of carrying a payload of 10 -14 BVR AAM.744  The Pk of AAM systems is, and will continue 
to be, a major issue requiring research and understanding.  Whether future systems carry a 
payload of AAM will largely depend on whether other means of disabling adversary 
counter-air air-breathing systems will be necessary.  Chapter 5 examines the evolution of 
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Chapter 5: The Evolution of Air-to-Air Warfare 
 
 ‘The farther backward you can look the farther forward you are likely to see’ 
Winston Churchill 745 
Will future air-to-air combat follow the norms that previous major conflicts have witnessed?  
It is possible that future peer-on-peer combat will result in more intense air battles, 
compared with those seen since the Vietnam War, Middle East and Falkland’s conflicts, 
with all sides potentially experiencing high attrition rates.746  The requirement for an 
appropriate air dominance system compels assessment.  Before this can be done, it is 
important to understand how AAS have performed in the past.  Evaluating statistical trends 
in historic air-to-air combat allows for a methodical approach in analysing the effectiveness 
of the types of weapon systems which were used, and those which may be required in the 
future.  Addressing the question of how often more lethal or effective weaponry determines 
tactical outcomes requires the examination of statistical data.  The best evidence comes 
from the domain of air-to-air combat.  There is a large amount of data available from both 
actual and simulated air combat.   
AAM are the primary weapons in air-to-air combat, and have been since the beginning of 
the Vietnam War.  The employment of AAM has not been without difficulties and 
controversies, however.  An understanding of the history and Pk of AAM is crucial before 
any evaluation of future systems can be conducted.  The Pk achievable of any AAM 
depends on a number of factors, including its kinematic performance, especially during the 
endgame phase of flight (the ability to react to and guide to a target during the last seconds 
of an AAM flight), against the intended target, and the performance of its seeker-head and 
fusing subsystems, predominantly in an EW countermeasures environment.747  
Understanding the capabilities and constraints of AAM is absolutely central to the whole 
process of the development of air platforms, sensors, weapons, and the tactical doctrine 
employed.  While it is important to have a thorough understanding of the principles of AAM 
Pk, however, AAM are but one part of a system required in achieving a kill.  The AAS 
includes the launch aircraft and aircrew operating it, the sensors required to detect and 
track adversary aircraft, including NEC, the EW systems, and all other personnel and 
assets involved in supporting the operation.  The USAF, for example, when assessing AAM 
                                                          
745 National Churchill Museum, 'Quotes', http://www.nationalchurchillmuseum.org/wit-wisdom-quotes.html, 
(accessed 29 July 2012). 
746 See analysis of air-to-air kills since 1965 at Appendices B-D. 
747 Shaw, op. cit., pp.57-58. 
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effectiveness during the Vietnam War, defined a fighter weapon system, as containing the 
major sub-systems of , ‘…the airframe, propulsion, and controls; avionics; weapons and fire 
control; the human being (pilot and crew)’.748  AAM form the basis from which all current 
counter-air doctrine and tactics are formed.  A thorough understanding of not only one’s 
own capability is essential, but also that of potential adversaries.  The overall capability of 
the AAS is consequently used when assessing overall Pk.   
Air-to-Air System Kill Probability 
Frequently misunderstood, or indeed, little understood by some air power proponents, is 
the likelihood of an AAM actually achieving a kill.749  To recap, AAM Pk affects the choice of 
how many AAM need to be fired in order to kill an adversary aircraft.  In addition, this in 
turn, affects almost every other consideration, such as the number of AAM carried on a 
fighter aircraft, affecting the required size of that fighter, and/or the number of fighters 
required to counter potential adversaries.  The basis on which the formula for AAM Pk is 
founded, is the ratio of AAM to Pk – this is referred to as the probability of a single shot kill 
(Pssk).750  How this is calculated depend on a number of factors, but will essentially be 
constructed on a series of AAM live-firing trials against the full gamut of target profiles, and 
simulated firings, which are conducted in a Hardware-in-the-Loop facility, which is a 
ground-based test, using actual aircraft and missile sensors and the EA techniques which 
would be used against them.751  These are normally centred on the ability of the AAS to 
operate in the full range of conditions likely to be encountered during an air battle.  A 
number of factors affect AAS Pk: Adversary EA capabilities; target manoeuvre; the 
serviceability of the AAS; the performance/capability of the AAS – including own aircraft air 
sensor and third-party sensor effectiveness; the skill of the aircrew, and situational 
awareness.  An acceptable AAS Pk in the most difficult scenario is an extremely important 
part of a counter-air system.  If aircraft are limited in the number of BVR AAM carried, then 
AAM Pk needs to increase.   
There comes a point with AAM Pk, when firing more than one AAM in a salvo does not 
increase the Pk significantly.  As the Pk of a single AAM increases, the corresponding 
                                                          
748 See, Attinello, Air-to-Air Encounters in Southeast Asia: Volume IV: Analyses, p.107. 
749 For example, in an otherwise exceptional reference guide for the planning of counter-air operations, 
The US Joint Publication 3-01 only mentions probability of a kill once, and then only in relation to attacking 
fixed C2 sites – see, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, op. cit., p.IV-5. 
750 See Robert E. Ball, The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and Design, Reston, 
VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., 2003, pp.2-5. 
751 Mitchell Sisle and Edward McCarthy, 'Hardware-in-the-Loop Simulation for an Active Missile', 
Simulation 39, no. 159, 1982, pp.159-167. 
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increase in AAM Pk with the number of AAM fired, decreases, relatively. The numbers of 
AAM fired in a salvo will therefore depend on the known Pssk of the AAM in a particular 
scenario.752  There is no panacea for this – it will depend on a number of factors, including 
the type of conflict – COIN, policing, or interstate war.  These will alter the risks which 
politicians and military leaders are prepared to take, whether that is losing aircrew and/or 
aircraft, or the assets that the fighters are protecting, and, not least, the repercussions if the 
battle is lost.  The point at which the Pssk of an AAM makes it worthwhile to have a one-shot 
doctrine is, therefore, subjective.753  With a Pssk of 0.5, two AAM are required to be fired in 
salvo in order to achieve a Pk of 0.75 - if that is the desired Pk.  If the AAM Pssk were as low 
as 0.15, then even launching eight AAM in a salvo would only achieve a Pk of 0.728.  For 
the purposes of this thesis, it is the author’s view that in high intensity state-on-state 
warfare, against a peer adversary, the outcome of which is deemed critical, an AAS Pk of 
greater than 0.9 is required – when applied to a salvo of AAM.  Even this may not be 
enough, if an adversary has similar AAS Pk, and greater numbers of AAM and aircraft.   
When considering firing a number of AAM in salvo in order to increase Pk, it is difficult to 
predict if each AAM will encounter the same conditions.  Therefore, the actual Pk may be 
somewhat different from that calculated on paper.  It is, nonetheless, a crucial factor when 
deciding AAM load-out, salvo numbers and tactics.754  Russian and Chinese air power 
tacticians understand the issue of AAM Pk, and have adopted procurement strategy and 
doctrinal tactics to counter this challenge.  The Russian exemplar of BVR combat has its 
origins in the Cold War, when Soviet operational analysis identified that the low Pk of AAM 
seekers and airframes, especially if degraded by countermeasures, would have a 
significant impact on effectiveness.  By the 1970s the standard Soviet technique in BVR 
tactics was to launch a salvo of two AAM.755  It is not unreasonable to expect Sukhoi 
Flankers to launch three or four round BVR AAM salvos during the opening phases of an 
engagement.  The aircraft being targeted have a difficult problem as it must jam, decoy 
and/or out manoeuvre three or four tightly spaced inbound missiles.  Even with Pssk of 40%, 
a three round salvo has a Pk of approximately 0.8.  If neither side has a decisive advantage 
in EW capability, the Flanker does have a decisive advantage in aircraft and AAM 
kinematics, in addition to having up to 6-7 times the payload of BVR AAM to expend, when 
compared to the current proposed load-out of 2 internally carried AMRAAM AAM for the F-
                                                          
752 Robert E. Ball, The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and Design, Reston, VA: 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., 2003, pp.2-5. 
753 AAM Pk formula and the effects that AAM salvos have are explained at Appendix A. 
754 For examples of exchange ratios and the effect of firing AAM in salvos, see Howard Van Horn, 'Can 
Simple Models Predict Air Combat Results?', Journal Of Aircraft 48, no. 2, 2011, pp.652-659.  
755 Kopp, 'The Russian Philosophy of Beyond Visual Range Air Combat’, op.cit. 
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35 JSF.756  The introduction into service of the Russian PAK-FA and Chinese J-20 stealth 
fighters in the coming decades, will only add to their capabilities.   
Unless possessing exceptional AAS Pk, and superior numbers, any air force not having 
parity in aircraft and AAM load-out should avoid BVR combat.757  Significantly, the Chinese 
appear to be mirroring Russian doctrine, and BVR AAM capability.  This has implications 
for any future counter-air system.  An important trend in the PLAAF’s modernisation is the 
development and deployment of support aircraft serving as force multipliers to enhance the 
effectiveness of its combat aircraft.  These support aircraft include AAR, AEW, AWACS, 
and EW and ISR.758  An example of the determination of the PLAAF to adopt Western 
doctrine is the 2011 deployment of J-10 fighters to Kazakhstan, where they participated in a 
Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) COMAO exercise.759 
Historical Analysis of Air-to-Air Kills 
That a given capability is technically feasible does not necessarily mean that it is 
operationally useful in an actual combat scenario.760  Since the advent of BVR AAM, 
approximately 660 air-to-air kills have been recorded by Western equipped BVR AAM-
equipped forces.  105 of 663 (15.8%) kills have been with RF AAM, of which only 26 of 663 
(3.9%) have been BVR.761  During the Vietnam War, US fighter crews conducted 
approximately 600 air-to-air engagements in Southeast Asia from 1965 to 1973, achieving 
190 kills against 75 losses.762  RF AAM were very seldom used successfully in air combat, 
                                                          
756 Robert Johnson, 'The F-35 Straps on Its Missiles for the First Time Ever', Business Insider: Military & 
Defense, 2012, http://articles.businessinsider.com/2012-02-21/news/31081646_1_f-35-smart-bombs-
weapons, (accessed 25 February 2012). 
757 Kopp, 'The Russian Philosophy of Beyond Visual Range Air Combat', op. cit. 
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(accessed 16 Decembe 2011). 
759 Peter Foster, 'China Air Force to Unveil New Aerobatic Team', The Telegraph, 2011, 
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teams.html, (accessed 21 November 2011). 
760 For example, during the early years of the Vietnam War, air combat training on instrumented ranges 
revealed that approximately 50% of simulated AAM shots were being taken out of parameters.  
Furthermore, from 17 June 1965 to 17 September 1968, approximately 600 AAM were fired during 360 air-
to-air engagements against Vietnamese fighter aircraft, achieving a probability of a kill of approximately 
10% - see Frank W. Ault, 'Report of the Air-to-Air Missile System Capability Review', Naval Air Systems 
Command, 1969, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA955142, (accessed 19 November 2012), 
Section I.A, p.2., and Section V.B, part 6, p.35.  
761 See analysis at Appendices B and C.   
762 Burton, op. cit., slide 3. 
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either by US aircrews in Southeast Asia during 1965-1973, or by Israeli aircrews in the 
conflicts of 1973 (Yom Kippur) and 1982 (Bekaa Valley).763     
An example of AAM Pk (in this case, a probability of a hit), are figures used for pre-combat 
AAM Pk used by the US during the Vietnam War.  The calculations took into account four 
causal factors: the probability of successful launch; the missile was fired within a successful 
envelope; the missile tracked the target, and the missile actually hitting the target.  The 
probability of the ‘system’ working is the sum of these factors.764  The RF AIM-7E had a 
pre-combat Pk of 0.71, while the IR AIM-9B was 0.65.765  During the period from April 1965 
to 1 August 1967, however, the actual combat results were somewhat different, with the 
AIM-7E being 0.15, and the AIM-9B, 0.25.766  As previously discussed, when Pk is so low, if 
it cannot be improved, then launching AAM in salvos can offer a solution.   
US RF AAM actual demonstrated Pk during the Vietnam War, from 1965-1973 was 0.06 (55 
of 918).767  US fighters were required to use the gun on North Vietnamese Russian MiG 
fighters, almost 100 times more than originally expected.768  The Yom Kippur War of 
October 1973 was a much shorter conflict, but the air-to-air combat was intense.  Burton in, 
Letting Combat Results Shape the Next Air-to-Air Missile, states that despite the large 
number of engagements, with 261 kills claimed, Israeli F-4 Phantoms only fired 12 AIM-7 
AAM, claiming 5 kills (1.9%); with one a single BVR kill (0.4%).769  Israel’s June 1982 
invasion of Lebanon offers a similar example.  By 1982, the Israelis had F-16 and AIM-7-
equipped F-15s in their inventory.  During the major air battles between Israeli and Syrian 
fighters that occurred over the Bekaa Valley in Syria in June 1982, the Israeli Air Force split 
air superiority responsibilities between their F-15s and F-16s, the latter being armed only 
with an internal gun and short-range IR AIM 9-L AAM.  The Israelis are thought to have 
shot down 82 Syrian fighters.770  Twenty-three AIM-7 AAM were launched, achieving 12 
kills (14.6%), giving a Pk of .52, with only a single BVR kill (1.2%) from 5 shots (.20 Pk) .771   
From March 1965 to the end of US air operations against North Vietnam in January 1973, 
only two BVR kills were officially recorded out of a total of 918 reported attempts at 
                                                          
763 Burton’s analysis has only 1 BVR RF AAM kill in each of the 1973 and 1982 Israeli conflicts (1% and 
4% respectively) - see Burton, op. cit., slides 4-5. 
764 Attinello, Air-to-Air Encounters in Southeast Asia: Volume IV: Analyses, p.92. 
765 ibid., p.98. 
766 ibid., p.93. 
767 See Appendix C. 
768 Stillion and Perdue, op. cit., PPF.19. 
769 Burton, op. cit., slide 3. 
770 Grant, 'The Bekaa Valley War’, p.61. 
771 Burton, op. cit., slide 5. 
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launching RF AAM used.772  From 1965 to 1982, approximately 95 of 953 (10%) of US and 
Israeli RF AAM firings occurred at distances beyond five nautical miles.773  From these only 
four achieved kills (0.04 Pk).774  Attempts to achieve BVR firings by US and Israeli aircrews 
during these conflicts were few, and are indicative of the problems inherent in the early 
evolution of BVR combat.  Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, only 4 of 614 (0.65%) kills achieved 
were BVR.  Since 1991, 22 of 49 (45%) of kills achieved have been BVR.775  Statistically, 
this appears an exceptional increase, with the proportion of BVR kills increasing 69 fold.  
However, how applicable is this?  Since the 1991 Gulf War, with US and allied forces 
enforcing a No-Fly-Zone over Iraq, and during the 1999 Kosovo campaign, AIM-120 AAM 
has demonstrated an overall 0.59 Pk in combat to date, with 17 AMRAAM fired for 10 
kills.776  Thirteen AMRAAM have been fired to achieve six BVR kills, giving a BVR Pk of 
0.46.777  Significantly, the Iraqi MiGs shot down were fleeing and non-manoeuvring; also of 
note, Serbian J-21 Jastreb aircraft shot down during the Kosovo conflict had no radar or 
ECM, and the MiG-29 Fulcrums shot down had inoperative radars.  In addition, there are 
no reports of ECM used by any fighter, and no fighter had comparable BVR weapons.  All 
engagements involved numerical parity or superiority.778  Although a significant 
achievement for forces operating at great distances from their own bases, and proving the 
efficacy of AWACS and other assets, the fact that the opposition was relatively inept and 
incapable of posing any real threat needs to be acknowledged.  This is absolutely essential 
when analysing the actual effectiveness of counter-air systems involved.  Will these 
conditions apply to a peer adversary, such as China?   
Why was the exploitation of the technical capability to launch BVR RF AAM prior to the 
advent of the AIM-120 so rare?  Why were there not considerably more BVR shots and 
kills?  The reluctance of US and Israeli fighter crews to risk BVR shots in actual combat 
during the Vietnam War and Middle East conflicts was not only due to ROE issues, but 
also, an initial mistrust of the effectiveness of RF AAM.  Fighter aircrew were reluctant to 
shoot BVR unless they could be highly confident that the target was the enemy.  This 
reluctance to risk air-to-air fratricide, known as ‘Blue-on-Blue’ within the counter-air 
community, was often reinforced by rigorous ROE.779  Burton observed that, ‘The most 
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dominant aspect of missile air combat to date [1985] has been the requirement to positively 
identify the target.  Results in dogfights [were] almost all shots within visual range and from 
the rear hemisphere’.780  As a result, BVR AAM kills were only practicable when the ROE 
criteria were fulfilled by the use of special equipment, such as Identification, Friend or Foe 
(IFF) interrogators.781   
Burton’s analysis of US engagements during the Vietnam War established that of 92 RF 
AAM launched BVR by US pilots, only 2 kills were achieved, an abysmal 1.84% success 
rate.782  These results would naturally lead to crews wishing to delay AAM launch; however, 
both the RF and IR AAM used up to the end of 1967 were not particularly effective in the 
closer, more manoeuvrable engagements either.  Analysis from Project CHECO, 
emphasised the extremely poor effectiveness of the AAM used at the time, particularly the 
AIM-7:  
.…35 percent of the AIM-7s and 26 percent of the AIM-9s were considered launched outside 
permissible parameters…There were only 11.1 percent recorded hits, with 2.8 percent designated 
probables, of the AIM-7…For the slightly more effective AIM-9, there were 18.6 percent hits 
recorded, of which 1.7 percent were probable.  These statistics indicate that the maneuvering 
environment of air-to-air combat presents many problems to the fighter pilot who is dependent 
upon the missile as his only weapon. 783 
North Vietnamese statistics were no better.  Although they possessed the Alkali RF AAM, 
only five firings were witnessed by US aircrews, with no hits.784  The Atoll IR AAM, which 
was similar to the AIM-9B Sidewinder, was the preferred weapon, achieving 24 kills from 
209 launched, giving a Pk of 0.11.785  The dominant limitations, however, were perhaps not 
technical, but a matter of aircrew preference.  Although this analysis highlights the poor 
AAM performance of both Soviet built and US AAM, it is worth noting that US aircrew would 
launch missiles early, outside of valid parameters, in order to distract MiG pilots: 
The most effective escort-counter to a close-in attack was found to be a hard turn to point at or 
slightly in front of the MiG, followed by early launch of an AIM-7/9.  Under these conditions the 
escort aircraft normally did not have time to achieve a radar lock-on or to satisfy valid launch 
parameters; the AIM-7/9 was launched primarily to disrupt the MiG’s attack.  Despite the 
absence of effective missile guidance, these early firings were frequently the escort’s only 
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chance of diverting the MiG’s attention and causing it to abort its attack on the strike 
elements…786 
Examples of fratricide in modern air warfare are fortunately few; however, the 2003 Gulf 
War saw an RAF Tornado GR-4 and a USMC F-18C shot down by US Patriot SAM.787  
During the 1982 Falkland’s War, an Argentinian Mirage II suffered damage by an AIM 9-L 
AAM fired from a RN Sea Harrier; subsequently, Lt Garcia Cuerva’s Mirage was shot down 
by his own side while attempting to make an emergency landing at Port Stanley Airfield.788  
Missiles of all types, air-to-air, surface-to-air, and air-to-surface, have grown ever more 
reliable and lethal, yet military operators must still make quick shoot/no-shoot decisions in 
order to be effective, and, under the extraordinary pressures of combat environments, 
those decisions remain open to fatal error.  The tragic downing of two US Blackhawk 
helicopters by two US F-15Cs in the no-fly zone (NFZ) over northern Iraq in 1994, which 
resulted in the deaths of all 26 people on board, graphically demonstrates the difficulties of 
reliably identifying adversaries in air-to-air engagements, and this was not in contested 
airspace.789  It is essential for military forces to be able to identify friends from adversaries; 
technological advances should enable significant improvements in gaining this situational 
awareness.790  The potential for fratricide remains a characteristic of modern air warfare.  
Advances in sensors and information systems ought to deliver improved methods of 
identifying adversaries; already examined, JTIDS is an example.  
Analysis of air-to-air kills in the modern era show a definite trend towards the use of AAM, 
in particular, BVR RF AAM.  It was not until the Gulf War of 1991 that the synergy of 
equipment, including by this time E-3A AWACS aircraft, and operational circumstances 
permitted a significant portion of the engagements resulting in 16 BVR AAM kills, from a 
total of 35 (46%).791  Sixty-seven RF AAM were fired, 29 of which were launched BVR, 
achieving 22 kills (BVR Pk of 0.59; overall 0.32).792  Prior to the Vietnam War, all air-to-air 
kills were achieved by the use of the AAG.  The author has examined the majority of air-to-
air kills achieved by US, UK, and Israeli forces from the Vietnam War to the present, but 
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has not included minor engagements, such as those that have occurred between Israel and 
Middle Eastern countries outside of major conflict, or those between the US and Libya 
during the 1980s, or between India and Pakistan in 1971.  These and other engagements, 
including those during the Iran/Iraq conflict during the 1980s have not been examined, due 
to the difficulty in verifying the results.  It is considered that these engagements do not 
unduly affect the overall statistical analysis.  The information at Appendices B - D is taken 
from a number of sources, some of which differ slightly from each other.  While not 
intended to be definitive, they are, nonetheless, consistent enough to allow statistical trends 
to be used and understood.   
From the Vietnam War, beginning in 1965, to the 1982 Falkland’s War and Bekaa Valley 
conflict, most air-to-air kills were achieved by IR AAM – 54.7%, with 33.4% by AAG.  Only 
11.9% of kills were from RF AAM, with a derisory 0.6% BVR.  From 1991 to date, 65.3% 
(32 of 49) air-to-air kills have been from RF AAM, with 44.9% (22 of 49) of these BVR; 
30.6% have been from IR AAM.793  No kills have been by AAG, although, two kills were 
achieved by US A-10 Thunderbolt anti-tank aircraft with an air-to-ground gun; both of these 
kills were against slow moving helicopters.794  Statistics sometimes deceive and confuse.  
However, the significance of the analysis is the establishment that air-to-air kills from AAG 
since 1991 have been zero.  Further, none of the kills achieved from 1991 have involved 
classic visual air combat manoeuvring.795   
 
There have been far fewer air-to-air engagements since 1991, than the period from 1965 
through to 1982.  There has been a rapid decline in state-on-state conflict since 1991, with 
intra-state conflict and insurgency being dominant.  This does not mean that state-on-state 
conflicts will not occur in the future.  Are Western states mentally prepared for conflicts that 
require control of the air to be achieved against peer or near-pear adversaries?  The advent 
of AIM-120 AMRAAM has dramatically changed the way in which BVR air-to-air combat is 
conducted.  Since 1992, all Western RF AAM kills have been achieved by the use of the 
AIM-120 AMRAAM.  An overall Pk of 0.59 may seem impressive; however, this increase in 
Pk needs to be kept in perspective.  The analysis illustrates the increase in the percentage 
of BVR kills, increasing from 0.6% prior to the 1991 Gulf War, to 43% in all major air-to-air 
engagements since.  IR AAM kills have fallen from 55% to 28.5%.796  However, statistically, 
the number of air-to-air engagements and AAM used does not offer compelling proof that 
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AAM are the panacea for future air combat.  There are a number of factors that have come 
together to enable this apparently dramatic increase in effectiveness of BVR AAM.  
Notwithstanding the AAS Pk already discussed, the evolution of air-to-air tactics has 
changed a great deal since the Vietnam War.  The continuing development of AMRAAM 
class systems, and most importantly, the integration of NEC, allowing a significant 
improvement in situational awareness and BVR tactics, has helped achieve this 
transformation.   
The biggest difference in weapon kills is the use of the AAG in air-to-air engagements, 
falling from 33% in the period up to the 1991 Gulf War, to 0% since.797  This is significant 
when making any judgement on the procurement/integration of AAG into future counter-air 
platforms.  It is the author’s view that the efficacy of future AAG employment requires 
examination; indeed, whether the fitment of an AAG will be relevant at all.  Though 
acknowledging that what has happened in the past, will not necessarily be the case in the 
future, trends do need to be analysed.  While the statistical analysis of air-to-air kills cannot 
offer definitive guidance on procurement strategy, or tactical doctrine, the results should aid 
decisions on future platforms, sensors, doctrine, and tactics.  The analysis conducted, in 
the author’s opinion, has established that although BVR RF AAM use and Pk, and AAS Pk, 
have greatly improved, it is insufficient to guarantee gaining control of the air in future 
conflicts.  Unless AAM/AAS Pk is significantly improved, particularly in the EA environment, 
then other methods of negating adversaries will be required, particularly, when a peer 
adversary has dominance in numbers, in both aircraft and weapons. 
Too few AMRAAM have been used in air-to-air scenarios to offer any meaningful statistical 
analysis.  Without a near-peer, or peer adversary, with all the capabilities these will have, 
AMRAAM performance in the ‘real world’ can only be guessed at by using open sources.  
The author considers it axiomatic that unless AMRAAM, or any AAM, can operate in a 
complex EA/denial environment, then any NEC, and all other sensors, weapons and 
qualities of aircraft and aircrew will be severely tested. 
Modern Air-to-Air Combat Philosophy 
It is not normally possible to destroy an enemy’s forces in one engagement – this applies in 
all domains, including the air.  Even if this were possible, reserves would (or should) be in 
place, to fight another day.798  Depending on the exchange ratio, and the number of 
reserves, the destruction of even a small percentage of an attacking force can have serious 
repercussions, especially if the war goes on for an extended period.  Terms such as 
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decimation and annihilation are sometimes used to describe an engagement outcome.  
‘Decimate’ means to ‘kill one in ten’.  ‘Annihilate’ means to kill more than 90% of a deployed 
force.799  Even if a force is ‘only’ decimated, it would not take many similar outcomes before 
that force was effectively annihilated, rendering it completely ineffective.  The 1982 
Falkland’s War took a massive toll of the Argentine Air Force.  Of the 129 air combat 
aircraft available, approximately 47 were destroyed.  This was not quite annihilation, but 
much more than decimation.800  The Israeli Air Force essentially annihilated the Syrian Air 
Force in the Bekaa Valley in June 1982, for no losses in air-to-air engagements.801  
The drive in BVR AAM development is to achieve a kill on an adversary aircraft as far from 
your own aircraft and forces as possible, before he can achieve a kill on you.  The theory 
offers a number of advantages, including less danger to the shooter, allowing a greater 
separation range (F-Pole) between the shooter and the target at AAM impact.802  There are 
problems with engaging adversaries at great ranges however.  Already discussed, without 
robust means of identifying a target at range, incidents of fratricide may increase.  The cost 
of developing fighters and sensors that are capable in the BVR environment is huge.  In 
terms of kinematic performance, the impact of the launch aircraft's kinematics at the point 
of AAM launch is vital.803  Ramjet AAM, such as Meteor, may offer a viable alternative, as 
these are not significantly affected by an increase in the launch fighter’s speed and 
height.804 
According to Stillion and Perdue, in Air Combat, Past, Present and Future, if a conflict 
develops between China and the US over Taiwan, it would be very difficult to predict who 
would have the advantage in the technological/countermeasure game.  China could enjoy a 
3:1 advantage in fighters, if the US could fly from Kadena Air Force Base in Japan, or 
approximately 10:1 if forced to operate from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam.805  
Historically, overcoming these odds requires huge qualitative superiority.  Such qualitative 
superiority is extremely difficult to achieve against a comparable power.  An example of this 
was Wold War II, which saw Germany pit its air force against a number of opponents; in all 
cases, until the summer of 1940, the Luftwaffe proved a formidable force, annihilating all 
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800 ibid. 
801 Grant, 'The Bekaa Valley War’, p.61. 
802 Shaw, op. cit., pp.51-52. 
803 Kopp, 'The Russian Philosophy of Beyond Visual Range Air Combat, op. cit. 
804 Described to the author by Jonathan Aird, Chief Missile Engineer, MBDA Ltd; 24 November 2011, 
(KCL’s Serendipity Rule). 
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adversaries, until it came up against the RAF, in what became known as ‘The Battle of 
Britain’.806  The Battle of Britain was ‘won’ not only by British and Commonwealth forces, 
but with the aid of French, Czech, and Polish airmen.807  This was a classic example of an 
air campaign waged at such distances from their own operating and support bases, that the 
Luftwaffe lost the battle.808  The military/industrial complex played a significant part, 
allowing greater RAF fighter aircraft production, and more fighter pilots being trained when 
measured against Germany; this, aligned with the fact that those pilots that the Luftwaffe 
lost, were almost always for the duration of the war, made it unnecessary for much of the 
RAF’s central and northern commands to be used.809   Klaus Maier, in Germany and the 
Second World War, states: ‘The German failure to achieve air supremacy and the 
unfavourable time of year reduced British fears of a landing.  [The] war-economy 
considerations forced a disbanding of the deployment of Operation Sea-Lion…’.810  
Operation Sea Lion, the planned invasion of Britain, was effectively cancelled, when Hitler 
issued his Directive No 21 ‘Barbarossa’, which turned the German military’s attention 
towards Russia.  Alexander Dallin, in German Rule in Russia 1941 – 1945, writes, ‘Gone 
where the last illusions of downing Britain ‘by one stroke’, gone was the pretence of 
German-Soviet ‘friendship cemented by blood’’.811   
Lack of control of the air by Germany over the airspace of northern France and southeast 
England, was one of the deciding factors in Britain avoiding an invasion.  Any success of 
invasion depended on gaining air superiority over the area of operations.812  Alexander 
Seversky certainly believed that Germany had no hope whatsoever of gaining air 
                                                          
806 An early official review of the Battle of Britain was conducted by Cecil James from the RAF Air 
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808 Ibid., p.110. 
809 See Richard Overy, The Air War: 1939 - 1945, Washington, DC: Potomac Book, Inc, 1980, pp.32-33.  
Most German losses were over the British mainland, the Channel, and the North Sea, with most survivors 
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812 Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain, London: Aurum Press, 
2000, p.109.  It is argued by Richard Overy that the Battle of Britain was not the crucial factor in the 
postponement of an invasion; other factors were, such as the German Navy and Army command’s 
understanding that they would face significant, if not insurmountable, difficulties against the Royal Navy 
and Army – see generally, Overy, The Battle of Britain: Myth and Reality, in particular, pp.108-109. 
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superiority over the south of England.  Seversky argued (in August 1940) that the Luftwaffe 
had inferior fighters, and their doctrine, which was based largely on supporting the army, 
with aircraft such as the Stuka, meant they were not geared to conduct successful counter-
air operations against the RAF.813  The fact that an actual invasion of Britain may not have 
been the main German objective does not alter the point that Germany underestimated the 
importance of gaining control of the air.  The importance of ‘winning’ however, is made 
clear by Richard Overy: ‘It is evident that not a lot was needed to deter Hitler from the idea 
of invading Britain.  Fighter Command tipped the scales.  The failure to destroy the Royal 
Air Force ruled out the possibility of a cheap, quick end to the war in the west and kept alive 
an armed anti-Axis presence in Europe’.814 
Russian and Chinese fighter doctrine relies on a number of basic tenets, including: superior 
numbers and firepower; sensor diversity on aircraft and weapons; advanced EW, for 
example, DRFM cross-polarisation jammers conducting EA, and towed radar decoys, and, 
significantly, a greater ability to absorb attrition.815  The West’s lead in sensors and 
electronics is not nearly as substantial as in the past.  Significantly, technologies developed 
for the computer, gaming, television, medical imaging, telescope, and wireless network 
industries can be directly applied to fighter sensors and weapon systems.  The impressive 
Russian Su-27 Flanker (and its later variants) is unquestionably the aircraft which has 
caused Western experts most concern to date.816  Of the West’s fighters - the Swedish 
JAS-39 Grippen, the French Rafale, the Typhoon and the US F-22 Raptor - only the fifth-
generation F-22 has thrust-vector control.817   Russian developers believe that the key to 
dogfight supremacy will rest in their pilots’ ability to engage enemy fighters in any position 
relative to their own aircraft.  It is arguable whether this ability to out manoeuvre fighters is 
relevant in an era when long-range BVR AAM capability is of such importance, and the 
potency of HOBS AAM and HMCS which are coming into service.  
It is not by accident, however, that all Western fighters strive for an ability to obtain an 
advantage in maximum sustained and instantaneous turn performance.  These two 
attributes allow fighter aircraft to turn quicker, while maintaining energy, allowing weapons, 
such as IR AAM, to be used quickly.  It is also crucial when attempting to get into the rear-
hemisphere of an adversary’s aircraft in order to employ the AAG.  Currently, it is 
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814 Overy, The Battle of Britain: Myth and Reality, p.110. 
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considered essential that any modern fighter must have the ability to manoeuvre to defend 
itself in the visual arena.818  Furthermore, in a high intensity conflict, when faced with an 
adversary with capable aircraft, weapons, and highly trained aircrew, it is not always 
guaranteed that the BVR shoot-out will succeed.  The introduction of extremely agile AAM, 
capable of being employed at very high off-boresight angles, HMCS, which enable a pilot to 
look at a target and shoot, have altered the way in which air-to-air combat is fought.  If 
required to enter a visual merge, the requirement for an aircraft to ‘turn and burn’, as fighter 
aircrew say, is greatly diminished.  Future requirements may differ, but do need 
considerable thought. 
The Flanker has a large internal fuel capacity and load carrying capability.819  All Flankers 
carry an IRSTS – existing US fighters do not.  Significantly, AMRAAM launches have large, 
unique thermal signatures.820  The Su-35BM Flanker will have the full panoply of sensors 
and electronic defences, including an IRSTS to detect the launch flare of the AIM-120, a 
Radar Warning System to sense radar and AAM active seekers, a MAWS to detect AAM, 
DRFM jammers to jam the AAM seeker-heads and the launch fighters' radars, a towed 
decoy, and the inherent ability to generate extremely high turn rates to out-manoeuvre 
incoming AAM.821  The PAK-FA is likely to have even greater capabilities.822   
Future Air-to-Air Scenario 
The importance that AAS Pk plays in air-to-air combat has been highlighted in the RAND 
study, Air Combat, Past, Present and Future, hypothesising on a possible conflict scenario 
between the US and China over Taiwan.823  This study offers a realistic scenario in which 
opposing US and PRC fighters are pitted against each other.  It effectively illustrates the 
implications of fighter numbers and AAS Pk.  Using this as an example, the author 
establishes a scenario of US F-22 Raptor versus PRC F-35 Flanker aircraft.  Operating in 
formations of 24 aircraft, a Flanker regiment can employ 16 very long-range anti-HVAA 
AAM, 240 AA-12/PL-12 BVR AAM and 48 AA-11 WVR AAM, giving a total of 304 AAM.  
                                                          
818 For a view on the perceived importance of WVR air combat manoeuvring, see Flt Lt Kevin Terret, 
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Conversely, 24 F-22s can employ a total of 192 AAM: 144 AIM-120 AMRAAM and 48 AIM-
9 IR AAM.824  In the following scenario, Chinese forces are RED, while US forces are 
BLUE.  In a possible air-to-air scenario, it is worth examining an air engagement where 72 
RED fighters, encounter 24 BLUE fighters.825  For the purpose of this analysis, the AAS Pk 
required is greater than .90 (in these examples the Pk is set at .93).  Both sides launch their 
BVR AAM at the same time.  Blue has 144 BVR AMRAAM.  Red has 720 BVR PL-12 AAM 
and 48 HVAA AAM.  Neither side enters within visual range of each other, therefore, their 
IR AAM are discounted.  The table below details the outcome of an air battle, depending on 
the Pk of both the BLUE and RED force’s AAS.  Both RED and BLUE field the same 
aircraft, sensor and aircrew capabilities.   
 
Table 2: 72 RED versus 24 BLUE fighters: AAS kill probability versus fighters remaining 
 
The example in Table 2 illustrates that with an AAS Pk of .90 or greater for both sides, 
BLUE would kill all RED fighters, but all BLUE fighters would also be destroyed in the 
process.  If both RED’s and BLUE’s AAS Pk is less than .87, all BLUE fighters are killed, 
with some RED fighters surviving.  This questions the basis for using any AAS that does 
not have an appropriate Pk.  If we take the known Pk of the AMRAAM in operations, thus 
far, as .59, then 232 AMRAAM are required to kill 72 opposing fighters, if the overall Pk 
required is greater than .90.  If AAS Pk falls to .10, all BLUE fighter are destroyed, however, 
66 RED fighters survive.  If BLUE AAS have a Pk of .5, and RED AAS have a Pk of .10, all 
BLUE fighters are destroyed, while 38 RED fighters survive.  Do the odds alter significantly 
if the size of the Blue force is doubled?  In a scenario with 48 BLUE fighters against 72 
RED fighters, with the same parameters as previously used, with both RED and BLUE 
having an AAS Pk of .25, all 48 BLUE fighters would be destroyed, with 43 RED fighters 
surviving.  Even with a Pk of .1 for both, 29 BLUE fighters would be destroyed, leaving 61 
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RED.  BLUE and RED have very few RF BVR AAM remaining, forcing both to enter WVR.  
BLUE are now outnumber by 2 to 1.  The actual number of RED versus BLUE fighters is 
not unrealistic, when considering the number of tangible fighter assets capable of being 
deployed, from the total numbers available – for both sides.826  See Appendix E for a 
breakdown of AAM exchange rates, with variable kill probabilities. 
 
These examples are designed to illustrate the importance that AAS Pk can have on the 
outcome of an air-to-air battle, and the significance of mass in numbers.  As already 
highlighted, the importance of AAS Pk and mass needs to be understood.827  When faced 
with a peer adversary, the US, or any other state, will need to consider whether it has the 
necessary weapon systems and balance of forces to gain control of the air.   
 
If modern Western BVR AAS are robust, and stealth is not countered, and secure land- and 
sea-based operating platforms are available, then current Western air-to-air doctrine is 
probably adequate, although it would be extremely unwise to rely upon this.  There comes 
a point where quality cannot compensate for sheer force of numbers.  History advocates 
that this limit is a ratio of approximately 3:1.828  Stillion and Perdue argue that, ‘China could 
enjoy a 3:1 edge in fighters if [the US can fly from Kadena AFB] – [and] about 10:1 if forced 
to operate from Anderson [AFB]’.829  Joseph Stalin is reputed to have said, ‘Quantity has a 
quality all of its own’.830  Perhaps this maxim holds true.  The PLAAF training and 
operational doctrine is not, yet, as sophisticated as the USAF.  However, they will not lack 
numbers when it comes to counter-air assets.  In 1992 the PLA had approximately 5000 
fighter and ground attack aircraft, with less than 50 considered modern, 4th generation 
fighters.  By 2012, China had reduced its total to 1900 fighter and ground attack aircraft, but 
with many considered 4th generation, including 268 J-10 and 405 Su-27/30.831  By 
comparison the US had more than twice as many such combat aircraft, with 3020 fighter 
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and ground attack aircraft fourth-generation, and 212 fifth-generation.832  This imbalance 
will not last.  It is projected that the PLA will increase its combat aircraft inventory 
significantly in the coming decades.  Analysis varies; however, by 2020 the PLAAF could 
be able to field 450+ Flanker type fighters.833  Air Commodore Ramesh Phadke, a retired 
Indian Air Force officer, believes that by 2030, ‘…the PLAAF and PLAN would have 800+ J-
10, another 800 Su-30/J-11Bs, and many JF-17… advanced trainers and [a number of] fifth 
generation stealth fighters’.834  Although the PLAAF have a way to go in attaining anything 
like the capabilities of their Western counterparts, significant progress is being made.  In 
testimony presented before the US-China and Security Review Commission in 2010, Roger 
Cliff, an analyst with the RAND Corporation stated: 
….Many of China’s fighters are now capable of carrying BVR missiles, China operates at least 
a dozen AEW&C aircraft, many strike aircraft are now equipped with precision-guided 
munitions… and China’s EW capabilities have improved substantially too.  Many Chinese 
fighter pilots are now believed to receive roughly the same number of training hours as their 
U.S. counterparts, and the quality and realism of training has also improved…Finally, China 
has had an additional ten years to absorb the modern doctrinal guidelines issued in 1999.835 
 
Cliff also stated that, ‘China’s air forces are no longer those of a third-world country.  
Improvements in China’s air force capabilities …mean that prevailing in an air war with 
China will be increasingly challenging’.836  The use of large numbers of converted 
unmanned fighter aircraft, and purpose built UAS, would also add to targeting difficulties – 
these would still require engagement, attriting own AAM stocks; the problem would be even 
greater, if these were able to conduct EA and launch their own AAM.837  What, therefore, is 
the solution?  Quality will not necessarily be the answer to an adversary that has effective 
counter-air systems, with a numbers advantage.  Perhaps it is the utilisation of UCAS, able 
to operate independently from centralised control, when required.  UCAS could operate at 
great range and for long periods from bases, both land- and sea-centred.  These could field 
current AAM, with an appropriate AAS Pk (calculated, taking into account AAM load-out), in 
all contested scenarios.  The questions are - how much degradation of BVR AAM 
performance can the Western concept of gaining control of the air accept?  If AAM are not 
the panacea to gaining control of the air, then what is?  Other weapon systems would be 
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required, such as on-board DEW, aligned with other game-changing technologies which 
may confuse an adversary’s situational awareness enough to gain the advantage - that is, 
gaining air control of the air for the defined period required. 
UCAS Concept of Operations  
Already in development, probably becoming operational towards 2020, UCAS capable of 
ISTAR and SEAD missions will form part of the matrix of future air forces’ combat air power.  
If an air-to-air role is to be developed, an appropriate CONOPS needs to be devised for the 
operation of these systems.  RAND’s, Shaking the Heavens and Splitting the Earth: 
Chinese Air Force Employment Concepts in the 21st Century, offers the view that tactical 
fighter aircraft may not be the optimum platform for providing counter-air capabilities in 
locations so far from the nearest viable air base:   
An alternative [to conventional fighters] might be a larger aircraft capable of carrying a large 
number (e.g., 20 or more) of extremely long-range (e.g., 200 nm) air-to-air missiles.  Such an 
aircraft could engage Chinese fighters while still beyond the range of their missiles and then 
withdraw before it could be engaged by any of the survivors...838 
 
Conceptually, this at least has some merit, and UCAS may be able to fulfil this task.  A 
doctrine of swarming airborne assets may also be an option, certainly for UCAS tasked 
with conducting TST ISTAR and SEAD missions.839  A swarming concept for UCAS 
would consist of a group of UCAS operating in support of both manned and unmanned 
units.  Swarm technology would allow the mission commander to use NEC to monitor 
UCAS, both individually and as a group.  NEC would connect UCAS to each UCAV and 
the swarm mission commander.  The UCAV within the swarm would fly automatically to 
an operating area.  It is intended that these UCAS would conduct area searches, as 
directed within pre-programmed systems, automatically processing imagery and 
detecting threats and targets, through the use of AI and NEC, fusing sensor information 
and image processing.  The Modus Operandi of swarming allows UCAS networks to de-
conflict and assign the best UCAS to each task.840  Before this could happen, however, 
control of the air is required.  This same swarming technology could be used to conduct 
counter-air missions.841   
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Autonomy will be incorporated where it increases overall effectiveness of UCAS.  Currently, 
automation is implemented in UAS to decrease operator workload and increase efficiency.  
This can include both auto take-off and landing, and transit operations.  The terms 
autonomy and automation have been discussed previously.  Autonomy can be viewed as 
more dynamic than simple pre-programmed flight in that the aircraft will manoeuvre 
automatically, based on sensors inputs from internal and external sources that include 
manoeuvring to avoid threats, such as IADS.  The US concept certainly envisages that 
some autonomy will also apply to ground operations, maintenance and repair.  Aircraft will 
integrate with other vehicles and personnel on the ground during launch and recovery, 
including auto-taxi.842  If it is deemed necessary to have a HITL at all times, UCAV could 
operate as part of a COMAO package, acting as wingman to a manned fighter, or even a 
C2 asset, such as AWACS.  This concept differs from swarming in that UCAV will 
accompany and work with a manned aircraft in the battlespace, acting as ISTAR assets, 
also capable of delivering kinetic effective, greatly increasing the situational awareness and 
airborne weapons available.  Wingman UCAV could also act as a refuelling asset.843 
 
Two of the main strengths of UCAS, range and endurance, would mitigate the requirement 
for a large number of AAR assets.  UCAV with capabilities of remaining airborne for 30+ 
hours (refuelled), with time on task periods of 5-10 hours, would allow for fewer air vehicles, 
and consequently less AAR assets.  Although still necessary, these AAR assets would not 
be required to operate at distances close to adversary counter-air assets rendering them 
inherently vulnerable.  A report from the US Center for Strategy and Budgetary 
Assessment, The Unmanned Combat Air System Carrier Demonstration Program, believes 
UCAS design features may give a potential endurance of up to 100 hours.  The report gives 
examples of the number of UCAS required, versus manned fighters/bombers, operating at 
ranges from 1500 to 3000 nm from land bases or carriers:  ‘…UCAS would be two to six 
[times] as effective as manned alternatives in generating persistent “Combat CAPs”’.844  
Although the report is thorough and meticulous in examining the advantages that UCAS 
would bring, it only mentions air and cruise missile defence once.845  It would seem that the 
report believes that control of the air is assumed to be achievable by UCAS, although it 
does not detail any specific requirements regarding weapon systems.  Manned ISTAR 
                                                          
842 United States Air Force: Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009 - 2047, p.33. 
843 ibid., p.34. 
844 Work and Ehrhard, op. cit., pp.32-33.  Among others technological challenges, advances in engine 
capabilities would be required.  AFRL are working on a new combat-aircraft engine, that may improve fuel 
efficiency by 25%, while increasing supersonic-cruise radius by 50% - see Graham Warwick, 'AFRL Backs 
New Type of Combat-Aircraft Engine', 24 September 2012, 
http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_09_24_2012_p31-497914.xml, (accessed 4 
October 2012). 
845 Work and Ehrhard, op. cit., p.48. 
187 
 
facilitating nodes, such as AWACS and ELINT aircraft may still be required; it is envisaged 
though, that the ‘systems’ available, as part of the ‘system of systems’ utilised by UCAS, 
would enable these very HVAA to remain outside of adversary threat systems.  The 
aerodynamic characteristics of UCAV would depend on the robustness of NEC and the 
types of weapons employed.   
 
The effectiveness of current counter-air AAS has been examined.  Unless dramatically 
improved, the AAM part of the AAS will need to be replaced with other means of defeating 
an adversary’s counter-air aircraft.  Assuming that NEC continues to feature as a critical 
node in warfare, and that whatever weapons are used are integrated into an overarching 
‘system of systems’, a counter-air UCAS would require the capability to achieve altitudes of 
50,000 ft.+, and a supersonic dash speed of at least Mach 2, that is at least as capable as 
Su-35, J-20 or PAF-FA fighters.  This speed and height capability allows a greater ability to 
avoid threats, and to use energy advantage when employing AAM.  The UCAV would need 
the ability to manoeuvre aggressively for defensive purposes, but not to achieve a position 
in order to employ weapons, as HOBS systems would be used.  The UCAV would need to 
be of such a size that it could contain enough fuel to achieve an operating radius of 1500 
nm, the probable range of China’s ASBM while maintaining on station for at least 1 hour, 
with 30 minutes of combat fuel, unrefuelled.846  This should enable a safe separation to be 
established between highly capable A2/AD weapon systems and operating platforms.  
Some effectiveness will be lost if denial systems are developed that have greater range.  If 
this occurs, the basis on which such UCAS were developed would still have efficacy, 
although, greater emphasis would be required on AAR assets.  Current UCAS 
programmes, such as the X-47B, propose a UCAV that will not be capable of supersonic 
speed or a high altitude capability, even with up-rated engines, or high ‘G’ 
manoeuvrability.847  The question is, could this system survive against the air-to-air 
component of a highly sophisticated IADS, unless supported by appropriate counter-air 
systems?   
 
Concentration of force is a fundamental principle of war that is well suited to air power.  
As previously described, when this is used, particularly with combat air power, 
experience has shown that air power concentrated in both time and space is more 
                                                          
846 These figures are based on current conventional counter-air aircraft capabilities, operating from 
relatively close land bases.  For examples of combat aircraft range and radius of operation capabilities, 
see Federation of American Scientists, 'Combat Aircraft Specifications', 
http://www.fas.org/spp/aircraft/table_ag.htm, (accessed 9 September 2010).  See also, China’s A2/AD 
capabilities in Chapter 6. 
847 Northrop Grumman, 'X-47B UCAS-D: Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration', 2010, 
http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/nucasx47b/assets/UCAS-D_DataSheet_final.pdf, 
(accessed 23 October 2010).  See also, Work and Ehrhard, op. cit., Part III, p.39. 
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effective in achieving an objective than if it were dispersed over a wider area and longer 
time.  Moreover, a concentrated force will use support forces more efficiently, increasing 
overall capability and survivability.  The COMAO concept involves packaging a large 
number of aircraft, with a variety of roles, complementing each other, in order to achieve 
a task.  A COMAO formation normally consists of counter-air, strike, AAR, ISTAR and 
other supporting assets.  As with manned aircraft, it will be vital that UCAS operating 
deep within adversary territory, if denied reach-back because NEC is compromised or 
inadequate, are able to continue to conduct the tasked mission.  If unable to continue the 
mission, autonomously if necessary, UCAS, or any other platform for that matter, would 
be valueless.  In this instance, ‘autonomous’ means operating independently of C2, as 
would manned systems.  One of the benefits of operating in large formations, includes 
minimising attrition by optimising mutual support and saturating adversary IADS.  
Fundamental to the future employment of UCAS, must be their ability to operate within a 
COMAO package.  The following is an example of a COMAO formation flown during the 
1991 Gulf War by US forces, against Baghdad C2 facilities: 
Target: Baghdad C2 Facilities:848 
Over the Target Time: 1200 – 1220Z 
Assets and Mission: 
24 x F-16 – destroy specified targets (ATTACK) 
08 x F-15 – offensive counterair (ESCORT) 
04 x F-4G – suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) 
04 x F-16 – suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) 
02 x EF-111 – close-in-jamming (CIJ) 
02 x EF-11 – stand-off-jamming (SOJ) 
01 x EC-130 – communications jamming 
04 x RF-4C – tactical reconnaissance 
08 x KC-135 – air-to-air refuelling (AAR) 
01 x E-3A – airborne warning and control system (AWACS) 
04 x F-15 – defensive counterair (DCA) 
 
Note the DCA/OCA assets required for this mission.  Future military actions, and 
specifically air power, should still be based on the same principles that apply today, that 
is, DCA, OCA, attack and ISTAR capabilities.  Although the emphasis of air power may 
change, its characteristics of reach, speed and flexibility are likely to remain relevant.  
With the advent of improved IADS, stealth technology may become less effective, with 
persistence, EA capability, payload, discrimination and counter-measures, being the vital 
components of an air battle.  Weapon and detection systems that are able to stand-off, 
                                                          
848 Major J. Scott Norwood, USAF, Thunderbolts and Eggshells: Composite Air Operations During Desert 
Storm and Implications for USAF Doctrine and Force Structure', School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 
Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: 1994, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA285156, (accessed 24 December 2009), p.12. 
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outside of threats, may offer an alternative form of counter-air and counter-IADS 
capability.  UCAS could offer this option.  The US is at the forefront of developing 
CONOPS for UCAS.849  For now, let us assume that UCAS will be utilised.  With this in 
mind, a comprehensive doctrine on UCAS employment can be developed.  If it is 
accepted that control of the air is vital in any campaign against a capable adversary, and 
that UCAS could undertake this task, how would UCAS be employed?  Current counter-
air Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) have aircraft such as the F-22 Raptor, F-
15C Eagle and Typhoon conducting operations in accordance and within a defined 
CONOPS, developed over many decades of experience - as described in Chapter 4.  
While a CONOPS is required for a UCAS, regardless of whether aircraft are manned or 
not, the doctrine with which air, sea and land forces are employed will likely remain 
constant.  It is proposed that UCAS would use the same TTP.   
 
It may be possible for a large COMAO formation of combat and support aircraft, combining 
manned aircraft and UCAS, or made up entirely of UCAS, to operate together or 
autonomously.  This autonomy may permit a quicker and more accurate response, with 
UCAS utilising automated flight and mission management systems, such as the Dynamic 
Airborne Mission Management system already mentioned, which could also be used by 
manned aircraft.850  If these management systems reach a level of capability allowing them 
to be trusted to an acceptable level, then HITL would not be required, for other than legal 
considerations.  Using the author’s autonomy levels, Level 4 would be the normal 
envisaged operating mode, with a HOTL only intervening if required.  Level 5, giving full 
autonomy, would be implemented if communications links were lost, and the importance of 
the mission was deemed crucial enough to warrant the potential risks that this may involve.  
                                                          
849 For example, see Alkire and others, op. cit., pp.33-54. 
850 Bonner, Taylor and Fletcher, op. cit., pp.157-158. 
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Chapter 6: International Relations and Future Threats 
Introduction 
The issues that form military doctrine and political policies towards international relations 
are complex.851  The types of military systems required to enforce these doctrines and 
policies are predicated on the likely scenarios that states may encounter.  It is important, 
therefore, to have an understanding of where future threats are likely to emerge.  Only 
then, can coherent strategic doctrine be formulated, and the correct military equipment 
procurement and training policies implemented.  No country or region should be viewed in 
isolation, but rather how they relate to each other.  This is a fundamental premise of 
international relations.  Whether there will be major state-on-state conflicts in the coming 
epochs is debateable.  Rupert Smith, in The Utility of Force, argues that major state-on-
state wars, involving the whole population and industrial complex are highly unlikely, and 
that our armed forces need to be reorganised to fight different types of conflicts.  Smith 
believes there is a, ‘…new paradigm of war amongst the people [which] is based on a 
continuous criss-crossing between confrontation and conflict…Rather than war and peace, 
there is no predefined sequence, nor is peace necessarily either the starting or the end 
point…’.852  Smith considers there are six major trends for what he terms as ‘war amongst 
the people’, with the primary being -  ‘The ends for which we are fighting are changing from 
the hard absolute objectives of interstate war to more malleable objectives to do with the 
individual and societies that are not states…’.853  The remaining are: ‘We fight amongst the 
people…Our conflicts tend to be timeless…We fight so as not to lose the force…On each 
occasion new uses are found for old weapons…[and]…The sides are mostly non-
state…’.854  While Smith’s views are worth considering, there are other opinions.   
Colin Gray believes that although future wars between states cannot be predicted, they are 
likely to occur; he states: ‘We can predict with confidence that the future will register war of 
                                                          
851 For an overview of the considerations for the planning and implementation of military and non-military 
strategy, and the nature and evolution of strategy and the changing role of military force, see generally, 
John Bayliss and others, Contemporary Strategy II, 2nd Edition, New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 
Inc., 1987,  See also, Bradley S. Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994, pp.13-31. 
852 See Rupert Smith, op. cit., pp.16-17.  For a view on the role of people and states in future wars, which 
offers a different perspective to Smith’s, see Pascal Vennesson, 'War without the People', in The Changing 
Character of War, Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 
pp.241-251. 
853 Rupert Smith, op. cit., p.17. 
854 ibid., p.17. 
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many kinds between states’.855  Amongst other possible conflicts, Gray hypothesises that a 
China versus the US clash, either over Taiwan, or hegemony in East Asia, is possible, with 
both countries arguing each is the defining threat for national security.856  Gray does not 
wish to give the view that this type of conflict is a certainty, but he emphasises that it would 
be prudent to be prepared for ‘strategic surprises’.  Perhaps Gray’s most important 
observation, is his belief that, ‘….the future of warfare will contain interstate conflicts that no 
one today who carries weight as a supposed expert on the future is imaging’.857 
Michael Howard, in The Invention of Peace & the Reinvention of War, discusses the 
probability of major state-on-states wars, and while opining that these are becoming less 
likely, believes nations such as China, Russia and the US, will offer the potential for 
confrontation.858  The historian Hew Strachan suggests that a lack of understanding of the 
true nature of war has led to a failure to understand its ‘changing characteristics’.859  
Strachan believes that: ‘Wars have become fuzzy at the edges: they have no clear end and 
army forces increasingly have to reject the appropriateness of classical definitions of 
military victory’.860  Strachan is of the view that while these issues, ‘…deserve coordinated 
action…[they]…are not wars, and so many so-called security issues are being resolved 
without a military dimension’.861  Another view comes from Azar Gant from Tel Aviv 
University, who believes that, although the probability of major wars remains low, does 
wonder if the ‘…near disappearance of armed conflict within the developed world is likely to 
remain as stark as it has been since the collapse of communism’.862  Gant views that the 
re-emergence of capitalist non-democratic states, such as China and Russia, is a paradigm 
shift in international relations.863  Strachan further argues that we are likely to see a change 
back to the ideas of deterrence and limited war.864  Strachan believes: ‘The wars of the 
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pp.99 and 101-102. 
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later twenty-first century may well be waged for assets, to which we feel in theory all 
humanity should have equal access but for which in practice we compete’.865 
Following World War II, and the devastating attacks on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, Bernard 
Brodie, one of the most imminent theorists of strategic deterrence, wrote: ‘….Thus far the 
chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars.  From now on its chief 
purpose must be to avert them.  It can have almost no other purpose’.866   Brodie’s remarks 
capture the essential reason for a nation possessing armed forces.  He succinctly stated: 
‘The threat of war, open or implied, has always been an instrument of diplomacy by which 
one state deterred another from doing something of a military or political nature which the 
former did not wish the later to do’.867  Perhaps Brodie’s most prescient observation was 
the likelihood that one’s own behaviour in extremis is unpredictable, let alone that of an 
adversary’s: ‘The wrong kind of prediction in the future could precip[it]ate the total war 
which too many persons have lightly concluded is now impossible’.868      
It is not possible to predict future events; it is, however, possible to learn from previous 
events, and to apply sound analytical judgement to the state of current international affairs, 
enabling the formulation of coherent policies.  Most major nations utilise think tanks and 
other institutions to help devise strategic policy.869  For example, the UK’s MOD’s DCDC is 
the UK Defence institution for doctrinal, conceptual and future scenario development.  
DCDC produces concepts and doctrine - underpinned by research and experimentation, 
with the aim to help inform decisions in UK defence strategy and capability development.870  
What makes a state a super power?  Analysis from DCDC defines power status as: ‘…the 
amalgam of military strength, access to resources, size of economies, educational 
opportunity, demographics, geo-political position and political stability amongst others’.871  
China uses its own method of calculating a nation’s power – Comprehensive National 
Power (CNP).  While there is no unified definition or method of calculation with regard to 
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CNP, it is generally defined as ‘…the comprehensive capabilities of a country to pursue its 
strategic objectives by taking actions internationally and the core factors to the concept are 
strategic resources, strategic capabilities and strategic outcomes, with the strategic 
resources as the material base’.872  Since the demise of the Soviet Union, and while the US 
is the only current true super power, there is a view among economists that China is likely 
to overtake the US economically, as early as 2020.  According to the UK’s National Institute 
of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), China is likely to overtake America as the 
world’s largest economy by 2019, as Western nations struggle to recover from the global 
banking crisis.873  Goldman Sachs estimates that the size of the Chinese economy will 
overtake America’s by 2027, and by 2050 will be almost twice as big.874  These predictions 
underline the contrasting fortunes of Asia, which is enjoying rampant growth, and the more 
subdued economies of the West.  China’s GDP grew by 10.4% in 2010, compared with 3% 
growth in the US and 1.8% in the Eurozone.  NIESR forecasts that Chinese growth will 
average 8% a year out to 2018, compared to 2.5% in the US.875  
While the future world view is impossible to predict, DCDC does, however, attempt to give 
some judgement as to the likely structure of the future international landscape.  DCDC 
believes: 
The era out to 2040 will be a time of transition; this is likely to be characterised by instability, 
both in the relations between states, and in the relations between groups within states.  During 
this timeframe the world is likely to face the reality of a changing climate, rapid population 
growth, resource scarcity, resurgence in ideology, and shifts in global power from West to 
East….The distribution of global power will change.  Out to 2040, the locus of global power will 
move away from the [US] and Europe towards Asia, as the global system shifts from a uni-
polar towards a multi-polar distribution of power.  This shift, coupled with the global challenges 
of climate change, resource scarcity and population growth, is likely to result in a period of 
instability in international relations, accompanied by the possibility of intense competition 
between major powers. The hegemonic dominance of the US will fade.  She is likely to remain 
the pre-eminent military power, although, in political, economic and military terms, she is likely 
to be increasingly constrained as others grow in influence and confidence…876  
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While DCDC believes the US will still be the pre-eminent military power in 2040, they 
assess that China may reach great power status – ‘The US is currently the only great 
power; the major powers are China, Russia, France and the United Kingdom.  Japan and 
Germany are major economic powers.  Their status is unlikely to change out to 
2040...[while] China may reach great power status by 2040’.877  DCDC’s views do not have 
to be agreed with, but they do offer a reasonable baseline.  The struggle for control over 
resources and the global commons may indeed increase the incidents of conflict.  The 
Global Commons is described as, ‘The domains of the high seas, international airspace, 
outer space, and cyber space are interlinked and critical to the prosperity and security of 
the Alliance nations. Access to these domains is both a military and economic necessity in 
today’s world’.878   
While direct conflict between the UK and a major power such as China or Russia is 
unlikely, wars involving the major powers is a possibility.  As part of a coalition, the UK may 
be required to confront a near-peer, or even a peer adversary.  China will be the 
benchmark by which the US judges its own capability requirements, and perhaps that of its 
allies.879  Although major state-on-state war is not predictable, there will remain the 
necessity for nation-states to maintain military capabilities that deter potential aggression.  
Are we possibly seeing a transfer of power, from the US to China, similar to that which took 
place in the early part of the 20th Century, when Great Britain began to cede its prominence 
to the US?880  Other states, such as Russia, North Korea, India, Australia, Brazil, Taiwan 
and Japan will all play a major part in future international relations.  Australia and Japan, in 
particular, are important economic powers in their own right; however, it is in relation to the 
security of their near-abroad that these two countries will seek to maintain and build 
alliances, attempting to balance China’s influence.  North Korea will likely continue to be a 
failed and unstable state, generally undermining the stability of that area of the Pacific.881  
Russia, India and Brazil (part of the so called BRICs) are states whose economies are 
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growing faster than those in the West, and are predicted to continue to do so.  DCDC 
believe that in 2029 the major powers will be the US, China, Russia, UK, France, India, 
Japan, Iran and possibly Brazil.882  Another view comes from Joseph Nye, who believes 
that although the US is likely to remain the most powerful state in the 21st century, it does 
not mean it will have domination.883   
Middle Eastern countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia will likewise have a significant 
impact on the nature of international affairs.  International attention regarding Iran’s intent to 
gain a nuclear weapons capability drives much of the international communities’ current 
efforts to reign in these ambitions.  It is probably too late in North Korea’s case, but Iranian 
containment may be possible, but at what cost?  What if Iran does gain nuclear weapons?  
The effect this will have in the Middle East, and further afield, will test international relations 
and military doctrine.  South America is likewise becoming increasingly important 
economically, with Brazil, in particular, an important exporter of agricultural products and 
raw materials.  It is quite possible that an alliance of South American powers may align to 
challenge the UK’s resolve over the Falkland Islands, creating tensions between the UK 
and those who have been traditional allies.  Argentina certainly shows no sign of giving up 
its claims to sovereignty to the Falkland Islands.884  
This thesis makes comment on, but does not attempt to judge, the current trend of some 
governments to be selective, when it comes to future international relations and military 
doctrine, which ultimately drives force structures.  Most governments base their military 
policy and procurement decisions on a range of scenarios in which they have deemed the 
state is likely to become involved in.  Those departments of government that are 
responsible for foreign affairs and military doctrine usually decide upon these scenarios, 
which are normally set in future epochs, 2015-2020, 2020-2025, and so on.  The UK, for 
example, uses a set of Studies Assumption Group (SAG) scenarios, developed by the 
Force Development department of DCDC; these are derived from British Defence Doctrine, 
to represent realistic examples of the types of operations involving UK forces envisaged by 
UK government policy.  These state: 
The purpose of Force Development is to guide the development of military capabilities and force 
structures in order to deliver UK defence policy.  Force Development provides MOD Main 
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Building with high quality, evidence-based advice to inform the strategic planning process, 
guiding decisions on defence policy, capability development and operations.885   
Within this procedure, there is process which turns these scenarios into credible joint 
campaign plans, from which the force package necessary to execute the plans is 
estimated.  Each is then evolved into a campaign plan, which is the subject of extensive 
analysis.  The output from these results, referred to as Joint Campaign Development Force 
Estimation, is used to inform the central planning process within the UK MOD.886  This 
procedure is a valid tool; however, if the initial assumptions are flawed, then all subsequent 
findings will be based on unreliable foundations.  Other states use similar procedures to 
calculate their own force requirements, each placing a different emphasis on their own 
scenarios.  This is one of the causes of such a variation in countries’ spending on their 
defence force structures.  Rupert Smith stresses the importance of proper analysis, stating: 
‘It is…possible to see the vital importance of conducting an analysis based upon the 
desired political outcome, since it will reveal whether military force can and should be used, 
and if so to what degree and purpose’.887   
Colonel John Warden suggests that errors of judgement in assessing potential threats are 
unforgiveable.  He advises, ‘The first step in assessing an enemy is a very careful review of 
intelligence information, followed by dispassionate war gaming, followed by more 
intelligence collection and analysis, followed by more war gaming, until the answer is 
relatively certain…’.888  Both Smith and Warden’s observations are very pertinent.  
Ultimately, the desired political outcome is the primary driver for a state’s foreign and 
military policy, or at least it should be. 
 
James Kurth in The New Maritime Strategy: Confronting Peer Competitors, Rogue States, 
and Transnational Insurgents, believes, ‘…the most obvious counterpart to the old Soviet 
Union and the only likely near-peer or peer competitor is China.’889  Most US strategists 
currently refer to China as a near-peer competitor, however, this is likely to change in the 
coming decades to a peer adversary.  Iran is not currently a near-peer competitor; its 
asymmetric approach to military doctrine may mitigate this requirement.  The 
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consequences of the future political and military policies of both China and Iran will have an 
effect globally, altering strategic, political, and military relationships.   
A major realignment in US strategic military thinking is taking place, which is currently 
budgeted on the capability to fight two major wars simultaneously.  Commitment to wars on 
two fronts, in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last ten years, has coincided with a global 
economic downturn, which has seriously tested the US economy.  Large cuts in the 
Pentagon’s budget were announced in January 2012.  As an interim measure, there will be 
cuts of $260 billion out to 2017.  Congressional budget agreements contain a sequestration 
requirement for $1 trillion, with half coming from the military.890  This means that if the 
Pentagon cannot agree on extra cuts, the US Congress will automatically instigate them.  
Leon Panetta, the US Secretary of Defence in 2012, warned that such large cuts to the 
military will be disastrous for US national security.  Although his pessimism is accepted as 
a challenge, there are others within the US that do not agree.  Professor Gordon Adams, a 
Fellow at the Stimson Centre, a Washington think tank, points out that even if $1 trillion is 
cut, this is still only 17% less than currently spent, compared with the cuts to the defence 
budget after the Korean, Vietnam and Cold Wars, which totalled 30%.891  The US military 
chiefs are similarly concerned, however.  In a brief to the US House Armed Services 
Committee in 2011, the four chiefs of the US Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines cautioned 
that planned budget cuts, and possible sequestration would lead to, ‘…[a] hollow force 
unable to provide a proper national defense…[and] of the increasing power of China…’.892  
After delays by President Obama, the US Congress enacted sequestration, and cuts were 
enacted in March 2013, amounting to $46 billion for 2013/14, to begin with.893  The 
challenges faced by the US and others are no less fundamental, simply because the Cold 
War is long over.  Indeed, it is not a straightforward comparison to say that the proposed 
military budget cuts are far less than previously experienced.  The US relationship with 
Europe, in particular, is likely to be tested.   
US focus is shifting towards the Western Pacific, while still seeking to maintain influence in 
the Middle East.  In its new strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: 
Priorities for 21st Century Defense, it is stated that, ‘U.S. policy will emphasize Gulf 
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security…to prevent Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon capability and counter its 
destabilizing policies’.894  It also states that:  
…while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance 
toward the Asia-Pacific region. Our relationships with Asian allies and key partners are critical to the 
future stability and growth of the region. We will emphasize our existing alliances, which provide a 
vital foundation for Asia-Pacific security.895   
Aaron Friedberg, a professor at Princeton University, believes that by 2030, the US will 
probably have withdrawn most of its forces from Europe, the Middle East and Southwest 
Asia, while, ‘[A] far greater fraction of the total American military and intelligence effort will 
be devoted to the Western Pacific, and to the area that extends from the Strait of Hormuz, 
in the Persian Gulf, through the Indian Ocean to the Strait of Malacca’.896  
The challenges that an aggressive China will bring to stability, not only in that region, but 
globally, will test alliances and military doctrine.  An editorial, in The Daily Telegraph, 
emphasised the significance of the cuts:  ‘For decades, the US has underwritten the 
security of the Atlantic as well as the Pacific, effectively allowing Europe a free ride and 
permitting a string of [NATO] members the luxury of running down their defence budgets.  
This era is rapidly coming to a close.’897  The editorial highlighted the fact that the US was 
most definitely moving to a more Asia-centric foreign policy, increasing its presence in 
Australia for example.  It also reiterated that China is unlikely to acquiesce to US hegemony 
in the region:  
Faced with the net of containment that America is quietly laying across the Pacific, China will 
search for the Achilles’ heel of the US Navy, perfecting a new generation of missiles capable 
of destroying aircraft carriers from hundreds of miles away, working out how to cripple the 
internet, and how to blind the US satellite network, on which all its military assets now 
depend.898  
Friedberg argues that because of their vulnerability to China’s emerging A2/AD doctrine, 
the US will need to reconsider its use of aircraft carriers; also, as China’s counter-air 
capabilities improve, and its land bases become more vulnerable to attack, ‘…the air force 
may find itself pressed to spend less on relatively short-range air superiority fighters…and 
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more on stealthy long-range bombers and unmanned aerial vehicles’.899  This view, which 
the author agrees with, is at the centre of the UCAS counter-air discussion. 
Whether the EU as a collective, or European countries as individual states, have the ability, 
or indeed intent, to become embroiled in a Pacific/Asia-centric strategic scene in the 
coming decades, cannot be evaluated with any confidence.  However, inadequate analysis 
may lead to a situation where the lack of willingness to become involved in any stabilising 
or deterrent measures could lead to the wrong interpretation by belligerent states.  
Economic constraints necessarily drive a country’s foreign policy and military aspirations.  
These same constraints may well mean a compulsory contribution is required, if domestic 
stability and reliable trade mechanisms are to remain the primary objective of the state. 
The author seeks to establish the most likely scenario in which a major state-on-state 
conflict will occur in the 2030-2040 period.  This does not mean that a future conflict can be 
predicted with any accuracy.  It is axiomatic, however, that recent conflicts such as Bosnia, 
Kosovo, the 1991 Gulf War, Afghanistan, and the 2011 Libyan uprising, were not factored 
into any defence planning assumptions by the US or UK, to any great extent.900  In order to 
enable the correct policy decisions to be formed, it is essential to consider all viable 
scenarios, which can only be relevant if a thorough understanding of the intent of potential 
adversaries is gleaned.  This thesis concentrates analysis on China and Iran, with regard to 
the effect these states’ international policies will have on the US and its allies’ relationships 
with them.  Countries’ foreign policies, such as those of US, Taiwan, Japan, Russia and 
India, will have a significant effect on China’s foreign and military doctrine, thus affecting 
the future security of the Western Pacific, and further afield.  Iran’s position in the Middle 
East also poses a significant conundrum for international politics; both of these areas will 
be the likely centres of gravity over the coming decades, at least for the US and its allies.  
China and Iran pose similar problems, with the likelihood that both will use A2/AD doctrine, 
forcing adversaries to operate outside their current optimum basing constraints.901 
China 
To fully understand the rise of China, from a Dynastic power, to the communist system it is 
today, would be a PhD thesis in itself.  This thesis does not venture down that road.  An 
appreciation of China’s path, is, nonetheless, fundamental.  There are a number of 
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excellent works of reference that detail China’s progress; these have helped the author to 
understand some of the reasons behind China’s internal and foreign policies.902   
China is dominating current international affairs, not only in regard to its position in the 
world economy, but also in relation to its military build-up and intent.  China is no longer the 
insular state it once was; over the past 30 years, great progress has been made in its 
pursuit of economic growth and development, enabling higher living standards for its 
people and increasing its international profile.903  These economic achievements, combined 
with progress in science and technology, have also enabled China to embark on a 
comprehensive transformation of its military.  With this economic success has come a 
revival of the view within China that it should be appreciated for what it is - a great power, 
and the pre-eminent one in Asia.904  Martin Jacques, in When China Rules the World, 
believes: ‘We are now witnessing an historic change which, though still in its relative 
infancy, is destined to transform the world’.905  China, as a civilisation, has existed for 
longer than any other comparable society.  Henry Kissinger in, On China, believes that the 
history of China as a civilisation seems to have no beginning, ‘It appears in history less as a 
conventional nation-state than a permanent natural phenomenon’.906  Jacques also 
believes that China should not be seen primarily as a nation-state, but be viewed as a 
civilisation.907  Jacques states, ‘China has existed within roughly its present borders for two 
thousand years and only over the last century has it come to regard itself as a nation-
state’.908  Since its unification in 221 B.C., until the early 19th Century, China’s rulers, 
through all its dynasties, took the view that China was the most important civilisation, by 
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far.909  Indeed, until the late 19th Century, China produced a greater share of the world’s 
GDP than any other society.910   
The fundamental social change China has undergone since the 1970s has shifted its 
aspirations and changed its worldview.  It is an economic dynamo, and as previously 
highlighted, is likely to usurp the US as the world’s No 1 economy in the coming 
decades.911  Its armed forces remain the world’s largest and are being reorganised and re-
equipped to enable them to meet any perceived threat.  The historian, Niall Ferguson, 
believes that Western dominance in the World order is rapidly coming to an end; he cites 
the fact that in 1970, China was 1/70th as rich as the US, while in 2010, it was 1/5th as 
rich.912  Ferguson believes that China and the US do not have a symbiotic relationship, and 
that any relationships built up thus far, are likely to decline, hastened by the change of 
Chinese leadership in 2012.  Perhaps Ferguson’s most important observation is that 
Chinese policies are non-linear, with a very high-level of unpredictability.913  
According to the Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 
the Peoples’ Republic of China 2010, the overriding drivers for China are, currently: 
‘…ensuring internal stability; reunification of Taiwan; gaining respect for its perceived global 
position; a balanced continuation of its economic development; and the securing of its 
energy supplies, including the routes through which they pass’.914  Aaron Friedberg sees 
China’s view of the future as, ‘…the strategic situation is characterized by tenuous near-
term stability, serious medium-term dangers, and expansive long-term possibilities’.915  
China may historically have no inclination to control its neighbours’ territory; however, it will 
likely reinforce its vision that it is the key regional power, which will defend itself, will not be 
threatened, and will protect what it identifies as its legitimate interests.  Although China’s 
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leadership emphasises its peaceful intentions, some international relations theorists believe 
that this is not the case, with the use of ‘soft power’ and ‘string of pearls’ strategies to 
mislead the international community.916  Professor Joseph Nye developed the concept of 
soft power in 1990, which he describes as, ‘…getting others to want the outcome you want 
– co-opts people rather than coerces them’.917  China is not the only major state to use ‘soft 
power – the US has been a proponent for decades, not least, following World War II, with 
the introduction of the Marshall Plan.918  Others, such as Avery Goldstein, do not consider 
this China’s intent.  Goldstein states in Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and 
International Security:  
There is…scant evidence at present on which to base predictions that China is likely to 
abandon its current, relatively conservative approach and instead adopt a grand strategy that 
would seek to overturn, rather than adjust to or reform, the international order it faces.919 
Whichever views are correct, China’s growing economic stature helps its drive for a more 
active external posture in which it is prepared to demonstrate a willingness to assert its 
interests.  In a significant move from its normal rhetoric, China’s 2008 Defence White Paper 
states that: 
China has become an important member of the international system and the future and 
destiny of China have been increasingly closely connected with the international community.  
China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy 
prosperity and stability without China.920 
Mitsuru Kitano, a Japanese diplomat, believes China is tending towards a China-centric 
order, as opposed to a responsible Great Power path.921  Kitano argues that: ‘To judge 
from the dynamics of China’s international relations at the present time, it seems that the 
China-centric order course will become more dominant as China’s national strength 
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increases and its relative importance in the international community grows’.922  Martin 
Jacques, writing in The Times, views China’s rise from an historical perspective, believing 
that, ‘…the Chinese do not think of themselves in terms of nation but civilization; it is the 
latter that gives them their sense of identity’.923  He firmly believes that China’s rapid growth 
will lead to a reconfiguration of the region: ‘….It is entirely plausible that we might once 
again see the return…of some elements of the tributary state system,… challenging the 
global dominance of [the] European [the Westphalian system] of sovereign independent 
nation states...’.924  He goes further, stating: ‘The rise of China signals the slow dawning of 
a very different era in which Chinese influence will become profound…’.925 
PLA military strategists perceive the US as posing both an immediate and long-term 
challenge to Chinese national security interests.  This perception is based on a set of 
concerns about US policies on Taiwan, US alliance relationships and defence ties in Asia, 
and overall US national security strategy.926  Japan’s re-emergence as a regional military 
power, India’s growing military power and regional influence, its own border and coastal 
defence, and defending its territorial waters and airspace, are also viewed as critical 
areas.927  The writings of Chinese military officers, and official government assessments, 
suggest a range of specific threats and potential challenges to Chinese security.  These 
perceptions drive current and future directions in doctrine and force structure planning.  
While most Chinese commentators do not see a rapid decline in the US’s comprehensive 
power, they do believe Iraq and Afghanistan have weakened its position in the world, and it 
is inevitable that the US’s hegemony in Asia will erode.928  Niall Ferguson certainly believes 
that the ‘West’ is in steady decline, while the ‘East’, in particular China, is on the 
ascendency.929  This decline may happen more quickly than anticipated; Ferguson gives 
examples of ‘Empires’ that have had relatively quick declines: The Soviet Union in 1991, 
The British Empire after 1945, Japan after 1942, and the Ottoman Empire in 1921, for 
example.930  
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Although China now perceives itself as a world power, there are underlying uncertainties, 
not least of these being whether China’s Communist Party (CCP) structure can adapt to 
new social and political pressures.  In addition, how will it choose to deal with Taiwan?  In 
line with China’s view of its place in the world, the PLA has been engaged in a concerted 
modernisation effort for some time, with the immediate focus being the ability to threaten 
Taiwan with military defeat if it attempts to break permanently from the Chinese mainland.  
Although economic and cultural ties between Taiwan and the China have made progress, 
China’s military build-up continues undiminished.  According to the 2010 Annual Report to 
Congress:  ‘….the PLA is developing the capability to deter Taiwan independence or 
influence Taiwan to settle the dispute on Beijing’s terms while simultaneously attempting to 
deter, delay, or deny any possible U.S. support for the island in case of conflict’.931 
China’s Strategic Priorities 
It may be that emerging China-US rivalry is due to misperceptions and policy issues that 
are relatively easy to rectify.  Aaron Friedberg does not believe this is the case.  Friedberg 
views that both the US and China have strategic objectives that threaten the other.932  
China is sure that the US wants to move China away from a one-party system towards 
liberal democracy.  It is largely because of this that the US is seen, ‘….as the most serious 
external threat to their continued rule…[and]…they feel the need to constrict its military 
presence and diplomatic influence in the Western Pacific, pushing it back and ultimately 
displacing it as the preponderant power in East Asia’.933   Aligned with this paradigm, 
China’s likely strategic focus, beyond its priority of reuniting with Taiwan, will be in 
strengthening its presence in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.  Andrew 
Erickson, in China, the United States and 21st-Century Sea Power, notes that Chinese 
analysts are concerned that the US has the power to threaten Chinese interests, including 
the, ‘…reunification of Taiwan, assertion of sovereignty over disputed islands [in the South 
China Sea], and ultimately some form of sea-lane security and regional maritime 
influence’.934  Kissinger views China’s stance over Taiwan as, ‘…not so much a test of 
Communist ideology as a demand to respect Chinese history’.935  
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According to Robert Kapan, in The Geography of Chinese Power, China seems to be 
‘…developing as a great land and sea power which will at the very least eclipse Russia in 
Eurasia’.936  As Geoffrey Till points out, ‘Because of its growing and absolute dependence 
on overseas commodities, energy and markets, China, like the rest of the Asia-Pacific 
region has little choice but to become more maritime in its orientation’.937 
Friedberg predicts that although China may displace the US as the World’s number one 
economy, it is unlikely to usurp it as the dominant military power.938  China does not publish 
equivalents to the US National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, or National 
Military Strategy.  Rather, China uses ‘white papers’, speeches, and articles as the principal 
mechanisms with which to communicate policy and strategy.  Although the transparency of 
China’s military and security affairs has improved in recent years, including its biennial 
publication of the Defense White Paper and the 2009 launch of an official Ministry of 
National Defense (MND) website, it is viewed by the US as not having gone far enough.939  
Previous Defense White Papers have outlined a set of national interests that serve as the 
fundamental basis for formulating China’s national defence policy.  These include: 
‘…safeguarding state sovereignty, territorial integrity and security; upholding economic 
development and enhancing the overall national strength; adhering to and improving the 
socialist system; maintaining and promoting social stability and harmony’.940   
Crane believes that Chinese military strategists consistently emphasise the need to 
maintain the existence of three conditions for China to survive and prosper.  In order of 
importance, these are - national unity, stability, and sovereignty.  Chinese threat 
perceptions and strategic planning are largely informed by the need to maintain these three 
conditions.  Crane also considers that the PLA’s assessment of the international security 
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environment is based on the extent to which the policies and actions of other nations 
threaten China’s ability to maintain these conditions.941  Although China has a long history 
of social disobedience, incidents are ruthlessly put down.  This has evolved into an 
indoctrination of civil obedience – the first principle is ‘know your place’.  The first priority is 
to stabilise the social order, not overturn it; social harmony is preferred over individual 
rights.  The CCP’s priority will continue to be maintaining the status quo.942 
The 2010 Report to Congress views that, ‘…the People’s Republic of China (PRC) leaders 
believe the initial decades of the 21st century as a “strategic window of opportunity,” and 
will be conducive to China’s rise to regional pre-eminence and global influence’.943  The 
report also assesses that, although China’s leaders continue to support the process of 
reform, there is a growing recognition that the process of change has forced a number of 
dilemmas.  Although these reforms have enabled China to experience rapid growth, they 
have also led to substantial challenges, particularly to internal stability.  Significantly, the 
report assesses that these conclusions have led China’s leaders to determine that they 
should focus on managing or exploiting external tensions, especially with the US and other 
major powers, to maintain an environment conducive to China’s growth, at least until 2020.  
The report judges that China could be deterred from a nonviolent course.944  The CCP are 
aware that once begun, unrest could be difficult to control and could easily turn against the 
state.  Additionally, unexpected increases in resource demand, and access to these 
resources, could affect China’s strategic viewpoint, and might force it to re-examine its 
resource priorities.945   While the report does seem to offer a relatively gloomy picture, there 
are more moderate views.  China’s current position could be viewed as an attempt to 
sustain regional stability and to reassure its neighbours, as opposed to weakening the US’s 
position in Asia.946  That said, there is certainly the acknowledgement within China’s 
leadership that the biggest external obstacle to achieving a true great power status, is the 
US.947 
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The possibility of a military conflict with Taiwan and US military intervention remain China’s 
most pressing long-term military concern.  A potential conflict will drive China’s military 
modernisation as long as China’s leaders judge that the permanent loss of Taiwan could 
seriously undermine the regime’s political legitimacy and hold on power.948  Coping with 
these forces will be fundamental to the development of China as a world superpower.  
Within China itself, there are some strident views.  As an example, The Sunday Times has 
highlighted a more bellicose trend among the Chinese military, in particular.  Michael 
Sheridan writes: ‘…army and navy officers [predict] a military showdown, [with] political 
leaders calling for China to sell arms to America’s foes.  The trigger for their fury was 
Obama’s decision to sell $6.4 billion worth of weapons to Taiwan…’.949   
Despite an increase in rhetoric from within China, some analysts believe the chance of war 
between China and the US is remote, as the Chinese military threat to the US is only 
indirect.  Jacqueline Newmyer, writing in Orbis, believes that China’s grand strategy today 
seeks, ‘…to prevent the encirclement of China while encircling prospective enemies, with 
the aim of creating a disposition of power so favorable to the PRC that it will not actually 
have to use force to secure its interests’.950  Rather than fight the US outright, the Chinese 
may be seeking to influence US behaviour precisely to avoid a confrontation.  Nonetheless, 
the US is required by its own laws to defend Taiwan.  While the provision of military 
equipment is one part of the Taiwan Relations Act, the act also has another fundamental 
obligation, that is:  ‘…to maintain the capacity of the [US] to resist any resort to force or 
other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, of the social or economic 
system, of the people on Taiwan’.951   
Even if the US stood by its obligations, could it actually defend Taiwan?  Stillion and 
Perdue believe that by the year 2020, the US will no longer be able to defend Taiwan from 
a Chinese attack.  They emphasises the air battle - China is just 100 miles away from 
Taiwan, whereas the US must project military power from vast distances, with more limited 
access to foreign bases than it had during the Cold War.  This strategy is designed not only 
to deny US Navy entry into Chinese areas of interest, but also to keep US forces away 
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generally.952  If the US were to abandon Taiwan to China, then Japan, South Korea, the 
Philippines, Australia, and other US allies in the Pacific, as well as India, will begin to doubt 
the strength of the US’s obligations.  According to Robert Kaplan, this could ultimately 
encourage these states to move nearer to China, allowing the emergence of a China with 
true supremacy in the Pacific Rim, and further afield.953  The subsequent fallout would 
change the balance of power in the region, with the associated ramifications for the rest of 
the world. 
Economic Development 
It is generally acknowledged that China is now the No 2 economic power, after the US, 
having overtaken Japan in 2010.954  A nation’s power is more than its economic clout, 
however.  China’s use of its own method for calculating a nation’s power, CNP, has varied 
somewhat in its consistency.  There are two contending scientific teams calculating CNP:  
military, and civilian.  The Academy of Military Science (AMS) analysis contradicts the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), with AMS assessing that China’s CNP score 
will equal the US, by 2020, while CASS consider that China’s CNP score will be half that of 
the US, by 2020, with Japan’s CNP 20% higher than the US.955  In the mid-1980s, Deng 
Xiaoping, China’s leader at the time, stressed that it was important to calculate future 
trends in CNP, in order to guide China's reforms; these CNP calculations include 
economics, science, defence, and other factors.  Although calculating CNP was developed 
in 1984, Chinese authors rationalise the use of CNP theory stating that it originally stems 
from ancient Chinese strategists.  Chinese analysts place great store on CNP scores, 
considering them an important tool in helping to identify five trends: ‘The status hierarchy in 
world politics…The power of potential rivals and potential partners…  Who will best exploit 
the Revolution in Military Affairs?... Which side will win a war?...The trend toward world 
multi-polarity and US decline’.956  Some Chinese commentators assess that although the 
US’s CNP decline will be relative, it will be actual, and it will be transformed from a 
superpower to a common power.957  
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Western forums make their own analysis – with most agreeing that it is only a matter of 
time before China overtakes the US as the No 1 economic power, as discussed earlier.  
There are, of course, contrary views.  Professor Joseph Nye, an adviser to various US 
administrations, believes that the image of the US’s absolute decline is false, but its relative 
decline is the same as closing the gap.  Nye does not believe China will overtake the US, 
and that the US has time to adapt strategy to mitigate China’s rise.958  James Mackintosh, 
writing in the Financial Times, views that although the economic consensus believes that 
China will keep expanding, to surpass the US in dollar terms sometime in the next 40 
years, research predicts that growth will fall, with many potential triggers for a slowdown, 
such as a shortage of housing, leading to a housing bubble, and runaway food inflation.959  
Aaron Friedberg also believes China’s growth will slow down:  
After decades of good fortune and nearly uninterrupted growth, China may yet experience a 
sharp economic crisis from which it will have great difficulty recovering.  If that happens, the 
remarkable progress of recent decades could give way to social unrest and political upheaval, 
and the “Chinese century” that so many have predicted could be over before it really has a 
chance to get started.960  
Even the Chinese Prime Minister in 2010, Wen Jiabao, admitted that the economy was, 
‘unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and ultimately unsustainable’.961  There are, 
however, those that argue that China’s economy is resilient, and as long as it continues to 
manage its power and water supplies, this will, aligned with its international reserves and 
internal financial wealth, allow it to continue to further expand its GDP and GPD per 
capita.962  Justin Yifu Lin, Chief Economist of the World Bank in 2011, believes ‘…China 
has the potential of maintaining an 8% annual growth rate for another two decades’.963  
This does not mean it will not slow down.  Paradoxically, slowdown in economic growth in 
China will affect the economic recovery of other countries, including Western states.     
China’s rapid economic growth will allow it to fulfil its international ambitions, if internal 
pressures do not force it to deviate from its objectives.  John Mearsheiner, in The Tragedy 
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of Great Power Politics, believes China has the capacity to be significantly more powerful 
than the US, viewing:  
Not only would China be much wealthier than any of its Asian rivals...but its huge population 
advantage would allow it to build a far more powerful army than either Japan or Russia could.  
China would also have the resources to acquire an impressive nuclear arsenal.  North East 
Asia...would be a far more dangerous place than it is now.  China, like all previous potential 
hegemons, would be strongly inclined to become a real hegemony, and all its rivals, including 
the United States, would encircle China to try to keep it from expanding.964 
This view may seem somewhat radical, yet Mearsheimer is by no means the only 
international relations analyst to raise concerns over China’s rapidly expanding economy, 
aligned with its strategic intentions.  A number of US analysts and policymakers have also 
raised apprehensions about the potential for China to mount a serious strategic challenge 
to the US in Asia, especially in the Western Pacific, during the course of the next two 
decades.965  These concerns are based on China’s expanding economy and growing 
military capabilities.  The rapid economic growth of the past three decades has dramatically 
increased the resources the Chinese government has available to devote to military 
spending.  Recent double-digit percentage increases in officially reported defence budgets 
indicate the degree to which China’s growing economic base has permitted the Chinese 
government to increase the resources it expends on the military.966  The real growth in 
defence spending is considerably more.967  The economy has not only enjoyed very rapid 
rates of growth over the past few decades, it has also benefited from large inflows of direct 
foreign investment, massive imports of modern equipment and machinery, and significant 
improvements in China’s educational system and the return of Chinese students from 
studying abroad.  All have contributed to the creation of a number of modern industrial 
sectors, especially in information technology.968  This technological and intellectual 
evolution and capacity will be fundamental to China’s continued economic expansion and 
military transformation.  
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String of Pearls, Sea Lines of Communications and the South China Sea 
China’s position vis-à-vis Taiwan and the South China Sea is becoming increasingly 
confrontational and intransigent.  With China’s economy growing, it is likely that China will 
continue to use its economic and diplomatic muscle to expand its influence in the Asia-
Pacific region, particularly, in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.  These represent 
key Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) for China’s energy supply – the majority of 
China’s crude oil imports transit the Strait of Malacca from the Indian Ocean.  This strategic 
focus is likely to create friction between China and India, at the very least.  Robert Kaplan 
believes: ‘China seeks domination of the South China Sea to be the dominant power in 
much of the Eastern Hemisphere…’.969  Kaplan goes further, ‘…the South China Sea is a 
vital route for much of Asia's commercial traffic and energy needs.  The US and other 
nations consider it an international passageway.  China calls it a "core interest”’.970  If not 
over Taiwan, then it is the importance that China places on its perceived right of hegemony 
over the South China Seas that will feature in the coming years.  This sea connects 
Southeast Asian states with the Western Pacific, acting as the conduit for global sea trade.  
More than half the world's annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through the Straits of 
Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar.  As much as 80% of China’s imported oil and gas 
has to pass through the Strait of Malacca.971  It is likely that China will continue to import 
60% of its oil, rising to at least 70% by 2035, keeping its import routes crucial.972  There is 
little doubt proven oil reserves of seven billion barrels, and an estimated 900 trillion cubic 
feet of natural gas, are factors swaying China’s position.973  China's own position in the 
Western Pacific emphasises its prominence when looking towards the South China Sea.  
China looks south towards Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, the Malay 
Peninsula divided between Malaysia and Thailand, and Vietnam.  Kaplan views ‘…the 
South China Sea is an obvious arena for the projection of Chinese power’.974  
Despite China’s desire to return Taiwan to the fold, its foreign policy is also currently turned 
more to engagement and involvement with its regional neighbours.  With an Indian naval 
base on the Andaman and Nicobar islands, and a large US navy presence in the region, 
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China has long feared that its trade and energy routes are vulnerable to blockade.  In 
response, China has created its ‘String of Pearls’ strategy.975  This is China’s desire to 
increase its geopolitical influence through efforts to increase access to ports and airfields, 
develop special diplomatic relationships, and modernise military forces extending from the 
South China Sea through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the 
Arabian Gulf.  Each ‘pearl’ in the ‘String of Pearls’ is an interconnection of Chinese 
geopolitical impact and military presence.976  A number of different types of facilities, in a 
variety of locations, make up the ‘String of Pearls’.  Hainan Island, with recently upgraded 
military facilities , a container shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, the construction 
of a deep water port in Sittwe, Myanmar, and the construction of a navy base in Gwadar, 
Pakistan – are all examples of ‘pearls’.  The ‘pearls’ extend from the coast of mainland 
China through the littorals of the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian 
Ocean, and those of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf.  China will continue to build 
strategic relationships and develop a capability to establish a forward presence along the 
SLOC connecting China to the Middle East.977   
Projects at strategic points across the Indian Ocean will allow China to extend its growing 
naval strength well beyond its traditional coastal waters.978  In addition, China plans to build 
thousands of miles of new railways to connect the southern Chinese city of Kunming with 
ports across Myanmar and South East Asia.  Not only will China's partnership with 
Myanmar help safeguard its own energy supply, but it will also give China a key strategic 
advantage over Japan and South Korea, who also rely on the Strait of Malacca for part of 
their energy supplies.979  See Figure 2 below. 
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Figure 2: China’s import transit routes/critical chokepoints and proposed/under construction 
SLOC bypass routes.980 
China is not limiting itself to the Asia-Pacific Region, with many African countries having 
received large inputs of Chinese funding.  China’s policy of not linking trade, aid, and 
investment to political reform or human rights issues has paid huge dividends thus far.981  
In less than a decade, it has created a presence across the entire African continent, 
ensuring a steady supply of much needed raw materials.  In Angola, the Chinese have built 
roads, upgraded ports and transformed railways.  They are also deeply involved in new 
construction projects in Ethiopia and Kenya.982  China has similarly used its surplus of 
foreign currency reserves to cement new alliances and finance cut-rate loans and 
commercial lines of credit.  There is only one condition: any money provided must be used 
to pay Chinese companies and buy Chinese goods that flood the continent’s street 
markets.983   
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Will African and other countries presently appreciating this apparent Chinese largesse 
always be as accommodating?  Does this doctrine of a ‘String of Pearls’ work to China’s 
advantage?  Time will tell, but China can afford to play the long game.  This strategy may 
be seen as two-fold: firstly, to extend its economic power and exposure to markets, and 
secondly, to impress upon regional neighbours that it is not a threat to their well-being. 
China’s Military Build-up 
The smaller states in the Western Pacific region accept that there is little they can do to 
counter Chinese regional aspirations and military capabilities.  However, in some cases, 
particularly Russia, Japan and India, there is likely to be a more robust response, including 
a potential military build-up to counter China’s burgeoning claims.  China’s recent test flight 
of a ‘stealth fighter’, the J-20, came as somewhat of a shock to Western intelligence 
agencies.984  The speed at which China has reached this stage of development is 
impressive.  China is not in the same league as the US in this type of capability, but is very 
likely to edge closer to Western concepts and capabilities in the coming epochs.985  New 
technologies do not necessarily make a nation’s armed services more efficient or capable; 
however, when aligned with robust doctrine and training, then improvements will naturally 
emerge. The mere fact that China is attempting to field an aircraft such as the J-20 is, 
perhaps, good news for the US administration, as it focuses on the potential threat.  US 
intelligence apparently failed to spot its rapid development.986  This is hard to believe, but is 
convenient, nonetheless.  Ultimately, this type of development will drive other countries to 
develop counters.  Russia and India are spending billions of dollars in upgrading their 
armed forces, India being a major importer of Russian military equipment, particularly 
fighter aircraft.  Previously highlighted, both countries are jointly developing a 5th-generation 
fighter, the PAK-FA, sometimes referred to as the T-50, which is seen as being as a 
counter to the F-22; it is planned to be in operational service by 2020.987  The US is 
refusing to export the F-22 to any foreign state, no matter how friendly.  Japan, while 
restricted by post World War II treaty obligations to remain a ‘defence force’, is considering 
developing its own sixth-generation fighter as a counter to the J-20.988  It seems that Japan 
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views its lack of a 5th-generation fighter as a significant disadvantage.  Towards the end of 
2011 Japan announced its intention to buy 42 F-35 JSF.989  It is likely that Japan has had to 
settle for what it views as the second best option.  This may or may not be correct, 
however, the acquisition of the F-35 will allow Japan to ‘learn’ the technology available, 
thus adapting it to its own indigenous developments.  
China’s stance on Taiwan and the South China Seas, and its military build-up, is causing 
other Western Pacific rim states to reconsider their military requirements.  Andrew Erickson 
from the US Naval War College has argued that China’s ASBM programme may produce 
pressure in Washington and Moscow to revise or abandon the International Nuclear 
Federation treaty, and that other nations, such as Japan, may feel compelled to develop 
similar capabilities as well.990  Richard Lloyd Parry, in The Times, writes that tensions have 
recently flared between China and Japan when:  
.…Japan announced that it would redeploy its armed forces in a calculated response to 
China’s growing military power.  Beijing reacted angrily after Tokyo announced that a new 
defence policy would shift its forces to protect strategic islands claimed by China.  The 
National Defence Programme Guidelines, approved yesterday by the Cabinet…, represents 
the biggest shift in Japan’s defence thinking since the end of the Cold War, and explicitly 
changes the emphasis from the threat formerly posed by Russia to the growing military 
ambitions of China.991   
Increased investment in hardware and training by Beijing is designed to dissuade the US 
from interfering in problems such as the long-running dispute over Taiwan.  According to 
Jonathan Holslag, author of Trapped Giant: China’s Military Rise, although the US has 
been the dominate power in the Western Pacific since World War II: ‘After the demise of 
the Soviet Union, China is emerging as the second power that might alter the military 
balance in a way that fundamentally reshapes the regional security order’.992 
According to the US Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘The PLA seeks the capability to 
deter Taiwan Independence and influence Taiwan to settle the dispute on Beijing’s terms.  
In pursuit of this objective, Beijing is developing capabilities intended to deter, delay, or 
deny possible U.S. support for the island in the event of a conflict’. 993  This view may be 
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correct; however, the scale and strategic reach of capabilities being developed by China 
appears well in excess of what would be required to defeat Taiwan and deter US 
intervention.  Its long-term aim to achieve a dominant position in Asia would allow China to 
add a coercive element to its extant policy of using ‘soft power’ to exert influence over 
regional nations.   
The PLA has made modest improvements in the transparency of China’s military and 
security affairs, although it is nowhere near the level required to allow other states to 
adequately analyse its strategic intentions, in apparent denial of what that means for other 
states’ strategy: it is in effect doubling expenditure on military capabilities.  Many doubts 
remain regarding how China will use its expanding capabilities; it is certainly not adequate 
to claim that Taiwan is the sole focus of its military ambitions.994  This limited transparency 
in its military and security affairs has only enhanced uncertainty and increased the potential 
for misunderstanding and miscalculation.995  The US, Japan, and others, have repeatedly 
called on China to be more overt with its defence plans.  
Richard Weitz, in Strategic Posture Review, notes that foreign analysts believe that official 
Chinese budget figures exclude spending on nuclear weapons, purchases of foreign weap-
ons, and military research and development.  For this reason, analysts generally double or 
triple the official Chinese defence spending figures.996  The 2010 Report to Congress 
states: ‘…that much more could be said by China about its military investments, the 
strategy and intentions shaping those investment choices, and the military capabilities it is 
developing’.997  The graph below details the US official interpretation of China’s defence 
budget, up to 2009, which essentially believes that the real expenditure is twice that 
acknowledged by China.  
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Figure 3: China’s annual real GDP and military budget growth: 1996 – 2009998 
Part of the difficulty is assessing the size of China’s defence budget, just as it was in 
estimating the Soviet’s military spending during the Cold War.  China’s annual defence 
budget supposedly increased in 2010 by 6.0% to US $78.7 billion.999  This is still only 9% of 
the American defence budget, which was US $693.6 billion in 2010.1000  China’s official 
defence budget increased by 9.1%, to US $90.2 billion for 2011.1001  Defence analysts view 
these increases, and recent confrontation between the regions’ military over territorial 
claims in the South China Sea, as indicative of a China prepared to use force, if 
necessary.1002 
Increasing national wealth has allowed China to pursue the single largest sustained arms 
buying spree observed since the Soviet build-up in the last decade of the Cold War.  
However, China’s military faces a number of constraints, not least, its ability to acquire the 
equipment and facilities it desires.1003  Constraints faced also include the deficiencies of 
China’s own defence industry and external restrictions on imports of more capable 
equipment from foreign suppliers.1004  All that said, unlike the Soviet build-up, which 
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effectively bankrupted its economy, China’s build-up should be sustainable if its economy 
continues to grow at a pace allowing it to spend revenues that would not otherwise be 
required for domestic purposes.  Nonetheless, as already discussed, a number of effects 
will need to align.  First, the economy will have to continue to grow.  Second, the 
government will have to be able to extract revenues for military expenditures.  Third, 
balancing competing pressures for social welfare and education, and more public 
investment in infrastructure, against increased military spending, will be difficult.  Last, not 
least, China’s defence industries will have to be able to produce the weapon systems that it 
would need to seriously challenge US forces.1005  Progress is being made in China’s ability 
to manufacture its own weapon systems, nonetheless.  A RAND Corporation report cites 
the possibility, ‘….that China may be more advanced [than the US] technology and militarily 
in 2020’.1006  This may be a somewhat pessimistic view, with more current analysis giving 
different timescales.  For example, Tai Ming Cheung from the US Institute on Global 
Conflict and Cooperation, cites a report from China’s International Institute of Management 
Development, giving the view that China will reach science and technology parity with the 
US between 2040 and 2050.1007  It is possible that China may develop the technological 
wherewithal, at least in some industrial branches, to produce comparable (to the West) 
modern weaponry.   
Whatever the case, the military’s ability to acquire the equipment and services it needs will 
require great effort.  A major factor is that the Chinese military has to contend with 
competitive markets for management and leadership talent, and restricted sources of 
supply for advanced weaponry; it also suffers from severe weaknesses in integrating 
weapons systems.1008  Recent concerns by Russia over Chinese production of aircraft 
engines, reverse engineered from Russian-supplied engines, for its indigenously produced 
J-11 fighter, highlight the reluctance of some countries, particularly Russia, to allow China 
unfettered access to their technology.1009  Ultimately, if China’s economy continues to 
modernise over the coming decades, its military equipment and weapons producers are 
likely to have access to domestically produced components to construct the military 
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equipment and systems needed to narrow the capabilities gap with the US.1010  
Notwithstanding domestic and other internal pressures, viewed holistically, this will have 
consequences for international relations in the coming decades.   
Perhaps one of the most important intangibles, when assessing a state’s capability to field 
a potent military force, is the quality of its personnel.  It is not a given that the possession of 
state-of-the-art weapons translates into the ability to achieve superiority over an adversary.  
History has illustrated that those forces that have achieved a high level of efficiency through 
training will beat or hold off an opponent, even when evenly matched with equipment and 
numbers of personnel.1011  The morale and esprit de corps of a force should also not be 
underestimated, both of which can be difficult to establish and maintain.  Whether this will 
be a decisive factor in future warfare is an important point.  Will mass outweigh quality and 
training?  This is not to say that the PLA cannot motivate its personnel, but the Chinese 
people, as a whole, will also need to be encouraged towards a similar mind-set.  
The First and Second Island Chains 
Kaplan believes that in the coming decades it is likely that China will project its power 
abroad, principally through its navy.1012  China’s horizons have broadened; it acknowledges 
that to continue its prosperity, maintain its SLOC and supplies of energy, it can no longer 
continue to be ‘land-centric’ and wait for an adversary to come to it.  It must be able to fend 
off a possible challenger as far as Japan to the east, and the Spratly Islands to the south – 
the ‘First Island Chain’.  PRC military theorists conceive of two island chains as forming a 
geographical basis for China’s maritime defensive boundary.  The precise frontiers of these 
chains have never been officially defined by the Chinese government, and are subject to 
some conjecture.  For example, Kaplan states that the ‘First Island Chain’ consists of the 
Korean Peninsula, the Kuril Islands, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia and 
Australia.1013  Another account states China's ‘green water’ extends eastward in the Pacific 
Ocean out to the ‘First Island Chain’, which is formed by the Aleutians, the Kuriles, Japan's 
archipelago, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo.  Further eastward is 
referred to as ‘blue water’ extending to the ‘Second Island Chain’ running from the north at 
the Bonin Islands and moving southward through the Marianas, Guam, and the Caroline 
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Islands.1014  Whatever is the real Chinese interpretation, it remains an extant part of China’s 
policy to push US influence beyond the ‘First Island Chain’, at the very least.  Initially, if it 
was deemed necessary, China would seek to be able to take control over the Yellow Sea, 
the East China Sea and the South China Sea, all of which are located within the ‘First 
Island Chain’ of the Pacific Ocean, including the Philippines and the Ryukyu Islands.1015   
Taiwan and the South China Sea 
The China/Taiwan dynamic is, perhaps, the most important potential flashpoint in the 
Western Pacific.  Taiwan’s paramount goal is to preserve its de facto independence and 
reinforce its separate identity, which allows it to govern itself autonomously; an acceptable 
condition in which neither sides risks cross-strait relations by pressing for independence or 
reunification.  This issue largely defines Taiwan’s political spectrum.  China’s fears about 
Taiwanese independence and possible US intervention are the most relevant to the PLA’s 
current planning and procurement.1016  Since the end of the 1990s, PLA reform, 
modernisation, procurement, and training have been predominantly focused on preparing 
for a conflict over Taiwan.  Taiwan is at the top of the PLA’s list of possible conflicts.  In this 
context, US policies on the Taiwan question are of immediate concern to Chinese defence 
planners.  According to Crane and others, in Modernizing China's Military: Opportunities 
and Constraints:  
The leaders of the People’s Republic of China are committed to ensuring the reunification 
of Taiwan on their terms; U.S. policies are seen as directly preventing this outcome.  Some 
Chinese military planners fear that the United States seeks to keep Taiwan apart from the 
mainland to use it as a strategic point in Asia to limit the growth of China’s regional 
influence.1017  
Specifically, PLA strategists perceive US arms sales to Taiwan and bilateral military 
agreements as part of an effort to keep China permanently divided.  Most Chinese and 
Western analysts presume that the US would intervene in a conflict, unless Taiwan 
declared independence.  As a result, much of the PLA’s modernisation has been focused 
not only on fighting Taiwanese forces, but on also fighting US forces if a conflict were to 
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erupt.1018  US military build-up in the Pacific cannot but affect China’s response.  An 
example is the new prominence and expansion of US Pacific Command (PACOM).  
PACOM is the largest of six regional commands; its emphasis is on improved technologies 
and infrastructure in its bases in Hawaii, Guam and Japan, which require a huge 
investment, all of which concerns China.1019 
Over the past few years, China has amassed enormous amounts of US government debt.  
Such economic pressure has led to calls to reassess the US - Taiwan relationship.  A 2011 
article in Foreign Affairs called on the US to reappraise its promise to defend Taiwan in 
order to maintain mutual peace and avoid a negative arms race spiral.1020  The New York 
Times published an editorial calling to stop arms sales to Taiwan, and to abandon the 
defence of the island in exchange for China dropping its US debt and save the US 
economy.1021  US authorities immediately came out to reject this recommendation as naive.  
But does it have merit?  There is a perception within Taiwan that the US is indeed 
contemplating a radical reappraisal of its position over Taiwan.  With cuts in its military 
budget, as well the rise of China’s maritime strike capabilities, the US has gradually started 
to withdraw its first line of defence from Asia in order to avoid a possible confrontation.  
Domestic protests in Japan have led to the US transferring half of its personnel to Guam in 
2011, while a complete withdrawal from Japan is possible in the future.  At the same time, 
the US plans to station troops in northern Australia.1022  According to the Taiwan News, the 
US plans to use control over the South China Sea to successfully close off the Strait of 
Malacca during wartime as well as the sea route between the Indian Ocean and the 
Pacific.1023  Undoubtedly, this would exert pressure on the oil supply route between the 
Middle East and China.   What effect will this have on the balance of power in the region?  
If the US does indeed intent to change its strategy and move its strategic line to the Second 
Island Chain, thereby extending the distance at which the PLA is required to operate, will 
this mean it is abdicating its responsibilities under the TRA act?   
China has a long history of employing ambiguous tactics and nefarious means to conceal 
the true reasons behind its military revolution and to advance its aspirations in the Asian-
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Pacific region.  In the 1990s, as China accumulated and intermittently fired ballistic missiles 
across the Taiwan Strait to intimidate Taiwan, it assured the world that its military build-up 
served only benign ends, and that it sought peaceful reunification with Taiwan.1024  
However, this stance was not universally accepted, and in response to China’s 1996 firings 
and military exercises near Taiwan, the US deployed the USS Nimitz CSG, which the 
Chinese were unable to counter at the time.  This US deployment produced a strong sense 
of resentment, and is the principal reason for Chinese efforts to develop ASBM, with the 
aim of preventing similar US carrier operations in the future.1025  China desires the ability to 
prevent effective US intervention in the event of a future Taiwan Strait confrontation and to 
constrain its influence in China’s disputed zones of core strategic importance.  In order to 
achieve these ambitions, China has been transforming its military, with emphasis on A2/AD 
capabilities.1026 
The most fundamental requirement for China’s policy towards Taiwan is the need to deter 
moves in Taiwan toward independence by demonstrating the ability to deter foreign 
intervention in response to its use of force.1027  ASBM and other systems are increasingly 
viewed as a key aspect of an integrated defence system, with other drivers being a strong 
desire to enforce sovereignty claims in the South China Sea and ensure access to vital 
resources.  China’s view that the South China Sea is of vital strategic and economic 
importance, in terms of establishing itself as a regional military power and countering the 
US, is consistent with wider fears that the US is trying to contain China through naval 
dominance, regional bases, and alliances with other regional powers.1028  China’s 
increasingly assertive approach has fuelled fears that it will impede common use of the 
sea-lanes and disrupt commerce in the South China Sea.1029  China claims a segment of 
the South China Sea extending all the way down to Malaysia and Brunei.  Already 
discussed, the strategically important South China Sea contains some of the world’s 
busiest shipping lanes; it also has valuable fish resources, and some proven oil and gas 
reserves.  The sea also contains hundreds of mostly tiny and uninhabited islands, reefs, 
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and rocks.  China claims almost the entire body of water as its own, and it claims overlap 
with that of Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Taiwan.1030   
The two main island groups in the South China Sea are the Paracel Islands and Spratly 
Islands, which are disputed territories between Vietnam, China, and Taiwan, with China 
currently controlling the entire island group.  The Spratly Islands consist of around 175 
identified islands and reefs, scattered over nearly 160, 000 square miles of sea, and are 
claimed at present in their entirety by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam.  Malaysia and the 
Philippines have partial claims.1031  These competing territorial claims are regarded as a 
potential source of conflict in Asia, and there has been a history of military clashes over 
sovereign rights in the region; if continued, these clashes present a threat to regional 
security and the uninterrupted flow of shipping.1032  In addition to China, Southeast Asian 
countries are also dramatically building their military.1033  It would seem an arms race has 
begun in an attempt to contain China’s ambitions in the South China Sea. 
Summary 
A perspective of the significance of an emerging powerful China, which will increasingly 
seek to influence its own sphere of interest and be a player on the international stage, is 
highly relevant.  The impact this strategic shift will have upon the rest of the Asia-Pacific 
region will be seismic, and the defensive strategies of Japan, Taiwan and Australia, in 
particular, must be seriously considered in view of this potential shift of US influence.  The 
relationships that these countries, inter alia, develop with each other, and their attitude 
towards security and defence doctrine, will shape future international relations.  The 
challenges faced by China and the international community are not insurmountable, but will 
require concessions from all parties.1034     
Some observers believe that the US’s customary means of projecting power abroad is 
becoming increasingly obsolete.  Andrew Krepinevich argues that: ‘….the Pentagon is ill-
equipped to counter rising powers such as China….Aircraft carriers, navy destroyers, short-
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range fighter aircraft and forward bases such as Guam and Okinawa are becoming 
increasingly vulnerable to technology and tactics being developed by America’s rivals’.1035  
This observation emphasises the need to develop a system that is capable of delivering 
unsupported combat air power at long range and for long periods.  The role for 
conventional deterrence, including that based upon cruise missiles launched from 
submarines and surface ships, and targeting Chinese military and political installations, will 
continue to be important.  However, the main feature of this conventional deterrence would 
be rather different from that applied to the Soviet Union.  In particular, it will focus upon 
achieving deterrence with the threat of denial, which is, denying China access to its crucial 
SLOC, especially for its imports of oil through the South China Sea and its exports of 
manufactured goods through both the South and the East China Seas.  Friedberg believes 
it is important for the US and its allies, ‘….to maintain a margin of military advantage 
sufficient to deter attempts at coercion or aggression’.1036  As Friedberg points out, ‘[If] 
China continues along its present path, growing richer and stronger but continuing under 
one-party authoritarian rule, it will pose a mounting strategic challenge…this scenario 
demands urgent and sustained attention from American strategists’.1037  It will be important 
for US forces to be able to deny China the capability to exclude the US from these seas; 
essentially, a counter version of China’s A2/AD doctrine.1038   
While this analysis of China’s current foreign policy and military doctrine has not been 
exhaustive, the author considers it adequate to allow analysis of the use of UCAS.  Bearing 
in mind that the purpose of this thesis seeks to analyse the utility of counter-air UCAS in 
future warfare, it is important to examine the context in which these systems may be used.  
The following section analyses the significance of China’s A2/AD doctrine, and how this is 
affecting international relations, and the US’s ability to counter China’s rise.   
China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial Doctrine 
The concept of air and sea forces conducting the majority of battles in any potential conflict 
in the Western Pacific is beginning to gain credence.  The term ‘AirSea’ offers a concept 
designed to maintain a stable military balance in the Western-Pacific, which offsets the 
PLA’s rapidly improving A2/AD capabilities.  This concept recognises that this theatre of 
operations is dominated by naval and air forces and the domains of space and cyberspace 
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– the question is, where do ground forces feature?1039   In a speech to the National 
Defense University in 2010, General Schwartz’s, the USAF Chief of Staff, addressed the 
issue of A2/AD doctrine.  He was clear that the current ‘AirSea’ debate should not be 
focused on any particular threat from China, but rather, it should be viewed in the context of 
any threat attempting to deny access or hinder US forces from operating in any area of 
interest.1040  While this is a rational point of view, the greatest A2/AD threat will come from 
China, although other states, such as Iran, North Korea and India, may also use this 
doctrine, basing their philosophy on Chinese writings and military practices.1041  It is, 
therefore, prudent to examine China’s A2/AD doctrine when analysing the threat to current 
and future US and other national strategic forces.  By doing this, the debate on the utility of 
UCAS can be better informed. 
The US is aligning its strategy and military capabilities, with the aim of mitigating the A2/AD 
threat.  In 2009, Robert Gates, the then US Secretary of Defense, gave an important 
perspective on the direction US investment in military technology is heading: 
.…when considering the military-modernization programs of countries like China, we should 
be concerned less with their potential ability to challenge the U.S. symmetrically— fighter to 
fighter or ship to ship—and more with their ability to disrupt our freedom of movement and 
narrow our strategic options.  Their investments in cyber and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air 
and anti-ship weaponry, and ballistic missiles could threaten America’s primary way to 
project power and help allies in the Pacific—in particular our forward air bases and carrier 
strike groups.  This would degrade the effectiveness of short-range fighters and put more of a 
premium on being able to strike from over the horizon—whatever form that capability might 
take.1042 
Researchers have postulated a potential Chinese strategy for seeking to drive US forces 
out of the Asia-Pacific region, one similar to the Imperial Japanese strategy of 1941-
1942.1043  Following the US, British and Dutch embargo of the supply of oil to Japan and 
the freezing of assets in 1941, Japan was determined to break these restrictions by force, if 
necessary.  A political solution was not forthcoming.  Seventy-five percent of Japan’s 
foreign trade, and 90% of her oil supplies were cut off.  Despite efforts from the US, Britain 
and Holland to negotiate with Japan over its position in China and its partnership with 
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Germany, Japan was persuaded by Germany to take the offensive.1044  Japan’s stance 
over China was pivotal; the US would allow oil shipments from the Dutch East Indies, but 
only if Japan withdraw from China.  Japan was not prepared to do this.1045  According to the 
US Army official history of World War II: ‘In the view of the leaders of Japan, there was no 
honourable choice but war.  The US and Great Britain, they were convinced, were bent on 
destroying Japan or reducing it to a minor power’.1046  Japan had informed the Germans as 
early as the beginning of 1941 that plans were being made for War against the US.1047 
The Japanese mounted a surprise attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941, 
intending to destroy the US Pacific Fleet.  Concurrently, the Japanese Army invaded the 
Philippines and what is now Malaysia, before moving on to Singapore.  Strategically critical 
islands in the South Pacific were also occupied, with India and Australia threatened.1048  
Japan’s intent was to present the Western powers with a fait accompli from an unassailable 
position and sue for peace.  Their strategy was flawed, not least, because Japan was 
unable to maintain control of the air in its sphere of operations.  According to Richard 
Overy, in The Air War: 1939 – 1945, because of the importance of the strategic use of 
aircraft by all sides in the Pacific/China theatre of operations, gaining and maintaining air 
supremacy was essential to the success of the Pacific campaign.1049  Overy writes: 
The Japanese inability to maintain the supremacy temporarily wrested from the Allies in early 
1942, and the Allied determination to build up massive and diversified air power before 
resources for invasion could be diverted from the European theatre, led to the final defeat of 
Japan through blockade and destruction by air.1050 
Although Japan’s strategy was seriously flawed, it taught that no scenario can be totally 
disregarded.  The future possibility of conflict in the Western Pacific does feature in some 
analysts’ assessments.  Henry Kissinger, for example, believes there are comparisons 
between British-German rivalry in the twentieth-century, and between China and the US in 
the twenty-first century.1051  In relation to China and the US, Kissinger observes: 
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An international system is relatively stable if the level of reassurance required by its members 
is achieved by diplomacy.  When diplomacy no longer functions, relationships become 
increasingly concentrated on military strategy – first in the forms of arms races, then as a 
manoeuvring for strategic advantage…, and, finally, in war itself.1052 
The doctrine developed by the US DoD following the Cold War was based on the 
convention that it would be able to deploy and operate its forces from bases comparatively 
unimpeded by adversary threats.1053  These assumptions extended to the operations of 
tactical fighter aircraft, CSG, AAR and ISTAR assets and networks, and all support 
personnel and logistics.  The 1991 Gulf War reinforced these assumptions and contributed 
to the US DoD’s development of a new doctrine based on structuring US forces primarily 
for conducting two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts, for example, in Iraq/Iran and 
Korea.1054  In 2012, the US announced it would be adopting a new strategy, which, ‘… 
commits the Pentagon to being able to fight a single large-scale war while retaining enough 
forces to deter or impose unacceptable costs on an opportunistic aggressor in a second 
region’.1055  Long-range strike was viewed as an initial requirement needed to rapidly halt 
adversary forces; subsequently, short-range tactical aircraft flying from nearby bases in 
relatively permissive operating environments could carry out the majority of strike missions.  
Mark Gunzinger, from CSBA, believes this investment in short-range combat aircraft has 
led to a paucity of investment in long-range strike programmes.1056  Range and persistence 
are now becoming the dominating requirement against adversaries with an A2/AD strategy. 
 
China is developing a capability that could alter the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific 
region and beyond.  Research is on-going into development of a range of systems which 
will allow China’s A2/AD strategy to be realised.1057  China’s ‘Assassin’s Mace’ doctrine, 
aligned with its very real desire to bring back Taiwan within its sphere of influence, is 
having a dramatic effect on the US’s ability to influence policy in the Asia-Pacific region, 
specifically, in the region that China regards as the First Island Chain.  The phrase 
‘Assassin's Mace’ is the English translation of ‘Shasho Jiang’, a term of ancient Chinese 
strategy.  There are, however, a number of different meanings.  The term is used to 
designate a wide array of technologies that might afford an inferior military an advantage in 
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a conflict with a superior military power.1058  Shasho Jiang is not seen as a panacea, but, if 
the correct strategy is used, aligned with the correct timing and conditions, then a superior 
adversary can be defeated.1059   
China’s A2/AD doctrine has been evolving over a number of decades, and increasingly, 
technical and operationally focused discussions are found in a range of Chinese sources, 
suggesting that China may be close to employing an ASBM - a weapon that no other 
country currently possesses.1060  An example of China’s determination to achieve this is the 
recent development of the Dong-Feng DF-21D ASBM (NATO designation: CSS-5), 
modified to sink aircraft carriers.1061  This ASBM is intended to provide the PLA the 
capability to attack ships, including aircraft carriers, in the Western Pacific Ocean.1062  It 
can be argued that this ASBM is a game changer and is fundamental to the strategic shift 
in current US thinking.  Its imminent deployment could restrict US fleet operations to 
outside of the ‘First Island Chain’, drastically limiting US capabilities and influence.  This 
shift in the balance of power in the Western Pacific is fundamental to the type of system 
that will be required to counter China’s forces.1063  Figure 4 below details the ‘two island 
chains’, and a number of potential weapon systems.   
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Figure 4: The First and Second Island Chains, and ranges of weapon systems.1064 
China wants to achieve the ability, or at least the appearance of such an ability, to prevent 
a US CSG from intervening in the event of a future Taiwan Strait crisis.  China has 
designed the DF-21D to be an A2/AD weapon with the specific intent of sinking a US 
aircraft carrier; it appears that the DF-21D has already been tested.1065  Chinese writings 
indicate a near term requirement to keep US CSG at a distance of at least 1100 nm from 
China’s eastern coastline.1066  The deployment of an effective ASBM, such as the DF-21D, 
and part of a matrix of systems, could achieve this objective, profoundly affecting US 
deterrence, military operations and the balance of power in the Western Pacific.  
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The ASBM would be just one of the many new platforms and weapons systems that China 
has been developing since the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.  However, an ASBM such as the 
DF-21D has the potential, well beyond the submarines and Anti-Surface Cruise Missiles 
(ASCM), which China has been adding to its cache of weapons, to create a strategic shock 
among regional allies of the US.  Although in development since 1996, it was not until 
2007, when Chinese rocket artillery and engineering papers were published suggesting that 
the capability was advancing, that the threat was taken seriously.  It was at this point that 
the US started to take notice, and action.1067   
As well as advances in ASBM technology, China is on the verge of achieving a number of 
game-changing developments, including the ability to launch multiple cruise missile attacks, 
robust indigenous satellite navigation, high quality real-time satellite imagery, target-
locating data, and anti-satellite (ASAT) and other space-related weapons.1068  Should 
China wish to prevent access to a contested maritime area in the event of conflict, such 
accomplishments would significantly advance China’s A2/AD capabilities by allowing it to 
threaten the whole gamut of surface- and air-based assets.  
The US government is acutely aware of the threat from the DF-21D.  The 2010 Annual 
Report to Congress does not mince its words:  
China is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile…The missile has a range in excess of 1,500 
[km], is armed with a maneuverable warhead, and when integrated with appropriate 
command and control systems, is intended to provide the PLA with the capability to attack 
ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean.1069   
The report also points out that the PLAN is improving its over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting 
capabilities with new radar systems to support long-range precision strikes, including those 
by ASBM.  The report emphasises China’s intent over Taiwan:   
China’s long-term, comprehensive transformation of its military forces is improving its capacity 
for force projection and anti-access/area-denial.  Consistent with a near-term focus on 
preparing for Taiwan Strait contingencies, China continues to deploy many of its most 
advanced systems to the military regions (MRs) opposite Taiwan.1070 
An effective ASBM and persistent maritime surveillance capability would form part of the 
matrix of capabilities that could prevent the US challenging Chinese use of force against 
Taiwan, ultimately undermining the principles of the Taiwan TRA.  Aligned with the 2010 
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Report to Congress, other US governmental departments believe China’s extensive 
campaign to modernise its military forces is moving forward at an alarming rate.  The 
National Air and Space Intelligence Center’s report on Chinese military-technological 
development, observes:  
China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world.  It 
is developing and testing offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, qualitatively 
upgrading certain missile systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile 
defenses.  China’s ballistic missile force is expanding in both size and types of missiles.  New 
theater missiles continue to be deployed in the vicinity of Taiwan…1071 
In recent years, this build-up has generated some significant new capabilities, all of which 
serve China’s broader strategic and political strategies in the Asian-Pacific region.  The 
2010 Annual Report to Congress warns, ‘China is aggressively pursuing the military 
capabilities necessary to wage and win a short-duration, high-intensity conflict with 
Taiwan—and with the US, should it ever intervene’.1072  A proposed follow-on variant to the 
DF-21D would extend an ASBM’s range to 1500 nm.  Subsequent technological advances 
could extend a conventional precision strike capability out to 4500 nm.  Figure 6 details a 
possible layered ASBM strike architecture.  The extended range of an ASBM would not 
necessarily mean its CEP is worse – the limiting factor would remain the same, finding and 
tracking a target.  
 
Figure 5: Possible layered ASBM strike architecture, with 1000, 2000 and 3000 km range ASBM 
strike assets.1073  
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China’s military strategists have also been evaluating the feasibility of a global conventional 
strike capability as an incremental follow-on to the successful deployment of an initial 
ASBM.  China plans to field a fully functional Precision Global Strike capability by 2025.1074    
In a future Taiwan scenario involving US military intervention, China could reserve the 
option to conduct conventional precision strikes against unhardened facilities that support 
US operations, including facilities in Hawaii, the US, Australia, and elsewhere.1075  These 
conventional systems would also be utilised with the intention of enforcing China’s regional 
sovereignty claims and ensuring the SLOC remain secure.  Ultimately, successful 
deployment of conventional ballistic missiles and other precision strike systems would offer 
China a flexible deterrent.1076  A study from the RAND Corporation explores the outcomes 
of a range of scenarios of a US and Taiwan alliance, against a determined effort by China 
to take Taiwan by force.  The conclusions are emphatic: China will likely have the 
capabilities to achieve its aims, if the appropriate counters are not instigated.1077  China’s 
doctrinal strategy, aligned with the new panoply of weapons, could achieve the desired 
strategic and operational effect, giving China the edge in a contest of wills, or indeed, in an 
actual kinetic confrontation.  The balance of power in the Pacific would radically change. 
Counters to China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial Doctrine 
In January 2009, Secretary of Defence Robert Gates stated: ‘…the Department of Defense 
is making good progress toward developing a number of programs to counter Chinese 
technological advances that could put our carriers at risk.’1078  US military officials have 
stressed that the development of new electronic jammers, a long-range nuclear capable 
bomber, modernised radars for the F-15, and significantly, new sea-borne UCAS will help 
mitigate this threat.1079  It is not certain, however, if these programmes will be successful.  
According to Stokes, the US may need to reassess its capabilities, including different types 
of ships and submarines.  The hardening of US military facilities throughout the Pacific 
region, including Kadena Airbase on Okinawa and facilities on Guam and Hawaii, will also 
need to be seriously considered.1080  Most significantly, long-range UCAS may offer a 
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solution in providing the capability to conduct the full gamut of OCA and strike missions, if 
access is denied to CSG and close land-based assets.  Mark Gunzinger recommends that 
the US, ‘Develop an air-refuelable naval UCAS with at least a 1500 nm combat radius and 
the all-aspect, broadband low-observable characteristics required to survive in the face of 
advanced air defense networks…’.1081  Krepinevich also argues that: ‘To avoid operational 
irrelevance, carriers should reduce their reliance on short-range manned aircraft in favor of 
much longer-range unmanned aircraft...’.1082  Significantly, these proposed UCAS will not 
be able to conduct the full gamut of counter-air roles. 
China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Development 
An ASBM system, if developed and deployed successfully, would be the world’s first 
weapons system capable of targeting a moving CSG, at sufficient range to severely curtail 
any current aircraft carrier’s effectiveness.  This could pose a new type of threat to the USN 
and other navies; the US has not had decades to tackle this new challenge.  Even if 
capable of doing so, if the US was to target these ASBM and supporting C4ISTAR 
infrastructure, with strikes in mainland China, the reaction would be incalculable.1083  
China has prioritised ballistic missile (BM) development for decades, enjoys an impressive 
science and technology base, and will likely continue to dedicate considerable resources to 
ASBM development.  The DF-21D challenges the technological superiority the US has 
maintained in carrier-borne capabilities for decades; this technological superiority is the 
foundation of the US’s military dominance in the Western Pacific.1084  The DF-21D can be 
launched in the general direction of a US Navy CSG , and while in flight, adjust course to 
directly target an aircraft carrier, or other selected sea-borne targets.  This ability to alter 
course during flight is a significant technological evolution.  No current Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) defence system has an acceptable probability of intercepting a BM that can 
significantly alter its course during flight.  This capability gives the DF-21D its advantage 
against existing US ABM defence systems.1085  ABM are launched near the intended flight-
path of a BM; when the ABM is within a predetermined distance from the BM, the terminal 
guidance and detection system of the ABM should be able to detect and intercept it.  
However, because the DF-21D alters course at high altitude and detects its target after 
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launch, the calculations sent to an ABM defence system would be incorrect.  It will be 
extremely difficult for any current ABM defence system to detect and defeat the DF-21D 
ASBM.1086 
The diagram below appeared in a 2006 article from the PLA’s Second Artillery College.  It 
describes in very simple terms the guidance and trajectory laws used by an ASBM.  There 
is nothing particularly revelatory with this concept, however, achieving effectiveness is 
another question all together. 
 
Figure 6: Missile flight trajectory with terminal guidance showing an ASBM’s use of midcourse and 
terminal guidance to strike an aircraft carrier.1087 
Indicators of successful development of the DF-21D include the recent launch of five 
Yaogan satellites – these would offer significantly better coverage of critical areas along 
China’s maritime area of interest.  Another indication is a news release from the China 
Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation (CASIC) citing Wang Genbin, Deputy Director 
of its 4th Department, stating: ‘the DF-21D can hit slow-moving targets with a CEP of 
dozens of meters.’1088  It is likely that when the successful development of the DF-21D is 
complete, China would reveal a test, attempting to influence opinion in the US, Taiwan, 
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Japan, and elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific.1089  In an interview to a Japanese newspaper, 
Admiral Robert Willard, commander of US Pacific Command stated, ‘To our knowledge, 
[the DF-21D] has undergone repeated tests, and it is probably very close to being 
operational’.1090  The Washington Times also reports that China conducted a long-range 
missile test on 25 September 2010.1091 
As with many military doctrinal and capability developments, the deterrent effect of merely 
possessing the means of denying access could achieve the desired strategic aims.  Some 
Chinese writers believe that even the significant likelihood of a capability, may have a 
substantial deterrent effect.  The ASBM is envisaged primarily as a deterrent weapon by 
Chinese analysts; to many this makes it inherently defensive in nature.  An editorial, in 
Global Times, gives an insight into the philosophies of the Chinese media.  The editorial 
advocated China’s need for powerful ASBM and other carrier-destroying measures.  
Significantly, it emphasised the requirement for deterrence, and the need to publicise the 
capability: 
China has never pursued a policy of confrontation with other world powers, including the US.  
However, it does need a strategic deterrence.  In a bid to protect its own strategic interests, 
China should not only build its anti-ship missile capacity, but also possess a range of other 
carrier-destroying measures as well....Since US aircraft carrier battle groups in the Pacific 
constitute deterrence against China’s strategic interests, China has to possess the capacity to 
counterbalance.…Such capacity could inhibit US thoughts of keeping China in check through 
aircraft carriers, and therefore greatly reduce the possibility of confrontation between the 
People's Liberation Army and US military forces in the Western Pacific.…An external anxiety 
over China’s development of its military is somewhat understandable.  The greater strategic 
deterrence China possesses, the more cautious it should be in using force.  China should 
carefully explore how to present its deterrence.  This is a new subject for China….To end 
“speculation” by Western intelligence agencies…China ought to convince the international 
community of its reliable carrier-killing capacity as soon as possible…1092 
The sequence of events required for any BM to successfully engage and destroy or disable 
a target is known as the ‘Kill Chain’.  All parts of this are required to work; if any one part 
should fail, the objective will not be achieved.  For a moving target, such as a ship, the task 
is significantly more difficult.  The essential core of this capability is a missile-borne sensing 
and data processing system, supported by an initial cueing from a surveillance network, 
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which would include, inter alia, UAS, OTH radar and satellites.1093  According to the 2010 
Annual Report to Congress, the PLAN is improving its OTH targeting capability with Sky 
Wave and Surface Wave OTH radars.  OTH radars can be used in conjunction with 
imagery satellites to assist in detecting targets at great distances from China’s shores to 
support long-range precision strikes, including by ASBM.1094  As well as OTH radars, China 
has also been working on a sophisticated network of ground- and space-based sensors, 
including electronic signals detection equipment, which can assist ASBM detection and 
targeting.  Chinese UCAS survivable in highly contested airspace could also be used to 
assist third-party-targeting systems.  It is also likely decoy UAS would be used as decoys; 
the aim would be to exhaust AAM and SAM stocks.  These decoys could also use EA 
systems.1095  Active radar is the most likely ASBM sensor, for the ‘track’ part of the kill 
chain.  The largest reflection would normally be the largest ship, usually an aircraft carrier.  
However, as with any radar-based sensor, deception techniques could be used to fool the 
ASBM into believing it was targeting a carrier.1096  EA techniques are extensively used to 
counter AAM, SAM, and all forms of radar.  However, counters to EA techniques are 
always being developed.1097   
Chinese PLA writings emphasise coordination and precision as being vital for deterring and 
blocking enemy CSG.  Locating sea targets is also stressed, with real-time target 
intelligence being critical, with the use of military reconnaissance satellites, domestic and 
foreign remote sensing satellites, and established satellite reconnaissance target image 
information processing systems, being considered paramount.1098  Developments in access 
to foreign satellite navigation-positioning systems, such as the Russian Glosnast and US 
GPS, increase the accuracy of Chinese BM and other weapon systems.  The development 
of a viable independent system, Beidou, could allow access to a reliable source of 
navigation accuracy during a conflict scenario.  China’s current four-satellite Beidou-1 
constellation, deployed in 2007, is limited to supporting operations on China’s near 
maritime border and is accurate to within approximately 20 m – not enough for precision 
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strike targeting.1099  To reliably support wider operations, China is deploying a 35-satellite 
(5 geostationary, 30 medium earth orbit) constellation—Beidou-2/Compass—which would 
provide much-improved accuracy, with global navigation coverage by 2015-20.1100   
US military commanders and politicians are increasingly giving their candid views on the 
subject of ASBM.  During a speech to North Carolina ROTC students on 29 September 
2010, Secretary of Defence Robert Gates emphasised the need to factor ASBM 
development into future carrier operations: 
If the Chinese or somebody else has a highly accurate anti-ship cruise or ballistic missile that 
can take out a carrier at hundreds of miles of ranges and therefore in Asia puts us back 
behind the second island chain, how then do you use carriers differently in the future than 
we’ve used them in the past?…I’m trying to get people to think about how do we use [carriers] 
in a world environment where other countries will have the capability, between their missile 
capabilities and their satellite capabilities, to knock out a carrier if you get to a certain point… 
within range.1101 
Gate’s speech is clear.  How seriously the US takes the development of the DF-21D is 
evident in the US Navy’s fundamental revolution in its development of ABM defences.  The 
USN's defence against this type of threat has continued to rely on the strategy of defence in 
depth.  Guns were replaced in the late fifties by the first generation of guided missiles in 
ships and aircraft.  By the late sixties, it was recognised that reaction time, firepower, and 
operational availability in all environments did not match the threat.  As a result, an 
operational requirement for an Advanced Surface Missile System (ASMS) was promulgated 
and a comprehensive engineering development programme was initiated to meet that 
requirement.  ASMS was renamed AEGIS (after the mythological shield of Zeus) in 
December 1969.1102  The concern defence analysts have regarding the future of the aircraft 
carrier in the 21st century is due, in large part, to the game-changing nature of the 
development of the DF-21D.  The acceleration of plans regarding the capabilities of the 
AEGIS weapon system is largely owing to recognition that current systems are not capable 
of addressing this threat.  The DF-21D and US AEGIS ABM defence system represents the 
first major offensive/defensive military capability arms race of the 21st century.1103  Gates 
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authorised increased investment in weapon systems to counter the growing potential threat 
posed by China’s advanced aircraft and missiles.1104 
Although deterrence would seem to be a clear purpose of any ASBM development, there 
are a number of questions regarding its operating doctrine: how would an ASBM be used to 
deter?  How would the US respond to this?  How would the US know it was a warning shot 
and not just a miss?  There is a well-founded fear that China’s military transformation, 
aligned with a perceived lack of coherent doctrine, may lead to mismanagement of any 
crisis scenario.  Ultimately, how robust is China’s ability to risk-manage, without threatening 
an escalation in tension, with unpredictable results?1105  
Summary 
China is intent on fielding a capability that could weaken the capacity of the US to assist 
Taiwan in a conflict scenario.  While open source reporting indicates that ASBM production 
has begun and has indeed been tested, it cannot be confirmed when an ASBM will be 
operationally available.  Western intelligence agencies should, however, be able to monitor 
Chinese developments, including any ASBM testing, pending any formal declaration by 
China.  China’s deployment of an ASBM capability could change the strategic balance in 
the Asia-Pacific region.  The PRC’s goal is to create the conditions for Taiwan’s unification 
on satisfactory terms, in which regard the US is viewed as the principle remaining hurdle to 
unification.  As well as a real Chinese capability to prevent the US’s capacity to intervene in 
a future crisis, the perception would be created within Taiwan of US weakness.1106  It is 
unlikely that China would use ASBM in isolation.  ASBM would be backed by a maritime 
surveillance network, theatre BM and extended range cruise missiles, designed to be 
launched from both conventional and nuclear-powered attack submarines.  These could 
operate in conjunction with submarines, conventional naval aviation, and EA assets.  
Follow-on ASBM variants are likely to strain the ability of US ABM defences, unless 
fundamental initiatives are taken to develop an anti-ASBM system, capable of negating this 
type of threat.  Forced to operate out of range of these ASBM, the effectiveness of carrier-
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based assets, such as the F/A-18E/F, would be even more limited than they already are, 
when forced to fight at greater ranges than in the past.1107   
China’s A2/AD doctrine gives China a strategic advantage, and it appears increasingly 
confident of its ability to deny US CSG the ability to intervene in a Taiwan scenario.  Overall 
US qualitative and numerical superiority is of limited relevance.  First, the platforms most 
likely to be employed by the US are those that are based within immediate striking distance 
from Chinese weapon systems at the outbreak of conflict; here China inherently enjoys the 
advantage.  Second, aircraft sent to the Asia-Pacific region require bases from which to 
operate; US regional options are limited geographically and politically, and are vulnerable 
to Chinese attack.  Indeed, China need not keep pace with Western technologically to have 
a huge influence.1108  If China’s intent on fielding a system that directly threatens US 
carriers is not neutralised, the US military alliances and reassurances which have helped 
maintain peace in the Western Pacific since World War II would be severely weakened; an 
arms race would inevitably ensue, if it has not already.  It is probable that China does not 
plan to attack US forces, but to deter them.  China states that it wants to protect its 
fundamental territorial interests and to ensure a stable environment for economic 
development.  If ASBM are ultimately developed, China would hope to prevent US 
projection of military power in circumstances that are hostile to China’s security interests.  
Yet ASBM development for this purpose is complex.  China has demonstrated an ASBM 
intent, if not capability, with substantial tensions certainly now developing.  Unless China is 
willing to open a dialogue regarding its intentions, it will be essential for governments in 
Taiwan, Japan, the US, and other affected states, to force multi-lateral debate, failing 
which, to respond with appropriate measures.  Krepinevich perhaps best sums up the US 
dilemma: 
The implications of these efforts are clear. East Asian waters are slowly but surely becoming 
another potential no-go zone for U.S. ships, particularly for aircraft carriers, which carry short-
range strike aircraft that require them to operate well within the reach of the PLA'S A2/AD 
systems if they want [to] remain operationally relevant. The large air bases in the region that 
host the U.S. Air Force's short-range strike aircraft and support aircraft are similarly under 
increased threat. All thus risk becoming wasting assets.1109   
As Eric Gons points out in his PhD thesis, ‘If forced to operate outside 1,500 km, naval 
aviation will not be able to contribute heavily to the counter-air effort. And if using USAF 
                                                          
1107 Bill Sweetman, 'Antiship Missiles Engage Diverse Targets', Aviation Week: Defense Technology 
International, 6 May 2009, 
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=dti&id=news/ANTI050609.xml, 
(accessed 29 September 2010). 
1108 Erickson, 'China's Evolving Anti-Access Approach', pp.5-7. 
1109 Krepinvech, op. cit., p.23. 
240 
 
tankers, USN aircraft will be displacing USAF aircraft tailored more specifically to the air 
superiority mission’.1110  The strategic balance is changing; there is a requirement for 
systems that counter this emerging threat.  There is also a requirement for extended range 
and endurance air platforms; UCAS could form part of the required matrix for gaining and 
maintaining control of the air in the Asia-pacific region, thereby fulfilling the air domain’s 
part of the ‘AirSea’ contract, and acting as a deterrent.  The US’s aircraft procurement 
strategy acknowledges the significance of anti-access threats, which, ‘…could impede the 
deployment of U.S. forces to a conflict and blunt the operations of those forces that do 
deploy forward’.1111  The US Navy, in particular, with its Next Generation Air Dominance 
(NGAD) aircraft study, is cognisant of the issues; it is looking at replacing the F/A-18E/F 
and F-35 with, ‘…a new manned or unmanned platform or a combination of both’.1112   
Aircraft carriers are widely seen as exemplars of technological prowess and military 
dominance.  The US, in particular, has supremacy in the number of carriers and support 
ships its navy possesses, with 11 CSG currently available.1113  These CSG form the 
foundation for US rapid response and power projection and, inter alia, deterrence.  What 
happens if these CSG are forced to stay outside of range of adversary attack systems?  
What if countries, such as China, establish doctrine that aims to make it so costly to an 
adversary to commit forces within its sphere of influence that their mighty military systems 
become so ineffective? 
When viewed in a conflict scenario in which an adversary has an A2/AD strategy, some of 
the counter-air maxims generally assumed may be invalidated, such as the capability to 
operate from close bases and aircraft carriers.1114  In the case of China, it is building up its 
forces and establishing doctrine and procedures to enforce such a policy.  Chinese threats 
to CSG include ASBM, submarines equipped with torpedoes and extremely capable 
ASCM, plus aircraft carrying ASCM.  China can also threaten air bases with short-range 
ballistic missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and land- and air-launched cruise 
missiles.  Ultimately, it may be feasible that large, sophisticated Chinese air, naval and 
missile forces can mass against a relatively small number of US CSG and air bases in the 
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Western Pacific.  In this context, the efficacy of UCAS gaining control of the air demands 
thorough scrutiny. 
Iran 
While the significance of the Western Pacific will continue to test the foreign and military 
policies of the US, its allies and others, the importance of the Middle East in international 
affairs is also obvious.  Two factors drive tensions in the region - oil, and separately, Israel, 
and its relationship with other Middle East states.  Within this Middle East context, Iran 
poses the greatest potential threat to Western interests, either acting as a destabilising 
influence in the region, or interfering with trade.  The use of proxies, such as Hezbollah, 
and interference with Iraq’s political processes, are examples of Iran’s willing to influence 
other Middle East states.  Iran’s nuclear programme is the most vexing concern of the 
international community.  This, with Iran’s emerging A2/AD strategy, is causing the most 
angst. 
Iran and Israel have not always been so antagonistic towards each other.  The rise of 
fundamentalists, such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has changed Iran’s view of Israel, and is 
seen as the main driver for Israeli concern.1115  At writing Ahmadinejad, was the president 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran; Ahmadinejad is certainly not opposed to stoking the flames 
with his provocative rhetoric regarding the US, its allies, in particular, Israel.1116  Domestic 
instability within a number of Middle East states is creating further anxiety.  The events of 
2011-2013 have highlighted the fragility of some Middle East regime’s existence, and the 
inherent instability in this region.  At the time of writing, the situation in Syria remains 
unresolved; it demonstrates the difficulties in orchestrating agreement within the UN’s 
Security Council, and the limits of military power, against an adversary with a well-
organised military, particularly a highly effective IADS.1117  Even if concerned nations chose 
to take direct action, interdiction in Syria would possibly cause a reaction by that country 
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and Iran, which would threaten to embroil the rest of the Middle East and consequently, the 
US and its allies.1118 
Natural resources feature in the power plays between potential antagonists.1119  The 
importance which oil plays in the politics of this part of the world is fundamental to how 
much outside states desire, or are prepared to become involved in, keeping the status quo, 
or deterring any unreasonable actions by belligerent states.1120  Access to water is also a 
vital area of concern in the Middle East, and a cause of friction, with potential for conflict.  
Llan Berman and Paul Wihbey, writing in The Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political 
Studies, examined the increasing crisis over water in the Middle East:  
….water resources are plummeting.  While representing 5% of the total world population, the 
Middle East & North Africa (MENA) region contains only 0.9% of global water resources.  The 
number of water-scarce countries in the region has risen from 3 in 1955 (Bahrain, Jordan and 
Kuwait) to 11 by 1990 (with the inclusion of Algeria, Israel and the Occupied Territories, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen).  Another 7 are 
anticipated to join the list by 2025 (Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Libya, Morocco, Oman and Syria).1121 
Although access to oil and the shortage of water will remain potential conflict points, it is the 
Iranian dynamic, which is likely to remain the West’s focus for some time.  Iran is a rising 
power in the Middle East and a long-term challenge to US regional interests.  The ruling 
elite within Iran perceive it as the natural leading power of the region, even of the Muslim 
World.  Although Iranians are Persians, not Arabs, they certainly see themselves as the 
superior peoples in the Middle East.  Graham Fuller, in The Center of the Universe: The 
Geopolitics of Iran, writes:  
Every Persian knows that there has been a Persia for nearly three millennia.  The historical 
personality is deeply rooted.  Persians have no doubt that Persia is a superior culture – far 
superior to the Arabs whom Persians historically perceived as crass Bedouin of the desert, 
“eaters of lizards”, lazy and unversed in the ways of civilization…1122 
Iran’s sense of pride and importance is influenced by a number of factors, not least its 
feelings of victimisation and insecurity arising from historical exploitation by outside powers.  
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This perception is still an important issue in determining and driving Iran’s strategic doctrine 
and view of its place in the world.1123  Britain, and France to a lesser extent, are considered 
Iran’s original nemesis; this is largely due to the part that both countries played in dividing 
the Middle East up after World War I, and British interests in Iranian oil reserves.1124  Iran 
now views the US and Israel as its main adversaries, and as threats to the regime’s 
survival.1125  Iran may see itself as the dominant force in the Middle East, however, Saudi 
Arabia’s role in the region is fundamental, and its significance to the stability of the global 
economy is essential to how future international relations will develop.  Conversely, Saudi 
Arabia views its status as the Middle East’s centre of power and influence, and its relations 
with Iran as a likely flashpoint.  Growing tensions over Iran’s nuclear programme, and the 
elimination of Iraq as the main regional counterbalance, guides Saudi Arabia’s relations 
with Iran.1126   
Iran was traditionally ruled by a dynasty of Shahs (King of kings, or Emperor), with the last 
being Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, from 1941 to 1979.1127  The 1979 revolution resulted in a 
referendum, with 97 percent Iranians supporting the establishment of an Islamic 
Republic.1128  The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran was finalised after the 1979 
revolution.  It stipulates that Iran is an Islamic Republic and that the teachings of Islam are 
the basis of all political, social, and economic relations.  Constitutionally, the Supreme 
Leader has overall authority; he is chosen by the Assembly of Experts, an elected body of 
83 religious scholars.  Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the current Supreme Leader, is the 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, having ultimate decisions on military matters.  
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The Constitution provides for a President to act as Chief Executive for a term of four 
years.1129   
The Iranian political and domestic system is one in which the informal outdoes the formal, 
power and influence derive as much from personality as from position.  Since the death of 
Khomeini, a number of key individuals have dominated the political elite in Iran, the first and 
foremost being Ayatollah Khamenei.1130  Khamenei is the most powerful and influential 
individual in Iran, and while tacitly supporting Ahmadinejad with his stance against the US 
and the West, will only do so as long as the risks of confrontation are contained.1131   
The 2009 Iranian presidential election and its aftermath proved to be a seminal event in the 
political evolution of the Islamic Republic.  Perceived as a rigged election by the opposition, 
widespread protests resulted.  The unrest upset an already unstable balance between 
advocates of the Constitution, with those who believed that the Islamic character of the 
regime is sacrosanct.1132  Ahmadinejad’s handling of the economy and sanctions have not 
helped.1133  Mark Lynch, in The Arab Uprising, views, ‘Iran’s botched 2009 elections [as] 
the single greatest reason for its declining appeal to an Arab public that defined 
antidemocratic regimes as the enemy’.1134  The opposition’s position within Iranian society 
has not diminished.  The nature of the opposition in Iran contains elements that oppose the 
Presidency of Ahmadinejad, the rule of Ayatollah Khamenei as Supreme Leader, and the 
system of clerical rule as a whole.  The regime’s somewhat benign reaction against the 
opposition has produced a fragile stability; however, this is likely to be severely stressed in 
the coming years.1135  At writing, Iran’s 2013 elections were being conducted, the results of 
these are not commented on.  
Iran has traditionally played a critical role in the Middle East, pushing rivalries with key 
states and extending support to others.  Its influence is based on oil and gas wealth, its 
large population, its relatively substantial armed forces and aggressive, but effective, state 
security services.  Its own perceived strength also means it is prepared to interfere with 
                                                          
1129 For a background on the Iranian leadership, see generally Thaler and others, op. cit. 
1130 ibid., p. xiii. 
1131 For an examination of the political leadership in Iran, see Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and 
Results of Revolution, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, pp.329-331. 
1132 Prof. Amin Saikal, 'The Roots of Iran's Election Crsis', Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 51, no. 5, 
2009, p.91. 
1133 Alizera Nader, 'Influencing Iran's Decisions on the Nuclear Program', in Sanctions, Statecraft and 
Nuclear Proliferation, Etel Solingen (ed), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p.224. 
1134 Mark Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East, New York: Public 
Affairs, 2012, p.205.  As previously defined, Iranians are not Arabs, but Persians, however, Arab peoples, 




other states’ domestic politics.1136  Iran has extremely close ties with Syria’s Assad regime 
and the Lebanese Shi’a party, Hezbollah, and some influence with Palestinian groups such 
as Hamas.  Iran and Syria are most certainly close allies, with Syria acting as a conduit for 
weapons, funding and training for Iranian-backed militant groups, such as Hezbollah.1137  
Iran’s influence in the area and the wider Arab world is based largely on its religious and 
cultural links with Shi’a alliances.  Always present, tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
means it is possible that Iran’s Shi’a majority may align with, or encourage Saudi’s Shi’a 
minority to rise up, particularly if provoked by an attack from Israel, for example.1138  
Protests by Saudi’s Shi’a minority in November 2011 highlighted the effect that the 2011 
‘Arab Spring’ has had in many Middle East countries.1139  The events of 2011 have 
highlighted the limits of US influence and increased Israel’s isolation.  If the protests that 
resulted in the overthrow of governments in the Middle East in 2011 spread to Saudi 
Arabia, it is almost certain that the West will need to react, drawing in other Middle Eastern 
states, including Iran.1140  It is likely that, longer-term, Iran fears the emergence of stable, 
moderate Arab states, which could threaten its influence.  Under conditions of slow change 
or prolonged chaos, however, Iran should be able to influence events in its favour, which is 
a concern to some US and Israeli analysts.1141   
Iran’s Nuclear Programme 
The UK’s DCDC believe that: ‘Iran is likely to become the most powerful state in the Middle 
East, although her rise to prominence will be contested…[Iran] is likely to shed her pariah 
status and be treated with degree of realpolitik by the international community’.1142  This 
may be difficult to envisage at present, but is not an unreasonable analysis, when Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions, and the reasons for them, are considered.  It is Iran’s nuclear 
programme, which is currently focusing the international community.  Many Middle East 
states are also concerned about Iran’s nuclear programme.  If Iran successfully acquires a 
nuclear weapons capability, then other states in the region may decide that they also need 
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to develop or acquire such weapons as a counterbalance.  Although its nuclear programme 
is, according to Iran, solely for peaceful purposes, this is contested by the US, Europe, 
Israel and others.   
Whether Iran requires nuclear reactors for power generation is debatable, however, the fact 
remains, under international law, it is perfectly entitled to have these for peaceful 
purposes.1143  Unclassified evidence that Iran has a nuclear weapons programme has been 
sparse.  Nonetheless, in November 2011, experts from the International Atomic Energy 
Agency presented convincing evidence that Iran is exploring ways to build a nuclear 
weapon.  They confirmed that Iran has enough fissile material to build four nuclear bombs 
should it further enrich the uranium in its stockpiles.  The report concluded that Iran is 
researching how to construct a nuclear weapon, but is not actively building one.1144   
In December 2011, Leon Panetta, the US Defense Secretary, stated that Iran could build a 
nuclear weapon in less than a year, prompting speculation about an imminent military 
strike.  This has obviously not happened, but importantly, indicating the measures the US 
was prepared to take, Panetta warned that the US was ready to use all options: ‘..we have 
to keep all options on the table…clearly there are those areas that for us are red 
lines.  Number one, we cannot allow them to develop a nuclear weapon…’.1145  In 2010, in 
testimony to the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, William Burns, the Deputy 
Secretary of State probably best espoused the US stance: 
A great deal is at stake, for all of us. A nuclear-armed Iran would severely threaten the 
security and stability of a part of the world crucial to our interests and to the health of the 
global economy. It would seriously undermine the credibility of the United Nations and other 
international institutions, and seriously weaken the nuclear nonproliferation regime at precisely 
the moment when we are seeking to strengthen it. These risks are only reinforced by the wider 
actions of the Iranian leadership, particularly its longstanding support for violent terrorist 
groups like Hizballah and Hamas; its opposition to Middle East peace; its repugnant rhetoric 
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about Israel, the Holocaust, 9/11, and so much else; and its brutal repression of its own 
citizens.1146 
Michael Herzog, a Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and 
former Chief of Staff to Israel’s Minister of Defence, emphasised Israel’s position:  
Israel perceives a nuclear Iran as a potentially existential threat.  The possible combination of 
extreme Islamism, a messianic leadership calling to “wipe Israel off the map” and nuclear 
weapons, is deeply sobering…A nuclear Iran will overshadow the calculations of regional 
actors, trigger a regional nuclear arms race, destroy the non-proliferation treaty, and increase 
the danger of miscalculation towards a nuclear crisis.1147   
The greatest concern in the near term would be that an unstable Iranian-Israeli nuclear 
rivalry could emerge, with a significant risk that either side would launch a first strike on the 
other, despite the consequences.  Over the longer term, Saudi Arabia and other states in 
the Middle East might pursue their own nuclear capabilities, raising the possibility of a 
highly unstable regional nuclear arms race.1148  However, this may not cause the effect that 
some predict; nuclear proliferation has not generally been as widespread as initially 
forecast.1149  For example, North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons has not pushed 
Japan to obtain any, at least yet.  However, if this type of arms race ensued, it would be 
fundamentally different from the Cold War, when deterrence was essentially based 
between two states, the Soviet Union and the US.  The interaction among three or more 
nuclear-armed powers would be more susceptible to miscalculation and escalation than a 
bipolar confrontation.  Multi-polar systems are generally considered less stable, where 
situations can change quickly, upsetting the status quo.1150   
Some analysts believe that there is the possibility that Iran might become less hostile 
towards Israel and the US, if it had its own nuclear deterrent.1151  Others argue that Iran 
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does not regard nuclear weapons as crucial to its survival.1152  There is also an argument 
that if Iran were to get nuclear weapons, the situation should be manageable.  It is 
advocated that if clear no-cross lines were established with Iran and if contravened, 
retaliation would result.  While this strategy worked during the Cold War, it is questionable if 
Iran would follow the same norms.  Eric Edelman and others, from RAND, view this attitude 
as, ‘…far too sanguine…it rests on the questionable assumptions that possessing nuclear 
weapons induces caution and restraint, [and] that other nations in the Middle East would 
balance against Iran rather than bandwagon with it…’.1153  Conversely, it is also reasoned 
that Iran’s antipathy toward the US and Israel is so strong and so central to its leaders’ 
legitimacy, that Iran will become more hostile once it has a nuclear arsenal, regardless of 
the consequences.1154  Perhaps the greatest fear is that it is probable that the US, and its 
allies, would lose authority internationally, possibly even encouraging action by potential 
belligerent states and terrorist organisations.1155  
Is the perceived view that the Iran leadership is so fanatical that it would use its nuclear 
arsenal outside the norms of self-defence and deterrence?  Shashank Joshi, from RUSI, 
does not believe so, citing the examples of the Soviet Union and China, both of whom have 
a history of mass extermination against their own population, and other non-democratic 
actions, yet managed, and continue to manage, their nuclear deterrents within international 
norms.1156  According to Dr Jonathan Eyal, Director of International Security Studies at 
RUSI: ‘…the debate about deterring a nuclear Iran is much more about the West and the 
risks it wishes to take, rather than about the price the country's neighbours may be required 
to pay…and the measures they may take to deal with the situation’.1157  Eyal agrees with 
other analysts that it likely to become a multi-sided issue, in which each state has a 
different perception of threats and the resulting calculation of risk.1158  Is this view too 
optimistic?  Henning Duus, in Comparative Strategy, argues that a nuclear Iran would 
present the West with, ‘[an] unprecedented asymmetrical threat’.1159  Duus’s point is that 
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Iran may use its nuclear deterrent, not as has traditionally been the case between the West 
and Russia or China, but within the context of a religious fulfilment of God’s will.1160  On the 
other hand, Ray Takeyh, in Hidden Iran, believes that, ‘…Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons 
does not stem from irrational ideological postulations, but from a judicious attempt to craft a 
viable deterrent posture against a range of threats’.1161  Takeyh argues that Iran is merely 
attempting to gain a position with nuclear weapons that will allow it to prevent attacks, such 
as chemical weapons used by Iraq in the 1980s; Israel, he believes, is not part of Iran’s 
motivation.1162  Peter Jones, writing in The Nonproliferation Review, has a different view; he 
argues there, ‘…are many reasons why Iran’s elite groups may pursue a nuclear program, 
even at great cost. These reasons include: internal political wrangling for power among the 
different factions; national and regional prestige; and the opportunity for vast corruption that 
accompanies any large program…’.1163 
There is a view that Iran does not require nuclear weapons in order to achieve its aims.  
Robert Baer believes, ‘…the Iranians see a nuclear bomb as nice to have but not crucial to 
their survival’.1164  Baer views as odd that the West seems to be ignoring Iran’s 
conventional weapons development, and is blinded by the worst-case scenario.1165  Some 
experts believe that Iran will very soon be able to ‘break out’, that is make a dash to enrich 
enough weapons grade uranium for a nuclear device.1166  Whether this is the case, or not, 
perhaps the antipathy towards Iran’s obtainment of nuclear weapons requires realignment.   
Negotiating with Iran is a complex task.  Diplomacy will be absolutely crucial to any solution 
to Iran’s nuclear position, whatever sanctions, or indeed force, is used.1167  A growing 
realisation that it may not be possible to prevent Iran obtaining nuclear weapons has 
caused an audit of other options.  One may be a containment strategy of extended 
deterrence.  In July 2009, the US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, suggested, ‘…the US 
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could extend “a defense umbrella over the region”’.1168  This policy could be immensely 
expensive, however, and would not necessarily be successful.   
Sanctions 
The US and other countries have applied a number of sanctions, attempting to force Iran 
into giving up its nuclear weapons ambition, but so far to no avail.1169  US sanctions over 
the last 30 years have limited Iran’s ability to dominate the region, but they have singularly 
failed to influence leadership choices, or indeed, prevent the development of a nuclear 
programme.  Indeed, some analysts believe that sanctions could backfire, and actually 
cause further intransigence.1170  Russia and China are reluctant to support an increase in 
further sanctions.  China remains opposed to economic sanctions that could harm its own 
economic interests, particularly its access to Iranian oil and gas.  Are economic sanctions 
actually working?  GDP per captia has fallen from US $4,589 in March 2011, to $3,366 in 
March 2013.  However, some analysts believe that this is in part due to internal issues, and 
any change in Iran’s nuclear position will not improve the economic situation.1171  Indeed, 
there is a belief that the current sanctions benefit the regime, while weakening those whom 
support reform.1172  Robert Hunter, a former US Ambassador to NATO, currently a senior 
advisor at the RAND Corporation, believes that sanctions, ‘…undercut, politically, elements 
in Iran which would like the regime to change course.  This is thus a time-buying option, 
with little realistic chance of working’.1173 
Iran’s Strategy 
Iran is pragmatic – it knows it cannot win a head-to-head war with Israel or the US.  Yet it 
believes it can influence its own hegemony in the region by attempting to deny the safe 
access of shipping through the Arabian Gulf, and by making support bases unsafe from 
which to operate.  Iran cannot win a military conflict with the US, but it can gain leverage by 
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threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz.1174  This would have a detrimental effect on the 
supply of oil, with 35% of the world’s seaborne oil, and a total of 20% passing through the 
Strait of Hormuz.1175  Iran does not have a range of weapons capable of denying access 
totally.  However, it does not need to, as by simply mining parts of the Strait of Hormuz, or 
threatening to do so, it would likely deter most civilian shipping.  Added to this, Iran could 
threaten to use its BM, ASCM, and other military assets, such as manned fast-boats and 
jet-skis, midget and diesel attack submarines and low-signature UAV, to target any 
shipping within reach.1176  Although lacking targeting accuracy, these would still likely 
create enough doubt, forcing huge efforts to counter this threat.  Iran’s ability to fight an 
asymmetric war could push the US into taking major military action, which would escalate 
tensions, at the very least.1177  Andrew Krepinevich judges, ‘…that the Persian Gulf…could 
become a no-go zone for the U.S. Navy’.1178  In effect, Iran’s doctrine is an AD/A2 strategy.  
While airfields in allied states, such as the United Arab Emirates, could be utilised to 
support US backed operations against Iran, should these be targeted or civilian centres 
threatened with retaliation, then maritime forces, or bases further away from the centre of 
gravity than initially planned, may be the only viable option from which to launch operations.  
The US is currently focused on China’s A2/AD threat, but it also needs to address Iran’s 
emerging A2/AD strategy.  According to Mark Gunzinger from CSBA, ‘Iran is pursuing 
capabilities that would allow it to deter, delay, or prevent timely US operations in the 
Persian Gulf, giving Iran the breathing room it would need to commit acts of aggression or 
coercion in the region’.1179  While Iran may currently lack the military capability to execute 
such a strategy effectively, its efforts strongly suggest its objective is to acquire such 
capabilities as quickly as possible.  To counter such threats would require the same 
capabilities required to counter China’s A2/AD doctrine.  Gunzinger and Douherty consider, 
‘Future air dominance systems may very well include a large aircraft more akin to a true 
“fighter-bomber” that possesses the capability to operate over longer ranges and carry 
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significant payloads of air-to-air missiles, anti-radiation air-to-surface missiles…and 
possibly [DEW]’.1180    
Potential Military Action 
Whether the US conducts strikes or Israel acts unilaterally anytime soon, or a coalition 
does in the future, will undoubtedly have repercussions throughout the Middle East, and 
further afield.  If this happens, it is highly likely Iran’s reactions would include an 
asymmetric campaign against any state that it deemed an aggressor.1181  Israel’s 
acceptance of the ‘nuclear’ Iran is highly unlikely.  Israel sees its ‘nuclear deterrent’, not in 
the traditional sense that the West and the Soviet Union saw theirs during the Cold War, 
but more as a barricade, that it can hide behind, enabling it to conduct its military policies at 
will.1182  Even if Israel were to conduct a unilateral strike against Iran’s nuclear 
infrastructure, it might set the programme back, but probably only for a short period.  The 
US is the ultimate guarantor of Israel, and although the US could use significantly more 
military capabilities, an attack might backfire.1183  As much as many of the Gulf states fear 
Iran’s intentions, they would prefer a solution that is not based on military force; they fear 
Iranian retaliation and, not least, the response of their own people, if it came to war.1184  
Edelman, and others, believe a strike, ‘…might enhance popular support for the 
regime…further strengthen Iran’s determination to go nuclear, and trigger a costly 
retaliation against the [US and its allies] in the Middle East’.1185  Frank Barnaby, from the 
Oxford Research Group, views that, ‘Far from setting back Iran’s nuclear programme, a 
military attack might create the political conditions in which Iran could accelerate its nuclear 
weapons programme’.1186   
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There have been 16 attacks against nuclear facilitates since 1942, and although these 
have prevented, or even stopped, nuclear weapons programmes, it is arguable whether the 
situation in Iran can be used as an equivalent example.1187  Paradoxically, a strike against 
Iran’s nuclear weapons facilities may sway support from some countries towards Iran’s 
ambitions, or at least allow Iran to revamp its programme, unhindered by international 
agreements, or UN inspectors.1188  Shashank Joshi believes, ‘…it is important to 
understand that a preventive war against Iran in the short-term could result in a more 
aggressive Iranian nuclear posture in the longer-term…constraining the West's future 
military options’.1189  Joshi also views that although a nuclear Iran is undesirable, it is 
probably containable at an acceptable level of risk.1190  A view that is gaining credence, and 
is certainly worth considering. 
Summary 
There are numerous opinions on the best strategies towards Iran, whether they are 
containment; engagement, or military confrontation; it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
make a judgement.  It is worth considering, however, as Robert Blackwill argues, dealing 
with the complexities of Iran’s nuclear weapons programme cannot be compared with 
historical analogies, such as World War II, Korea or Vietnam.  Blackwill advocates an 
assessment process that attempts to avoid possible unintended consequences.  As an 
example, he cites the US embargo of oil to Japan in 1941, which was a major factor in 
Japan’s decision to attack Pearl Harbour.1191  It is, ultimately, Khamenei whom will decide 
whether Iran continues with its nuclear weapons programme.1192  Perhaps the Iranian’s 
themselves will pressure the regime’s leadership to temper their nuclear ambitions.1193  
Nuclear armed or not, Iran’s significance to international relations in the coming decades is 
unlikely to abate.  Iran’s aspiration to dominate the Middle East will require significant 
efforts by the international community in order to establish a workable stability in the region.  
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To do this requires a force structure offering a credible capability to deter, or to act with 
force if necessary.   
 
The means by which an alliance targets appropriate Iranian C2 and IADS nodes may well 
fall to forces positioned at distances that require the ability for airborne assets to have the 
qualities of endurance and reach, with high survivability.  These forces may be obliged to 
operate to the east of the Strait of Hormuz, or from the Western Mediterranean.  The same 
requirements for systems that can operate in the Western Pacific could be utilised against 
Iran.  The likely ability of Iran to deny access to the Arabian Gulf and viable operating 
bases will force military systems to operate from distances that require weapon systems 
with range and endurance.  Gunzinger and Dougherty believe the US should seek new air 
dominance capabilities that would be less dependent on close-in bases and AAR.  They  
recommend developing long-range bombers and carrier-based unmanned aircraft, 
observing that, ‘…forces that require very large close-in theatre footprints, are only suitable 
for operations in permissive and semi-permissive areas, or are limited to performing “niche” 
missions, may be candidates for reduced funding’.1194  Air-breathing systems capable of 
operating at range, while enduring for significant periods, will be required; these systems 
will be necessary to conduct all combat air tasks, including, ISTAR, SEAD, strike, and 
counter-air.  UCAS developed to complete all of these tasks would help to enhance the 
capabilities of those states responsible for containing the Iranian threat.  These same 
systems will have efficacy in any scenario that requires access by forces denied access to 
their normal operating bases and platforms. 
Both land- and sea-based air power will be an essential element of any conflict in the 
Arabian Gulf, or for that matter, other areas of the world requiring interdiction other than 
from a nation’s own homeland bases.  Within these scenarios, efficient generation of a 
large number of sorties will be crucial to accomplishing the required operational objectives.  
To a lesser extent, but certainly with some effect, Iran could use the same A2/AD doctrine 
as China.  In the confines of the Arabian Gulf, and in those states that would support a US 
led alliance, the mere threat of massive retaliation from Iranian weapon systems would 
probably cause pause for thought by a US alliance, at the very least.  Would the US risk a 
CSG in an Arabian Gulf conflict, even if the chances of it being successfully targeted were 
small?  In such scenarios, the critical nodes of a force’s counter-air capabilities require 
serious auditing.  
                                                          





‘The only security upon which sound military principles will rely is that you should be master 
of your own air’.1195  Churchill’s dictum remains extant.  UAS are currently assuming roles 
in air power that have traditionally been undertaken by manned aircraft, at least in 
permissive environments.  Future warfare could see UCAS, the next evolution of UAS, 
undertaking the tasks and accepting most of the risks in high threat scenarios that have 
previously been the responsibility of military aviators.  UCAS have the potential to offer a 
revolutionary new set of options, with enormous long-term payoffs to air power in terms of 
persistence, endurance, tactical deterrence and affordability.  The context in which these 
systems would be used is fundamental to their developmental path.  Although the military 
capabilities of future threats to international security should be adequately assessable, the 
intent of these nations remains less easy to predict.  An understanding of where these 
threats are likely to come from is essential; any specious assumptions will lead to 
erroneous conclusions, in turn, potentially leading to the wrong procurement decisions.  
Some countries struggle to balance their aspirations with the threat of political and 
economic disintegration; it is relationships with these countries that are likely to dictate the 
frequency and severity of future military challenges.  Future conflicts will probably range 
from peace keeping and policing roles, to minor inter-state warfare, with the potential for 
large interstate warfare.  Identification of these possible adversaries is realistically 
achievable; how they are deterred and, if required, defeated, is not so easily accomplished.  
The UK’s DCDC views the era out to 2040 to be a time of transition: ‘Out to 2040, the focus 
of global power will move away from the US and Europe towards Asia…[the US] is likely to 
remain the pre-eminent military power…in political, economic and military terms, she is 
likely to be increasingly constrained as others grow in influence and confidence’.1196  China 
is currently the World’s No 2 economic power, and is likely to overtake the US power by 
2030.1197  There is also a view that China will reach technological parity with the US, 
sometime between 2040 and 2050.1198  Both of these paradigm shifts are aligned with 
China’s desire to become a major military power, able to influence the status quo in the 
Western Pacific, forcing its hegemony in the region.  This will make China the centre of 
gravity for the foreign and military policies of the US and others in the coming decades.  
While the US does not view China as an existential threat to the US mainland, it believes 
that it poses a threat to stability in the region.  China’s developing A2/AD doctrine will force 
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states, especially the US, to mould foreign and military policies to militate against China 
gaining dominance in the Western Pacific and the South China Sea.  Not only does China 
wish to bring Taiwan into its sphere of influence, it also desires to hold sway over the 
natural resources lying beneath the South China Sea, and is also hedging against access 
being denied through the Strait of Malacca, through which most of its oil supplies transit.  
For many of the same reasons, the US, its allies and others, do not wish China to gain 
strategic dominance in this part of the world.  The Middle East, with Iran at its centre, will 
also test international relations.  Iran is also developing a strategy of A2/AD.  China and 
Iran’s A2/AD doctrine will likely force the US and its allies to operate from land bases and 
aircraft carriers at greater ranges than those currently planned.  The development of 
ASBM, such as the DF-21D, and other weapon systems capable of pinning forces down at 
ranges that make current weapon systems unviable in deterring aggression in these 
regions, requires inspired evaluation.  Air systems, inter alia, which are capable of 
operating at ranges outside of these threats, potentially unsupported, are necessary.  At 
whatever distances from bases, against an adversary with an air defence capability, control 
of the air will continue to be a fundamental prerequisite for all conventional military 
operations.  
Powered unmanned aircraft have been operating almost as long as manned powered flight.  
Along with the trend towards single-seat aircraft operations, doctrine and tactics have 
evolved to take advantage of the transformation evolution that technological advances have 
allowed manned flight to utilise.  Other than the actual act of flying an aircraft, historically, 
navigation has been deemed critical to mission success.  Navigation accuracy and the 
precision of weapon delivery, both air-to-air and air-to-ground, is, currently, the 
predominant requirement for combat air power.  The Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, and 
COIN operations in Afghanistan and post-war Iraq, have demonstrated the vital role that 
precision weapon delivery plays in modern warfare.  The primacy of navigation, and all that 
the mastery of it brings, is now firmly established as the priority of any nation wishing to 
have, and use effectively, a military force.  As technology has developed, the role of the 
navigator, and other associated airborne professions, has become less crucial.  Using the 
same rationality, the fact that pilots have traditionally been required to fly aircraft that 
facilitate achieving the requisite military task, should not be a driver for future doctrine, 
tactics, or procurement.  Technology now allows greater time, effort, and resources to be 
focused on systems that will not require a human interface in an aircraft, or potentially, 
even monitoring weapon systems.  
Existing UCAS programmes focus on detecting and destroying TST, utilising ISTAR and 
SEAD roles – the air-to-surface part of the counter-air task.  Most military forces consider 
the air-to-air component of counter-air warfare, a true TST issue, as the main pillar of air 
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power, or at least, ‘the first amongst equals’.  Significantly, there is a paucity of research 
into the air-to-air capabilities and requirements for future UCAS.  The importance that 
situational awareness plays in warfare, particularly in control of the air, is vital.  From World 
War I, through to modern air warfare, situational awareness has proven to be the key 
enabler in gaining control of the air; pilots, and other aircrew and personnel, have of course 
been vital, but would be ineffective if they did not possess situational awareness.  NEC is 
pivotal in establishing consistent and reliable battlefield situational awareness.  Along with 
the negating portion of the kill chain, this is the critical node in all the domains of 
warfare.1199  Could the same systems that give the F-22 Raptor and future F-35 JSF 
operators’ situational awareness be utilised by UCAS?  Could UCAS properly see and 
sense what an adversary is doing now, not just where it is?  Using NEC to gain situational 
awareness will allow an integrated UCAS to take the fight to an adversary, at ranges that 
are not currently obtainable by manned counter-air systems.   
The gun, and since the 1950s, AAM, have been used in aerial conflicts, however, there 
have been no known Western or Israeli air-to-air kills requiring classic air combat 
manoeuvring since the Vietnam War.1200  This covers almost 40 years of military aviation - 
a significant portion of the total history of aerial combat.  The utility of the air-to-air gun has 
to be questioned.  ‘It will never be required’ cannot be guaranteed, however, the question of 
whether it is worth the cost of developing certain weapon systems and aircraft 
manoeuvrability, requires stringent examination.   
If viewed dispassionately, there is nothing particularly difficult in conducting the air-to-air 
role, if situational awareness is adequate, and weapon systems are effective.  It is relative, 
however; viewed as a three-dimensional chess game, air combat has stressed the 
capabilities of modern air systems and aircrew.  Nonetheless, even in the most complex 
visual air-to-air engagements, there would be a finite number of possible decisions.  If the 
‘unknowns’ are ‘known’, it is essentially a case of completing a set of prescribed 
manoeuvres and decisions, that, although complex at times, should be programmable.  
Situational awareness is the key.  If only partial situational awareness exists, a logical 
pattern of actions should still be programmable.  In any case, it is arguable whether visual 
air combat, requiring highly manoeuvrable aircraft, will be required by 2040.     
Given any counter-air scenario, a human, with the correct training, being in the right frame 
of mind, and having the required skill and situational awareness, could make the correct 
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decisions.  Because most humans are affected physically when operating high-
performance aircraft in dynamic and stressful environments, assimilating information is 
extremely difficult without taking some time to do so, and potentially making the wrong 
decision, or too late; if the process was automated to a level that did not require human 
input, then the outcome would probably be fundamentally improved.  The days of fighter 
pilot versus fighter pilot in visual air combat may not be over, but they will surely continue to 
follow the trend since the 1980s.   
To some, the term ‘autonomous’ is emotive.  The author’s view is that UCAS would only 
truly be autonomous if communications links were lost, and then only in the sense that 
these systems will be operating in a highly automated mode, with no supervision by a 
human.  UCAS would use the algorithms within their pre-programmed systems, using look-
up tables that would contain all conceivable eventualities; computing processing technology 
should continue to advance, allowing systems to conduct operations to the level of a 
human, but faster and more accurately.  AI programs, such as Agent software, could be 
used to aid the decision process, but only within a defined set of rules.  Autonomous 
systems would not make random decisions without the constraints that would normally be 
placed on humans.  Data fusion of information collated through NEC, allowing the 
employment of kinetic effects, such as AAM or DEW, could be utilised on UCAS, or 
manned systems.  With a high level of automation/autonomy, and situational awareness, 
the ‘system,’ could make all the appropriate decisions on required tactics, leading to 
successful engagements.  Development of these systems should allow the appropriate 
effect to be obtained before the visual arena is entered – or at least to an extent that does 
not warrant development of close visual combat systems that require the air vehicle 
component to be highly agile. The requirement for what is currently known as a ‘knife fight 
in a telephone box’ by fighter crews, would be negated by the use of HOBS weapon 
systems with a high kill probability, whether AAM or DEW, aligned with NEC.   
The effect that political, legal and ethical issues of using UCAS might have upon decision 
makers is an important consideration.  This should not be underestimated, particularly in 
terms of politicians’ willingness to deploy such systems at little, if any, risk to their own 
military personnel.  Although ROE constraints and political necessities may initially militate 
against full autonomy, the development of AI and HMI technology should offer a level of 
integration enabling a greater degree of certainty when conducting CID and CDE, than that 
of HITL systems.  It would also allow missions to be planned and then executed using on-
board decision making – with a HOTL monitoring the system and taking action only when 
necessary, and perhaps autonomously, if this is deemed desirable.   
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The LOAC calls for the responsibility of a human to be in the loop when decisions are made 
for release of weapons.  The ‘Nuremburg Principle’ requires that someone will always be 
held accountable for an action that is taken that falls inside or outside of international law – 
that is, they are legally and morally accountable.  Is it against the LOAC if UCAS are used 
without a human at least ‘on the loop’?  If responsibility is taken within the command chain, 
at all levels of decision-making, then no laws are broken.  It could be argued that it is the 
software programmers who write the code for UCAS that are ultimately responsible.  
However, this is not the situation with extant weapon systems that are autonomous (highly 
automated).  Air-to-surface missiles, SAM, cruise missiles, and AAM, are all examples of 
weapon systems that have this capability.  Military commanders and politicians have 
satisfied themselves that the level of risk that these weapons pose in causing collateral 
damage is acceptable within the LOAC.  The same logic would apply to UCAS.  It is 
straightforward – if the legal criteria could not be met, then UCAS would probably not be 
utilised autonomously.   
It was fundamental to ensure that this thesis had merit.  The questionnaire used, 
established that the research methodology was appropriate, and that the subject warranted 
investigation.  Many of those interviewed had relevant experience in counter-air operations.  
Ninety-eight percent believed UCAS could gain control of the air by 2040.  These are pilots, 
navigators, and counter-air specialists with an understanding of all the relevant strands and 
many vagaries that the fundamentals of air-to-air combat have traditionally entailed.  It 
seems counterintuitive, but none was tempted to protect the man in the cockpit; none had 
the ‘pilots/aircrew are gods’ attitude which has prevailed in air forces around the world, ever 
since aircraft were first used as weapons of war.  Eighty-six percent of interviewees have 
no ethical concerns with the use of UCAS.  This does not mean, however, that 
consideration is not required when developing training for personnel, taking into account a 
potential lack of understanding of air power, if these personnel have not themselves been 
immersed in the philosophy of warfare, or indeed, in combat operations.  There may also 
be a risk of detachment when authorising weapon release, perhaps leading to a lack of 
emotional connectivity with the battlespace.  These aspects will require particular attention 
by military leaders.  
 
Persistence and endurance are important constituents of air power, allowing weapon and 
sensor effects capabilities to be maintained for long periods.  Autonomous air-to-air 
refuelling, potentially with unmanned tankers, together with advanced power sources will 
enhance this capability.  These technologies will take time to acquire, but should be within 
the reach of the Western defence/industrial apparatus by 2030-2040.  The physiological 
constraints faced by aircrew today are unlikely to be mitigated in the coming decades.  
Separating aircrews from their platforms is a factor in increasing range and endurance, not 
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so much in allowing more fuel to be carried, but by at least negating the requirement to 
sustain a human for periods that are considered unviable.  Similar to manned aircraft, a 
future UCAV may use stealth characteristics and defensive measures to penetrate hostile 
airspace; EA capabilities would also be a fundamental requirement.  However, although 
UCAS could deploy over great distances and with a reduced logistic chain, their operating 
tempo may stretch any manned airborne supporting systems.  If the cost of UCAS means 
that these systems are treated as HVAA, the result may be that manned fighters, 
themselves valuable airborne assets, are required to protect them, constraining these 
UCAS to operate within range of manned fighters, thereby negating any advantage that 
these systems offer.  It is important, therefore, that UCAS are capable of operating 
independently of other HVAA, with a high chance of survival; that is, UCAS should be able 
to gain and maintain control of the air.    
 
The author’s research indicates that an unmanned counter-air vehicle will need to have 
some of the characteristics of the current USAF’s F-22 Raptor – namely, EA and stealth 
technology tailored to combat X-band (fighter) radars, aligned with high-speed and height 
capabilities.  A UCAS, or any manned system for that matter, would not require being as 
manoeuvrable.  The effectors for gaining control of the air combine the C2, NEC, sensors, 
aircraft, weapon systems, personnel, and the logistics chain.  Effective ISTAR, SEAD, and 
general air-to-surface missions will require all of these current enablers, which have proven 
to be effective in most conflicts since the Vietnam War.  There is doubt, however, in the 
effectiveness of some current air-to-air enabling assets - that is, the sensors and weapons 
currently utilised.  AAM have not fulfilled their initial promise.  While statistics since 1991 
show that the kill probability of air-to-air systems have significantly improved, these have 
not developed to the extent that they offer a guarantee of winning an air-to-air battle against 
a peer adversary.  Future negation systems offering a high kill probability are required.  
When countering an adversary with numerical superiority, the quality of own weapon 
systems, aircrew training and C2/NEC are paramount.  When opposing an adversary that 
has both superiority in numbers and in weapon systems, and whose training and C2/NEC 
is adequate, then control of the air cannot be guaranteed.  Whether there will be major 
conflicts between nation-states in the coming decades can be debated.  However, at the 
very least, force structures and capabilities will be required to deter potential aggressors.   
 
The best way to fight a war is to prevent it happening.  Diplomacy, sanctions, and ultimately 
the threat of force, are all traditional tools in international relations.  Future conflicts 
between major powers may follow the same deterrence route.  Conflict may be averted if it 
is clear one side has a major strategic advantage over another.  However, the deterrence 
and escalatory policies of some states may not follow currently accepted norms.  The 
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A2/AD strategies that countries such as China and Iran are evolving will test current 
Western doctrine and strategy, and, not least, the planned manned air-breathing weapon 
systems envisaged to implement policy.  These strategies will strain the capability of 
seaborne forces to operate within current planned distances of adversary centres of gravity 
and target sets.  Land-based forces may face similar constraints.  Systems that are capable 
of operating from ranges and for periods, hitherto not required, are needed to counter these 
new emerging strategies, and that also offer a potent deterrence; as Bernard Brodie 
observed: ‘It is a truistic statement that by deterrence we mean obliging an opponent to 
consider, in an environment of great uncertainty, the probable cost to him of attacking us 
against the expected gain thereof’.1201 
 
The potential of UCAS conducting missions totally autonomously, semi-autonomously, or 
as part of a swarm, controlled or monitored by a single pilot in a fighter, or operator in a 
large aircraft, such as an AWACS, or from a stationary C2 node, should be assessable.  
This will take time and funding, with technological advances informing decisions based on a 
series of connected trials, programmes, and academic and scientific analysis.  Until novel 
systems, not currently conceived, are available, it will fall to air-breathing systems to take 
the fight to the enemy.  Ultimately, it may be possible for a large COMAO formation of 
combat and support aircraft, combining manned aircraft and UCAS, or made up entirely of 
UCAS, to operate together or autonomously.  This autonomy may permit quicker and more 
accurate decisions, enhancing the probability of survival, while achieving the desired 
mission objectives.  UCAS would use automated flight and mission management systems, 
which could also be utilised by manned aircraft.  If these management systems reach the 
capability that allows them to be trusted to an acceptable level, it is axiomatic that the HITL 
would not be required, for other than legal considerations.  Using the author’s autonomy 
levels, which are based on NASA’s FLOAAT and the DERA PACT concepts, Level-Four 
would be the normal envisaged operating mode, with a HOTL only intervening if required.  
Level-Five, giving full autonomy, would be implemented if communications links were lost, 
and the importance of the mission was deemed crucial enough to warrant the potential 
risks that this may involve.   
A radical approach is required, if current strategic doctrine remains extant, with the 
emphasis on the ‘AirSea’ concept for counter-A2/AD warfare.  Against potential adversaries 
with this strategy, current and planned weapon systems will be tested by the necessity to 
operate at extended ranges and with adequate persistence.  It is the economics and 
operational effectiveness of such systems that are likely to affect decisions on procurement 
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and capability.  Although there is understandable doubt as to their future efficacy, 
development of UCAS may reach the stage where it can be demonstrated to commanders, 
both military and political, that there are no adverse risks.  With situational awareness, 
gained through NEC/NCW, there are no technical reasons why UCAS could not carry out 
the full range of combat air tasks currently undertaken by manned aircraft.  The US is 
examining a variety of systems that may partially achieve this aim.  The US Navy’s 
UCLASS programme is an exemplar, with the Northrop Grumman X-47B UCAS-D as a 
potential system.  However, this system has not been designed to gain control of the air in 
all domains.   
This thesis has examined the advantages of extended range and endurance, and the 
potential for swifter and more efficient actions, that UCAS bring to warfare.  The utility of 
UCAS warrants full investigation, including that of gaining control of the air, in its entirety.  
There is currently a lack of synergy and clear thought on their future effectiveness, 
particularly within the UK, which requires cogent and informed input.  The findings of this 
thesis confirm that there are few reasons why UCAS should not be considered for the 
counter-air role, indeed, it is essential that this be done.  The debate appears to have 
stalled; this thesis will help take the debate forward, allowing value to be added to the 
procurement process and helping to inform future policy decisions over the manned versus 
unmanned debate.  If unable to control the air, at whatever range is necessary, all other 
military operations are drastically curtailed.  Ultimately, unless there is some other 
programme capable of achieving control of the air in a peer on peer conflict, one in which 
A2/AD doctrine is dominant, the author believes that the development of UCAS able to 
conduct this task is essential.  These systems would offer a potential revolution in the way 




Appendix A: Probability of a Kill Formula 
 
Pk Formula1202 
PH = Probability of a Hit   PF = Probability of Fuzing 
PK = Probability of a kill = PHPK/H  PES = Probability of escape 
PSSK = Probability of a single shot kill n = The ‘power’ of the number of AAM 
fired 
1 – (Pssk) n = Pes 
1 - Pes(n) = Pk Pk = 1 – (1 – Pssk)n 
Therefore, in the case of one AAM being fired with a Pssk of .85: 
Pk = 1 – (1 – .85)n  = 1 – .151 = .85 
If two AAM are fired with a Pssk of .85 
Pk = 1 – (1 – .85)2 = 1 – .152 = 1 – .022  = .978 
The following examples illustrate how AAS Pk is increased with an increase in the salvo of 
AAM fired: 
Pk of .15 
If 2 AAM are fired, which have a Pssk of .15 (Pes = .852 = .723) the Pk is (1 - .723 = .278) 
If 4 AAM are fired, which have a Pssk of .15 (Pes = .854 = .522) the Pk is (1 - .522 = .478) 
If 8 AAM are fired, which have a Pssk of .15 (Pes = .858 = .272) the Pk is (1 - .272 = .728) 
Pk of .75 
If 1 AAM is fired, which has a Pssk of .75 (Pes = .75 = .25), the Pk is (1 - .25 = .75) 
If 2 AAM are fired, which have a Pssk of .75 (Pes = .252 = 1 - .06), the Pk is (1 - .06 = .94) 
If 3 AAM are fired, which have a Pssk of .75 (Pes = .253 = 1 - .016), the Pk is (1 - .016 = .984) 
Kill Probability formula, with examples of the effects of multiple salvos of AAM 
It is emphasised that calculating AAM Pk is not exact.  Each AAM launched will meet 
slightly different conditions, because, unless all are launched at exactly the same time, and 
are subjected to exactly the same physical constraints and counter-measures, the formula 
is not exact.  However, the formula gives the best indication of likely AAM effectiveness, 
and is considered satisfactory for the purpose of AAS development.1203 
                                                          
1202 Ball, op, cit., pp.2-5. 
1203 For an explanation of the effects that height, speed, warheads, and other factors have on an AAM, 
see Hewson, op. cit., pp.23-24. 
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Appendix B: All Air-to-Air Kill Data: 1965 to Date 
ALL AIR-TO-AIR KILL DATA 
CONFLICTS Total Air-
to-Air Kills 
Gun Kills Infrared AAM 
Kills 
RF AAM Kills 
1965-1991 Gulf War 
US: 1965-68 / Vietnam1204 117 40 - (34%) 51 - (44%) 26 - (22%) 
Israel: 1967 / 6 Day War1205 60 59 – (98.3%) 1 – (1.7%) 0 
US: 1971-73 / Vietnam1206 73 7 - (9%) 34 - (47%) 32 - (44%) 
Israel: 1973 / Yom Kippur1207 
 
261 85 - (33%) 171 - (65%) 5 - (2%) 
UK: 1982 / Falkland’s War 
 
211208 21209- (9.5%) 191210 - (90.5%) 0 
Israel: 1982 / Bekaa Valley 
 
821211 8 - (9%) 62 - (76%) 12 - (15%) 
TOTAL – Pre - 1991 614 201 – (32.7%) 338 – (55%) 75 – (12.3%) 
1991 Gulf War to Date 
US: 1991 / Desert Storm1212 
 
35 2 - (5.7%) 11 - (31.4%)1213 22 - (62.9%) 
US: 1992-94/ Iraq1214 41215 0 1 - (25%) 3 - (75%) 
US: 1994 / Bosnia1216 4 0 3 - (75%) 1 - (25%) 
US / Holland: 1994 & 1999 / 
Bosnia & Kosovo1217  
6 0 0 6 - (100%) 
TOTAL – From 1991 49 2 – (4.1%)  15 – (30.6%) 32 – (65.3%) 
TOTAL 663 203 – (30.7%) 353 – (53.2%) 107 – (16.1%) 
                                                          
1204 Burton, op. cit., slide.3. 
1205 Nordeen, op. cit., pp.100-102 
1206 Project Red Baron III: Air-to-Air Encounter in Southeast Asia, Volume III: Analysis – Part 1: Tactics, 
Command & Control and Training, p.55.  In addition, one MiG-19 and one MiG-21 were induced losses, 
caused by running out of fuel, ibid. 
1207 Burton, op. cit.., slide.3. 
1208 Ethell and Price, op. cit., pp.214-215. 
1209 ibid. 
1210 Stillion and Perdue,  op. cit., PPF.27. 
1211 Grant, 'The Bekaa Valley War', p. 62. 
1212 Watts and Kearny, op. cit., Part II, p.113. 
1213 Forty-eight AIM-9Ls were launched – see Stillion and Perdue, op. cit., PPF.28. 
1214 Air Force Historical Research Agency, op. cit. 
1215 Two kills were ‘blue on blue’ (fratricide), when two USAF F-15Cs shot down two UH-60 Blackhawk 
helicopters. 
1216 Air Force Historical Research Agency, op. cit. 
1217 Stillion and Perdue, op. cit., p.25.  See also, Air Force Historical Research Agency, op. cit. 
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Appendix C: Radar Air-to-Air Missile Data: 1965 to Date 
RADAR AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES 
CONFLICTS Total 
Shots 
Total Kills PK BVR Shots BVR 
Kills 
BVR PK 
1965 – 1991 Gulf War 
US: 1965-73  Vietnam1218 918 58 .06 92 2 .02 
Israel: 1967 / 6 Days War 0 - - - - - 
Israel: 1973  Yom Kippur1219 12 5 .42 1 1 1.0 
UK: 1982 Falkland’s War1220 0 - - - - - 
Israel: 1982 Bekaa Valley1221 23 12 .52 2 1 .50 
TOTAL – Pre - 1991 953 75 .08 95 4 .04 
1991 Gulf War to Date 
US: 1991 / Gulf War1222 67  22 .33 29 16 .55 





3 1.0 2 2 1.0 





1 1.0 0 0 0 
US / Holland: 1994 & 1999 
Bosnia & Kosovo NFZ1225 
 
13  6 .46 9 4 .44 
TOTAL – From 1991 84 32 .38 40 22 .55 
TOTAL: 1965 to Date 1037 107 .10 135 26 .19 
                                                          
1218 Burton, op. cit., slides 3 and 5. 
1219 ibid., slides 3, 4 and 5. 
1220 Although Argentina’s Air Force possessed and did launch Matra-350 RF AAM at British Sea Harriers, 
no kills were achieved.  The Sea Harrier did not possess RF AAM - see Ethell and Price, op. cit., p.61. 
1221 Burton, op. cit., slides 3, 4 and 5. 
1222 Watts and Keany, op. cit.,  Also see Watts, Six Decades of Guided Munitions and Battle Networks: 
Progress and Prospects, p.43. 
1223 One kill was fratricide, with an AIM-120 employed by a US F-15C on a friendly UH-60 Blackhawk 
helicopter. 
1224 Air Force Historical Research Agency, op. cit. 
1225  Stillion and Perdue, op. cit., PPF.25.  See also, Air Force Historical Research Agency, op. cit. 
266 
 
Appendix D: 1965 to Date Air-to-Air Kills 
 
1965 to Pre-1991 Gulf War air-to-air kills  
 



























1991 Gulf War to date air-to-air Kills  
  
1991 Gulf War to date air-to-air kill 
 
While not classic air-to-air engagements, two A-10 Thunderbolt ant-tank aircraft used their 

























Appendix E: RED fighters v BLUE fighters Air-to-Air System Kill Probability 
 
Fighters BVR Air-to-Air System Pk 
1.0 0.9 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.10 
BLUE AMRAAM Fired (Total 144) 72 144 144 144 144 144 
RED PL-12 Fired (Total 720) 24 48 51 102 234 586 
BLUE Fighters killed 24 24 24 24 24 24 
RED Fighters Killed 72 72 68 34 15 6 
BLUE Fighters Survive 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RED Fighters Survive 0 0 4 38 57 66 
24 BLUE fighters verus 72 RED fighters remaining against kill probabilities 
 
 
Fighters BVR Air-to-Air System Pk 
1.0 0.9 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.10 
BLUE AMRAAM Fired (288) 72 144 154 286 288 288 
RED PL-12 Fired (720) 48 97 102 205 467 708 
BLUE Fighters killed 48 48 48 48 48 29 
RED Fighters Killed 72 72 72 67 29 11 
BLUE Fighters Survive 0 0 0 0 0 19 
RED Fighters Survive 0 0 0 5 43 61 
48 BLUE fighters verus 72 RED fighters remaining against kill probabilities 
These tables illustrates the factor that AAS Pk has on counter-air effectiveness, and the 




Appendix F: NASA’s Function-specific Level of Autonomy and Automation Tool 
(FLOAAT) 
Level Observe Orient Decide Act 










































3 Data is monitored 
both on-board and 
on the ground. 
Calculations are 
performed both 




board and on the 
ground, and the 
final decision is 
negotiated 
between them. 
The task is 
executed with both 
on-board and 
ground support.  










































The author’s five levels of autonomy are based on NASA’s FLOAT.1226 
                                                          
1226 Proud and Hart, op. cit., p. 6. 
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Interviewee military rank 
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US Military - Non Aircrew











































































Appendix H: Interviewee Responses 
 
Requirement to Conduct Visual Manoeuvring to Achieve a Kill 
 
 
BVR Engagements - Requirement to enter the visual merge to kill an adversary, as a 




WVR Engagements - Requirement to conduct air combat manoeuvring to achieve a kill, 




Requirement to use the AAG in visual air combat, as a percentage of sorties, during 











































BVR Third-Party Targeting 
 


















































UCAV and Manned Fighter Agility 
 
 




























































Will stealth be crucial? 
 
  



























































































Yes - No caveats Yes - With Caveats Don't Know No
Aircrew MOD/Aviation Analysts RAF Ground US Ground
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Northrop Grumman’s X-47 UCAS. 1227 
 
 
Artist’s impression of Dark Sword (An Jian), from a model shown at the 2006 Zukhai Air 
Show.1228 
                                                          
1227 Northrop Grumman, 'X-47B in Flight', 
http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/nucasx47b/assets/lgm_UCAS_3_0911.jpg, (accessed 11 
December 2011). 








Artist’s impression of BAE’s Taranis UCAS.1230
                                                          
1229 Brandon Hill, 'Mig Unveils Skat Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle', DAILYTECH, 
http://www.dailytech.com/MiG+Unveils+Skat+Unmanned+Combat+Air+Vehicle/article8589.htm, (accessed 
5 May 2009).  
1230 "Taranis, United Kingdom', airforce-technology.com., http://www.airforce-





Responders to Questionnaire 
 
The interviews and questionnaire responses were conducted under King’s College 
London’s Research Ethics mandate.  The interviewees were made aware of the use to 
which the interview derived material would be put, and were given the option of providing 




Air Chief Marshal Sir Simon Bryant RAF: Commander-in-Chief Air Command; Tornado F-
3/F-4 Phantom/F-14 Tomcat, Navigator– interviewed 30 March 2010 
 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton RAF: Chief of the Air Staff; Jaguar/Tornado GR-1, 
Pilot – interviewed 12 January 2010 
 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Glen Torpy RAF: Tornado GR1, Pilot; Ex-Chief of the Air Staff, 2006 -
2009 – interviewed 11 October 2011 
 
Air Marshal Christopher Nikols RAF: Tornado GR1/Jaguar, Pilot; Chief of Defence 
Intelligence – interviewed 12 September 2011 
 
Air Vice-Marshal Paul Colley RAF: Tornado F-3/F-4 Phantom, Navigator; Qualified 
Weapons Instructor, Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Concepts and Doctrine) – 
interviewed 4 March 2010 
 
Air Vice-Marshall Ross Paterson RAF: Chief Executive, Services’ Pay and Veterans’ 
Agency – interviewed 9 April 2010 
 
Major General Lawrence Wells USAF: F-16, Pilot; Commander, US 9th Air Force, Air 
Combat Command – email response, 2 December 2012. 
 
Air Commodore Richard Atkinson RAF: Tornado F-3/F-4 Phantom, Pilot; Qualified 
Weapons Instructor, Air Officer Scotland and Station Commander RAF Leuchars – 
interviewed 10 August 2009 
 
Air Commodore Gordon Moulds RAF: Tornado F-3/F-4 Phantom, Navigator; Commander 
British Forces Falkland Islands – interviewed 1 July 2009 
 
Air Commodore Richard Powell RAF: Tornado F-3/F-4 Phantom/F-14 Tomcat, Navigator; 
Qualified Weapons Instructor, Station Commander RAF Waddington – interviewed 11 
November 2009 
 
Group Captain Simon Hindemarsh RAF: Tornado F-3/F-4 Phantom, Navigator; Qualified 
Weapons Instructor, Chief of Staff, Falkland Islands – interviewed 29 May 2009 
 
Group Captain Tony Innes RAF: Tornado F-3/F-4 Phantom/Typhoon, Pilot; Qualified 
Weapons Instructor, Station Commander RAF Leeming – mail response 1 April 2010 
 
Group Captain Paul Taylor RAF: Tornado F-3/F-4 Phantom/E3-D, Navigator; MOD 
Operations Directorate – interviewed 5 November 2009 
 
Group Captain Alan Vincent RAF (Retd): Buccaneer/Tornado GR1, Navigator; Group 




Colonel Gaillard Peck USAF (Retd): Phantom/F-15 + Aggressor, Pilot; USAF Weapons 
School Instructor – email response 11 April 2010 
 
Wing Commander Jeremy Attridge RAF: Tornado F-3/F-18C/Typhoon, Pilot; Qualified 
Weapons Instructor, MOD Capability Theatre Airspace – Interviewed 20 December 
2011 
 
Wing Commander Andrew Dickens RAF: Tornado F-3, Pilot; RAF Air Warfare Centre, 
Head of Trials and Tactics – interviewed 15 May 2009 
 
Wing Commander Hugh Griffiths RAF (Retd): Tornado F-3, Navigator; Qualified Weapons 
Instructor; Director – Inzpire Ltd – mailed response 28 March 2010  
 
Wing Commander Mike Humphreys RAF (Retd): Tornado GR1/4, Navigator; UAS Business 
Development Director BAE – mail response 6 April 2010 
 
Wing Commander Richard Knight RAF: Tornado F-3, Navigator – interviewed 1 May 2009 
 
Wing Commander Mike Lumb RAF: Tornado GR1/4, Navigator; DSTL Military Adviser – 
interviewed 1 April 2010 
 
Wing Commander Justin Reuter RAF: Tornado F-3, Navigator; Qualified Weapons 
Instructor; Assistant Head MOD Capability EPA – interviewed 2 November 2010 
 
Wing Commander Chris Thirtle RAF: Tornado F-3/F-15E, Pilot; MOD Chief of the Air Staff’s 
UAS Strategy – interviewed 12 January 2010 
 
Wing Commander Mark Wakeman RAF (Retd): Tornado F-3/F-4 Phantom, Navigator; 
Qualified Weapons Instructor – interviewed 9 January 2010 
 
Wing Commander Paul Wallace RAF: Buccaneer/Tornado GR-1/4, Navigator; UCAS 
Analyst – email response 25 February 2010 
 
Squadron Leader Dr Richard Birchenall RAF: Communications Engineer and IADS 
Specialist – interviewed 14 October 2010 
 
Squadron Leader Ian Brain RAF: Tornado F-3/F-4 Phantom/Wessex, Navigator – email 
response 19 February 2010 
 
Squadron Leader Edward Burrows RAF: Tornado F-3, Pilot; Qualified Flying Instructor – 
interviewed 13 January 2010 
 
Major Charles Ware USAF: Aeronautical Engineer – interviewed 5 June 2013 
 
Squadron Leader Steven Davis RAF: Nimrod R1/2, Air Electronics Operator; IADS 
Specialist – interviewed 24 August 2010 
 
Squadron Leader Jonny Farrow RAF: Tornado F-3, Navigator; Qualified Weapons 
Instructor – email response 24 February 2010 
 
Squadron Leader Sue Freeman RAF: Tornado F-3, Pilot; Qualified Flying Instructor – 
interviewed 13 June 2009 
 
Squadron Leader Adam Grindley RAF: Buccaneer/Tornado GR1/4, Navigator; DSTL 




Squadron Leader Fredrick Grundy RAF (Retd): Tornado F-3/F-4 Phantom, Pilot; Qualified 
Weapons Instructor – interviewed 25 October 2009 
 
Squadron Leader Martin Higgins RAF: Tornado F-3, Pilot; Qualified Flying Instructor – 17 
June 2009 
 
Squadron Leader Steven Kilvington RAF: Tornado F-3, Navigator; Qualified Weapons 
Instructor – interviewed 3 February 2010 
 
Squadron Leader Andrew Miller RAF: Tornado F-3, Navigator; Qualified Weapons 
Instructor – interviewed 25 April 2009 
 
Squadron Leader Matthew Nicolas RAF: Tornado F-3, Navigator, Qualified Weapons 
Instructor – interviewed 22 October 2009 
 
Squadron Leader Kenneth Reeves RAF: Tornado F-3/F-4 Phantom, Navigator; Qualified 
Weapons Instructor – interviewed 11 August 2009 
 
Squadron Leader David Richards RAF: Tornado F-3/GR-4, Navigator – interviewed 3 
December 2009 
 
Squadron Leader David Smith RAF: Battlespace Manager – interviewed 20 January 2010 
 
Flight Lieutenant Mike Hearnshaw RAF: Tornado F-3, Pilot – interviewed 27 April 2009 
 
Flight Lieutenant James Hunkin RAF: Tornado F-3, Pilot – interviewed 25 April 2009 
 
Flight Lieutenant Russell Jones RAF (Retd): Tornado F-3/F-4 Phantom, Pilot – interviewed 
10 April 2010  
 
Flight Lieutenant Roy MacIntyre RAF: Tornado F-3/F-4 Phantom, Pilot – Qualified 
Weapons Instructor – email 19 April 2009 
 
Flight Lieutenant Gerard McCormick RAF: Tornado F-3, Navigator – interviewed 28 April 
2009 
 
Flight Lieutenant Andrew Shaw RAF: Tornado F-3/F-18 Pilot – interviewed 29 April 2009 
 
Flight Lieutenant Jonathan Skinner RAF: Tornado F-3/Typhoon, Pilot – mail response 24 
March 2010 
 
Flight Lieutenant Jonathan Smith RAF: Tornado F-3/F-22 Raptor, Pilot; Qualified Weapons 
Instructor – interviewed 3 February 2010 
 
Flight Lieutenant Jennifer Trafford: Tornado F-3, Navigator – mailed response 22 March 
2010 
 






David Bromley: MOD UAS Aviation Analyst – interviewed 15 June 2011 
 




Professor Tony Gillespie: UCL Professor/DSTL Scientist – Autonomy and Artificial 
Intelligence – email response 1 April 2010 
 
John Keirl: DSTL Scientist; UAS/UCAS Lead – interviewed 27 November 2009 
 
Harjit Lota: DSTL Scientist; UAS and Weapons Specialist – interviewed 3 May 2010 
 
Dr Simon Lovell: DSTL Scientist, Future Air Systems – interviewed 4 March 2010 
 
Keith Payne; Aviation Engineer – interviewed 16 December 2011 
 





Alan Bell: Engineer – interviewed 3 April 2010 
 
Callum Murray: Retired Royal Marine Officer/Businessman – interviewed 8 March 2010 
 
Polly Murray: Bespoke Furniture Designer – interviewed 8 March 2010 
 
Stephen Oxnard: University Student – interviewed 8 April 2010 
 
Angus Paterson: Student – interviewed 9 April 2010 
 
Myles Paterson: University Student – interviewed 9 April 2010 
 
Lynne Todd: Certified Engineer and Materials Scientist – interviewed 3 April 2010 
 
Marie Young: Retired Financial Consultant – interviewed 6 March 2010 
 
Raymond Young: Retired Engineer – interviewed 6 March 2010 
 
Oliver Waghorn: Special Adviser to the Secretary of State of Defence – interviewed 24 
June 2011 
 
Joanne Wills: Business Development Consultant – interviewed 31 January 2010 
 
 
Chatham House Rule 
 
 
Five interviewees chose to respond under the Chatham House Rule, including an RAF 
pilot, an ex-Senior Responsible Officer for the MOD’s Information and Superiority 
capabilities, an aviation consultant and a USAF army officer specialising in counter-air 
systems. 
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